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Introduction 
 
1 Introduction: industrial districts and the outside world.  
 
While it has been commonly held that both industrialisation and the emergence of modern 
capitalism favoured the rise of big business, regionally entrenched and decentralised modes of 
production have nonetheless persisted. The concept of the industrial district, which describes 
the spatial concentration of small to medium-sized firms and highly specialised businesses in 
a single sector, is one of the most well-known examples of such an alternative to big business 
and corporate development. The robustness of districts has been traditionally explained by a 
number of advantages that were generated through the proximity of firms: a predisposition 
towards cooperation, inter-firm networks, and the sharing of innovations or technological 
modifications. These factors mitigate the costs of decentralisation. A large number of 
historical studies have used the concept of the industrial district in order to revive ‘alternative’ 
worlds of industrialisation, to nuance the spread of corporate development, and to modify 
teleological accounts of modern capitalism. Most importantly, the emphasis on geographically 
defined industrial districts has revealed regional dynamism and economic variety beneath the 
level of national statistics.  
 
Many bookshelves can be filled with examinations of the industrial district and regional 
economics. Why is another study about the industrial district necessary? This thesis is based 
on the observation that historical research into the phenomenon of industrial districts suffers 
from a remarkable lacuna: the link between the industrial district and the ‘outside world’ 
remains largely understudied. Historical studies have predominantly portrayed industrial 
districts as self-contained entities.
1
 This tunnel vision stands in sharp contrast to the recent 
interest in contemporary globalisation and its impact upon regional economic entities. While 
many predicted the final decline of such alternative structures because of imminent global 
competition, this did not happen. Moreover, despite threats from globalisation, the idea that 
regions (rather than nation-states) are the dynamic units of economic development is 
surfacing ever more strongly.
2
 Currently the capacity to adapt to global competition is seen as 
constitutive of modern industrial districts or, for that matter, of regional economies in general. 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts and Regional Clusters,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, ed. 
Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 234. 
2
 Celia Applegate, “A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern 
Times,” Peace Research Abstracts 38, no. 3 (2001). 
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However, industrial districts’ ability to engage in global networks is anything but a recent 
phenomenon. Therefore, this thesis examines historical patterns of the adaptation of the 
industrial district to global competition and the framework in which industrial districts 
engaged in patterns of internationalisation. 
 
The choice to study one such industrial district, the Leipzig fur industry concentrated in the 
region of Saxony, is almost self-evident. Saxony historically harboured many industrial 
districts and sectors that were governed by moderate-sized and highly specialised businesses. 
Saxon businesses were, on average, much smaller than in the Reich and the family firm was 
an important institution. Equally, the region’s economy was surprisingly well oriented 
towards the world market. The small businesses in Saxony typically produced consumer 
goods and depended upon foreign imports and the export of finished products. However, the 
capacity of firms in the region to engage in global networks remains largely uninvestigated. 
How did industrial districts and decentralised business structures manage being part of an 
economy oriented towards the world market?  
 
The fur industry concentrated in and around Leipzig formed an archetypal Saxon industrial 
district. The district’s many small firms were specialised in an aspect of the production 
process, ranging from trade (wholesalers and brokers) to manufacture (dressing and dyeing). 
Moreover, the fur industry was arguably part of one of the most well integrated historical 
world markets. Furs connected Leipzig to hunters in subarctic frontiers and remote woodlands 
from whence this valuable commodity travelled via intermediaries to the city. In Leipzig, furs 
were manufactured and sold not only in Germany but also throughout Western Europe and 
across the Atlantic. The industrial district was therefore highly open (and vulnerable) to 
exogenous developments. Modifications to hunting laws, the exhaustion of resources, 
competition with other centres, and changing patterns of consumption in both Europe and 
America were felt in the district. Nevertheless, the many specialised small fur firms in Leipzig 
managed to survive for decades. These firms somehow had the capacity to adapt to global 
competition.  
 
This introduction will set out the framework for my research on the industrial district in 
Leipzig. It will begin by exploring the concept of the industrial district and more precisely 
defining the research deficit in the historical literature. Additionally, I will explain the absence 
of research on industrial districts and the outside world through a discussion of the 
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characteristics of the Saxon economy that will focus on its openness to the world market and 
its decentralised production system. After defining the research deficit in both theoretical and 
empirical terms, I will explore concepts that make the study of the external dimensions of the 
industrial district possible. I will thereby suggest a research framework based on including 
commodity chain analysis within industrial district theory.  
 
1.1 Industrial districts as a capitalist and industrial alternative. 
 
1.1.1 The conceptual history of the industrial district (1922 – present).  
 
The economist Alfred Marshall was one of the first to wonder about the persistence of small 
firms in a world where the growth of big business seemed unstoppable. In 1922, he described 
the cost-saving benefits for firms located near external factors such as available labour, 
related industries, relevant knowledge, and exploitable resources. Marshall argued that these 
factors prevented the growth of “internal economies,” by which he meant the growth of a 
firm. In other words, he asserted that large-scale production could also be achieved by groups 
of small-sized and specialised firms that were concentrated in a given geographical area.
3
 A 
high number of specialised firms contributed to various stages of the production process and 
thereby prevented its concentration in a single corporate firm. Marshall called these localised 
production structures ‘the industrial district.’4  
 
The concept of the Marshallian industrial district (and by extension the link between location 
and firm behaviour) remained rather obscure for several decades because of the success of 
Chandlerian-inspired management literature. It re-appeared much later in post-war Italian 
economic sociology, where scholars put industrial districts at the centre of a post-Fordist 
economic growth model (the so-called ‘third Italy.’)5 In the 1980s, Giacomo Becattini and 
others claimed that the post-war Italian economy saw the emergence of 60 to 100 industrial 
                                                 
3
 Giacomo Becattini, “Italian Industrial Districts: Problems and Perspectives,” International Studies of 
Management & Organization 21, (no. 1 1991): 84. 
4
 Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi, and Lisa De Propris, “Critical Nodes and Contemporary Reflections on 
Industrial Districts: An Introduction,” in A Handbook of Industrial Districts, ed. Giacomo Becattini, Marco 
Bellandi, and Lisa De Propris (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2009), xvi. 
5
 Bjorn T Asheim, “Industrial Districts: The Contributions of Marshall and Beyond,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Economic Geography, ed. Gordon L Clark, Maryann P Feldman, and Meric S Gertler (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 419 
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districts, which became leading economic entities in a period when major Italian firms were 
declining.
6
 This new research trend introduced a few novel elements into industrial district 
theory, such as the importance of artisans and a shared “attitude” to work.7 Based on the 
Italian district, this research formed the canonical neo-Marshallian definition of the industrial 
district, which stressed the importance of external economies arising from the concentration 
of small to medium-sized business with characteristics derived specifically from Italian cases, 
such as the presence of artisans and an ‘industrial culture’ that gave a common identity to 
members of the district.
8
 
 
Researchers who were dissatisfied with the conflation of the industrial district and the Italian 
context presented several new cases outside Italy. This expanded the research field and led to 
the development of new concepts to describe variations of business concentration, such as 
decentralised production systems and non-industrial districts. The variety exhibited in 
different regional case studies and dissatisfaction with the Italian-based neo-Marshallian 
research obviously put the consensus regarding the definition of the concept under pressure. I 
adhere to the definition advanced by Jonathan Zeitlin, who has returned elasticity to the 
notion and ousted some of the highly specific and context-bound elements of the concept. 
Zeitlin defined an industrial district as a “geographically localized productive system based on 
an extended division of labor between small and medium-sized firms specialized in distinct 
phases or complementary activities within a common industrial sector.”9 Importantly, Zeitlin 
stresses that essential elements are variable (the degree of localization, the extent of inter-firm 
networks etc.), which means that diversity is inherent to his definition of the concept. This is 
an important point since the neo-Marshallian definition is quite rigorous in its claims that 
socio-cultural factors are the bedrock of the industrial district.  
 
At first, Zeitlin’s definition of the industrial district does not seem to differ much from 
another popular concept that also deals with the phenomenon of business concentration, the 
                                                 
6
 Becattini, “Italian Industrial Districts,” 83. 
7
 Jean-Claude Daumas, “Dans la ‘boîte noire’ des districts industriels,” in Les territoires de l’industrie en 
Europe,1750-2000: entreprises, régulations et trajectoires : actes du colloque international de Besançon, 27, 28 
et 29 octobre 2004, ed. Jean-Claude Daumas, Pierre Lamard, and Laurent Tissot (Presses Univ. Franche-Comté, 
2007), 15. 
8
 Jean-Claude Daumas, “Territoire et Dynamique Industrielle: Des Configurations Historiquements Différenciées 
(France, XIXe - XXe Siècles),” in Les banques et les mutations des enterprises. Le cas de Lille-Roubaix-
Tourcoing aux XIXe et XXe siècles, ed. Hubert Bonin and Jean-François Eck (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Septentrion, 
2012), 76. 
9
 Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts and Regional Clusters,” 222. 
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‘cluster.’ Michael Porter has defined clusters as “a geographically proximate group of 
interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
commonalities and complementarities.”10 Although both deal with competitive advantages 
derived from location and the proximity of similar firms or supporting industries, the ‘cluster’ 
encompasses a wider economic structure and stresses externalities that are much broader in 
scope to those typically considered in industrial district theory. Moreover, Porter’s cluster 
concept also allows for the presence of larger businesses that centralise production. The size 
distribution of the firm and decentralisation clearly differentiate both concepts. Therefore, 
industrial districts can be seen as a specific type of cluster.
11
  
 
In addition, the industrial district stresses patterns of local cooperation whereas the cluster 
concept argues that cooperation is a possibility rather than a necessity.
12
 Social relations 
actively direct economic behaviour and include tacit agreements, a sense of local belonging, 
the coordination of actions, joint investment, and cooperation.
13
 Mechanisms for collective 
action can be steered from above by the government but are always based on social relations 
and institutions, such as historically developed group trust. Thus, an important feature of the 
industrial district is that firms do not simply profit from ‘passive location’ like they do in a 
cluster economy. Unlike cluster theory, industrial district theory is a research trend that shares 
basic assumptions with economic sociology.
14
 Economic sociologists like Mark Granovetter 
have claimed that economic action is “embedded in social relations.”15 Equally, industrial 
district theory evinces a type of economic behaviour that is embedded in geographically 
defined social boundaries.  
 
                                                 
10
 Michael E Porter, “Locations, Clusters, and Company Strategy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Geography, ed. Gordon L Clark, Maryann P Feldman, and Meric S Gertler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 254. 
11
 Michael Porter and Christian Ketels, “Clusters and Industrial Districts. Common Roots, Different 
Perspectives.,” in A Handbook of Industrial Districts, ed. Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi, and Lisa De 
Propris (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2009), 181. “Clusters are a much broader concept, 
encompassing many possible configuration of companies and institutions. Clusters encompass the configuration 
found in IDs, so that IDs are one type of a cluster.” 
12
 Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts and Regional Clusters,” 226. However, the authors stress that cooperation is not a 
‘natural feature’ of the ID and that mechanisms to resolve conflicts and institutions to foster cooperation are 
consciously created. 
13
 Michael P Todaro and Stephen C Smith, Economic Development (Boston, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 2012), 
321. 
14
 Richard Swedberg, Principles of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), xi. 
15
 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” American 
Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (November 1, 1985): 483. 
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1.1.2 Contributions and shortcomings of the ID concept 
 
Taking this brief account of the industrial district concept’s trajectory into consideration, it is 
now time to take a closer look at its contributions to historical research. Firstly, industrial 
districts have also been used to point to decentralised forms of production, like the varieties of 
capitalism that manifest in regional spaces. In this sense, the discussion about industrial 
districts is often merged with the debate surrounding the importance of economic regions.
16
 
Franscesca Carnevali stated that this extensive literature has the common goal of “seeking to 
provide an alternative tale of industrialisation than that found in the broad sweep of national 
statistics.”17 She argued that regionalised and localised economic structures often contributed 
to national economic growth in ways that are often overlooked in aggregate studies. As such, 
the contribution of the industrial district lies in the scale of analysis used. The discovery of 
industrial districts and regionalised economic structures has led to their deployment in a 
variety of national economic contexts, most recently so in France. For instance, the city of 
Toulouse during the nineteenth century has been described as a centre of flexible and 
decentralised production where the many dynamic workshops “put into practice new 
techniques that were modest but well implemented.”18 Pierre Judet described the Arve valley, 
a region that was historically characterised by decentralised production, as an industrial 
district in the metal production sector.
19
  
 
Across the Atlantic, Philip Scranton pointed to the importance of “specialty” production in the 
US’ second industrial revolution. He looked at manufacturing units that focused on the 
production of custom-made nonstandard goods. The involvement of firms in speciality 
production had important consequences for the spatial dynamics of American business. 
Scranton argued that there was “no better location [for specialty production] than an urban 
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industrial district.”20 With regard to industrialisation in England, John Wilson and Andrew 
Popp have established the importance of industrial districts and business clusters in processes 
of industrialisation and economic growth by assembling a variety of case studies ranging from 
the Lancashire textile industry to the Manchester industrial district. They also examined links 
between local manufacturing and banking in West Yorkshire. In doing so, they illustrated that 
industrialisation in Britain was a highly regionalised affair.  
 
Secondly, the industrial district concept has been used to illustrate the continued persistence 
of small business and the alternative forms of production associated with them, despite 
corporate development and the expansion of mass production. The work of Charles Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin is highly prominent in this research field. They have argued that moderate-
sized firms and specialised business communities were often very innovative when it came to 
the alteration of production processes or in the development and exploitation of new 
technologies.
21
 They called their methodology the “historical alternative approach.” Its point 
of departure is “the rejection of the narrow track models of industrialisation and economic 
development.”22 Sabel and Zeitlin argued that mechanisation and industrialisation occurred 
much more incrementally than is commonly assumed and that business entities like industrial 
districts were often creative in finding hybrid forms of production.
23
 Geographical clustering 
and collective action was key in developing flexible methods of industrial production.
24
 
Wilson and Popp also situated the success of the British industrial district in its capacity to 
adopt incremental changes: “the major force in shaping all major English industrial clusters 
was the progressive elaboration of their technological bases and capabilities.”25 Due to this 
extensive literature, the view that industrial districts determined regionalised economic 
growth and that they formed alternatives to the realms of big business and mass production is 
now widely accepted.  
 
                                                 
20
 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 18–19. 
21
 Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and 
Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization,” Past & Present 108, no. 1 (August 1, 1985): 143–144. 
22
 Zeitlin, Jonathan, “The Historical Alternatives Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 121. 
23
 Charles F Sabel, Jonathan Zeitlin, World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western 
Industrialization ( Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31. 
24
 Andrew Popp and John Wilson, “Districts, Networks and Clusters in England: An Introduction,” in Industrial 
Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, ed. John Wilson and Andrew Popp 
(Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 15. 
25
 Andrew Popp and John Wilson, “Conclusion,” in Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks in 
England, 1750-1970, ed. John Wilson and Andrew Popp (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 273. 
Introduction 
 
However, this thesis is devoted to an entirely different dimension of industrial districts. Whilst 
historical research on the industrial district has affected mainstream industrialisation 
historiography and challenged “the narrow paths of economic history,” a considerable caesura 
continues to exist. Overwhelmingly, industrial districts have been studied as closed internal 
circuits, supposedly based on local vitality alone and propelled solely by internal dynamism. 
To put it another way, the historical research on industrial district suffers from tunnel vision. 
Jonathan Zeitlin noted that “the self-contained character of the districts has been overstated 
even for earlier periods” and acknowledged that a research deficit exists in regards to “the 
district and the wider world.” He added that “indeed it would (...) no doubt prove illuminating 
to investigate more closely (...) local firms’ own attempts at internationalisation.”26 In 
particular, transborder activities, the impact of globalisation and de-globalisation, and, more 
generally, the reactions and strategies triggered by these macroeconomic developments have 
been ignored. In France, where the history of industrial districts recently attracted much 
scholarly attention, historians largely came to the same conclusion. Jean-Claude Daumas 
suggested that there was a similar deficit “in connecting the local dynamics of the district to 
the global context.”27 He stated that it would be better to cease studying districts in terms of 
industrialisation so as to “confront the history of the district with challenges coming from the 
outside,” by which he meant external market forces and global competition.28 Patrick 
Fridenson noted that it is necessary “to get the ID out of the enclave” and “to question the 
relationship between the interior and the exterior dimension of the industrial district.”29  
 
In contrast, the relationship between internationalisation and the dynamics of contemporary 
industrial districts constitutes a growing body of literature. Becattini noted that “the nature, 
intensity and scale of the increasingly global networks that IDs have to engage with for 
knowledge, goods/services and labour exchanges (...) underlies their capacity to reproduce 
themselves.”30 In the light of contemporary economic globalisation, some have suggested the 
existence of a paradox: the local clustering of firms continues to be a defining feature of the 
modern world economy despite the spread of commercial activity due to economic 
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globalisation.
31
 Others have stressed that contemporary industrial districts can survive 
precisely by engaging in international activities. Such analysts warn about “over-
embeddedness” or the danger of being “locked in.” In order to survive global competition, 
local production systems need “to tap into external markets and engage in translocal 
interaction.”32  
 
Historical studies dealing with industrial districts have not neglected the bigger picture or the 
international economic dimension altogether. For instance, in their account of industrial 
districts in England, Popp and Wilson acknowledged that the wider macro-economic context 
also had an impact.
33
 However, systematic analyses of industrial districts adjusting to macro-
economic developments like globalisation or district firms’ participation in processes of 
internationalisation remain largely absent from historical research. Such an approach is 
additionally justified because of the bias of the aforementioned economists, sociologists, and 
geographers in regards to the contemporary “process of economic globalisation.” As it is 
assumed that globalisation constitutes an unprecedented phenomenon, the historical 
dimension remains mostly missing from the debate. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that 
similar, if less intensive, processes of global entanglement preceded contemporary 
globalisation. As O’Rourke and Williamson argued, few would dispute the fact that “the 
world-market was in 1913 extremely well integrated.”34 Even if we are willing to accept the 
uniqueness of contemporary globalisation or the variations in the pace and volatility of 
globalisation in different epochs, industrial districts were never entirely self-sustaining 
entities. In other words, there is no reason to reject the premise that transborder activities and 
connections to the outside world have always been an integral dimension of industrial 
districts. Decentralised economic structures and small businesses have continued to exist not 
only when industrialisation and mass production transformed the economy but also whilst 
they endured dramatic shifts in the world market and suffered from exogenous shocks.  
 
The lack of interest in the nexus between the industrial district and the outside world is quite 
surprising given that the role of businesses in worldwide economic integration today forms a 
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growing research field. Geoffrey Jones in particular has called for a more systematic 
understanding of businesses as agents in shaping the globalised world economy since 1850. 
Jones noted that “firms drove globalisation by creating trade flows, constructing marketing 
channels, building infrastructure and creating markets.”35 In other words, the international 
activities of businesses increased “the mobilization of information, knowledge, technology as 
well as capital across boundaries.”36 The obvious problem, however, is that such research 
tends to focus on the actions of big business in the form of multinational corporations.
37
 
Without denying that the spread of multinational enterprises qualitatively changed the 
structure of the world economy, the attempts of smaller firms at internationalisation both 
existed and contributed extensively to processes of international economic entanglement.
38
 In 
addition, the multinational enterprise does not own the monopoly on transborder business 
activity. There is thus no reason to assume that small district firms remained on the sideline.  
 
I believe that this statement will be clarified by introducing the case study of the Leipzig fur 
industry when considered as part of the open Saxon economy. The Saxon economy is 
particularly well suited to illustrate the lack of research on connections between industrial 
districts and the outside world. Most of its industries harboured characteristics that correspond 
to those of decentralised production systems, as is evinced by the high number of small to 
medium-sized businesses and highly specialised enterprises. Simultaneously, the economy of 
the region was strongly oriented to the world market. A description of Saxony’s economic 
landscape will exemplify the lacuna in the research regarding industrial districts and the 
outside world in a more concrete fashion. 
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1.2 From theory to practice: Saxony and the world.  
 
1.2.1 Saxony and regional exceptionalism 
 
Anyone who studies German history will acknowledge that the region of Saxony is an almost 
inevitable example for those who point to regional developments that ran counter to social, 
economic, and political developments on the national level.
39
 Many socio-economic 
developments made Saxony unique. First of all, Saxony was the most densely populated 
territory in Germany. The population increased from 1,178,802 inhabitants in 1815 to 
2,556,244 in 1871. Secondly, Saxony was already an industrialised territory with the majority 
of the population working in industry or craft manufacture. Saxony was thus one of the first 
regions to industrialise, in contrast to Germany’s belated industrialisation.40 Kiesewetter 
argued that Saxony industrialised relatively early because it became dependent upon 
agricultural imports after the loss of territory to Prussia as a consequence of the Napoleonic 
wars.
41
 Others have stressed that early industrialisation was related to what could be called 
forms of proto-industrialisation, based on dexterous artisans or labourers working in Saxon 
towns.
42
  
 
However, in his seminal book Industrial Constructions, Gary Herrigel was one of the first to 
place emphasis on business structure rather than early industrialisation to define Saxony as an 
exceptional regional economy in Germany. Herrigel claimed that there were many vibrant 
worlds of moderate-sized business in Germany when mass production was increasingly 
becoming the norm. The persistence of such business structures was predominantly regionally 
clustered. Herrigel characterised these regions of Germany as “decentralized industrial 
orders,” which he described as being “composed of multitudes of highly specialised small- 
and medium sized producers and a host of extra-firm supporting institutions. Together, these 
actors have created (and in part were created by) a system of governance mechanisms that 
stimulate innovation, socialize risk, and foster adjustment, at both local and national levels, in 
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ways that do not resemble the governing principles of either markets or hierarchies.”43 
Herrigel advances a definition of the decentralised production order redolent of the industrial 
district. He portrayed the kingdom of Saxony as a “primary location of this pattern of 
productive organisation.”44 
 
Herrigel rightly pointed to the fact that the firms in Saxony were on average much smaller in 
terms of the number of employees than in the Reich. Certainly, Saxony had many larger firms 
with over 50 employees (13.2% of the German national total). Nevertheless, these large firms 
employed only around 11.7% of the labour force. Conversely, middle-sized firms (with 
between 6 and 50 workers) “were present in percentages much above the Reich average.”45 
Indeed, not only was the average firm much smaller but also the industry of Saxony was 
remarkably diversified, possessing both heavy and light industry. The decentralised business 
structure encompassed many sectors domiciled in the region. Family-owned small businesses 
produced textiles, instruments, brushes, textiles, furs, books, toys, and garments, but the 
model also encompassed heavy industries like machine construction.
46
 Unsurprisingly, the 
structure of the economy had spatial consequences. Whereas this decentralised form of 
production was to be found in sectors across the entire region, many of the entrepreneurs 
decided to settle in urban industrial districts. The book-printing industry and the fur industry 
in Leipzig are the most well known examples of industrial districts in Saxony.
47
 The fur 
industry in Leipzig is proposed here as a case study of an industrial district that typified 
Saxony as an exceptional region. The fur industry not only typifies the Saxon economy from 
an organisational point of view, it also evinces the second precondition necessary for our 
research, namely openness to the world market.  
 
Indeed, the fact that Saxony was strongly oriented towards the outside world added an extra 
dimension to its regional particularism. The Saxon economy was mainly composed of 
“consumer goods industries (...) that basically imported raw materials from abroad and 
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exported manufactured goods to other regions in Germany and the whole world.”48 Werner 
Bramke wrote that “industries based on consumer goods offered great opportunities on the 
world market” and claimed that “Saxony remained the number one German export region 
until the eve of the Second World War.”49 Many world-famous products, from Rudolf Sack’s 
universal plough to the coffee filter, were launched from businesses domiciled in the triangle 
between Leipzig, Dresden, and Chemnitz.
50
 Industrial districts in Saxony, the fur industry 
foremost among them, were international players. In terms of migration and mobility, 
openness applied as well. At the end of the nineteenth century, the region was a popular 
destination for German migrants as well as for international immigrants. Between 1871 and 
1900, the regional migration surplus amounted to 229,880 persons.
51
 
 
Remarkably, internationalisation occurred not despite the omnipresence of small firms but 
apparently because of it: “the Saxon entrepreneur was typically an owner or a partner in a 
textile, machine constructing, or any other small export-oriented manufacturing company that 
was not very large.”52 However, the openness of the decentralised production order had a 
downside too: arguably, crises raged more intensively and had a deep impact upon economic 
stability.
53
 Due to Saxony’s dependence on world trade, the region was often labelled with the 
rather unflattering description, “the storm centre of the trade cycle” (Wetterwinkel der 
Konjunktur).
54
 Indeed, the negative consequences of economic crises and the First World War 
affected Saxony’s consumer and world market oriented economy much more deeply than it 
did other German regions.
55
  
 
The lacuna concerning the industrial district and the outside world is thus replicated here in 
the description of the Saxon economy. Saxony was characterised as a decentralised mode of 
production but it was by no means locked in. Indeed, it seems that the many moderate-sized 
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firms not only formed alternative worlds to corporate development and mass production but 
also gave the Saxon economy the status of the most internationally oriented region of the 
Reich. Nonetheless, the historical structure of the Saxon economy in relation to its openness 
remains surprisingly understudied. It is precisely the interplay between decentralised 
production and the region’s status as the storm centre of the trade cycle that will be 
questioned in this thesis. Why was one of the most decentralised regions (from a business 
point of view) also a leading actor on the world market? This main question can be split in 
two main subquestions. Firstly, how did firms in the region participate in processes of 
internationalisation? Secondly, how did the vibrant communities of small businesses persist 
despite being part of the “storm centre of the trade cycle”? In other words, I question how 
businesses in structures like the industrial district dealt with exogenous pressures.  
 
In the questions set out above, regional decentralisation and world market orientation gives 
rise to an inituitive assumption of incompatibility. However, this assumption might be the 
wrong way of looking at the problem. As suggested above, the decentralised business 
structure was perhaps not inimical to an orientation to the world market. Would it not make 
sense to ask the question in another way: how did the integration of the region in the global 
economy shape business structures in Saxony? Given that industries depended upon import 
and export trade, it makes sense to claim that firms in Saxony were proficient organisers of 
transborder trade. So why should the regional decentralised business structure not dovetail 
with its relative openness? Reversing the question means we see how district firms organised 
and constructed governance mechanisms in order to deal with being part of an open economy. 
In other words, the hypothesis is that linkages between the industrial district and the outside 
world have to be studied in the very characteristics of the industrial district itself. To put it 
differently, the external economic context is not external per se but constitutes one of the 
variables that determined processes and features typical of a district.  
 
Indeed, the integration of the industrial district in the wider context entails a different reading 
of firm behaviour in local networks and collective actions, like patterns of local collaboration, 
appropriation of new technologies, and the sharing of innovations. In what ways could these 
aspects be advantageous in an open economy, if indeed they were? There are certain 
indications that support my hypothesis. Michael Schäfer, one of the experts on Saxon 
economic history, argued that the strong family ties woven into the management of the 
smaller Saxon business were decisive in the willingness to protect the firm in times of crisis. 
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Traditionally, such ties are seen as a handicap to organisational development.
56
 In addition, 
Stephen Gross has stressed the importance of regional associations and umbrella institutions 
for small business operating in an international context: “small firms facing challenges abroad 
and at home (...) turned to local umbrella institutions (the Leipzig Trade Fairs) that 
coordinated the interest of firms within a given sector or region.”57 Indeed, this is part of the 
hypothesis that I will employ here: several local coordination mechanisms and institutions, 
which account for the industrial districts’ productive competitiveness, also gave district firms 
the ability to deal with challenges abroad and to participate in processes of 
internationalisation. I claim that this also encompassed other elements of the industrial 
district, like sharing and local collaboration.  
 
Having established this claim, it is necessary to establish a framework in order to examine 
collaboration at the local level (i.e. the industrial district) in interaction with the global level. 
As mentioned above, industrial district literature offers no framework to study the linkages 
between the industrial district and the outside world. In the next section, I will construct a 
framework by placing commodity chain analysis into the theory of industrial districts. In 
order to synthesise notions of commodity chain analysis with industrial district theory, it will 
be necessary to examine more closely a few concepts employed in the former theory. While 
both traditions utilise a network-oriented view on economic organisation, the synchronisation 
of both concepts is not a straightforward task.  
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1.3 Squaring the circle: Linking collective action into a commodity centred 
perspective.  
 
1.3.1 The industrial district in the commodity chain. 
 
One problem in creating a framework that enables me to study the industrial district and the 
outside world is that external relations in industrial district theory remain relatively under-
theorised. While industrial district theory takes a Granovetterian approach to economic 
embeddedness as a place-bound phenomenon, it has little to say about external relations, 
global networks, and the overarching market in which the local system is embedded. Since 
industrial districts are usually formed at the sectoral level (in our case the fur trade), it makes 
sense to suggest the commodity chain as the appropriate scale for examining the external 
relationships of the industrial district. Combining industrial district theory with a global 
network approach such as the commodity chain is not a straightforward enterprise, largely 
because industrial districts are geographically ‘locked-in.’ Nonetheless, an attempt will be 
made to join commodity chain analysis to industrial district theory by proposing that the 
former be used as a conceptual tool.  
 
Before advancing this proposal, let us start with exploring the fundamentals of commodity 
chain theory. There are three main concepts that apply the ‘chain’ metaphor to the 
organisation of global production. All of them are concerned with the organisational dynamics 
of international trade. Wallerstein and Hopkins first coined the concept of the “commodity 
chain” and defined it as “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity.”58 The term ‘commodity chain’ was applied within a framework of 
world-system analysis, which structured the world economy in the terms of core and 
periphery. In 1994, Gereffi constructed a nuanced, expanded, and more ‘workable’ version of 
Wallerstein’s commodity chain. Gereffi defined global commodity chains (GCC) as “inter-
organisational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, 
enterprises, and states to one another within the world economy (...) these networks are 
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situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social 
embeddedness of economic organisation.”59  
 
The more nuanced global commodity chain allows us to analyse differences in access to 
markets and resources by making a distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven 
chains. In the latter, large trading companies play a controlling role while in the former, such 
a part is assigned to large manufacturing corporations.
60
 Although Gereffi acknowledges the 
importance of many social contexts in the chain, in practice the GCC focussed on 
contemporary large firms to set the terms of trade in a chain. A third variant are the so-called 
global value chains (GVC), an extension of Porter’s concept of the value chain that usually 
applies to the internal organisation of firms. The GVC draws on transaction cost theory and 
describes activities that are “transactional linkages connecting firms in a global chain.”61 As 
such, GVC theory emphasises inter-firm networks as the defining feature of global 
production. The nature of global economic organisation is accordingly described as “recurrent 
transactions” between individual firms. Differences in chains are explained by variations in 
inter-firm networks that can range on a continuum from arm’s length transactions to 
hierarchies.
62
 Global value chains thus sketched out a landscape of global production defined 
by networks between economic actors interlocked across geographic space. The nature of the 
networks between these firms determined the type of chain.  
 
Two problems arise from linking industrial district theory to any of the chains mentioned 
above. The first is of an epistemological nature, since both theories seem difficult to reconcile 
in terms of networks. In essence, commodity chain concepts have claimed that global 
networks mattered in the organisation of the world economy but at the same time rendered 
local production systems like the industrial district abstract, despite Geriffi’s claims regarding 
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“social embeddedness of economic organisation.”63 Proponents of industrial district theory or 
regional business entrenchment have done the opposite. This research trend is based on the 
Granovetterian notion that economic activity is embedded in social networks that are bound to 
place. However, the external relations of such district structures have scarcely been theorised. 
Both concepts are therefore difficult to reconcile. In global value chains, for instance, 
economic organisation is synonymous with the networks between firms across geographic 
space. However, it says little about processes of local collaboration in terms of global 
networks. This means that we can only examine separate firms of the district and not its 
collective action. It seems remarkably difficult to reconcile the ‘place-bound’ networks of the 
industrial district with the ‘place-less’ global networks elaborated upon by commodity chain 
perspectives. Jennifer Bair was the first to diagnose the tension between the “embedded 
network approach (...) and the network-based analysis of economic organization in (...) the 
global chains literature.”64  
 
The second problem is connected to the former and involves the problem of agency, since 
chain perspectives impose a rather deterministic approach to firm behaviour. From the 
definition of ‘chains’ given above, the nature of inter-firm networks determines the position 
of the firm within the commodity chain. However, many critics have emphasised that 
commodity chain perspectives should pay attention to agency and contingency as well as to 
the historical and socio-institutional specificity of each commodity chain.
65
 Individual firms 
create independent international operations and follow strategies running counter to the 
mechanisms of the commodity chain. As Ian Hunter has thoughtfully noted, “in differing 
cultures and societies, institutional arrangements and societal norms engender different forms 
of commercial activity, support different labor processes, and inspire different managerial 
responses. In short, the commodity chain is not separate from the actors that constitute the 
chain, and these actors retain agency to determine the shape and characteristics of the 
chain.”66 
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Attempts to combine commodity chain analysis with embedded forms of business largely fail 
to resolve the aforementioned problems. A solution to the first challenge, opposing types of 
networks, was proposed whilst advancing the concept of inter-firm networks of global value 
chains based on the spatially clustered forms of economic activity.
67
 Humphrey and Schmitz 
argued that the scope of local business activity in entities like industrial districts was 
determined by opportunities offered by global firms and how they governed the chain. 
Another solution was proposed by examining “lead firms” in the district as mediators or 
“gatekeepers” of changes in the global value chain.68 Here, it is argued that several district 
firms emerge as “lead firms” in the district, heading processes of transformation and 
organising transborder activities in times of increased competition. Leading firms in the 
district were seen as gate-openers to foreign markets and as pioneers in adjusting the district 
to global competition.  
 
However, neither contribution is useful for me since they still obscure the dynamics of local 
interaction. In the first proposal, the restricted range of activities in the district imposed by 
global firms offers no way out of agency problem. The second proposal that identifies “local 
lead firms” as gatekeepers of the district is certainly more compelling in terms of agency. I 
accept the argument that there is a difference between district firms in the extent to which 
they participate in transborder activities. However, as this approach only highlights local lead 
firms, it is highly problematic for my claims because “the district as a system” is reduced to 
the “individual strategies of few firms through which the local system can open its 
structure.”69 Local lead firms are undoubtedly important but such a perspective does not give 
us what we need, namely reconciliation between local social cohesion and global economic 
organisation. The actions and strategies of local lead firms can only be a part of the story. 
Indeed, Zeitlin, a much-cited author in the “local lead firms” approach, did describe the 
emergence of large lead firms in the district as just one of the possible outcomes in the context 
of increased global competition.
 
According to Zeitlin, an equally important outcome was 
“more continuous and more formalized collaboration among economic actors.”70 In other 
words, paying attention to lead firms is important but I should also factor local collaboration 
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and collective action into the external relations of the district. However, now we are back to 
square one. How does local collective action fit into the commodity chain?  
 
1.3.2 The commodity chain as a conceptual tool.  
 
Even though we should be aware that commodity chain theory and industrial district theory 
have differences that are difficult to reconcile, such a combination is not impossible. A 
possible reconciliation lies in the usage of commodity chains as a conceptual tool. Steven 
Topik has mentioned that “historians can use it [commodity chains] as a conceptual tool for 
understanding the complicated business of global trade rather than as a normative theory 
capable of generating refutable hypotheses.”71 Topik underscored the importance of 
approaching commodity chains as concrete social relations between historical actors.
72
 In 
other words, commodity chains or “commodity centred views” are “conceptual tools” that 
focus on various actors in the chain rather than the “organisational driver of the chain” or the 
governance of the chain. Topik’s flexibility in his use of the commodity chain resolves a 
number of problems mentioned above. Most importantly, agency is restored since looking at 
the impact of local transformations upon the organisation of international trade are central to 
his analysis: “Topik shows how changing patterns of popular consumption in foreign markets, 
as well as particular characteristics of the locations in which production takes place shape the 
geography of international production and trade networks.”73 Importantly, commodity chains 
as a perspective or a tool “are attentive to the influences of the global on the local and vice 
versa.”74 The commodity chain perspective and its interactive view on the local and the global 
allow us to examine the industrial district and the outside world.  
 
Indeed, many historians seeking to map the interaction between the local and the global have 
embraced the commodity chain as a conceptual device. David de Vries, for instance, 
employed a commodity chain perspective on the diamond industry, a sector attached to 
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localities much in the same way way as the fur trade. For de Vries, commodity chains involve 
the “need to interlace international linkages with local and state specifics and examine the 
extent to which the interactions between them have been formative and mutually 
influential.”75 Another advantage of the historical approach is that it studies commodity 
chains as processes of entanglement. According to Beckert, the usefulness of commodity 
history lies in the fact that “transnational economic ties produced by a commodity bring 
political, economic and even cultural networks in the centre of attention.”76 Such a 
transnational perspective on local communities has recently also been advanced by labour 
historians “to extend the frontiers of labour history to a empirical comparison of conditions of 
production and labour control at the different nodes of a transnational commodity chain.”77 
 
Secondly, the emphasis on the entanglement between the local and the global, which such 
perspectives have in common, resolves some of the theoretical issues raised above as well as 
practical ones. It follows from this perspective that every commodity chain is unique in the 
sense that they are rooted in varying social contexts. Therefore world markets or global 
commodity chains are social constructions too. According to Kenneth Pommeranz, “the 
market structures that are basic to our world were not natural or inevitable, always latent and 
waiting to be “opened up”, rather markets are, for better or worse, socially constructed and 
socially embedded.”78 Just like every individual industrial district has it owns particularities, 
every commodity chain develops its own logic.
79
 This flexibility and variety brings us back to 
a central premise employed by both the chain and industrial district perspectives, namely that 
“economic activities are coordinated through non-market relationships.”80 In other words, just 
as the economic action in the district is socially situated, commodity chains contain the basic 
premise that “all economic action is socially embedded” as well.  
 
                                                 
75
 David De Vries, Diamonds and War: State, Capital, and Labor in British-Ruled Palestine (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), 3. 
76
 Sven Beckert, “Das Reich der Baumwolle. Eine globale Geschichte,” in Das Kaiserreich Transnational: 
Deutschland in Der Welt 1871-1914, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2004), 295. 
77
 Frank Meyer, “Expanding the Frontiers of Labour History: Kjartan Flogstad’s Synthesis of Local, Global and 
Environmental History,” International Review of Social History 54 (2009): 109. 
78
 Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World 
Economy, 1400 to the Present (Amonk (New York): M.E. Sharpe, 2006), x. 
79
 Steven C Topik and Allen Wells, “Warenketten in einer globalen Wirtschaft,” in 1870-1945: Weltmärkte und 
Weltkriege, ed. Emily S Rosenberg (München: Beck, 2012), 684. 
80
 Humphrey and Schmitz, “How Does Insertion,” 1019. 
Introduction 
 
Of course, a view that the economic system runs on “noneconomic” bases is far from new and 
can be traced back to as early as Polanyi, who noted that “man’s economy as a rule is 
submerged in his social relations.”81 Both commodity chain analysis and industrial district 
theory are indebted to this view but they have situated the existence of social relations in 
different spheres, in global networks on the one hand and local networks on the other. 
However, the view that both local embeddedness and world markets are socially constructed 
offers the potential to research the interaction between those levels. This allows us to think 
about “world markets” as social constructions, forged by global and local actors. Following 
Dejung and Petterson, it is precisely the local and global interactions define global markets, 
the rules of which are “constructed by public and private, local, national and global actors.”82 
Accordingly, social action shapes markets and economic relations at different levels: local, 
national, and global. This view has two implications. Local collective action can have a 
bearing on the outside world, shaping the rules, norms, and practices of the world market. 
Equally, the structure of the world market can deeply affect local communities. In other 
words, processes of local embedded interaction were constitutive to the world market and the 
industrial district was not invulnerable to exogenous developments. This social perspective on 
world markets best reflects a combination of micro and macro level analysis on the problem 
of economic organisation and scale. In constructing such a framework, this thesis is indebted 
to those “commodity centred views” that have provoked a growing body of literature on the 
history of economic globalisation and capitalism. 
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1.4 The industrial fur district in Leipzig and the outside world (1870-
1939): collective action, lead firms, and world market transformation.  
 
I have proposed the Leipzig fur industry as the subject of this research because it nicely 
represents the dualism between decentralised production and openness to the world market 
that was sketched out in the theoretical framework and was one of the central characteristics 
of Saxony’s economy. The Leipzig industry was a typically Saxon system of industrial 
production based in small and medium sized enterprises. Specialisation among the many 
small and medium sized firms of the fur industry, which numbered around 1,000 in 1925, was 
the norm. Steffen Held characterised the industrial district as a symbiotic concentration of 
wholesale merchants, factories for dressing and dyeing skins, and fur tailors in small to 
medium-sized workshops.
83
 Trading houses were domiciled in the inner city, in the Brühl and 
Nikolaistrasse, whereas industry was located on the outskirts of the city and in adjacent 
towns. The Leipzig fur industry took the form of an industrial district during the long 
nineteenth century and it was the most dynamic in the years leading to the First World War 
and in the 1920s. Its demise began after the economic and financial crisis of 1930-31.  
 
Importantly, the industrial district of the Leipzig fur industry emerged while being part of a 
highly globalised trade. The fur trade was responsible for the largest frontier expansion in 
world history since demand for furs pushed traders and explorers into the Siberian frontiers 
and the woodlands of North America.
84
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the fur trade was 
still internationally oriented, involving peripheral subarctic regions, new areas of production 
in Central Asia and South America, and emerging marketplaces and manufacturing centres in 
North America, Great Britain, and continental Europe. Consumers of furs were to be found 
virtually everywhere on both sides of the Atlantic.
 
Just when the fur industry emerged in 
Leipzig, the international fur trade was undergoing rapid transformation. Due to intensive 
hunting and growing demand, resources became scarcer, which pushed price levels 
upwards.
85
 Furthermore, fur garments were no longer exclusively destined for the upper 
classes but came into the reach of an ever-increasing range of customers. Consequently, 
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global competition over resources intensified. Fur companies entered frontier zones and new 
markets surfaced, especially in North America.
86
 The transformation of the international trade 
in the nineteenth century, particularly the increase in consumption, undoubtedly offered 
opportunities but heightened global competition was potentially threatening. Nevertheless, the 
fur industry in Leipzig somehow dealt with changing international patterns and managed to 
operate on a highly volatile world market.  
 
I would like to discuss the chronology of the case study more closely, which stretches from 
1870 to the 1930s. There are some good reasons behind the choice of these dates. Many 
would argue that international business operations and therefore exogenous challenges 
became less relevant in the interwar period. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the Leipzig fur 
industry did not simply retreat from the world market after the First World War. Firstly, the 
periodisation that places the end of the so-called first phase of economic globalisation at the 
outbreak of war in 1914 has been questioned. Geoffrey Jones, for instance, has argued that 
this periodisation is outdated from the perspective of business history: “business historians 
have demonstrated that business enterprises were often more robust than an aggregative view 
of markets would suggest. During the 1920s, there were still many new multinational 
investments. (…).”87 Jones instead proposes that the Great Depression marked the 
“meltdown” of the international trade system. While the claim is not universally accepted, a 
growing body of scholars support it. For example, Robert Boyce mentions that “the outbreak 
of the war in 1914 brought a collapse of the international states system but only a hiatus in 
global economic relations. In economic terms the 1920s bore a much closer resemblance to 
the pre-war period than is commonly assumed (...) by the second half of the 1920s, world 
trade and financial flows were greater than before the war and increasing at twice the rate of 
national growth.”88 Others pointed out that protectionism, common in the political economy 
between the wars, had already surfaced well before World War I.
89
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Secondly, it is arguable that even Germany, which was comparatively more disengaged from 
international trade after the war, oriented itself back towards on the world market in this 
period.
 90
 By 1929, the total export of the German economy reached 95 % of the 1913 levels 
and its share of world trade was 11.6% (it had been 14.3% in 1913).
91
 Explanations point to 
the deliberate strategies of firms and politicians that were intended to re-integrate the German 
economy into world trade.
92
 German corporations managed to re-enter the world market 
through participation in international cartels.
93
 As with during the Kaiserreich, a call for 
attention to smaller actors seems to be in order. Saxony remained the most world-market 
oriented region of Germany until the beginning of the Second World War. Equally, the First 
World War was but an interlude for the Leipzig fur industry: it only declined in the 1930s. 
Furthermore, the unstable period since the First World War is all the more interesting from 
the point of view of studying exogenous challenges that interfered with the dynamics of the 
industrial district. I also incorporate the 1930s in order to examine the demise of the industrial 
district.  
 
It is in regards to the industrial district of the Leipzig fur industry between 1870 and 1939 that 
I pose my central research question: why did a business structure characterised by a plethora 
of small businesses became so successful while participating in a volatile world market? This 
main question has been split in two major subquestions that form the core of the thesis. 
Firstly, how do economic agents of the industrial district deal with exogenous challenges? 
Secondly, how do firms of the district participate in processes of internationalisation? In 
following a commodity perspective on the industrial district, I will employ an actor-oriented 
approach to processes of collective action, the behaviour of individual firms in the district, 
and how such patterns interacted with the structure of the world market. Local developments 
will still form the main thread of the narrative but will be connected to broader macro-
economic developments produced by international linkages of the commodity chain. 
Employing a commodity perspective means examining the world that is brought together by 
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the commodity of furs, the main actors that held it together (lead firms, governments, 
economic institutions, and market conventions), and how these institutions interacted with the 
local business system. 
 
It is my central hypothesis that responses to external challenges (most particularly collective 
action and interfirm collaboration) were inherent characteristics of the industrial district. 
Collective action and interfirm collaboration will thus be central to the analysis. As Carnevali 
argued, collective action formed a “strategic choice” and was not simply a natural by-product 
of firm-interconnectivity in the industrial district.
94
 I underline once more the central premise 
that local collaboration does not necessarily follow from the concept of the district. 
Mechanisms and forms of cooperation were actively and intentionally constructed and 
remodelled. It thereby follows that collective and creative action was also potentially 
developed towards exogenous challenges. Such an intentional view on collective action is 
stressed in economic sociology. Herrigel noted that “joint creative action” of economic actors 
takes place in various social contexts “confronted with global pressures” in order to modify 
inherited organisational forms and governance mechanisms.
95
 Joint creative action against 
global pressures arises because actors collectively define, understand, and resolve challenges 
in a common environment.
96
  
 
In order to reconstruct the abilities of local collective action, the thesis will employ a broad 
sweep on collective action in the industrial district. Besides focusing on inter-firm networks in 
the fur industry, it will integrate networks with other local stakeholders from related industries 
or services that were arguably embedded in the local structure or somehow connected to the 
fur industry. As such, collective action encompasses many actors gathered around the local 
fur industry, like financial institutions, university scientists, political stakeholders, and related 
industries. Indeed, local banking is often identified as an important agent of local business 
systems.
97
 The connection of district firms to such stakeholders and associated economic 
agents was also connected to the growing complexity of global markets, which increasingly 
depended upon knowledge, scientific development, the availability of financial resources, and 
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the standardisation of payment traffic. As such, I hope to encompass the full complexity of 
local dynamics and interactions with global developments. The forms of collaboration will be 
exhibited via typical inter-firm cooperation, whether formal or informal. In addition, 
collective action also entails the creation of new economic institutions, the conversion of old 
institutions, and inter-personal networks. Nevertheless, while stressing the importance of 
collective action, I also continue to pay attention to the behaviour of individual firms and the 
heuristic potential of the so-called lead firm as a pioneer of new projects and global relations.  
 
In studying the links between district and the outside world, I will also employ a broad view 
that does not neglect the potential role of lead firms as gatekeepers of transnational links. The 
broad view will demonstrate that the forms of translocal links produced by the business 
community were wider than the canonical form of individual firms’ creation of multinational 
branches. Important translocal links to the outside world were created on different levels, not 
just within the firm through the practice of multinational branching, but also on the level of 
individuals, like transnational entrepreneurship, mobility and business travel, international 
business networks and partnerships, as well as larger economic institutions housed in the 
district, such as trade fairs or the annual meetings of international trade associations.
98
  
 
The broad view on local collective action as well as on patterns of internationalisation had an 
impact on the source material I selected for this thesis. In the local archives of Leipzig, I have 
not only looked at the material from Leipzig fur firms but also information from other 
economic stakeholders, especially the local banks. The source material of other economic 
actors often gave more information on the activities of the fur industry than the few sources 
bequeathed by the fur firms themselves. In addition, the archives of the local administration 
and the regional government in Dresden were consulted. It was not my aim to reconstruct a 
complete image of the Leipzig district and every participant. Processes of collective action 
formed the criterion in selecting material. Moreover, it was impossible to gather comparable 
information on each business. The concept of the lead firm was a guideline in representing 
material on individual firms. These were not only the most visible in foreign trade: lead firms 
often ‘led’ in processes of collective action. Therefore if some firms receive more attention 
than others, it is because of the role they played in both local and international activities. 
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Through the lens of lead firms, I hope to gain insight into processes of collaboration and 
collective action. 
 
1.5 Ambitions and pitfalls.  
 
On a final note, I should address a number of potential pitfalls that one can come across while 
examining the relationship of the district and the outside world. Firstly, it would be dangerous 
to present industrial districts as entities that exhibit a high degree of social homogeneity and 
harmony. There is already a long-standing critique on research into the social structure of the 
industrial district.
99
 To avoid uncritically painting a picture wherein actors cooperated 
willingly in order to overcome internal and exogenous challenges, a critical stance vis-à-vis 
the nature of collaborative networks and attention to potential conflicts is required. Somewhat 
related to this is the problem of performance and collective action. Business history is 
generally more interested in success than failure.
100
 Similarly, research into industrial districts 
runs the danger of overstating the dynamism and flexibility of the district. However, success 
is not the ultimate yardstick by which dynamism in the industrial district can be measured. In 
fact, declining districts and regions can develop the same mechanisms for sharing and 
collaboration as successful ones.
101
 The analysis will be aware of the failure and 
ineffectiveness of joint efforts in order to enhance our understanding of the interaction 
between the local and the global.  
 
The second obvious pitfall in my research design is that every collective action initiative in 
the district is read in the light of exogenous change. Certainly, it is not my aim to explain all 
collective action and local modifications from the point of view of external developments. In 
fact, industrial district processes are conditioned by multilayered developments and always 
need to be situated in local, national, and global contexts. The fact of the matter is that the last 
category has been hitherto omitted. The intent of this work is precisely aimed to highlight the 
interaction of local business systems with the outside world. Nevertheless, I do not downplay 
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the important and often unique character of local developments. Rather, the thesis hopes to 
contribute to the literature by pointing to the transregional and even global dimensions of 
local action, the international impact of small business, and exogenous factors that play a 
much larger role in the emergence and dynamism of industrial districts and regional business 
systems than has been previously assumed.  
 
It is this regional dimension of processes of world market integration that needs further 
elaboration. The fact that Saxony was at the forefront of processes of globalisation adds an 
important dimension to historical globalisation debates, which are largely biased towards 
examining the national context in interaction with the global. Sebastian Conrad argued that 
globalisation profoundly restructured national politics and societal processes in Wilhelminian 
Germany.
102
 The same goes for businesses and economic actors. Cornelius Torp described 
how “the challenges of globalisation” caused major cleavages in Germany’s economic policy, 
thereby exacerbating internal struggles.
103
 The fact that regions like Saxony were at the 
forefront of processes of globalisation seems to be the missing link in this new research. 
However, proponents of the globalisation perspective are not unaware of this. Conrad, for 
one, added that it would be useful to add localities and regions to the “nation and 
globalisation” debate by examining “how globalisation not only caused the restructuring of 
the nation, but also left its traces at the level of the local, and indeed was simultaneously 
shaped by local developments (...).”104 The thesis hopes to increase our understanding of 
regional insertion into processes of globalisation.  
 
The question of the role of small businesses and local dynamism is still highly relevant in 
these times of economic globalisation. To begin with, many have periodically predicted the 
end of small business. While it has been argued that globalisation initiates the demise of such 
structures like the industrial district, the regional economy is back on the political and 
economic agenda. Especially in the European Union, regions are increasingly seen as decisive 
to the political future and dynamic powerhouses of economic growth. One of the main ideas is 
that regions, local entities, and smaller businesses should be armed against the “challenges of 
global competition” and that they should be “stimulated to pursue international trade.” In 
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2008, the EU introduced to the Small Business Act, which aimed to stimulate the growth of 
SMEs (Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises). It was noted that “SMEs in our society have 
become even more important (...) as key players in the wellbeing of local and regional 
communities (...) in a globally changing landscape characterised by continuous structural 
changes and enhanced competitive pressures.”105 One of the key points of the act is that 
regional governments and the EU present themselves as partners in the stimulation of foreign 
trade and in signalling opportunities on foreign growth markets.
106
 For instance, in the context 
of the Small Business Act, the Saxon government recently introduced a policy designed to 
stimulate the foreign trade of its SMEs.
107
 Whereas contemporary supranational states carve 
out a growing role for themselves in protecting and stimulating regionally based small firms 
in global competition, this story hopes to examine how such functions historically grew from 
below and how small firms have historically been vibrant and active in processes of 
internationalisation. I hope that the thesis can contribute to our knowledge of regional 
dynamism by learning from the historical trajectories of industrial districts’ adaptation to the 
pressures of global competition.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis.  
 
Rather than following a chronological “rise and fall” narrative that follows the Leipzig fur 
industry from its rapid emergence in the second half of the nineteenth century to its demise 
after World War II, the chapters of the thesis are divided into three large parts that centre on 
several patterns of collaboration that surfaced because of exogenous pressures. Such a 
structure also ekes out some of the foreign operations of the firms of the industrial district. 
Part I, ‘The International Roots of the Leipzig Fur Industry (1850-1914)’ with two main 
chapters, employs a transnational perspective to look at the emergence of the Leipzig fur 
industry as an industrial district in period from 1850 until World War I. Central to the analysis 
is the question of why the district emerged whilst being part of a changing world market in 
furs and how regional openness shaped the emergence of the fur industry. Chapter 2 largely 
focuses on endogenous and exogenous factors that determined the emergence of the Leipzig 
fur industry and also on internationalisation strategies pursued by fur firms in the district that 
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allowed the integration of the district in the world market of furs. Chapter 3 more closely 
examines the patterns of internationalisation of the industrial district in a case study dealing 
with the conquest of the Brussels sales market by Leipzig firms. In particular, the importance 
of transnational entrepreneurship in constructing links to new foreign sales market as an 
alternative to traditional transborder business organisation of the multinational is highlighted.  
 
The three chapters of part II, ‘Lost Markets and New Products 1903-1939,’ are devoted to 
district dynamics of a completely different nature. These chapters examine how Leipzig firms 
reacted to structural resource shortages and world market disruptions. It deals with the 
sourcing of new resources required because of exogenous pressures on the supply of raw 
materials to the district. They have one major theme in common: all these chapters highlight 
the importance of collective action on the one hand and links between the fur district and 
scientific research on the other hand. The association between the fur industry and scientific 
research allowed for one of the most profound innovations in the modern fur industry, that of 
fur farming. The experimental niche of fur farming offered a series of tremendous 
opportunities to the local business system in overcoming problems connected to international 
resource markets. Chapter 4 highlights a peculiar case of fur farming in the German empire, 
that of sheep farming in the German colony of South West Africa and the role of the Leipzig 
fur industry in this colonial project. Chapter 5 discusses the impact of World War I upon the 
industrial district. The chapter focuses on processes of resource substitution as well as 
problems of business organisation in times of war in order to acquire a better understanding of 
the district in the period between the wars. Chapter 6, the last chapter of this part, looks at the 
introduction of new production paradigms and then focuses on the debut of modern fur 
farming inside Germany in the 1920s. The links between farming and the agricultural sciences 
with the industrial district are also considered.  
 
Part III, ‘the Golden but Turbulent Twenties,’ examines the industrial district in a time when 
the global trade in furs had undergone some major modifications. The interaction between the 
Leipzig fur industry and the changing post-war world market features prominently in this part. 
The three chapters highlight several aspects of the way in which the fur industry in Leipzig 
managed these exogenous challenges. Chapter 7 examines the impact of world market 
restructuring in the early 1920s upon individual businesses in the district. It delves into the 
problem of local lead firms, investigating whether several emerging lead firms disturbed firm 
balance in the business community and to what extent they contributed to the restoration of 
Introduction 
 
international links. Chapters 8 and 9 then look at how patterns of collective action allowed for 
the renewal of links between the Leipzig business community and the outside world. Chapter 
8 discusses interfirm cooperation in the creation of new market institutions that re-established 
the position of Leipzig as an international centre of the fur industry. Chapter 9 discusses the 
dynamism of interfirm cooperation in the construction of an international trade exhibition, the 
IPA in 1930, which was designed as an international promotion campaign for the Leipzig fur 
industry. The thesis ends with an analytical conclusion, preceded by an epilogue that 
discusses the decline of the industrial district in the 1930s and places emphasis on continuing, 
if eroding, patterns of collaboration in the Leipzig fur industry in times of economic turmoil 
and political upheaval. 
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2 The Birth of an Industrial District. Local Entrenchment 
and World Market Orientations (1850-1914). 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
 
In the introduction, I located a tension in the economic structure of Saxony in the perplexing 
combination of business embeddedness and its orientation towards foreign markets. This 
‘missing link’ in the history of the region as well as in industrial district theory is analysed 
here in one of its most active and successful industrial districts. As mentioned before, the 
Leipzig industrial district emerged while being dependent upon one of the most historical 
world markets. In the mid-1920s, city official Walter Leiske called it one of the most valuable 
industries of the city. At this point, the luxury fur industry employed 3.2% of the Leipzig 
workforce and one out of four garment businesses in the city was occupied with fur 
manufacture.
108
 Along with London and New York, Leipzig had developed into one of the 
largest markets in the world trade of furs. The fur district had thus emerged as one of the main 
sectors in the urban economy during the long nineteenth century. How and why could such a 
structure emerge in this strongly globalised industry? This chapter sets itself the task of 
finding the underlying causes as well as the characteristics of the development of Leipzig as a 
fur hub. 
 
Firstly, a number of endogenous factors will be explored, such as the presence of human 
capital, the process of industrialisation, and the importance of pre-existing economic 
institutions. All of these facilitated the growth of Leipzig fur industry. To begin with, the role 
of the guilds in Leipzig, which persisted well after the introduction of freedom of commerce 
in 1861, will be examined. Guilds were comparatively strong in Saxony and connected to 
processes of early industrialisation.
109
 How did the craft tradition influence the process of 
industrialisation in the Leipzig fur industry? Did they facilitate or decelerate the formation of 
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an industrial district? Secondly, the role of the Leipzig trade fairs was just as important in the 
development of the fur hub. The Leipzig trade fairs made the city one of the major centres of 
early modern trade: the terrestrial fur trade featured prominently in them.
110
 How did the fairs 
and the commercial functions of the city influence the formation of the fur industry as an 
industrial district? Thirdly, the chapter also devotes attention to inter-firm networks, collective 
bodies like the trade associations, and the associations with the other economic agents in the 
district, foremost financial institutions.  
 
The fur industry in Leipzig represented a typically Saxon industry: it was a consumer goods 
industry that was dependent on foreign markets for both the import of the required raw 
materials and for the sales of the end product. Therefore, it is almost impossible to conceive 
of the Leipzig fur industry emerging without taking into account major changes in world trade 
and processes of economic globalisation that characterised international economic 
organisation in the nineteenth century. The second part of the chapter analyses the position of 
Leipzig more closely within the structures of world trade. The historical analysis of the 
commodity chain in furs is aimed at reaching a deeper understanding of the local development 
of the fur district. The local characteristics sketched out above, like industrialisation and local 
networks between economic actors, will be studied by looking at their interplay with 
exogenous developments, such as economic globalisation and the expansion of the 
international fur trade. Attention will be devoted to how local networks contributed to linking 
the industrial district to the outside world. In particular, the symbiosis between local finance 
in Leipzig and the fur industry will be shown to have been instrumental to processes of 
internationalisation. Finally, in sketching the developments in the global commodity chains, 
the chapter considers the broad variety of ways by which an industrial district forges links to 
the outside world. Aside from multinational branching and local umbrella institutions like the 
fairs, I will pay particular attention to personal mobility in the formation of translocal links.   
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2.2 Industry and Trade: The Local Tenets of the Fur District in Leipzig.  
 
2.2.1 From artisans to industrialists.  
 
Fur manufacturing already constituted an essential part of the crafts industry in Leipzig in the 
Middle Ages. However, fur crafting in Leipzig was not unusually large in comparison with 
other German cities. In 1555, Leipzig had 45 master furriers. However, Breslau (107 masters 
in 1536) and Augsburg (92 masters in 1499) had a much larger fur sector. Breslau was an 
important marketplace for trade with the east whereas Leipzig belonged to the smaller cities 
(only 1745 inhabitants in 1529) of the Holy Roman Empire. Despite this, Leipzig fur 
workshops were comparatively large. Guild statutes in 1449 permitted masters to employ as 
many as four journeymen and two apprentices. This changed in 1598 when a statute reduced 
the earlier stipulation down to three journeymen and one apprentice.
111
 In subsequent 
centuries, little changed in terms of either the size or the distribution of the fur craft in 
Leipzig. In 1800, the number of masters had barely increased to 64 furriers: however, this was 
still 20 more than 250 years previously.
112
  
 
Even before freedom of commerce was introduced in 1861, patterns of early industrialisation 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century had ramifications for Saxon guilds. Several guilds 
lost members and relevance, although others remained robust for an extended period of time. 
Fur crafting was one of the Saxon guilds that remained stable. There was even a noticeable 
increase. Between 1849 and 1861, just before the introduction of the freedom of commerce, 
the number of masters increased only slightly but there was a significant rise in the number of 
journeymen and apprentices working in the Saxon fur industry.
113
 According to Erika 
Rowald, growth in fur crafting generally took place in commercial centres of trading, like 
Leipzig and Breslau.
114
 In 1849, the fur industry in Leipzig numbered around 97 fur 
workshops, employing about 197 workers. In 1850, a strike in the British fur industry served 
as an important impetus to the development of the fur dyeing and dressing industries as more 
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skins from the London market arrived in Leipzig and its environs. Nevertheless, growth in the 
fur industry was gradual. In 1861, the number of fur workshops reached 100 in Leipzig and its 
immediate surroundings while the number of journeymen and apprentices reached roughly 
329.
115
 These figures indicate that the growth of fur manufacturing in Leipzig was at first 
situated in the growth of traditional furrier workshops.  
 
 Masters Journeymen 
and 
apprentices 
1849 643 477 
1861 682 693 
Table 2-1: Furrier Artisans (1849-1861) 
 
In 1861, the introduction of the freedom of enterprise and the final abolition of guild 
privileges reinforced the formation of the industrial district as craftsmen and traders 
throughout Germany went to Leipzig to set up dressing, dyeing, and fur trading companies.
116
 
The freedom to establish new businesses gave an impetus to the industrialisation of fur 
manufacture. However, the role of artisans did not decline in this new phase of growth. The 
entrepreneurs who renewed fur manufacturing were often craftsmen coming from other cities 
to set up business in Leipzig. A firm founded by Theodor Thorer, a furrier from Görlitz who 
came immediately after the introduction of free enterprise, would become one of the leading 
firms of the district. Thorer constructed a factory in the early 1880s in Lindenau, on the 
outskirts of Leipzig. It immediately turned into one of the most successful factories: in 1883, 
the Thorer factory was a source of employment for more than 100 workers.
117
 In 1847, 
Friedrich Erler, an apprentice from Frankfurt am Main, established a workshop in Leipzig. 
Later, he experimented with modern dyeing techniques in collaboration with the chemist 
Adolf Stieglitz. Together they founded the dyeing company ‘Adolf Stieglitz & Co’ in 
Plagwitz in 1876 and it was placed under the supervision of the chemist.
118
 The Stieglitz firm 
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moved to Leipzig-Lindenau a few years later and remained closely connected with Erler well 
into the 1930s.
119
  
 
2.2.2 Industrialisation and the growth of the industrial district. 
 
While the expansion of local fur manufacturing remained fixed in the realm of artisanship, 
industrialisation drastically changed the production process and introduced wage labour on a 
large scale into the fur industry. In contrast to other sectors in Saxony, the industrialisation of 
the fur industry occured relatively late, in the 1870s and 1880s. In part, this is accounted for 
by the robustness of crafting. Equally, the industrialisation of the fur industry was somewhat 
delayed because it was strongly linked to shifts in production connected to the second 
industrial revolution, such as synthetic dyeing.  
 
In order to fully understand its impact, let us explore the ramifications of industrialisation on 
the production process. The fur production process consisted of two successive procedures, 
known technically as dressing and dyeing. Both dressing and dyeing can include a variety of 
practices but generally boil down to the following. Fur dressing, the first stage, involves the 
careful cleaning of fat and any remaining flesh from the skin and, crucially, treating the skins 
with a series of chemicals that softens and preserves them. Basic preservatives were most 
often applied to raw furs before their introduction into the fur market, although this was 
usually insufficient or unsystematic. Further preservation was thus required. A large variety of 
preservation methods existed. They differed in the composition of the preservative (the ratio 
between salt and chemicals), which depended on the procedures developed in the dressing 
plants. Preservation was accomplished by turning the skins in tubs containing the substance 
for a couple of hours. Treatment with chemical substances was introduced much later. A pre-
industrial method of preserving the skins with perspired salt was generally known as the 
‘Leipzig dressing’ method.120 From the beginning of the nineteenth century, this part of the 
process was industrialised: the manually performed turning was replaced by tons driven by 
steam engines.
121
 Later, preservatives and treatment solutions were also systematically 
improved by utilising advances in applied chemistry. 
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Fur dyeing, the next stage of production, involves the application of colorants. The 
application of dyes can differ significantly depending on the quality of the material. When the 
quality of the natural fur is excellent, only minor adjustments like blending and “reinforcing” 
are required. For furs of substandard quality, the process can also entail complete over-
dyeing. In other words, dyeing could be used to evenly spread the fur’s ‘natural’ colour but 
often it entailed the imitation of colourations. Fur dyes are usually applied in a dye bath.
122
 
Fur dyers finalise the production process by giving the dyed skins a sawdust treatment in 
order to eliminate unwanted residue. The development of synthetic dyeing rendered the time-
consuming process of applying natural dyes obsolete and constituted a watershed in the 
history of fur dyeing. It also enhanced the potential for “imitating” prime fur colorations. A 
German chemist named Hugo Erdmann received one of the first patents for the process of hair 
and feather dyeing in 1888: the patented process involved soaking the skins in a para-
phenylene-diamine solution followed by oxidation either in the open air or through the 
application of an oxidising agent.
123
 Like in dressing, the composure and ratios of the 
chemical substance and the duration of oxidisation were often kept secret.  
 
Picture 1 A fur dressing workshop in Leizpig, 1920-1940 (Stadtarchiv, BA 1977 3272) 
The first ‘factories’ in Leipzig to industrialise the production process were established from 
the 1870s onwards. Industrial production defined fur manufacturing in Saxony relatively late. 
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By 1875, Leipzig had 10 fur factories that employed 259 employees. The first fully 
independent dyeing factories, four in total, were also in place by this time. At first, these 
enterprises employed no more than 40 persons. Industrialisation therefore continued to co-
exist with manufacturing workshops. Indeed, after freedom of commerce was enacted, the 
number of workshops exploded, swelling to 125 enterprises employing over 553 workers.
124
 
In sum, when industrialisation kicked in, manufacturing in fur workshops still represented a 
much larger proportion of the industrial district than the new factories 
 
This slow transition from traditional to modern manufacturing was not unusual in Saxony. 
Before 1848, the proportion of artisans in Saxony was much higher than the rest of Germany. 
However, traditional manufacturing was in decisive decline after 1865.
125
 In the transition 
phase of fur manufacturing, the furrier remained an important part in the formation of the 
industrial district. Artisans continued to lead small workshops whilst others maintained 
themselves as tailors. The latter turned factory dressed and dyed furs into custom garments. 
Such finishing activities thus also had a prominent position within the district. The artisans 
and furrier workshops continued to occupy an important position in Leipzig, adding to the 
specialisation and division of labour typical of an industrial district.  
 
Together with the presence of highly qualified and independent artisans, industrial production 
stimulated the emergence of the Leipzig fur industry as an industrial district. The timing of 
the expansion runs parallel to that of industrialisation. The industrial census of 1882 confirms 
the existence of 788 fur factories in Saxony, employing 2,150 workers. The fur industry 
expanded rapidly during thereafter. The formation of the district should also be put in its 
proper geographical dimension. The fur factories in Saxony were clearly concentrated in 
Leipzig and its environs, an area that contained precisely 212 firms and 1,381 workers.
126
 
Furthermore, many fur factories were domiciled in towns that bordered Leipzig, like 
Schkeuditz, Ötzschz, Markleeberg, Markranstädt, and Plagwitz. The Leipzig fur industry was 
arguably a Saxon phenomenon: it emerged within the region of Saxony, with Leipzig 
functioning as the undisputed epicentre. In turn, Saxony formed the core of the German fur 
industry.  
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The different geographical scales, local, regional and national, are represented in the 1882 
census as follows. About 16.1% of German fur workers were employed in Saxony and the 
number of factories represented 11.1% of the Reich’s total. In turn, the labour force in the 
Leipzig fur industry represented 64 % of Saxony’s fur industry and roughly 10% of the 
German fur industry in its totality.
127
 Later, levels of concentration in Saxony continued to 
expand. The Saxon fur industry grew at a more rapid pace than the Reich’s average, a fact that 
contributed to the regional concentration of the German fur industry. In 1907, despite a 
decrease in factories to 742, the fur industry in Saxony now represented 15.7% of the Reich’s 
total (5,070 companies). Furthermore, 4,643 labourers worked in Saxony’s fur industry, 
which was about 25.5% of the Reich’s 18,232 labourers.128 In the census year 1907, 36% or 
272 of Saxon fur factories were domiciled in Leipzig and 40% of the Saxon labourers in the 
fur industry were Leipzig fur workers (against 64% in 1882). Still, one out of ten German fur 
workers worked in Leipzig. Leipzig had expanded its status as both the Saxon and national fur 
capital, although manufacturing was now more pronouncedly a Saxon phenomenon. 
 
 Leipzig Saxony Reich 
1882 1,381 2,150 13,345 
1907 1,857 4,643 18,232 
1925 5,881 11,170 30,002 
Table 2-2: Fur Workers in Germany (1882-1925) 
 
The First World War was but a small interlude in the growth of the industrial district. In fact, 
by the mid-1920s, the fur industry in Saxony reached its zenith. The peak of the Saxon fur 
industry is illustrated by the following figures: 1,091 fur factories employed over 11,170 
workers, including 5,520 female workers. This figure could even expand to 18,397 workers 
(8,160 male, 10,237 female) during the peak of the fur season, since approximately 7,000 
workers were part of a seasonal labour force.
129
 According to the 1925 census, the German fur 
industry was as large as 5,166 firms, employing 30,002 non-seasonal fur workers in total.
130
 
37% of all German fur workers were concentrated in Saxony (against 25.5% in 1907). Leipzig 
was still the epicentre of the Saxon fur industry with 519 fur companies employing 5,881 
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labourers (2,865 male and 3,016 female workers). The Leipzig labour pool thus represented 
roughly 20% of Germany’s fur workers and 52% of Saxony’s. The fur industry in Saxony and 
Leipzig would never be larger than during the mid-1920s.  
 
 Leipzig Saxony Reich 
1882 212 788 4907 
1907 272 742 5070 
1925 519 1091 5166 
Table 2-3: Number of fur firms in Germany 
 
The size distribution of the firms represents a more thorny issue. At first glance, the figures 
tend to reveal an increase in scale. Between 1882 and 1907, the number of workers increased 
more rapidly than the number of manufacturing plants. Still, the number of production units 
that employed more than 50 labourers only represented 2.5% of the total number of firms in 
1907. However, the number of labourers working in firms with more than 50 labourers had 
climbed to 42.9%, indicating the scale increase in Saxony. Moreover, this percentage is far 
above the Reich’s average: only 15% of the workers were employed in factories with over 50 
labourers whereas 52.8% of the fur workers worked in small workshops. This contrasts 
significantly with a figure of 17.7% in Saxony. A fur factory in Saxony tended to be larger on 
average (105 workers) than one outside Saxony (101 workers).
131
  
 
These figures run contrary to the image of Saxony as a region characterised by a decentralised 
mode of production where firms were on average much smaller than in the Reich.
132
 
However, the reason for this difference has to be sought within the structure of the fur 
industry itself. Most importantly, Saxony was the industrial powerhouse of the German fur 
industry. Saxony developed as the centre for fur production whereas business activity in such 
production across the Reich tended to focus on specialised functions like tailoring or retailing 
manufactured furs from Leipzig. Every city in the Reich had at least a few fur shops, small 
workshops, or retailers. Industrial concentration, on the other hand, only took place in 
Saxony. This is a plausible explanation for the difference in size distribution of the firms.  
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Even though firms were larger than the Reich’s average, moreover, the fur industry in and 
around Leipzig still corresponds to the features of an industrial district. Firstly, firms were 
highly specialised. Besides industrial production, there was a place for related activities like 
fur tailoring, brokerage, and trading. Secondly, the discrepancy with national figures does not 
mean that big business was the norm in the Saxon fur industry. In the mid-1920s, at the apex 
of the Saxon fur industry, the overwhelming majority of firms were extremely small. To begin 
with, 309 firms (28%) employed no workers other than the owner of the workshop (see figure 
X). In addition, about 313 firms (29%) employed 1 to 3 labourers. In all likelihood, these 
units represented the segment of artisanal production at the very end of the production chain, 
which had been transformed into an integral part of the industrial district. Moreover a large 
part of the labour force worked in small to medium-sized enterprises. The largest group, 
consisting of 3,479 workers (31%), were employed in middle-sized firms that had between 11 
and 50 employees.
133
 26% of the labourers worked for companies that employed between 51 
and 200 workers. There was litte big business. Only 6 fur firms employed more than 200 
workers but these firms provided work for 20% of the workforce.
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: The number of fur firms Fur firms in Saxony according to size in 1925 (1091 firms)134 
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Figure 2-2: Size of the companies in the Saxon fur industry according to the number of workers (11170 in 1925) 
 
In addition, the size distribution of the firms in Leipzig resembled Saxon patterns in general, 
even though medium-sized fur businesses developed much earlier in Leipzig than in the 
Saxon hinterland.
135
 In 1925, 141 Leipzig companies employed no one other than the firm 
owner but the large majority of the firms that did employ wage labour made use of no more 
than 50 labourers. On top of the size distribution pyramid, 19 fur factories firms had between 
51 and 200 workers. Two of the six factories in Saxony that employed over 200 labourers 
were situated in Leipzig. From these figures, it is clear that small to medium-sized businesses 
were the norm: statistics reveal the industrial district-like character of the Saxon fur industry.  
 
2.2.3 Turning merchants into businessmen (1830-1914). 
 
It is impossible to examine the emergence of the industrial district without looking at another 
important field of business specialisation, fur trading. In order to understand the trade as an 
integral part of the district, we need to examine the history of Leipzig as a commercial centre, 
which is almost synonymous with the history of the Leipzig trade fairs. The major fair was 
held on Easter (Ostermesse) and a smaller one took place in the autumn (Michaelismesse). 
The Leipzig trade fairs have a venerable history that dates back as early as 1190, when count 
Otto von Meissen officially ratified the existence of the annual fairs. Stimulated by official 
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recognition, the importance of the Leipzig fairs soon transcended the locality. By the end of 
the 15
th
 century, the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I granted the Leipzig trade fairs 
imperial status, which confirmed Leipzig as a trade centre of transregional importance. As a 
result, numerous foreign merchants settled in the city.
136
  
 
The Leipzig trade fairs were not only important for the local economic fabric: they also 
created early transregional connections that firmly placed the city in overland trade routes. 
The same was true for fur trading at the fairs. Merchants specialised in furs connected the 
Leipzig trade fair to the system of fur procurement in Russia. The Russian system had its 
roots in subarctic frontiers where Russian hunters or natives typically hunted in the huge areas 
around their settlements, the so-called skupsciki. Local middlemen bought the furs that were 
stockpiled in these settlements, transported them to smaller trade centres, and fetched the 
isolated hunters foodstuffs and other basic equipment in return. From these local markets, 
barrels and packages of fur travelled to busier markets, like Irkutsk, Irbit, and Nizhnii 
Novgorod.
137
 From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Nizhnii fairs became an 
indispensible commercial event in Russia, with sales worth around 150-200 million rubles on 
average.
138
 The Nizhnii fairs attracted averagely 1.5 million visitors during the summer.
139
 
European traders, notably Germans, were welcome guests there every summer. The Irbit fairs, 
east of the Urals, were smaller, making around 25-40 million rubles in sales: they were 
strongly focused on select commodities like tea and furs.
140
 
 
Jewish middlemen played a leading role in connecting the fur trade in Russian fairs to those in 
Leipzig.
141
 In particular, the Jews of Brody, part of the Austrian empire after the division of 
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Poland in 1772, were important as fur importers to Leipzig.
142
 In 1779, the Austrians turned 
Brody into a ‘free trade city’ by lowering customs significantly.143 Jewish merchants of 
Austrian, Russian, and Polish origin bought furs in Russia and Poland and transported them 
via Brody to the fairs in Leipzig. Authorities in Leipzig realised the importance of Jewish 
middlemen, especially in regards to the fur trade, and therefore relaxed the rather strict 
regulations that governed the movement of Jews in Saxony, although only moderately. In 
1747, for instance, the city council allowed for the settlement of Polish and Russian Jews 
without paying taxes “in recognition of their contribution toward the import of raw materials 
for the hide and fur industries.”144 The city council also granted Jews the status of “fair 
brokers,” an official permit that legalised their stay in Leipzig during the fairs.145 
 
How did the Leipzig trade fair influence the creation of the industrial district? The answer has 
to be sought, somewhat paradoxically, in the relative decline of the fairs. During the long 
nineteenth century, the fur trade woven around the annual fairs declined due to the cost-
lowering impact of railroad transport and steamboat shipping. In fact, Leipzig was integrated 
into modern railroad networks relatively early. The first train connection on German soil was 
constructed in Saxony (between Dresden and Leipzig) in 1839.
146
 The transportation 
revolution cleared the path for a permanent supply of commodities as well as persons 
(merchants, labourers and entrepreneurs) to Leipzig: this made trading on a permanent basis 
possible and thereby rendered trading at the fairs superfluous. City officials in Leipzig were 
well aware of the decline of the Leipzig trade fairs as a market for a wide variety of 
commodities. The function of the fairs was finally changed in 1895 when fair officials turned 
the “purely commercial” trade fair (Warenmesse) into an exhibition fair (Mustermesse), where 
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business sectors showcased product samples and developments rather than sold them. 
Information sharing and networking became the central activities undertaken at the fairs.
147
  
 
The participation of the fur trade in the fairs followed the tides of change. In particular, 
furriers in Leipzig managed to adapt to the new fair system. They organised a ‘novelty 
exhibition’ that focused on fashion developments and showcased new garment models. 
However, due to a wide variety in the quality and types of raw furs, many fur traders held the 
exhibition of samples to be of limited value.
148
 Did the fur fairs lose their commercial value 
entirely? The renowned Saxon economist Erich Benndorf estimated that the trade in furs at 
the eastern fairs still represented roughly one third of the sales turnover of the Leipzig fur 
business before World War I. Whereas the Michaelismesse in the autumn lost international 
relevance (it was almost exclusively visited by German buyers), merchants from abroad 
continued to visit the city during the Easter fairs.
149
 However, the bulk of trade was now 
performed outside the Leipzig trade fairs.  
 
Nevertheless, the changing function of trade fairs did not lead to a decline in commercial fur 
trading in Leipzig per se. Rather, it stimulated the emergence of permanent fur businesses in 
Leipzig. In particular, the settlement of Jewish middlemen in Leipzig as domiciled 
businessmen fortified the process of business formation in the fur industry. The settlement of 
Jewish fur traders in the Brühl was part of a lengthy process that was only partially initiated 
by the decline of the trade fairs. Until around 1830, Saxon laws curtailed Jewish business and 
property rights. Leipzig therefore only had 22 Jewish inhabitants in 1785 but that number had 
grown to 76 in 1834. A change in Saxon laws in the mid 1830s facilitated the settlement 
Jewish business. Marcus Harmelin, a supplier from Brody, founded one of the first prominent 
Jewish companies in Leipzig in 1830. The Felsenstein brothers also established themselves as 
one of the first Jewish merchant houses in Leipzig. The arrival of Harmelin and the 
Felsensteins in the Brühl preceded many more traders who linked the fur business in Leipzig 
to the outside world.
150
 Many traders originated from Brody, the Galician city that served as 
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East-West trade junction. Fein Nachmann (1842) and Saul Finkelstein (1857) ranked amongst 
the most prominent Jewish traders from Brody.
151
 Clearly, the number of permanent 
mercantile establishments was on the rise both in Russia and Germany, decreasing the need 
for annually organised trade fairs.
152
  
 
The full emancipation of Jews, which came in the wake of Saxony’s integration into the North 
German confederation, triggered the arrival of a new cohort of Jewish entrepreneurs who 
mostly originated outside the tradition of the fairs.
153
 The Jewish community grew from 713 
members in 1858 to 6,171 in 1900.
154
 A third wave of Jewish immigrants after World War I 
gave Leipzig Jewish community its strongest ever presence. In 1925, 12,594 persons belonged 
to the Jewish community in Leipzig (1.8% of the urban population.)
155
 Many of the second 
wave Jewish migrants were already businessmen who had established firms abroad or 
elsewhere in Germany before opening branches on the Brühl. Most noteworthy was the 
successful Moscow-based business of Chaim Eitingon (1857-1932). Eitingon opened a branch 
in Leipzig in 1893. Many of these newcomers could be categorised as transnational 
entrepreneurs that forged connections with the outside world. Between 1904 and 1917, for 
instance, Chaim Eitingon occasionally resided in Moscow, close to his business 
connections.
156
 The Eitingon family would become one of the largest and most important fur 
trading businesses in the interwar period. The family as organiser of transborder activities also 
typified the Ariowitsch firm, established by Julius Ariowitsch in 1871 and one of the most 
prominent firms in Leipzig. Julius Ariowitsch’s father Mordechai preferred to stay in Russia: 
he died while visiting the Nizhnii Novgorod fair of 1878.
157
 Having analysed the waves of 
Jewish immigration, the importance of outsiders and migrants in the creation of the industrial 
district has to be emphasised. The significance of migrants was pronounced in the trading 
sector. Outsiders contributed to the growth of the Leipzig fur industry in manufacturing as 
well. International mobility was thus an important aspect of the formation of the industrial 
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district. The transborder connections forged by these immigrants, who often continued to lead 
transnational lives themselves, will be discussed later: their mobility contributed significantly 
to the formation of the fur business in Leipzig.  
 
Finally, I should note the occupational structure of the Jewish population in Leipzig. Jewish 
migrants in Leipzig mainly contributed to the fur industry as traders and entrepreneurs 
whereas comparatively few of the Jewish migrants were employed as fur workers. This seems 
to divert from occupational patterns in the fur industry elsewhere. In both European and 
American fur centres, Jewish immigrants tended to be more active in sweatshops and in the 
manual labour workforce than in Germany. For instance, in 1912, 7,000 of the 10,000 fur 
workers in the USA (predominantly in New York) were of Jewish descent.
158
 In Germany, 
Jewish settlers were mostly self-employed since German administrative policy clearly 
favoured the settlement of more well-to-do migrants. According to Nancy Green, German 
migration authorities employed a more ‘utilitarian’ policy that focussed on the economic 
surplus the Jewish migrant could produce. The result was that relatively few Jewish craft 
workers settled in the Reich.
159
 Merchants therefore represented the majority of Jewish 
settlers in Saxony.
160
 The policy determined the supply of entrepreneurs to the Leipzig fur 
business. In 1925, of the 4,693 Jews in Leipzig with a gainful occupation, 805 worked on the 
Brühl. Thus, almost one out of four Jews worked in the Leipzig fur business. Of the 805 Jews 
associated with the Brühl, 396 were independent merchants and 268 worked as white collar 
workers in one of the many trading houses. Conversely, only 79 Jews worked as furriers and 
even fewer, 62, as labourers in the fur industry.
161
 The absence of Jewish fur workers in the 
Leipzig fur industry marked a major difference between Leipzig and other international fur 
centres: these tended to be more strongly characterised by an “all-round presence” of 
sweatshop workers and a Jewish proletariat next to successful entrepreneurs. 
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2.3 Patterns of local cooperation: specialisation, trade associations, and 
bank-firm relationships.  
 
2.3.1 The symbiosis between manufacturing and international trade.  
 
With the commercial function of the trade fair in decline, a permanently settled fur trade 
ascended. A body of merchants settled permanently in the city and organised the supply of 
furs at roughly the same time as when industrialisation triggered the formation of highly 
specialised production units in Leipzig. It is my belief that the development of trading and 
industry mutually reinforced one another. At the very least, the fact that the fur trade 
expanded simultaneously with the growth of fur manufacturing holds true. At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, Leipzig housed only 30 wholesale fur traders in total. By 1907, 
Saxony had about 350 fur trading firms employing 1,243 persons in addition to the many new 
factories that had emerged in Leipzig and environs. The number of Saxon fur trading firms 
represented 35% of the Reich’s total and the number of employees represented 42% of all 
workers active in the Reich’s fur trading activities. The group of entrepreneurs active in fur 
commerce was multifaceted not only in terms of ethnicity. The spectrum of entrepreneurs 
ranged from small traders to commissioners and brokers who worked on behalf of foreign 
trading companies. According to the contemporary trader Wilhelm Harmelin, a minority of 
these firms (roughly 30 to 50) were classified as leading fur trade companies. 
 
It is hard to ascertain precisely how many of them belonged to the city of Leipzig. However, it 
is clear that the Brühl was the undisputable heart of the Saxon fur trade. Based on research in 
Leipzig’s address book, it is can be concluded that Leipzig had about 794 fur traders in the 
city by 1930.
162
 Of the 794 fur traders active in the trading district, it was estimated that at 
least 460 of them were of Jewish origin. Unlike the processing industry, the commercial 
segment of the fur district was not widely dispersed in and around Leipzig, but centralised on 
the Brühl and in the adjacent Nikolaistrasse in downtown Leipzig.
163
 The Brühl was 
transformed into the billboard for the German fur industry, much like the Sentier was for the 
Parisian fashion industry. The fur trading houses, most of which were constructed between 
1860 and 1914, even evinced a distinct architectural style. The so-called ‘Pelzkontorhaus’ 
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typified the Brühl and the Nikolaistrasse in Leipzig: unfortunately only a few have survived 
the tides of history into the present day.
164
 Fur merchant houses could be recognised by their 
rich decoration and their large exhibition spaces. Fur merchant houses were connected to a 
common inner courtyard where deliveries were accepted.  
 
Picture 2: The Brühl in Leipzig (Stadtarchiv Leipzig, BA 1977 761. s.d.) 
 
There are strong indications that fur trading and fur manufacturing reinforced each other as 
the central components of the fur district. Steffen Held characterised the Leipzig fur industry 
as “a symbiosis between wholesale trading, the dressing and dyeing of skins in factories, and 
also small furrier businesses, primarily involved with fur tailoring.”165 Two elements of the 
symbiosis should be emphasised. Firstly, fur trading arguably influenced the emergence of the 
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fur cluster since it provided the raw material to be processed in these production units. In fact, 
trading necessarily involved links to the wider world. Fur traders forged connections with 
resource producing areas and discovered foreign sales markets. The following numbers reveal 
the foreign dimension of the Leipzig fur trade. The joint trade volume of the Leipzig fur 
industry amounted to 100 million marks in 1908: according to Benndorf, around 75 to 80% of 
that figure was earned from the turnover of foreign commerce.
166
  
 
Secondly, the fur trade was not only beneficial because of the connections it constructed to 
the outside world. Many fur trade companies built partnerships with existing fur factories or 
established manufacturing units by themselves in order to expand the profits made by fur 
trading. As a result, few fur factories in Leipzig operated independently from commerce.
167
 
They accepted work on behalf of other companies or depended upon the import of raw furs 
from larger enterprises specialised in commerce. For instance, in 1883, the trade firm Theodor 
Thorer opened a dyeing factory (Thorer & Co) in Leipzig-Lindenau, specialised in the 
industrial dyeing of karakul and Astrakhan sheepskins.
168
 Despite this horizontal integration, 
the Thorer family chiefly focused on the trading affairs of their business in North America, 
Central Asia, and Russia. The Thorer family therefore granted the factory a significant degree 
of autonomy. After 1925, a kinsman from the renowned Leipzig machine construction 
company Rudolf H Sack KG was appointed as the manager of the fur dyeing Thorer & Co. 
factory.
169
 The factory ranked as one of the largest in Leipzig since it employed 500-600 
workers (the number of labourers could fluctuate depending on seasonal activities). The trade 
firm itself, strongly in the hands of the Thorer family, employed 80 labourers and white-collar 
workers.
170
  
 
A similar division of labour applied to Friedrich Erler & Co. As mentioned above, the 
partnership with the chemist Adolf Stieglitz in the 1870s led to the construction of a fur 
dyeing factory. Stieglitz developed not only synthetic dyeing procedures but was also 
appointed manager of Erler’s factory, first in Plagwitz and later in Leipzig-Lindenau.171 
Although the Stieglitz firm retained its connection to the Erler firm well into the 1930s, it was 
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not exclusively a part of it. Indeed, the Erler firm had transformed from a fur workshop into a 
wholesale trading business. Similar collaborative structures between trading and 
manufacturing emerged between the trading firm Friedrich Maerz in the Brühl and the dyeing 
factory of Adolf Arnold AG. Links were created the other way around as well. Walter AG in 
Markranstädt, one of the largest fur dyeing factories and the only German fur company that 
was listed on the stock exchange, had a semi-independent trading division in the city centre of 
Leipzig.
172
 Ferdinand Salm, a medium-sized Jewish trading firm, owned a factory of about 
100-110 workers in Wahren, which, like Walter AG in Markrandstädt, illustrates the 
connection of international trading with Leipzig’s industrial hinterland and the wider Saxon 
region.
173
 In sum, the fur industry was compartmentalised along the lines of vertical 
specialised activities and they were not integrated in one overarching business but operated 
semi-independently from one another. Cooperation was an essential characteristic of intra-
firm networks. 
 
2.3.2 The social structure of the cluster: interest groups and trade associations.   
 
In the wake of the formation of the industrial district, trade associations in Leipzig followed 
suit. These associations served as forums to regulate conflicts in the district, not only between 
firms themselves but also between capital and labour. Firms also used trade associations to 
lobby the public authorities. Associations developed as forums that tried to keep adverse 
developments in the district at bay and regulate intra-firm competition. While examining trade 
associations of the fur industry, I hope to present proof that Leipzig was not only the 
commercial and industrial epicentre of the German fur business but was also the ‘capital’ of 
the German fur industry from an organisational perspective. It will be shown that all of the 
major national associations established headquarters in Saxony’s commercial centre, even if 
they were not strongly associated with the region. The timing of their emergence also 
illustrates the rapid formation of the district and reveals elements of the business structure. 
Remarkably, none of these organisations succeeded in representing firms across specialised 
activities, despite the fact that partnerships between firms often cut across such 
specialisations. Instead, trade associations followed the vertical division of labour that 
characterised the fur district. Every segment of the industry was represented by a separate 
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trade association: furriers, retailers, the trading houses, and finally the dressing and dyeing 
companies.  
 
The Leipzig Fur Guild (Kürschnerinnung zu Leipzig) ranked as one of the oldest because it 
represented the old guild established in 1425.
174
 Around 1900, it represented the interests of 
about 40 artisans, who employed 75 journeymen and 60 apprentices.
175
 It was perhaps not the 
most dynamic trade association of the district. The loss of their monopoly on production in 
the early 1860s, industrialisation, and the emergence of modern consumption patterns further 
jeopardised the independence of artisans.
176
 Like most heirs to the old guild organisations 
after freedom of enterprise, the furrier guild was predominantly occupied with a rearguard 
fight against the dismantlement of corporatism in Germany and the preservation of the 
venerable handwork tradition. In 1906, for instance, the furrier-guild set up a campaign 
against sales in department stores and bargain sales organised by fur traders that put 
downward pressure on craft-produced fur garments.
177
 Yet, as we have seen, artisanship 
maintained its appeal and formed an integral part of the fur district. The guild still issued 
regulations on apprenticeship and journeymen for its members and provided certificates for 
craft careers. Nevertheless, the guild had lost its monopoly on the organisation of handicraft 
work. A competing organisation, the Union of Independent Furriers in Leipzig (Verein 
selbständige Kürschner von Leipzig und Umgebung), was established in 1912.
178
 260 Leipzig 
furriers were members of this organisation. In addition, a significant number of furriers did 
not belong to any of these associaitions. 
 
The Leipzig Fur Guild was part of the national Union of German Furriers (Verein Deutscher 
Kürschner), which unified the diverse guild associations in Germany that protected craft 
traditions after the liberalisation of commerce in Prussia and other German states.
179
 In the 
mid-1890s, the association consisted of about 500 members across Germany.
180
 Leipzig also 
maintained a leading position within the national craft organisation. In 1922, the headquarters 
of the national association was placed in Leipzig and prominent Leipzig furriers, such as 
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Oskar Wenke and Kurt Quedenfeld, were appointed as leaders.
181
 Its most important feat was 
the foundation of a ‘furrier school’ in Leipzig, designed to preserve the tradition of fur 
crafting. In general, the importance of Leipzig as the organisational centre of fur crafting also 
attests to the enduring significance of craft production in the fur district.  
 
The relative decline of the guilds and the industrialisation of the fur industry fostered the 
development of new organisations. The Association of German Fur Dressers and Dyers 
(Verband Deutscher Rauchwaren Zurichtereien und Färbereien) was established in 1899.
182
 
The organisation remained rather small. In 1925, 27 industrialists had joined the Association 
of Fur Dressers and Dyers, 20 of whom were domiciled in Leipzig.
183
 Conversely, the 
organisation of labour appeared in the wake of the fur industry’s industrialisation. The first 
labour unions emerged in the 1880s, especially in the industrial hotspots of the fur industry: 
Markranstädt, Rötha, Lindenau, and Schkeuditz. Hard and unhealthy working conditions (fur 
dressers were prone to skin and lung diseases) erupted in two major strikes in 1884 and 
1886.
184
 In 1894, the furrier unions organised an international organisation, the International 
Furriers’ Secretariat (Internationales Kürschner Sekretariat) with headquarters in Berlin, one 
of the many International Trade Secretariats representing branches of the garment industry. In 
Leipzig, the fur workers unions achieved their first wage increase in 1882 and established the 
10-hour working day in 1900.
185
  
 
I will conclude this list of associations with the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association (Verband 
Leipziger Rauchwarenfirmen), established by the Leipzig fur traders in 1908. The Leipzig Fur 
Merchants Association attracted more members than its industrial counterpart. 42 trading 
firms immediately joined the trade association. It was also the most prominent and influential 
organisation of the Brühl. A diverse number of items characterised the agenda of the 
association, ranging from the standardisation of trade practices to the protection of the 
international position of Leipzig’s fur trading companies.186 The Leipzig Fur Merchants 
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Association witnessed its largest expansion after World War I. The Association was renamed 
the German Fur Merchants Association (Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Rauchwaren-firmen) 
and included firms from outside Leipzig. Membership rose from 148 firm-owners in 1919 to 
about 688 in 1925. Nevertheless, the headquarters remained in Leipzig. Since 480 members 
were Leipzig firms, the Leipzig division arguably formed the nucleus of the German Fur 
Trade Association.
187
 Since traders had the largest interest in foreign trade, this association 
also collectively addressed problems connected to transborder activities of the Leipzig 
district, admittedly somewhat timidly before World War I but more firmly thereafter.  
 
2.3.3 The local bank and fur industry nexus in Leipzig (1900-1914).  
 
This section on the link between finance and industry in Leipzig will conclude the portrait of 
the industrial district. I will demonstrate that local finance was supportive of both the local 
development of the Leipzig fur industry and the international operations of fur firms. As such, 
the local banks will be presented as economic agents of the district economy. Although cross-
fertilisation between the financial system and industrial development on the local level is 
often implicitly assumed, knowledge about the interaction between finance and industry in 
Saxony remains tentative at best. Frank Zschaler has shown that private banking persisted for 
a relatively long time in comparison to other industrialising regions. The persistence of 
private banking is said to have influenced the formation of the smaller businesses that 
pervaded in the region.
188
 The argument is based on the assumption that private banking was 
prone to invest in the smaller and specialised firms in the local areas whereas joint-stock 
banking investments flowed into the larger businesses. Private business had more limited 
financial resources than joint-stock banking and smaller partners therefore seemed better 
suited.  
 
How was the development of the fur industry in Leipzig linked to finance? It is unlikely that 
private banking was responsible for the pronounced business specialisation in the fur district. 
                                                 
187
 Rückert, Leipziger Wirtschaft in Zahlen, 888. 
188
 Frank Zschaler, “Das Bankhaus Meyer & Co in Leipzig. Eine Sächsische Bankiersfamilie Zwischen 1814 
Und 1972,” in Unternehmer in Sachsen. Aufstieg - Krise - Untergang - Neubeginn, ed. Ulrich Hess and Michael 
Schäfer, Leipziger Studien Zur Erforschung von Regionenbezogenen Identifikationsprozessen 4 (Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 1998), 235. A similar argument on the persistence of private banking and its influence on the 
formation of middle-sized businesses is made on a more general level in Youssef Cassis, “Private Banks and the 
Onset of the Corporate Economy,” in The World of Private Banking, ed. Philip Cottrell and Youssef Cassis 
(Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 43–61. 
The Birth of an Industrial District 
68 
 
After all, Leipzig formed the exception to rule in Saxony as a centre of banking. The 
commercial magnitude of the city attracted the presence of both private banks and the larger 
joint-stock banks. Whereas private banks emerged in Leipzig in the mid-17
th
 century, one of 
the first German join-stock banks, the Leipziger Bank, was established there as early as 1839. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Leipzig had developed as the financial centre of 
Saxony and was second only to the financial capital of the Reich, Berlin. In 1911, besides a 
Reichsbankhauptstelle, 31 private banks and bank branches were to be found in Leipzig. All 
major German joint-stock banks opened branches in the city: the Allgemeine Deutsche 
Creditbank (ADCA, present from 1856), Mitteldeutsche Regionalbank, the Hamburger 
Commerz und Discontobank (from 1911), the Deutsche Bank, and the ‘Bank für Handel und 
Industrie’ (Darmstädter Bank).189  
 
Without downplaying the importance of Zschaler’s observation on the cross-fertilisation 
between private banking and the domination of medium-sized business in Saxony, the 
presence of large joint-stock banks in Leipzig was not inimical to the clustering of small-
scaled and specialised fur firms. Joint-stock banks did not leave investment in the fur industry 
to private banks: rather, the credit market was divided between private and joint-stock banks. 
In general, the fur industry was a capital-intensive industry. Furthermore, I will argue that 
small and medium-sized business profited from the bank competition prevalent in Leipzig’s 
financial district. In other words, the interest of the banks in the city’s commercial business, 
especially in a rapidly expanding entity like the fur district, offered opportunities to both small 
and large firms alike. All the joint-stock banks took an interest in the fur district, particularly 
the ADCA, the Dresdner Bank, the Deutsche Bank and, to a lesser extent, the Commerzbank. 
The fur industry was also closely linked to private banks, most importantly the Bankhaus 
Meyer & Co. Firms could rely on several bank connections and profited from bank offers that 
aimed to extract the fur firms from rival banks. Bank competition, rather than the nature of 
the banks, seemed to have been influential in regards to business organisation. 
 
Competition between joint-stock banks over the fur industry was particularly strong in the 
case of the branches of the Dresdner and the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig. Their rivalry was also 
the best documented. Both banks entered the financial market of Leipzig relatively late. 
Whereas the Dresdner Bank had its roots in Saxony, the Leipzig branch was established only 
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in 1909, surprisingly late: this was significantly later than the establishment of branches 
abroad (London, 1895) or commercial centres in Germany of comparable magnitude like 
Hamburg (1892).
190
 The opening of a branch in Leipzig was thus part of an expansive policy 
of transforming itself into a universal bank with the aim of creating a dense network of 
branches in the Reich and abroad. Importantly, the new branch first opened in the epicentre of 
the fur trade, at the Brühl 37/39.
191
  
 
The Dresdner Bank was still interested in investing in its home region, despite the fact that it 
had gradually evolved into a nation-wide bank at the turn of the century.
192
 In 1913, von 
Klemperer, the director of the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig, wrote “despite its role as large and 
international bank, the Dresdner Bank is still a Saxon institute and one of its first goals is the 
support of Saxon trade and industry.”193 Given this self-declared commitment to Saxony, the 
lack of customers in Leipzig was a painful lacuna in the banking affairs of the Dresdner Bank. 
As the bank had to start from scratch in Leipzig, the fur industry featured prominently in the 
‘conquest’ of the local lending market. The bank focused on “unsatisfied customers” in order 
to attract new accounts. This can be seen in the somewhat self-laudatory memoirs of von 
Klemperer: “I began with the fur sector and found success because of our international 
contacts and our willingness to provide credit and accept “special desires.” I succeeded in 
bringing in first class firms as customers and thereby I had overcome!”194 The first customers 
were Chaim Eitingon, Königswerther, and Ullmann: after only a few months, most of the fur 
firms had become customers of the Dresdner Bank.
195
 Locally clustered activities were 
apparently of interest to the Dresdner Bank. After the fur industry, von Klemperer won many 
new accounts in the book printing industry, the other main industrial district in the Leipzig 
region. The result was that the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig assigned a staggering 70% of its 
credit activities between 1924 and 1929 to the local fur industry and the book printing 
sector.
196
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The Deutsche Bank entered the Leipzig market much earlier (1901), where it occupied the 
vacuum left by the bankruptcy of the first joint-stock bank in Leipzig, the Leipziger Bank.
197
 
Competition between banks in Leipzig sharpened after the opening of the Deutsche Bank’s 
division.
198
 The Leipzig division of the Deutsche Bank followed a similar strategy to the 
Dresdner Bank in order to gain a foothold in the trade fair city. On the business credits 
market, the Deutsche Bank focused on luring customers from the ADCA. In 1901, it gained 
Ariowitsch as a customer. Soon, the Brühl came to represent the largest circle of customers of 
the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig.
199
 Continuity of leadership also preserved the entanglement 
between banks and the fur industry. Von Klemperer led the Leipzig division of the Dresdner 
Bank from its opening in 1909 until 1934. Continuity in terms of personnel characterised the 
Deutsche Bank as well. Eugen Naumann headed the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig between 1909 
until 1930. Before the directorship, he had been vice-director of the Leipzig branch between 
1901 and 1909: earlier, he had learnt banking in the London and Hamburg branches. Both 
directors were advocates of investment in the local fur industry. They remained in the highest 
positions of local finance for almost thirty years.  
 
The trade in furs, an expensive luxury commodity, required large financial efforts. The banks 
in Leipzig were an important support for the international operations of the Leipzig fur 
industry as they helped to finance fur imports to the Leipzig district. As such, the support of 
the banks was seminal to the development of the Leipzig fur industry as an industrial district. 
In addition, due to the structure of the ‘fur business year,’ money was needed at very specific 
moments, such as the annual fairs and auctions where fur traders bought large bulks of furs. 
Little is known about the relationship between the banks and the fur industry before World 
War I, yet several factors indicate that banks tailored their financial products to the 
requirements of the fur industry. In 1906, for instance, the Deutsche Bank granted the 
Theodor Thorer firm 300,000 marks of unsecured credit, which was extended with short-term 
loans to the sum of “200,000 marks during the large fairs and auctions in the world.”200 
Thorer did not solely depend on the credit of the Deutsche Bank. Indeed, the opposite was 
true. By October 1913, the credit provided to Thorer by the Leipzig banks (which he spent in 
London and Nizhnii Novgorod) amounted to 2,310,000 marks: 500,000 had been provided by 
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the Deutsche Bank.
201
 The fur industry was able to profit from the competition between the 
banks. Firms could accrue credit from multiple sources because of the laws of supply and 
demand on the bank market. Fianlly I should briefly note the advantages of multiple bank 
connections. In order to diminish risk, the banks were interested in investing in more than just 
a few fur firms. Joint credit offers diminished the financial risks of the banks.  
 
The element of competition can be found in other cases as well. In particular, two other 
examples will be given in connection to the Deutsche Bank. Before Thorer, the Ariowitsch 
account was the most important to the Deutsche Bank and its commitment toward this Jewish 
trade firm consisted of around 600,000 marks in unsecured credit that the firm could freely 
use for purchasing. According to the Leipzig office, the Ariowitsch fur firm represented “the 
single most important account in their books.”202 With the banking affairs of the firm 
amounting to 3,000,000 marks, it represented the flagship account of the new branch. It was 
noted that “we are the only bank connection and much of the profitable foreign commerce 
goes through our hands.”203 Ariowitsch entertained connections to one bank only and the 
Deutsche Bank in Leipzig tried to keep it that way. The effects of competition worked here as 
well. In 1913, the Ariowitsch family could easily exert pressure on the Deutsche Bank when 
they needed additional unsecured credit: “two other banks have offered these gentlemen 
unsecured credit but they want to stay with us, and will refrain from opening a second credit 
line.”204 However, this was on the condition that the Deutsche Bank extended the unsecured 
credit by a further 150,000 marks.  
 
As part of its expansion policy, the Deutsche Bank connected to the Biedermann firm, one of 
the pioneering companies in the fur trade in Russia’s Far East, as early as 1908.205 The trade 
volume of the Biedermann firm was worth 2,600,000 marks and therefore it was one of the 
largest fur firms on the Brühl. Although the Biedermann firm had considerable financial 
resources, “steadily increasing prices” forced Biedermann to support his commercial activities 
in Russia on bank credits. Biedermann divided his banking affairs between the Deutsche Bank 
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and, to a lesser extent, the Bank für Handel und Industrie and the Bankhaus Meyer & co, a 
private Saxon bank. In 1910, the Deutsche Bank, like the Bankhaus Meyer, approved 
commercial credit of 100,000 marks, which Biedermann could spend at the Nizhnii fairs. 
Later, in 1913, Biedermann demanded that his credit be increased in order to keep up with the 
rise in prices. The head office in Berlin regarded Biedermann’s credit request as 
‘inconvenient’ (unbequem) since the international fur industry was undergoing problems in 
1913. Upon the advice of Berlin, the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig therefore declined his request 
in order “curb his entrepreneurial spirit.” However, Biedermann, whose trade volume had 
increased to 11,000,000 Mark, then opened negotiations with the Dresdner Bank, the main 
competitor of the Deutsche Bank, for some short-term loans.
206
 Biedermann held that bank 
credit for buying in Russia was paramount for the survival of his firm. With the threat of the 
Dresdner Bank lurking, the Deutsche Bank gave in. Naumann increased Biederman’s 
unsecured credit from 100,000 to 300,000 marks.
207
 Bank competition offered considerable 
opportunities to the fur firms in Leipzig and made it difficult for banks to curb ‘risky’ 
business expansion. 
 
The heavy competition on the local lending market is further illustrated in the communication 
of the Deutsche Bank between the branch in Leipzig and the head office in Berlin. Criticism 
towards the policy of the Leipzig office had long been looming but finally erupted in 1913. In 
that year, the trade cycle in furs was rather slack and Berlin panicked about the position of its 
Leipzig office in the local economy. It posed restrictions on the Leipzig office, which had 
been overly transfixed on the success of several fur firms. Nonetheless, the head office 
understood the pressure that Naumann had experienced when breaking into the local lending 
market: “We understand that under the circumstances it is not easy to pose limits on your 
customers in the fur industry, which are courted heavily by your competitors and whose 
commercial success tempts you to further expand your business activities.”208 In the years 
before the war, the head office aimed to reverse the policy of the Leipzig office. Berlin 
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instructed that the Leipzig branch should “limit its credit to the local industry and decline new 
requests for credit, particularly from the fur industry.”209  
 
The nervousness during the 1913 slump reveals the lopsided balance between the fur industry 
and the banking system. The Gotha Privatbank, for instance, had almost blindly granted 
300,000 marks of credit to Theodor Thorer from 1906 on the advice of the Deutsche Bank. In 
the troubled year of 1913, the private bank suddenly worried about the risks it had 
undertaken: “the connection is now somewhat uncomfortable since we are not able to learn 
more about this firm and we cannot supervise it. Moreover, they have multiple connections to 
banks besides us (…).”210 Regarding the panic that had engulfed the banking system in 1913, 
the director of the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig noted that “several of the banks (...) especially 
the Bank für Handel and Industrie, Mitteldeutsche Privatbank, Bankhaus Meyer & Co (...) 
have gratuitously and even light-headedly granted credit to a number of companies in the 
district that do not even deserve to exist and will scatter once trade imposes restrictions.” The 
Deutsche Bank believed in a purifying effect of credit restrictions: “the new conditions have 
the effect that many traders will be unable to purchase at the fairs: all the strong firms will 
survive and the weaker ones will go down. It is a traditional phenomenon at the Brühl that a 
“purification” of the market occurs without having negative effects upon the stronger 
elements.”211 
 
As can be seen in the above discussion, the competition between those banks positively 
influenced the development of firms in the district since banking competition had a downward 
effect on lending conditions. However, the entanglement of the banking system and the fur 
industry cannot be seen as a purely endogenous factor, since the clustering of business and 
finance can also be read as a reaction towards macroeconomic developments. Banks followed 
the requirements of firms that were imposed on the latter by foreign commerce, like short-
term credit for annual fairs. In addition, by the end of the nineteenth century, a decreasing 
supply of prime furs caused a steady rise of wholesale prices.
212
 The local banking system not 
only supported the growth of the fur industry: the availability of credit was of seminal 
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importance for the fur industry since such allowed them to participate in the international fur 
boom of the early twentieth century. It is hereby illustrated again that the formation and 
endurance of the industrial district and inter-firm networks cannot be solely explained by 
endogenous factors. Like most Saxon industries, the Leipzig fur industry was strongly 
oriented towards the world market. In other words, to understand the formation of the fur 
district, we need to examine the structure of the world market that the local economy was 
embedded in. It is time to position the fur district more consistently within the system of 
international trade.  
 
2.4 The changing structures of the world fur trade. 
 
In order to study the position of the district in relation to the outside world, it is obviously 
necessary to place Leipzig within the context of global trade: in other words, within the 
commodity chain of furs in which it was embedded. However, a difficulty immediately arises 
when talking about the commodity chain in furs. It makes more sense to subdivide the 
commodity chain into two larger subchains. The first chain originated from the heartlands of 
Siberia and went across the Urals to fur markets in western Russia, where the furs ended up in 
the hands of foreign buyers. The second one started in the woodlands of North America with 
London as its central hub in terms of both trade and manufacture. Both had a number of 
striking historical similarities and both changed significantly during the long nineteenth 
century.  
 
The global commodity chains of furs on both continents were created relatively early in terms 
of world economic history and featured prominently in processes of frontier expansion. Since 
the late middle ages, traders from the state of Muscovy systematically integrated the vast 
Siberian woodlands into what would become the largest continental empire in world history. 
Russian traders set out en masse to explore the Siberian woodlands and installed an imperial 
exploitation system that was subsequently monopolised by the state.
213
 Similarly, European 
demand for furs was largely responsible for attracting hunters and explorers to North 
America. A difference in the colonial expansion on both continents was coercion.
214
 The 
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Russians installed a system of taxation, ‘iasak,’ obliging the natives to contribute a yearly 
tribute in furs.
215
 The collection of iasak, which formed the basis for Russia’s fur trade, was 
accompanied by coercion and brutal violence against the natives.
216
 In North America, 
especially before the Seven Years War, competition based on bartering with native hunters, 
rather than coercion, characterised the fur trade.
217
 Whereas the state dominated fur 
procurement in Russia via taxes, the Hudson’s Bay Company (an imperial-chartered company 
similar to the East India Company) exploited the fur wealth of the Canadian woodlands. 
 
The impact of the fur trade upon the resource-orientation of the involved economies was 
similar. Russian and Canadian economic development was to a large extent shaped by the 
trade in furs well into the 1700s. The dependency on furs characterised pre-Petrine Russia. 
Historians like Alexander Etkind have pointed out the impact of the fur industry upon the 
infrastructure of the Russian state, which had made itself proficient in the export and taxing of 
resources. He writes that “fed by the fur trade, the state experimented with other resources and 
institutions.”218 Similarly, Harold Innis’ seminal monograph on the fur trade in Canada 
described how the trade, created by European immigrants and foreign companies, produced a 
long-lasting economic dependence on overseas markets and shaped the country’s core 
institutions. Even though the economic determinism used by Innis has been refuted, his 
“staple theory” that preceded dependency and underdevelopment theories gave birth to a 
reassessment of the political and economic history of North America.
219
  
 
An important difference between the Siberian and North American trades was the way in 
which sales were organised. As mentioned before, the Siberian fur trade was organised into a 
system of trading at fairs. In sharp contrast, the sale of North American furs was organised at 
auctions. In auctions, the seller puts the ‘pricing in the hands of the buyers’ hoping that 
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competition will set an acceptable price. Therefore, it is a useful system if there are a large 
number of potential buyers.
220
 It is also convenient for selling a commodity that is not entirely 
standardised. This was the case for furs because of a large variety in quality: fluctuations were 
also caused by changes in fashion. The British fur trade was initially characterised by a quasi-
monopolistic seller and a large arena of buyers from Britain and abroad. Auctions were thus 
tailored to the quasi-monopolistic Hudson’s Bay Company and its top-down trade structure. 
On the other hand, fairs enabled multiple buyer-seller transactions and the presence of many 
smaller firms, as was the case in the Russian fur trade. Auctions were a typically British 
phenomenon too. Auction houses like Sotheby’s emerged in eighteenth century England. 
Auctions governed the transaction of other imperial commodities, like the tea offered by the 
British East India Company.
221
  
 
Nonetheless, the historical commodity chains were undergoing significant changes in the 
nineteenth century that made them more alike, although still not identical. First of all, in both 
North America and Siberia, the fur trade became less central in economic affairs. Between 
1700 and 1900 the importance of furs in the structure of the Russian economy declined 
steeply. By 1900, the export of furs represented only a marginal 1% of total Russian 
exports.
222
 According to Michael Dohan, between 1909 and 1913, the export of furs in tsarist 
Russia corresponded to 1.1% of exports.
223
 In Canada, the fur trade was replaced by other 
activities like lumbering, mining, and farming. At the same time, the world market prices of 
furs went uncontrollably upwards, especially at the turn of the century. According to Arthur 
Ray, fur prices in Canada remained relatively stable between 1870 and 1900. However, in 
1905 prices reached 130% of the 1870 level and in 1910 prices ascended even further to 
180%. Prices of raw furs reached record heights in 1913 with 230% of the 1870 price level.
224
 
The trend in Russian furs is remarkably similar. Russian trade figures reveal that earnings 
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made from exports went up while procurement stagnated. At the turn of the century, fur 
exports were worth 3.3 million roubles on average: between 1900 and 1906, this figure 
reached 9.5 million and then 15.6 million between 1907 and 1913.
225
 Scarcity and growing 
consumption in particular were driving world market prices to new heights. 
 
The squandering of resources and growing consumption increased global competition over 
furs. Furthermore, competition became fiercer because of the growing accessibility of the 
frontier zone. Both in North America and in Siberia, more capitalistic businesses came to 
divide control the fur trade.
226
 In Canada, the Hudson’s Bay Company had to tolerate the 
intrusion of foreign competitors that made use of the transcontinental railway and steamboat 
shipping. Most leading American, British, and German merchant houses had sent agents or 
installed branches in Canada’s boreal zones.227 In 1821, the HBC managed to merge with the 
North West Company, one of the first that threatened to trade along the Pacific coast.
228
 
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, American firms played a leading role in the 
Canadian fur trade. The French Revillon Frères company also became one the most dynamic 
competitors of the HBC in North America. Firms like Revillon Frères turned into global 
players. Such global firms meant heavy competition for the London auctions. At the turn of 
the century, roughly 50% of Canadian furs were exported to the US and the other half to 
Great Britain. Prior to 1900, almost 80% flowed to the fur auctions in London.
229
 In Siberia, a 
similar pattern of competition emerged on the frontier. The state-led exploitation based on the 
iasak was replaced by monetarised transactions because of the intrusion of private merchants 
and businesses.
230
 Siberia became more ‘open’ too. Business interests intruded Siberia and its 
markets like Irbit because of the construction of parts of the Trans-Siberian railway. The 
Revillon Frères company opened departments in the Siberian heartlands and in Central Asia 
in 1908.
231
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By the turn of the century, global competition in manufacturing surfaced more strongly as 
well. Aside from Leipzig, fur manufacturing emerged prominently in Great Britain and North 
America. The fur dressing industry in London’s East End was one of the first manufacturing 
hubs in Europe. However, the British fur dressing and dyeing industry remained significantly 
smaller than its German counterpart. In 1907, Britain’s fur industry employed 2,386 male and 
2,305 female workers, a figure that is almost identical to the number of labourers in Saxony 
(4,643) in the same year.
232
 British fur manufacturing was thus completely dwarfed by the 
total workforce in the German industry (18,232). Furthermore, fur manufacturing in London 
obviously profited from the presence of merchants but forms of cooperation between 
commerce and industry like in Leipzig were non-existent. Competition particularly came from 
across the Atlantic. A key shift was the increase in fur consumption in the US and the 
associated emergence of fur manufacturing in American cities like Chicago and New York at 
the turn of the century. By 1912, the American fur industry employed around 10,000 
labourers, amongst which were 7,000 of Jewish origin.
233
 Fur manufacturing in Toronto and 
Montreal was said to be of a lesser magnitude.  
 
The emergence of Leipzig as an industrial district has to be placed within a context of 
increased global fur manufacturing and fur trading. It emerged in a world market that was in 
full expansion. Both chains had changed considerably during the nineteenth century in the 
sense that they became more globalised. The international fur trade that had been 
characterised by early modern trade patterns, based on the fairs, and dominated by quasi-
monopolistic actors like the HBC was in full transition. Capitalist business increasingly 
defined the organisation of trade in both chains. I have already mentioned that historically the 
fur trade in Leipzig was strongly oriented towards Russian business. Nonetheless, economic 
institutions like the fairs were under pressure. How was the Leipzig industrial district 
embedded within this changing structure of global trade and in the dual commodity chains? 
Did firms simply focus upon the Russian market or were they interested in other markets as 
well? How did long term development and chain institutions govern the conditions under 
which the Leipzig firms operated?  
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2.5 Leipzig on the world market.  
 
2.5.1 Transnational entrepreneurship and eastern orientations.  
 
In a way, increased competition was not an entirely new chapter in the history of the Siberian 
fur trade. While fur procurement was dominated by the state system of fur tributes or iasak, 
the organisation of the fur exports had historically been in the hands of competing foreign 
firms and merchants.
234
 The initial trade in Siberian furs in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries was 
organised by members of the Hanseatic league and then by merchants that frequented the fairs 
in Nizhnii Novgorod. Dutch and British merchants, drawing upon the power of their merchant 
navies, were predominant but German traders were important as well.
235
 In the nineteenth 
century, the export organisation of an important number of resources and agricultural products 
remained largely in the hands of foreign firms and banks.
236
 However, global competition 
over Siberian furs at the end of the nineteenth century involved foreign firms not only as 
organisers of exports but also as agents of procurement.
237
 
 
Most of the firms and merchant banks that dominated the Russian trade in the nineteenth 
century were of German origin. In fact, German merchants and merchant houses had replaced 
the British as the main trading partner of Russia, especially after the Crimean War.
238
 By 
1860, German merchants commanded the list of exporters using the harbour of St. 
Petersburg.
239
 Between 1899 and 1910, around 45% of Russian’s exports on average were 
destined for Germany whereas 45% of Russian imports originated from the Reich. In contrast, 
Britain ran a small deficit with tsarist Russia: it imported 18% of Russian goods but only sold 
                                                 
234
 Jarmo Kotilaine,  ussia’s  oreign Trade and Econo ic Expansion in t e Se enteent   entury: Windows on 
the World (Leiden, the Netherlands; Boston: Brill, 2005), 9. 
235
 Eric Henk Wijnroks, Handel tussen Rusland en de Nederlanden, 1560-1640: een netwerkanalyse van de 
Antwerpse en Amsterdamse kooplieden, handelend op Rusland (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2003), 12. 
236
 Dohan, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy and Soviet Industrialization Strategy,” 104. 
237
 Ibid. Foreign capital also  not invested much in export driven industries of Russia, but rather on industries that 
focused on the domestic market 
238
 Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24. 
239
 Erik Amburger, “Der Fremde Unternehmer in Russland bis zur Oktoberrevolution im Jahre 1917,” Tradition: 
 eitsc ri t   r  ir engesc ic te und  nterne  erbiograp ie 2, no. 4 (1957): 354; The list of exports through 
the harbour of St. Petersburg in 1861 was headed by Ludwig Knoop, who purchased Russian goods for 
8,723,126 silver roubles. On the German presence in Vladivostok, see Lothar Deeg, Kunst & Albers 
Wladiwostok: die Geschichte eines deutschen Handelshauses im russischen Fernen Osten (1864-1924) (Essen: 
Klartext, 1996).  
The Birth of an Industrial District 
80 
 
13%.
240
 A considerable number of key Russian export commodities were in the hands of 
German traders, like barley (61.5%), grain (31%), and oil (40%). Conversely, between 1907-
1910, 45% of all goods that Russia imported came from Germany, foremost machinery and 
dyes. Furs were central to bilateral trade relations. In 1913, 64.3% of Russia’s total fur exports 
(which accounted for roughly half of world production) arrived in Germany.
241
  
 
Moreover, the German fur industry also controlled Russia’s internal fur market by re-
exporting manufactured furs, since synthetic dyeing was largely underdeveloped in Russia. 
Michael Dohan noted that 84% of all Russia’s processed leather and fur imports came from 
Germany. This lead to the situation where German garments, made from Siberian furs, were 
sold in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Despite being one of the largest fur producers in the 
world, Russia was essentially transformed into a net importer of furs at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. According to the tsarist customs houses, the value of these processed furs 
was roughly 2.8 times higher than raw furs.
242
 Furs joined the commodity list of Russian 
products, like flax and platinum, which the Germans could use to dominate internal markets 
in Russia through re-export with added value.
243
  
 
What explains the success of German merchants and firms? Apart from the impact of 
international events like the Crimean War on rival British businesses, Maragaret Miller noted 
that this “peaceful penetration” was based on a German willingness to adapt to local customs: 
“German merchants studied the language, customs, desires, and needs of their customers to a 
much greater extent than did their English colleagues.”244 The same tendency to meet Russian 
desires extended to the level of trading practices. For instance, German traders complied with 
the Russian penchant for selling on credit, which the British merchants strongly disliked.
245
 In 
contrast to the complacent representatives of British firms, the Germans were quicker to 
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appear in cities and areas that required trading services, to adapt to local customs, and to make 
themselves proficient in the Russian language. 
 
Anecdotal evidence delivers proof that Leipzig merchants were indeed organisers of Russian 
fur exports and had specialised themselves in the Russian commerce. Firstly, the 
entanglement between banking and the fur trade allowed fur traders to comply with the 
Russian preference for payment in advance. Banks in Leipzig gave considerable credit to 
purchase furs at the fairs in Nizhnii, thus covering the time between buying in Russia and 
selling in Leipzig. In addition, the gradually increasing prices did not affect the firms’ abilities 
to operate on the Russian markets since competition between banks in Leipzig pushed credit 
to the same heights. Secondly, firm owners in the fur business showed at least a similar 
devotion to adapt to Russian trade customs as their colleagues in other trades. All the major 
Leipzig firms possessed branches in Russia or had brokers working for them. However, the 
specialisation in the Russian business also made way for a different mode of entrepreneurship, 
one that was closely linked to a transnational lifestyle. This was, of course, linked to the fact 
that many entrepreneurs had a migrant background. 
 
The last two elements of specialisation in the Russian fur business, branching and mobility, 
can be illustrated by analysing the foreign activities of several Leipzig firms. Fur merchant 
houses in Leipzig traditionally sent family and employees on long journeys through Russia. 
Joseph Garfunkel, employed by the Marcus Harmelin firm and also a member of the Harmelin 
family through marriage, mentioned a journey as a young adolescent to Nizhnii Novgorod in 
1889 with his father. Later, Joachim Harmelin, one of the youngest descendents of Marcus 
Harmelin, joined Garfunkel on a trip to Nizhnii. In 1892, Garfunkel undertook travel to the 
February fairs in Irbit, which was still uncharted territory for many foreign merchants. This 
was an advantageous strategy because it meant that the firm could circumvent the 
intermediary trade that took the furs from Irbit to Nizhnii Novgorod.
246
 At the turn of the 
century, the Harmelin firm possessed an agency even deeper in Siberia, close to the source of 
raw furs.
247
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The Jewish Fränkel family also organised business according to the large sales events in the 
Russian fur trade, thereby demonstrating the features of transnational entrepreneurship. The 
Fränkel family were Jews who had moved in the 1850s to Leipzig from Brody and established 
the Julius N. Fränkel company. Hugo Fränkel, who was born in Leipzig, inherited the 
business much later. Whilst maintaining the branch in Leipzig, he moved back to Moscow 
and spent most of his time in Russia. However, Fränkel conducted most of his business 
outside of Moscow. His 14-year old son Jury mentioned in his memoirs that his father took 
him to the fairs in Irbit in the winter of 1913-14, the beginning of a long sequence of tiresome 
trips.
248
 In Irbit, Fränkel and his son met many members of the Leipzig Brühl, one of whom 
was David Biedermann. After Irbit, Fränkel sent his furs back to Moscow. With the furs 
shipped from Moscow to Germany, he and his son travelled in the spring to Leipzig, where 
they stayed with their family still residing close to the Brühl. In the summer, however, the 
Fränkels went back already to Moscow and travelled forth to Nizhnii in order to attend the 
fairs. The analysis of the business activities of this family firm reveals that the phenomenon of 
transnational entrepreneurship was seminal in the commercial links between the east and 
Leipzig. Transnational entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs that maintain business links within 
multiple communities across state borders: “Transnational entrepreneurs by travelling both 
physically and virtually, simultaneously engage in two or more socially embedded 
environments.”249 Such merchant families were certainly rooted in more than one social 
context and they maintained global trade relations of the Leipzig fur trade.  
 
As can be seen from the example of the Fränkel family, the Moscow-Leipzig axis had turned 
into an operating base for fur trading in Russia. Moscow was a growing hub for foreign 
business: a large German community was domiciled in Moscow and Nizhnii Novgorod could 
easily be reached from there.
250
 The Chaim Eitingon AG in Leipzig had a division in 
Moscow, which after 1910 was called the Moskauer AG für Rauchwarenhandel and was 
headed by a nephew of Chaim Eitingon.
251
 Chaim, similar to the Fränkel family, was a 
transnational entrepreneur in the sense that he lived in both cities: only just before World War 
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I he desided to reside permanently in Leipzig. Middle-sized firms also had branches in 
Moscow, like Koenigswerther (1910-1914) and Munisch Rapaport, a fur trader who had 
agents in Moscow and Nizhnii Novgorod.
252
 Other Leipzig firms penetrated deeper into the 
Siberian heartlands in order to increase the efficiency of trade. In addition to the Moscow 
branch, Ariowitsch established a branch in Slobodskoi after 1904.
253
  
 
With regard to the organisation of Russian exports, Leipzig profited from the presence of 
merchants of Jewish origins, some of whom not only held contacts in Russia but were also 
Russians themselves. Aside from branching, links between Russian and Leipzig were 
maintained through mobility. Many of the Jewish entrepreneurs clearly led transnational lives, 
with Leipzig being one of their social contexts. However, gentile firm owners who specialised 
in the trade with the East demonstrated similar behaviour. Theodor Thorer, the founder of the 
Theodor Thorer firm, took his son and successor Paul Thorer, aged 17, to the Russian fur 
centres Moscow and Nizhnii Novgorod. In order to avoid middlemen, Paul took the business 
further into Asia. He sent agents to Bukhara in order to buy Astrkhan and karakul sheep skins 
on the local market, thus circumventing the Russian trade. In 1902, Paul Thorer himself 
undertook a journey to Bukhara in order to expand his trade infrastructure. During his 
journey, he met the emir of Bukhara personally.
254
 Personal contacts and travelling was of the 
highest importance in securing profitable supplies of furs. The structure of the Russian fur 
trade required personal efforts and a transnational lifestyle.  
 
Some of the Leipzig firms were truly global firms. An intriguing example in terms of 
organising Russia’s foreign trade was the firm of David Biedermann. Biedermann (1869-
1930), a Russian Jew who lived in Leipzig, supported an impressive trade infrastructure on 
the Far Eastern frontier. Although he never travelled there in person, Biedermann’s firm was a 
pioneer in organising exports from the Russian Far East, usually through the Chinese border. 
Biedersmann’s Far East headquarters was situated in Urga (Ulan Bator), a major trade centre 
in Central Asia where the fur trade played an essential part. From Urga, Biedermann’s 
Russian representatives bartered with hunters and sent caravans stuffed with supplies, tea, 
sugar, leather, and silver to native tribes and hunter communities in Central Asia. It was 
therefore one of the few Leipzig firms directly involved in cross-cultural trade. The provisions 
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were traded for furs, wool, and animal hair.
255
 While Urga was the centre of the firm’s fur and 
wool trade, Biedermann possessed branches in Manchuria, Harbin, Chialar and Uljajutas in 
Mongolia. Indeed, cities like Harbin and Tainjin had flourishing Jewish communities that 
traded in furs, amongst other things.
256
 Biedermann integrated Leipzig into the Jewish-
Chinese fur trading business. As well as having a lucrative trade passage to China, the 
Biedermann firm also operated through the traditional channels, participating in the fairs of 
Nizhnii Novgorod and Irbit. David Biedermann left the dealings of the firm at these important 
fur fairs to his brother in Moscow.  
 
In terms of the Russian business, it has been established that a small business community in 
Leipzig constructed many ties with the East and Central Asia. Evidence regarding the 
activities of Leipzig merchants in Russia is patchy and certainly not exhaustive but 
nonetheless confirms a larger picture of dynamic German merchants in Russia prior to World 
War I. Leipzig merchants were successful in the Russian fur trade because of their great 
knowledge of local markets, customs, and networks. In addition, it has been illustrated that 
trade customs, like the credit system, were appropriated by local dynamics. Bank competition 
was beneficial to the international operations of Leipzig firms in the sense that it led to larger 
amounts of credit. Classic instruments like branching and agents were supplemented by 
transnational entrepreneurship. Many of the entrepreneurs who linked the industrial district 
were in fact members of more social contexts than just the Leipzig district, leading lives that 
took them abroad for a considerable period of time. Such a strategy was effective, although 
time-consuming. Indeed, perhaps it was so time-consuming that it may count as an additional 
factor preventing local firm expansion?  
 
2.5.2 Orientation to the American and French markets.  
 
While the export of Siberian furs was dependent upon foreign business and particularly 
German merchants, the German fur trade was not dependent on the exports of furs from 
Russia. Arthur Ray has noted the importance of Leipzig dealers in purchasing the furs that the 
Hudson’s Bay Company sold around 1870.257 Indeed, the German fur trade procured raw 
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material from multiple sources (see figure 1). The import of Russian furs was almost constant, 
although the numbers show a small contraction in the years leading to World War I. The 
decline in the Russian fur export can partly be traced back to the structural over-exploitation 
of Siberian fur resources. In 1914, the Altnoaer Nachrichten published an alarming report on 
the Russian fur trade: “prices increased yearly and reach a fabulous height (…) In spite of 
severe punishments in certain areas for hunting furbearers, results are absent. One cannot 
deny that the polar fox, the sable, and the skunks almost everywhere in the Russian empire are 
threatened by extinction.”258 Such reports were sensational but true. Russian hunting laws 
were very ineffective at protecting wildlife populations in the country, since they often 
exempted private property and vast Siberian territories. Illuminating is the drop in the number 
of caught sables (100,000 to 35,000) and martens (80,000 to 30,000) between 1896 and 
1913.
259
 
 
Figure 2-3: Import of raw furs to Germany (million marks)260 
 
In particular, the figures show that German fur businesses sourced raw furs from different 
suppliers but increasingly focused on the USA as a trade partner. Whereas Germany imported 
furs mainly from Great Britain and Russia at the turn of the century, imports chiefly came 
from the USA and Russia in the years leading to World War I. The reason was that American 
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firms and centres increasingly dealt in Canadian furs at the expense of the London market.
261
 
In this context, Leipzig fur firms increasingly oriented themselves to the American market. 
American firms also operated on the European market. Joseph Ullmann, a fur merchant from 
Pfaffstadt (Alsace) who established businesses in Chicago and New York in 1867, was one of 
the first to establish major ties between the European continent and American markets. As an 
American firm, Ullmann opened a branch in Leipzig in 1873.
262
 Revillon Frères, the main 
competitor of the HBC in Canada, also opened a branch in Leipzig. Not only did Revillon 
provide Canadian furs to the Leipzig market, but the firm also operated as a wholesale buyer 
in that centre. The interest of foreign firms in settling in Leipzig coincided with the 
emergence an industrial district in the fur industry and it signalled growing business 
competition over fur resources. 
 
Similarly, Leipzig firms increasingly established foreign branches as well, especially across 
the Atlantic. Indeed, these houses opened simultaneously with the shifting trade flows in 
Canadian furs from Great Britain to the USA. Ariowitsch established a New York division 
that opened in 1910 and was renamed as the J. Ariowitsch Corporation in 1914. However, it 
was liquidated immediately after World War I. Besides branches in New York, Ariowitsch 
was active in other markets, especially in Paris (Société d’Importation de Pelleteries, Paris), 
London (London: Ariowitsch & Jacop Fur Co. Ltd), and to a lesser extent in Stockholm 
(Svenska-Norska Pälsvaru-Actiebolaget).
263
 The Eitingon business, originally centred around 
the Leipzig-Moscow connection, also opened a branch in New York in 1912: the Russian 
nationality of the Eitingon family saved it from liquidation during World War I.
264
 
 
Theodor Thorer was one of the pioneers on the New York market. Alexander Thorer (the 
fourth son of Theodor) established the New York business in 1884: it was known known as 
Thorer Hollender Inc after the First World War. The New York house completed Thorer’s 
business empire. Before 1914, he had representatives in all the major fur markets: New York, 
London (Raw Furs Ltd), and Paris. This was all governed from Leipzig. Maintaining a 
multinational business across the Atlantic was not without its problems.
 265
 Alexander Thorer 
lacked the business acumen of his father and left America again for Germany in 1896. 
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Between 1896 and 1904, Carl Praetorius, a local German entrepreneur, was given leadership 
over the New York division. In 1904, the company appointed Edward M. Speer as a 
manager.
266
 However, relations between the head office in Leipzig and the management in 
New York remained dysfunctional. In 1913, the company was faced with what Thorer called 
himself the “worst year in company history.” It made a substantial loss of around 414,000 
marks, a part of which was ascribed to buy out the last shares of Praetorius in the New York 
branch.
267
 In February 1914, Paul Thorer and Paul Hollender pushed back the multinational 
organisation of the firm by giving more autonomy to the New York branch, thus transforming 
it into a free-standing subsidiary with a capital base of $200,000. Thorer had his qualms about 
the activities in the USA: “in recent years, it has been proven that Leipzig management over 
the New York division cannot be achieved in a satisfactory way. From the larger autonomy of 
the branch, I expect a return of the profitability of Thorer in New York.
268
 Even though the 
management of transatlantic business was not straightforward (except for Biedermann), a few 
major Leipzig houses had representation in New York before World War I. 
 
2.5.3 Global competition and collective action.  
 
The orientation to the American market was not only caused by the fact that Canadian furs 
were traded by American fur companies or the increasing transatlantic business connections, 
but also because of the growing competition between Leipzig and London. The scant source 
material on the German fur industry in the years leading to World War I points to an 
atmosphere of conflict between the Leipzig business community and London. Above all, 
participation in the British auction system was a source of major discontent. Auction fees 
could amount to 10% of the total price of the goods.
269
 However, while the auction fees were 
certainly galling, the main problem was that the crowded auction calendar increasingly 
interfered with the Leipzig fairs. The London raw fur market was saturated in the years 
leading to World War I. Firms that hitherto played a secondary role on the London fur market 
organised important auctions as well. Next to the HBC and the Lampson & Co auctions, the A 
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& W Nesbitt firm took a larger interest in the fur trade and the merchant banker Frederick 
Huth & Co organised auctions in London from 1912, which likewise dealt in North American 
furs.
270
 The boom in London fur auctions caused concern among Leipzig trade firms, who 
feared for the marginalisation of their international market institutions, especially the Leipzig 
trade fairs. In order to counter the London auctions, fur businesses in Leipzig endeavoured to 
create new market institutions. Such attempts were made early on. In the 1870s, the Leipzig 
merchant Heinrich Lomer tried to organise auctions in order to create a Leipzig market for the 
distribution of North American furs, thereby undermining the leading position of London.
271
 
However, the attempt failed.  
 
Interestingly, protecting the Leipzig fur trade against the British auctions was identified by 
individual firms as a common goal. Here, the importance of local associations came into play. 
In 1913, the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association opened negotiations with Lampson, one of 
the new players in London, in order reshape the agenda of the fur season. This led to the first 
meeting of international fur trade representatives in London at the Cannon Street Hotel. The 
Leipzig Fur Merchant Association demanded a merger between the Lampson & Co fur 
auctions and those of the Hudson’s Bay Company in March. This would allow the Leipzigers 
to preserve the importance of the Easter fairs, which were at that point “enclosed” between 
those large auctions, the HBC March auctions, and the Lampson June auctions. However, the 
meeting failed to produce a satisfactory result for the Leipzig trade. The British offered minor 
adjustments that only eased competition between the London firms but failed to do so on an 
international level.
272
 In 1914, the Leipzig Fur Merchant Association called for a boycott of 
Lampson’s June auctions.273 In Leipzig, 137 firms abided by this boycott: 32 companies also 
joined them, not all of them of German origin. Rivalry on the level of international business 
formed the basis for cooperation between firms in the fur district. Collective action was 
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undertaken to preserve the importance of the local economic institution that defined the 
position of the locality in the system of international trade. 
 
2.5.4 Leipzig and the export business.  
 
A final point we need to address is the position of Leipzig in terms of export markets. Figure 
2 presents the export structure of the German fur industry at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, representing the same duration of the import structure. The statistics here also 
confirm the trend of intensified trading with the US. Exports to resource providers are 
particularly noteworthy. Great Britain, the USA, and Russia were not only the major 
providers of raw furs but also important consumers of German-made furs. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that France was the most important customer of the German fur industry. Especially 
after 1904, France became the largest consumer of furs dyed in Germany by far. How was it 
that France was the principal customer for German furs? The answer is difficult to ascertain. 
Proximity was undoubtedly important since neighbouring countries, such as Belgium and 
Austria-Hungary, formed important markets too. The lack of fur manufacturing and an 
absence of a fur market in France might have played a role as well. In all likelihood, the 
strong presence of Leipzig-affiliated firms helped conquer the Paris sales market. It could also 
be argued that immigrant or transnational entrepreneurship played an important role in 
proximate sales markets like Paris. Before the Franco-Prussian War, a large community of 
German furriers was already present in the city.
274
 German immigration to Paris was 
temporarily declined immediately after that war but ultimately returned to older levels. 
Around the turn of the century, several firms opened branches again: a factory from Berlin, 
Wolff, Wilhelm Reinecke, Herpich Söhne, and Gebr. Breslauer, a Breslau firm, are cited as 
new German fur firms operating on the Parisian market.
275
 Leipzig firms like Konigswerther, 
Haendler Nathan, Ariowitsch, and Thorer followed suit.  
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Figure 2-4: Exports of German furs 
 
It is difficult to find a satisfactory answer regarding the role of the Saxon fur industry in the 
total export figure. We know it was an open business but precise figures are lacking. Rough 
estimates have placed the proportion of the Leipzig manufactured furs at about 45% of total 
German exports.
276
 However, figures on Leipzig exports to the USA are available and indicate 
the magnitude of fur manufacturing in Leipzig (see table 4). The reports of the American 
consulate in Leipzig recognised that the largest share of imported processed furs originated 
from Leipzig after 1904. In fact, firms in Leipzig almost exclusively served the American 
import market for manufactured furs in the years immediately preceding World War I. The 
share of processed furs from the Leipzig fur industry in American imports was much larger 
than the dressing industry in Great Britain. In 1912, $7,280,000, or 40% of the total American 
fur imports, had been processed in the Leipzig fur cluster.
277
 The value of the Leipzig exports 
to America equalled 29,120,000 marks and represented a 14% share of the total German fur 
exports. Thus, in several markets like the American one, the Leipzig industry was 
disproportionately large. It can be assumed that the Leipzig fur industry possessed a similar 
magnitude in exports to other countries as well.  
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Year Fur Imports  From Germany From 
Leipzig 
From Great 
Britain 
1901 11.01 3.28 2.76 3.46 
1902 15.62 5.32 4.23 4.61 
1903 15.3 4.86 3.86 4.26 
1904 14.76 5.15 4.76 3.67 
1905 18.3 7.44 5.92 4.03 
1906 21.85 7.65 5.65 5.04 
1907 21.88 8.03 5.46 5.03 
1908 15.91 5.51 4.68 3.37 
1909 21.08 8.19 6.97 4.14 
1910 26.59 9.31 6.92 4.72 
1911 23.61 8.01 7.65 4.42 
1912 24.98 9.43 7.28 4.35 
Table 2-4: American fur imports in millions of dollars.  
 
2.6 Concluding remarks.  
 
This chapter has discussed the formation of the industrial district in Leipzig that took place 
during the long nineteenth century. The fur industry was a typical Saxon industry, a consumer 
goods industry mainly composed of small to medium-sized businesses that was also open, 
pronouncedly transnational, and dependent on the world market. How can the formation of 
such typical Saxon niches, and similar decentralised production systems elsewhere, be 
understood without taking into account the structure of the world market in which such 
locally entrenched business groups were embedded? The argument developed in the chapter 
supports the observation that the formation of the industrial district cannot be separated from 
the external macroeconomic changes that governed the international fur industry. In fact, the 
chapter has demonstrated that the fur district grew when the world around the commodity was 
undergoing significant changes. At the same time, the chapter has engaged with the difficult 
task of understanding how processes of globalisation defined and determined the actions of 
district firms.   
 
A number of important international trends have been identified. Firstly, the international fur 
trade experienced a bonanza throughout the nineteenth century. Fur consumption was clearly 
on the rise while at the same time the process of expansion into the fur frontiers came to its 
ultimate conclusion. In addition, new markets across the Atlantic Ocean were established. The 
result of the former was a spectacular increase in wholesale prices, whereas the latter 
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unleashed fierce international competition. This global context of commercial expansion and 
competition reinforced the formation of an industrial district, activating local factors already 
present. These were the Leipzig trade fairs, which had aggregated local expertise in fur 
trading and crafting. The furrier workshops were the places where expansion in 
manufacturing started in the early nineteenth century. Small factories emerged out of 
workshops or furriers abandoned the workshop altogether but stayed in city as tailors. The 
surge of new businesses in Leipzig by the end of the nineteenth century was as powerful as 
the rising value of the international fur commerce.  
 
However, the fur industry in Leipzig also constructed this worldwide transformation as much 
as it was essentially a result of it. For instance, the interplay of local economic actors not only 
had a positive effect on the internal dynamics of the fur district but also was often tailor-made 
to meet the conditions of distant commerce and transborder business activity. This was 
arguably the case with the role of the local banks in financing the local fur industry. Whilst 
firms profited from financial services to establish themselves on the local markets, tough 
competition forced banks to serve the ‘special needs’ of fur firms, allowing them to adapt to 
international trade parameters. Credit steadily followed the inflating price levels in 
international commerce. Moreover, the availability of credit also allowed the firms to pursue 
an expansionist policy towards trade in Russia, where trading on credit was preferred by local 
traders. In other words, the large local credit market not only facilitated the opening of new 
business in the district, it also enabled fur entrepreneurs to pursue profits in the uncharted 
territory of the Siberian heartlands and the Far East frontier. What appears to be a symbiosis 
between two local economic actors in fact harboured a significant international dimension. It 
allowed the firms to construct a world market. 
 
The dialectic between local and international dynamics in the formation of the industrial 
district is also evinced by entrepreneurship, particularly by transnational entrepreneurship. 
Foreign entrepreneurs, especially former fair visitors, were not merely attracted by the local 
expansion of the fur trade and industry: rather, their arrival further played a decisive role in 
connecting Leipzig to the outside world. Foreign entrepreneurs continued to lead transnational 
lives and were thereby constitutive of processes of globalisation from below.
278
 Once settled 
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in Leipzig, many foreign entrepreneurs behaved like transnational entrepreneurs, travelling or 
dividing their time between several offices. In the summer, a lengthy visit to the Nizhnii fairs 
was deemed essential for business. The same applied for the many auctions in London. 
Entrepreneurs and their family members further integrated Leipzig into an economic space 
that was a part of land-based trade network reaching deep into Siberia and Central Asia. The 
phenomenon of transnational entrepreneurship will be further studied in the next chapter by 
looking at the growing relationship between the Leipzig industry and the relatively ‘new’ fur 
market in Brussels. In that chapter, it will become clear that the fur district not only received 
transnational entrepreneurs but that it was also a starting base for entrepreneurial mobility. 
Processes of mobility and migration in the creation of transborder business activities will thus 
receive further attention as an important element in the links between the industrial district 
and the outside world.  
 
Finally, the process of business formation resulted in the configuration of the local business 
community as a social structure. Being part of the successful fur industry created a sense of 
belonging that was not simply derived from nationalism or regionalism and that cut across 
ethnic borders. As a result of business growth, the Leipzig businessmen increasingly came to 
form a social structure with trade associations shaping the multiform ties between individual 
business leaders. Identification with the local space in which the firm was embedded 
increasingly defined business strategies, although expressions of this were still timid. 
Additionally, international competition and common obstacles made processes of collective 
action crystallize out of the district. On the eve of World War I, the London boycott showed 
that the Leipzig fur merchants had apparently discovered the possibility of collective action 
and not only on the local stage. Simultaneously, modest ideas about market engineering 
surfaced in order to strengthen local market institutions. On the one hand, furriers and 
businessmen redefined their participation in the Leipzig trade fairs. On the other hand, a failed 
attempt at organising ‘Leipzig auctions’ also attest to processes of market engineering. In 
addition, collective action and processes of self-identification were not synonymous with 
insularity and self-retrenchment. The practice of auctions that dominated wholesale 
transactions in the Anglo-American fur industry formed an attractive model for market 
transactions, despite being despised by many. Economic actors in Leipzig were open to 
borrowing foreign market institutions. Admittedly, collective action with the aim of market 
engineering was still of a very modest nature: however, the point is stressed here because 
transfer of market institutions forms an important part of the narrative that is developed in 
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section 3 of the thesis, which deals with the re-admission of Leipzig to the world market. This 
process of world market re-admission went side by side with more intensive forms of 
collective action and market engineering. The precedents have been sketched in this chapter. 
First, however, we must focus more clearly on the phenomenon of transnational 
entrepreneurship.  
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3 Transnational Entrepreneurship: The Connection 
between Leipzig and the Brussels Fur Industry (1880-
1920). 
 
3.1 Transnational entrepreneurship and the industrial district. 
 
German immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs played an important role in processes of 
economic internationalisation. They were active in a large variety of fields, including banking, 
insurance, maritime commerce, and various specialised niches. German immigrant 
entrepreneurs were to be found in many major European cities, such as Moscow, Paris, 
London, and Brussels, as well as across the Atlantic Ocean.
279
 This chapter describes 
transnational entrepreneurs as liaisons that connected the industrial district to the outside 
world. Indeed, the garrison of German immigrants, merchants, and craftsmen abroad offered 
opportunities to smaller firms: as Petersson has noted, “these immigrants offered smaller 
German and foreign enterprises that couldn’t afford commercial representation abroad 
channels of exploitation and informed the latter about foreign customers and potential 
deals.”
280
 In contrast to the focus on economic integration in terms of multinational business, 
which occurred principally through direct foreign investment of firms in other countries, this 
chapter wants to emphasise transnational business links between immigrant entrepreneurs and 
firms in the region that dispatched them.
281
 Undoubtedly, the establishment of multinational 
divisions was utilised by Leipzig firms in order to pursue internationalisation. However, I 
have already established that mobility and migration formed an important impetus to the 
district’s patterns of internationalisation. This chapter elaborates on this phenomenon of 
transnational entrepreneurship and mobility in the forging of links between the district and the 
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outside world by examining a case study, that of the presence of German immigrants in the 
Belgian fur industry between 1880 and 1920.  
 
Chiefly concentrated in Brussels, the Belgian fur industry constituted one of the densest 
niches in which German businessmen and labourers in Belgium were active.
282
 Brussels was a 
hot spot for German emigrants to Belgium: only Antwerp proved more attractive. By 1910, 
almost 4,944 German immigrants lived in Brussels and were the second largest migrant 
community after the French (6,403). If we take the growing presence of German immigrants 
in suburbs of Brussels into account, the size of the German community rises to 15,000 
members.
283
  In Antwerp, where 20,000 German immigrants were resident, the port 
stimulated the settlement of merchants active in maritime trade. In Brussels, the situation was 
somewhat different. ‘New production sectors’ stimulated by the presence of rich elites in the 
capital city was a major draw for German immigrants. As de Schaepdrijver noted, “when a 
service or trade was both expanding and skilled, it was overrepresented among foreigners.”284 
In Brussels, German immigrants displayed interest not only in banking and insurance but also 
in the ‘new’ industries that had profited from the increasing purchasing power of Brussels’ 
bourgeoisie.
285
 These involved luxury industries like the fur industry and leather manufacture. 
Importantly, many of the fur businesses established by German immigrants had ties to 
Leipzig.  
 
Arguing that the German immigrants acted as drivers of transnational trade activities, I will 
pursue two questions. Firstly, how did immigrant entrepreneurs link the industrial district to 
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the outside world? To answer this question, I will need to study transnational business 
relations. Parallels will be sketched between the features of multinational business 
organisation and those of transnational immigrant entrepreneurship. Secondly, what were the 
strengths and weaknesses of links with transnational entrepreneurs? Attention will be drawn 
to their knowledge of local markets as well as to their good connections with ‘mother firms’ 
in Germany and Leipzig in particular.  
 
Indeed, a transnational approach to immigrant entrepreneurship requires a bilateral 
perspective that encapsulates the social worlds of departure and arrival whilst also 
demonstrating how the contact between the two determines entrepreneurial behaviour and 
moulds business activities. Dirk Hoerder has argued that migrants tailored their actions to 
both contexts within the fluidity between the old and the new setting, thus creating a “new 
transcultural space.”
286
 A transnational perspective therefore envelops the activities of 
“migrant groups whose social relations connected two or more countries.”
287
 Transnational 
migration studies recommends a process-oriented study of a migrant group in constant flux, 
employing a dual focus on their lives in the host country and contact with their country of 
origin.
288
 Furthermore, transnational entrepreneurship and mobility have been identified as the 
ways in which translocal connections frame districts or clusters.
289
 I will relate this 
transnational dimension to the emergence of transborder firm activities from the district. This 
study will therefore examine a sample of entrepreneurs and focus on their professional 
itineraries in order to to research forms of entrepreneurship and transnational business 
relations.
290
 After providing a general overview of the fur industry in Brussels, I will explore 
the connections between the immigrants and their contacts with the German fur industry. 
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Transnational contacts, such as business connections and communication with Germany, will 
then be analysed in depth so as to examine their influence on entrepreneurial behaviour and 
economic integration.  
 
Why is the link between Brussels and Leipzig highlighted rather than connections with other 
cities?  German furriers and fur merchants were present in large numbers in Paris as well.
291
 
Similarly, Germans played a large role in the British colonial fur trade and German merchants 
were omnipresent in London.
292
 Only the sources of the Belgian fur industry, however, 
proffer the amount of material necessary to properly evaluate the links that tied the industrial 
district to the outside world. This study is chiefly based on two combined sources: 
sequestration archives and the files of Belgium’s immigration police (police des étrangers). 
These allowed me to unfold the business activities and careers of immigrant entrepreneurs in 
the fur industry. The sequestration archives exist because of the confiscation of German 
property on Belgian soil after the November 1918 armistice. By happy chance, the 
government often retained the business archives of those confiscated companies in order to 
liquidate them smoothly and reimburse (mainly Belgian) creditors. The sequestration archives 
are a unique source by which insight can be gained into the way German business abroad 
operated during the Wilhelminian era. The individual police files figure as a complementary 
source: they relate biographical details and illustrate travel patterns.
293
  
 
The list of studied firms is far from exhaustive: there were more German entrepreneurs than 
sequestered firms. However, the information from the sequestered firms and also their 
unmolested counterparts partially compensates for this. The studied firms are Les 
Etablissements Schulz (SA), Mayer & Cie, Norden Frères, Adolf Mummet, Jacques 
Krochmal, Max Satz, and Jean Schmidt. Sources from these companies tell us about other 
companies and the surrounding business environment and so they can be readily used to paint 
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an insightful panorama of the transborder businesses activities of German entrepreneurs and 
their connections with ‘mother firms’ in Leipzig.  
 
3.2 Furs and the conquest of a new sales market (1880-1900).  
 
In late nineteenth century Brussels, the fur sector burgeoned rapidly, just like most other 
urban luxury industries. It was the increased purchasing power of the local middle classes that 
spawned this growth. The timing of the spurt is remarkably close to the formation of the 
industrial district in Leipzig and fur centres elsewhere in the world. In 1873, there were only 
26 fur workshops in and around Brussels: in 1896, the number of active fur business had 
jumped to about 36.
294
 Yet, the most spectacular growth occurred between the late 1890s and 
the beginning of the First World War when new entrepreneurs saw the fabulous possibilities 
that Brussels offered and established almost 100 new firms. This surge brought the total of fur 
shops in Brussels to 136 in the months just before the First World War. This far exceeded 
Antwerp, the second largest Belgian city, which housed a mere 24 fur clothing factories and 
23 retail shops.
295
 The new firms also made use of novel industrialised methods, most 
importantly synthetic dyeing and dressing techniques, which made increased volumes of fur 
garment production possible.
296
 The sewing machine, and in particular the fur sewing 
machine, rapidly replaced the manual forms of labour traditionally performed by artisans.
297
 
 
Changes in production coalesced with the democratisation of luxury consumption, a 
phenomenon that was not limited to Brussels. Throughout European cities, fur garments were 
gaining popularity in the emerging milieu of the bourgeoisie, who sought to stylise their 
improved status with luxury goods.
298
 Shopping became a sort of leisure activity. The 
Brussels department stores, mostly founded by French or German immigrants, epitomised this 
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new mode of consumption.
299
 For instance, the store Hirsch & Cie offered a wide variety of 
ready-made furs garments for sale. These department stores were characterised as a 
“permanent temptation” to which consumers could easily succumb.
300
 With fur consumption 
on the rise, the expansion of the fur industry and retailing followed suit. Alongside the 
spectacular growth in production units, 9 wholesale stores and 49 retail stores opened in 
Brussels. The growth of firms also resulted in an expanding labour market. While the fur 
industry employed about 434 labourers in 1896, the number of workers increased to about 
1,452 in 1910.
301
 The bulk of these employees (789) worked in companies located in Brussels.  
 
How strong was the German presence in this sector? Before answering this question, I have to 
mention the division of the fur industry into large firms and small workshops caused by 
decentralised production in the Belgian garment industry.
302
 According to Sven Steffens, there 
was a predisposition towards economic independence in the Belgian garment industry that not 
only applied to immigrant entrepreneurs.
303
 The result was a clothing industry characterised 
by many forms of self-employment. At the top of the hierarchy, one found merchants and 
managers of ready-made clothing production units while at the lower end there were semi-
independent tailors and home-workers (Heimarbeiter) that were characterised by poor 
working conditions and very low profit margins.
304
 In short, there was a large differentiation 
in business size in the garment industry and the fur industry. A tailor operating a fur sewing 
machine at home was often classified as an “enterprise.” Additionally, individual firm owners 
were often subcontractors or brokers operating for larger firms. Needless to say, the social 
reality of the self-employed differed significantly and the number of small firms exceeded the 
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large ones by far. Of the 136 companies in Brussels, 88 consisted of one-man or family-based 
enterprises. The larger companies were fewer in number: only 11 companies had been 
established as an official company partnership.
305
 Within these partnerships, the number of 
German investors and businessmen seems to be disproportionally large: 4 of the 11 companies 
had German owners. Other forms of German entrepreneurship were situated in the 
miscellaneous mass of traders, brokers, subcontractors, and small shopkeepers in the city. 
German self-employment also was ubiquitous here: Germans owned about 60 fur shops.
306
  
 
3.3 An overview of German businesses in Brussels (1890-1914).  
 
The four largest German companies in Brussels, all of which were officially registered 
partnerships, were Phillippe Norden & Cie, Mayer & Cie, Müller & Cie, and Les 
Etablissements Schulz. Müller & Cie, established well before the 1890s, was probably one of 
the first German fur companies in Brussels whereas Schulz was the only German firm 
registered as a limited liability company (Société Anonyme).
307
 Phillippe Norden, the founder 
of Phillippe Norden & Cie, was a Jewish entrepreneur born in the Prussian city Lissa in 1841. 
His entrepreneurial trajectory was remarkably bumpy. In 1872, he went to Berlin and then 
headed to New York a few years later. However, his ventures in America were not blessed 
with success. In 1882, Norden liquidated his New York fur business and went to Leipzig. He 
stayed there for 12 years. In 1894, the family finally migrated to the Belgian capital where 
Norden established ‘Phillippe Norden & Cie. Manufacture des fourrures’ in the Laekenstraat. 
Kurt and Arthur Norden took over the management of the company after the death of their 
father Phillippe in 1910. The Norden brothers renamed the company ‘Norden Frères.’308 In 
brief, Phillippe Norden was an entrepreneur with good connections in Leipzig but his attempts 
to make it in other cities endured ups and downs. 
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The history of Müller & Cie should be included with that of Mayer & Cie. The founders of 
Mayer & Cie, the German Jews Richard Katz and Bernhard Mayer, went to Brussels in the 
1890s in order to invest in the new and promising business of Müller & Cie. Together with 
Karl Müller, a German fur worker, Mayer and Katz founded Müller & Cie. However, the 
alliance between Müller, Katz, and Mayer was shortlived. Müller believed that Katz and 
Mayer took inappropriate risks.
309
 In 1903, Katz and Mayer started business on their own 
account while Müller continued under his own name at the old location on Bischofsheim 
Boulevard. Mayer and Katz’s brand new company occupied a building strategically located 
on the Place de Brouckère, one of the most renowned inner city squares and in close 
proximity to the bourgeois clientele. Finally, Otto Schulz, Fritz Tacke, and Edouard Simmel 
founded the company ‘Schulz & Cie’ in 1899: it became ‘Les Etablissements Schulz’ in 1909 
when the firm was reconstituted into a limited liability company.
310
 In terms of the numerous 
small firms, I will consider two brokers (Adolf Mummet and Jacques Krochmal) and two 
shopkeepers (Max Satz and Jean Schmidt).  
 
From a migration perspective, the backgrounds of these entrepreneurs contain a few 
interesting details. First of all, of a sample of 32 entrepreneurs who settled in Brussels, almost 
half of them had ties to the city of Leipzig. In addition, of the German entrepreneurs of the 
Antwerp fur firms, 4 out of 5 originated in Leipzig.
311
 Some entrepreneurs were born in 
Leipzig but the majority just spent a couple of years in the city. Secondly, there are several 
indications that immigrant entrepreneurship was strongly linked to the traditional trajectory of 
fur work, which was focussed on learning on the shop floor and ganing experience by 
wandering. Indeed, most of the immigrants who later became firm leaders came to Brussels as 
workers. Except for Phillippe Norden, Bernhard Mayer, and Richard Katz, most entrepreneurs 
who arrived in Belgium were between 20 to 30 years old.  
 
The mobility of the German fur workers resembled the consecutive stages of a craft career: 
apprentice, journeyman, and master. In such a career path, journeymen were encouraged to 
wander around and work in other cities as part of the professional curriculum. Did such 
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patterns continue to exert an influence on migration patterns and entrepreneurial behaviour? 
Sigrid Wadauer and Josef Ehmer have argued that craft traditions continued to frame 
mobility, work experience, and migration choices in particular professional groups throughout 
Germany up to the beginning of the First World War.
312
 It is not easy to grasp the influence of 
craft traditions upon migration patterns. Apart from the age when these individuals travelled, 
which suggests a link between the journeymen years and migration decisions, there are only a 
few cases that do show some correspondence with the linear craft career. For example, Adolf 
Mummet was born in Sonnenberg in 1882 and moved as a young boy with his parents to 
Leipzig. In Leipzig, Mummet became an apprentice in the workshop of Paul Körner in 1900. 
In 1903, he completed his training as a furrier. The completion of his training required that he 
move and so Mummet went to Berlin (1903-1905) to work as furrier. In 1905, the Phillippe 
Norden company in Brussels hired him. While his apprenticeship in Leipzig provided the 
opportunity to start a career abroad, a taste for adventure was also a motive behind his 
migration to Brussels: he recalled in 1913 that “I wanted to experience life abroad (...) before 
I married.”
313
 J. Krochmal, another fur broker in Brussels, followed a similar path. Krochmal 
was of Austrian descent and, like Mummet, moved at a relatively young age with his family 
to Leipzig. Once he finished his training as a furrier in Leipzig, he went to Brussels in 1908 at 
the age of 20. In 1912, he established himself as an independent fur broker.
314
  
 
In summary, several of the furriers who would later become entrepreneurs arrived in Brussels 
at an early age, which suggests that mobility continued to be connected to a stage in a craft 
career. The same is true of those firms that were not sequestered. It may also account for the 
predisposition towards economic independence. In any case, contemporary sources generally 
attribute mobility in the fur industry to factors related to the craft. Paul Larisch, a specialist on 
the fur industry, described in 1928 what he called the “great furrier migration” 
(Kürschnerwanderung) to Western European cities like London, Paris, and Brussels.
315
  
 
Besides the actual experience accrued in Leipzig, having a “Leipzig connection” mattered in 
the German-Brussels fur trade. German entrepreneurs viewed the Leipzig connection as a 
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crucial criterion in assessing the power and potential of trade partners in Brussels. In 1912, 
Isaac Künstlinger, who settled in Brussels as a shopkeeper, was soon known amongst other 
businessmen as a “German subject (...) with affluence and relations in Leipzig.”
316
 A stay in 
Leipzig also opened doors in the host country.  
 
So, many of these entrepreneurs had gained their expertise in Leipzig or at least entertained 
good connections with the German fur centre. The next section is devoted to the mechanisms 
of transnational entrepreneurship. How did German enterprises in Brussels function? How did 
they maintain links with mother firms in Leipzig? In short, I will examine the extent to which 
immigrant entrepreneurs relied on Leipzig business links when setting up an enterprise and 
how transborder firm activities were organised.  
 
3.4 Transborder business networks and entrepreneurship.  
 
3.4.1  The influence of capital flows on entrepreneurship 
 
Examining the financial dimension of immigrant business is a fruitful way by which to shed 
light on the links between new businesses in Brussels and existing ones in Leipzig. Acess to 
capital is one of the crucial barriers for immigrant entrepreneurs. When Otto Schulz, who 
arrived in Brussels as a young fur worker, established his own company Schulz & Cie in 
1899, Edouard Simmel and Fritz Tacke, two of the more well-to-do German immigrants, 
provided the capital. In 1909, Otto Schulz upgraded the firm into a limited liability company, 
Les Etablissement Schulz SA, with the approval of Simmel and Tacke. Under Belgian trade 
laws, the limited company was a form of business which could generate larger amounts of 
capital whilst limiting personal liability. Shareholders usually had little to do with the 
management of the company.
317
 In addition, it was an uncomplicated way to raise capital 
from foreign investors. The main shareholder of Schulz was the Leipzig based merchant firm 
“Isidore Kaufmann.” Kaufmann bought the largest part of the shares, around 100 of the 600 
available, for a total capital of 100,000 Belgian francs. The other shares were received by 
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Schulz, Simmel, and Tacke or were bought by local investors.
318
 André Lion (Paris, 10 
shares) and Berthold Auerbach (London, 12 shares) also invested: they were the owners of 
Schulz’s affiliated businesses in Paris and London.319 As such, Kaufmann’s shares generated 
the largest capital input in the firm. Consequently, the money sent from Leipzig allowed the 
former furrier Schulz to lead one of the largest Belgian fur companies. Only two Belgian fur 
enterprises were joint-stock companies and the immigrant firm Les Etablissement Schulz was 
one of them.  
 
However, foreign investment from German companies came with strings attached. The 
mother firm’s investment was accompanied by a contract that tied Schulz more closely to the 
firm in Leipzig. Whilst the daily management was left in the hands of Schulz and his 
associates Tacke and Simmel, they were subject to limitations when it came to obtaining trade 
partners in Germany: Kaufmann blocked Schulz from undertaking commercial relations with 
any other company in Leipzig. Kaufmann thus prevented other firms in Leipzig from gaining 
access to his foreign connection. If Schulz defied this contractual obligation, Kaufmann had 
the right to impose a 2% charge on deals concluded with alternative suppliers in Leipzig.
320
 
Such a contract was not unique. Phillippe Norden had signed a similar exclusivity contract 
with Robert Ehrmann, a trader in Leipzig.
321
 Moreover, Ehrmann often used Norden as an 
intermediary in his dealings with London-based firms. Thus, at least two Brussels firm had 
considerable links with mother firms in Leipzig. A slight decrease in autonomy was the price 
that had to be paid for access to capital.  
 
In terms of both fur and money supply, small firms often completely depended upon their 
connections with Leipzig firms. Many of these small firms acted as brokers on the Brussels 
market, representing one or more Leipzig firms. As such, these brokers were entirely focused 
on the transborder market. Fur brokerage emerged as a typical niche for Leipzig firms since 
they could ill afford foreign investment but nevertheless pursued international activities. For 
example, the fur broker Adolf Mummet represented the interests of no less than four Leipzig 
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firms (Paul Bülow, Wöhlrab, Körth, and Grossman Nachf). The Leipzig raised Austrian 
Jacques Krochmal set up a very similar business. Three Leipzig firms (Arthur Berger, Robert 
Meyer, and H. Königswerther) appointed Krochmal as their representative in Brussels. The 
brokers sold all kinds of products on the local market, such as furs (both raw and 
manufactured) and equipment.  
 
The fur brokerage market in Brussels was a heavily competitive one: representing a Leipzig 
firm was a highly unstable business. In cases of bad results, the mother firm could easily 
appoint a new broker. Furthermore, immigrant entrepreneurs who made their living as fur 
brokers heavily competed with one other to win the representation of Leipzig firms or aimed 
for German companies that were new to the Belgian market.
322
 For instance, Dietzold, a 
merchant in Leipzig, cancelled his agreement with Krochmal in 1913 and switched to a rival 
German-Brussels broker, W. Seidensticker. Although brokerage was the shortest way to self-
employment, it was also the most dependent upon external factors since it relied on the 
goodwill of a trade partner abroad at the very least. In addition, the infrastructure of these 
firms was not designed to develop any alternative lines of business. 
 
Brokerage and representation were attractive ways for the smaller firms in the Leipzig district 
to pursue a strategy of internationalisation. Indeed, firms preferred immigrant entrepreneurs as 
representatives due to cost-reducing factors in transborder traffic. An example is offered by 
the activities of H. Königswerther, a Leipzig merchant firm. One of the brothers, Jules 
Königswerther, had established a branch in Brussels in the 1870s and was thus one of the first 
Leipzig entrepreneurs in the Belgian fur industry. Due to a change in international strategy, 
Königswerther spearheaded foreign investment in Paris at the turn of the century: Jules 
Königswerther was sent from Brussels to Paris as their representative. Later, the head office 
in Leipzig decided to liquidate the Brussels business all together. However, the interests of 
Königswerther in Belgium were looked after by J. Krochmal.
 323
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These smaller businesses acted as subsidiaries of Leipzig firms on the Brussels market. In 
bridging the distance between Brussels and Leipzig, brokers had a say in the business strategy 
to be followed on foreign markets. Brokers possessed information on which the mother firm 
could base its decisions. Mummet informed his Leipzig partners about rival businesses in 
Brussels. He was especially obsessed with the developments in the Norden company, where 
he had worked for several years. He also regularly described the situation in other firms, 
although in less detail. Despite the often repetitive character of his information, Schlesinger 
Nachf, one of the Leipzig firms he represented, was very interested in Mummet’s reports: 
“We ask that you please continue to inform us about what you sell and what the rivals are 
doing. The more information you give, the better we can support you.”324  
 
The effect of immigrant entrepreneurship on the fur trade between Brussels and Leipzig was 
impressive. In terms of trade volume, transnational immigrant business (in the form of large 
business and brokerage) had beneficial results for the German-Belgian bilateral trade (cfr. 
figure 1). The export of furs from Germany to Belgium increased in proportion to the 
establishment and growth of immigrant businesses. Before 1900, raw furs ranked low on the 
German export list to Belgium but rose steadily from 1905 onwards, ranking fifth in 
individual export commodities in the years before the First World War. Somewhat 
surprisingly for a niche luxury industry, furs came second only to those export commodities 
that provided for Belgian heavy industry, like coal, pig iron, and coke.
325
 Over fifteen years, 
the same period during which the largest German fur businesses settled in Brussels, the value 
of raw fur exports from Germany quintupled.  
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Year Value 
(in million 
mark) 
Ranking in 
commodity 
trade 
1900 2.3 20 
1901 1.8 21 
1902 2.1 23 
1903 2 25 
1904 3.2 16 
1905 - - 
1906 4.3 4 
1907 5.2 4 
1908 6.2 4 
1909 8 3 
1910 8 4 
1911 6 5 
1912 8.9 5 
1913 10.3 5 
Table 3-1: German export of raw fur to Belgium (1900-1913) 326 
 
3.4.2  Transnational entrepreneurs as local actors.  
 
The advantages that cooperation with immigrant entrepreneuers offered to Leipzig firms were 
not limited to cost reduction. Firstly, German immigrant entrepreneurs had a greater 
knowledge of the local market than that of personnel in new branches. The endeavours of 
immigrant entrepreneurs in seeking integration with Brussels high society were an important 
advantage. German firms chose French names for their companies, thus disposing of 
Germanic connations. Take for instance Les Etablissements Schulz or Norden Frères. A key 
marketing technique was identification with the upper strata of bourgeois life in Brussels. 
Jean Schmidt, a German immigrant and shopkeeper of one of the most illustrious Brussels fur 
boutiques, claimed prestigious links with the royal family. Business marketing, flyers, 
invoices, and signboards stressed that Schmidt was supplier to the princess Clémentine, 
(“fournisseur de la Madame La Princesse Clémentine de Belgique”) the youngest daughter of 
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Leopold II.
327
 French was also the language used to address customers from high society. 
Customers in Brussels were sensitive to the use of French in communications with fur shops 
and shopkeepers. Mummet, a representative of some Leipzig companies, mentioned this 
problem in many letters to the Leipzig mother firms. The problem was not so much that 
Mummet spoke bad French but rather that Dietzold (one of Mummet’s main business 
associates) used “bad French” in direct communication with Belgian firms and customers.
328
 
This was something Belgian customers had complained about. It shows that brokers not only 
helped to reduce costs but also provided knowledge about local sensitivities. 
 
As well as acting as convenient outlets for Leipzig firms, the immigrant fur firms were also 
dynamic entities that sought to expand local market shares. In particular, German immigrant 
entrepreneurs pursued strategies of horizontal expansion in order to expand their radius of 
action.
329
 The larger German firms especially sought to construct networks with retailers by 
taking over existing shops or incorporating smaller firms into collaborative agreements. 
Contrary to contemporary observations that warned of a flood of aggressive German take-
overs, these operations involved taking over both Belgian and German shops.
330
 Processes of 
horizontal expansion in the Brussels fur industry started at the beginning of the twentieth 
century as the larger German fur firms consolidated their position on the Belgian market. In 
1907, Bernard Mayer financed the establishment of a shop by Bernard Moser, a former 
German employee, in the prestigious Rue Neuve, a location ideally suited for the sale of 
luxury goods.
331
 Mayer was the co-owner of Moser’s shop.332 In August 1912, Norden Frères 
gave financial support the Belgian shopkeeper Emile Mertens, which enabled him to establish 
a retail outlet called ‘Mertens & Cie,’ located at the Congresstraat 6.333 Apparently, it was 
quite a large shop with six street windows. The Schulz firm also actively pursued a strategy of 
horizontal expansion. Schulz controlled the fur shop of a woman called Agnes Royer. As a 
rule, the larger firms kept strict control over the new retailers (although degrees of ownership 
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could vary substantially). Mertens’ book keeping was controlled by accountants from Norden 
Frères, which illustrates the former’s lack of autonomy. Although his share of ownership 
gradually declined, Mayer kept control over Bernard Moser until the beginning of the First 
World War. Schulz’s company exclusively supplied Agnes Royer’s boutique: “selling furs 
from other workshops was allowed only with special permission of Schulz.”334  
 
Immigrant business also formed a buffer against the risk to foreign operations from economic 
malaise or political upheaval. Such local factors debilitated transborder activities. Through 
formal or informal collaboration with immigrant entrepreneurs, German firms in Leipzig were 
able to avoid losses caused by social tensions or political instability. The fur business was 
badly affected during the 1913 general strike, which was a reaction to Catholic Party’s refusal 
to adopt universal suffrage.
335
 The Belgian Socialist Party (BWP-POB) had threatened a 
general strike since 1912 and finally called for one in April 1913. Approximately 550 fur 
workers participated in the strike and the general economic infrastructure was blocked, 
thereby delaying consumption. In letters to his business partners in Leipzig about the 
standstill, Mummet (a Protestant) decried the resolve of the Belgian Catholics and hoped that 
favourable economic conditions would return swiftly.
336
 The strike ended after 10 days on the 
22 April.  
 
German immigrants also tried to participate in local interest groups and trade associations. 
Most notably, they acquired some prominence in the ‘Chambre Syndicale de la fourrure’: the 
Norden brothers were active members while Bernard Mayer was appointed vice–president for 
a couple of years just before World War I.
337
 As such, it is likely that the German 
entrepreneurs wielded influence on the organisation of the Belgian fur industry. There is a 
distinct German flavour to the emphasis on the importance of a craft career in the sectoral 
labour agreement of 1913. However, it is impossible to retrace how it was composed. 
Nevertheless, the organisation of labour in the Brussels fur industry was based on strongly 
hierarchical divisions. The Chamber saw the completion of an apprenticeship as a 
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precondition for attaining a higher salary (ouvrier formé).
338
 Importantly, labour mobility was 
encouraged as well. In order to become fully trained workers, apprentices had to complete an 
internship for at least 5 years in two separate companies and work as a junior worker (jeune 
ouvrier) for at least two years. Much of this suggests a German influence on labour structure 
in the Brussel’s fur trade.   
 
In short, German entrepreneurs in Brussels were attractive partners for a number of reasons. 
Immigrant entrepreneurs used various strategies to gain control over the local market. These 
involved adapting to local urban consumer culture. German entrepreneurs sought to profit 
from consumerism in urban high society and their appointment in the Chamber of Commerce 
illustrates that they were accepted as prominent businessmen. As far as retailing was 
concerned, several German entrepreneurs followed an aggressive expansionist policy by 
taking over local shops, regardless of the nationality of the owners, in order to enhance sales 
opportunities.  
 
3.4.3 International dimensions of immigrant entrepreneurship. 
 
Having ascertained the importance of local integration patterns, how did immigrant 
entrepreneurs act as drivers of internationalisation? In answering this question, this section 
will investigate two issues: namely, independent internationalisation strategies on the one 
hand and an orientation towards the Leipzig market on the other hand. Immigrant 
entrepreneurs shared some sort of common business culture with firms in Leipzig. Firms in 
Brussels used a common method of fur treatment called ‘nach Leipziger Art.’ Immigrants 
brought this nebulous term with them to Brussels, translating it into French as ‘à la façon de 
Leipzig.’ It stressed the alleged higher quality of their products, much in the same way as the 
brands  ‘made in Germany’ or ‘Deutsche Arbeit.’339 In general, the expression ‘nach Leipziger 
Art’ was a quality standard attached to the manufactured goods and linked the German fur 
industry in Brussels with a notion of scientific progress. For instance, when the new German 
fur factory ‘Otto Peter & Cie’ was established in Brussels, the German industrialist Otto Peter 
distributed a flier which introduced the new company: “because of our solid commercial 
organisation and modern facilities ‘nach Leipziger Art,’ we will be able to deliver all orders 
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for manufactured furs as quickly as possible.”340 This example makes clear that the notion of 
Leipzig’s “way of doing things” was almost synonymous with a modern and industrial 
approach. Similar to ‘Deutsche Arbeit,’ the creed of ‘à la façon de Leipzig,’ was usually 
connected with evaluative language that made use of connotations like ‘modern’ and ‘high 
quality’ in order to give a sense of national economic advancement.
341
 As well as forming 
associations with local elites, German entrepreneurs also constructed cultural associations 
with their home country.  
 
Along with emphasising common methods, immigrant entrepreneurs endeavoured to maintain 
close more tangible links with businesses in Leipzig. Several immigrants maintained their 
contacts in Leipzig. Wittrichs Bruno, for instance, owned a fur shop in Brussels and divided 
his life between there and Leipzig. Between the end of February and the middle of September, 
he worked in Leipzig: he returned to Brussels for the winter season.
342
 Leipzig was only about 
17 hours distant by train.
343
 The transnational dimension of the Leipzig-Brussels trade came 
to the fore during one particular moment of the year that ranked highly in the economic 
calendar of Leipzig: the Easter fairs. The Leipzig fur fairs abroad stimulated the transnational 
influence on German business. These exhibitions were ideally suited to make new business 
contacts and forge new trade networks.
344
 As an important event in the international 
commerce in furs, the eastern fairs in Leipzig helped maintain transnational links. Over the 
course of time, these fairs had transformed from a trade event into a commercial one where 
new products and garments were exhibited to prepare furriers for the most intensive sales 
period.
345
 In particular, the designs of the Leipzig furriers were intended to anticipate the next 
season and foreign influences, most notably from Paris. An industrialist from Berlin who 
participated in the fairs of 1912 wrote to the Norden company: “the fashion prefers a rich 
decoration of the fur with wisps and trimmings (…) given these developments, I will present 
my new collection at the fur fairs.”
346
 Visitors thus absorbed what could be called market 
prophecies, especially on the subject of fashion developments. Brussels firms were invited to 
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attend the fairs, although it is not clear if they did so in great numbers. In any case, firms in 
Brussels were kept extensively posted on the Leipzig fairs through letters.  
 
On rare occasions, there were explicit calls for loyalty from the Leipzig fur industry to 
entrepreneurs living abroad. This was especially the case when the Leipzig Fur Merchants 
Association decided to boycott the London auctions in June 1914: several firms in Brussels 
were forced to choose sides. Schulz received the following appeal in May 1914: “we request 
that you subordinate your particular trade interest to the common good of our fur trade and 
support our boycott by leaving aside the June auctions of this year.”
347
 Outside Leipzig, the 
boycott gained partisans amongst immigrant entrepreneurs in Paris and also from non-German 
firms such as Revillon Frères.
348
 Several of the Brussels firms abided by this boycott: J. 
Krochmal, Les Etablissements Schulz, and perhaps others
349
 Although the boycott was only 
partially successful (the absence of German traders failed to prevent the successful holding of 
the June auction), it shows that the Brussels firms took the perceived general interest of the 
Leipzig fur industry into account. 
 
3.5 Transnational entrepreneurs and internationalisation.  
 
We have already established that many firms depended on international ties with Leipzig for 
their activities in Brussels. However, this view has been nuanced by describing how firms 
often pursued independent strategies on the local level, especially with regard to horizontal 
expansion. Such independent behaviour also took place at an international level. When the fur 
industry grew in Brussels, tapping into foreign markets became essential for Brussels 
enterprises. Despite the restrictions attached to the access of capital from Leipzig firms, 
immigrant entrepreneurs did pursue internationalisation strategies in places other than 
Leipzig. Moreover, several German firms established multinational organisations in order to 
gain a foothold in markets and cities beyond Brussels. The active behaviour of migrant firms 
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in processes of internationalisation further nuances the image of immigrant firms as outposts 
of mother firms in Germany.  
 
This development took place in the first decade of the twentieth century, ten years after the 
largest German firms had established themselves in Brussels. The internationalisation was 
oriented mainly, although not exclusively, towards fur markets in neighbouring cities such as 
Paris, London, and Berlin. Bernhard Mayer set up the most extensive network of foreign 
branches. In 1905, Mayer opened his first branch on the German market in Berlin. His brother 
Charles led the branch, which was located on the Kommandentenstrasse. Over the next few 
years, many more branches were opened. Bernhard Mayer and Richard Katz established 
branches in Paris (Rue Réamur), Zurich (Dianastrasse), and Amsterdam (de Singel). An office 
was opened in Lille.
350
 The Zurich office became the epicentre of the Mayer-Katz business 
when the Brussels headquarters was liquidated after the First World War. Further plans were 
forged to open a branch in Frankfurt am Main in 1910. The Mayer firm clearly entertained 
highly ambitious plans in terms of internationalisation.  
 
Mayer had apparently gained an international reputation in the years leading to World War I. 
In 1911, Pierpont Morgan made Mayer an offer to establish a Mayer fur branch in New York 
as a joint venture. One of America’s most important financers offered to finance 90% of the 
business while Mayer was entitled to a 50% share in the profits. In return, Mayer had to offer 
expertise to the New York firm.
351
 Morgan was impressed by the rapid emergence of Mayer’s 
international empire: “I have been informed that you have established branches in Paris, 
Berlin, etc. I know that you raised your business from a small enterprise in the American style 
of a ‘self-made man.’ I have thought about establishing a factory with you here in New 
York.”352 The company was to be named “Morgan, Mayer & Cie” but it never materialised. 
 
The Mayer business was one of the most important independent firms in the Brussels fur 
industry. It had no ties whatsoever to the Leipzig fur industry. Migration background does not 
account for its success. Mayer was a Jewish entrepreneur born in Laufersweiler, a small town 
between Trier and Koblenz. Before going to Brussels, he lived in Aken. Katz came from 
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Melsungen, near Kassel, and lived in Cologne before moving to Brussels.
353
 It remains 
unclear how they became involved in the fur business. Nevertheless, after the quarrel with 
Müller, their first business partner in Brussels, Mayer and Katz turned their new firm into one 
of the largest and most successful in Brussels. Just before the First World War, Mayer & Co 
employed about 200 workers and its renown stretched far beyond the Brussels marketplace. 
Contrary to the standard practice of other Brussels firms, which typically operated in the 
framework of German fur commerce, the origin of Mayer’s success lay in securing direct 
supply lines from Russia and North America. Mayer and Katz operated in Russia through 
Hugo Fänkel, a personal representative in Moscow. Fänkel, ‘unseren Moskauer 
Commissionaire,’ was the manager of the transport firm ‘Loewe & Sydler’ and transferred 
Mayer’s raw fur purchases directly to Brussels.354 Perhaps the Mayer firm was so successful 
because it was independent from German/Leipzig influences?  
 
Firms that were strongly associated with Leipzig went international as well. Schulz opened 
branches in London (Oxford Street) and Paris (Rue Montmartre) after 1900. In 1909, Berthold 
Auerbach and André Lion, the managers of these branches, also became shareholders in the 
Schulz concern. Norden had two branches at his disposal after 1905: one in Berlin 
(Spittelmarkt) and one in Paris (rue Bachaumont). Although these firms seemed to 
concentrate on the same markets, there was only one city where their interests overlapped, 
namely Paris. What is more, the branches of Mayer, Norden, and Schulz in Paris were 
remarkably close to one another: the Rue Monmartre, Réamur, and Bachaumont were all 
located in the quarter called le Sentier, the hub of the Parisian garment industries.  
 
Internationalisation was linked to the manufacturing of furs. Manufacturing was clearly on the 
rise in the Brussels market at the beginning of the twentieth century and it increasingly 
defined opportunities for internationalisation. Mayer & Co, Norden Frères, Schulz, and 
Müller & Cie were all involved in manufacturing. Other important German fur factories in the 
Brussels area were the aforementioned Peter & Cie and Beyer & Cie: the latter was 
established by Arthur Gohler and Richard Zeumer, two fur workers from Leipzig. In addition, 
the factory was partly financed by Mayer & Cie in 1911.
355
 The reasons why German 
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immigrantants began to develop manufacturing businesses have to be sought in Belgium’s 
customs policy on furs and leather goods. Instead of importing manufactured goods from the 
Leipzig fur industry, firms in Brussels became increasingly interested in expanding 
manufacturing activities. Between 1890 and 1914, Belgium allowed free trade on unprocessed 
skins and hides but imposed import tariffs on semi-manufactured leather goods and 
manufactured furs, which amounted to 30 Belgian francs per 100 kilograms.
356
 Overall, tariffs 
favoured the stimulation of manufacturing in immigrant business: it was a strategic action 
undertaken by firms in order to jump over the tariff wall. Like the subsidiaries of 
multinational businesses, transnational immigrant businesses provided a way to avoid tariff 
barriers by acting as local producers.
357
 And it was the manufacturing firms in Brussels that 
sought to create international connections.  
 
In the previous section, I examined the durability of financial and commercial links between 
the entrepreneurs operating from Brussels and German firms in Leipzig. Leaving aside the 
remarkable case of Mayer & Cie, the overview showed that financial investments from 
Leipzig’s firms strongly tied the companies of both cities together. Although financial links 
and the system of commercial representation engendered strong dependency on the German 
counterparts of immigrant entrepreneurs, customs policy and the creation of separate export 
markets produced a relatively autonomous Belgian fur market. I will now examine more 
closely how the Brussels fur firms attracted qualified labour in order to gain an insight into 
the workings of the transnational labour market and its relation to entrepreneurship. It will be 
shown that the labour market provided a steady supply of new entrepreneurs and workers but 
that this system reached its limits on the eve of World War I.  
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3.6 Market saturation and the limits of immigrant entrepreneurship.  
 
In the summer of 1912, Adolf Mummet described the situation of the fur industry in Brussels 
to one of his business partners. He was worried about a very specific problem, namely that 
many newcomers were trying to establish businesses, which in turn had increased pressure on 
the local market: “new businesses are mushrooming (...) in the last three weeks, about twenty 
new furriers, mostly former chamber masters and branches of the largest firms, have been 
established as new enterprises. As a result, business is rapidly dwindling.”358 Even though 
many of the new companies emerging between 1910 and 1914 were often the result of 
horizontal integration of the larger firms, I will show that the continuity of high turnover in 
immigrant entrepreneurship was the result of a labour market created by the successfull 
German firms and was caused by the persistence of the idea that economic independence was 
the ultimate aim. However, the scale of such new enterprises differed significantly from those 
of the first generation: as the market was already crowded with entrepreneurs, the new 
immigrants increasingly had to focus on unprofitable sectors of the fur market in Brussels and 
were often dependent on the larger firms. The supply of entrepreneurs remained high because 
economic independence was seen as the ultimate goal but the golden years of the pioneer had 
certainly ended.  
 
Firstly, let us take a look at the structure of the transnational labour market that emerged in 
the wake of the many new immigrant businesses. Large new firms in Brussels like Norden, 
Schulz, and Mayer were important in attracting qualified labourers. Personal contact was 
undoubtedly crucial but the trade press also played a seminal role here: trade journals like Die 
Kürschnerzeitung (The Furrier Journal) were aimed at an international readership. The 
journals published job offers or the advertisements of furriers marketing themselves on what 
was becoming a transnational labour market.
359
 For example, an issue of Die 
Kürschnerzeitung from 16 March 1913 published two adverts from German furriers who were 
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looking for positions abroad.
360
 Advertisements appeared in other German journals as well, 
especially in Die Neue Pelzwaren Zeitung. The journals also channelled other information, 
often concerning very practical matters ranging from work opportunities to detailed 
descriptions of developments in foreign markets. The journals gave detailed travelling advice 
to migrants. Advertisements in Der Kürschner, a journal of the German fur trade union, 
recommended the ‘Taverne de Prague,’ an Austrian restaurant and hotel in Brussels that 
served Austrian cuisine and also offered furnished rooms for wandering furriers.
361
 The same 
journal recommended the ‘Pension Neukirchen’ on the Rue Dauphin in Paris for 
accommodation and German cuisine. These hotels became gathering places for fur workers 
who had recently arrived in the city.  
 
Unfortunately, only the Norden archives have preserved information about the job 
opportunities published in Die Kürschnerzeitung. The Norden applications reveal a strongly 
transnational labour market supplying highly qualified labourers to important European fur 
centres. Responses to Norden’s job offers came either from furriers in Germany or those 
already working abroad, most notably in France.
362
 The application letters are similar to the 
specific migration characteristics of the entrepreneurs I have described above. The application 
of the fur worker Eugen Krämer, for instance, demonstrated the importance of learning in 
Leipzig when he wrote to Norden in March 1912 about his professional career: “I joined the 
fur trading company M.J. Elias in Leipzig in Easter 1897 and concluded my apprenticeship in 
this company (...). Between 1901 and 1911, I worked for the German fur factory Bellwinkel 
in Hamm, for three years as a labourer and for the last seven years as a trade 
representative.”
363
 When Krämer wrote to Norden, he was working in a fur factory in Breslau. 
Such application letters reveal that the labour market in the fur industry was characterised by 
high mobility. 
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The letter from Fritz Herzberg, another applicant, reveals both the importance of Leipzig 
training and the geographical mobility of these furriers. Herzberg noted of his training: “after 
finishing at the gymnasium, I voluntarily joined one of the largest fur firms in Leipzig.”
364
 In 
January 1911, he migrated to Paris to work in a fur workshop: “here I have an independent 
position and I am also responsible for dealings with Leipzig.” Herzberg was in the possession 
of a letter of recommendation from the H. Königswerther house in Leipzig. Another example 
can be found in the response of the German furrier Waldemar Rechenberg to an advert from 
Norden Frères in the Neue Pelzwarenzeitung in March 1912. Rechenberg had trained and 
worked in many Leipzig houses: after working in Paris and Brussels, he was then hired by the 
Belgian fur company R. Mallien. Like the other fur workers mentioned above, he claimed to 
possess experience in the international fur trade: “I have received my training in the 
Machenhauer house in Leipzig, where I went with my boss to the London auctions in March 
1910.”365 
 
The swelling numbers of entrepreneurs was connected to the large supply of highly qualified 
labour. It was mostly those labourers that tried to establish new businesses. Self-employment 
was unintentionally stimulated by the important positions these foreign labourers occupied in 
the German firms in Brussels. In the Schulz company, roughly one in ten workers were of 
German origin, yet almost all of the highest positions in the company were occupied by 
Germans. The company’s rank and file consisted of lowly paid Belgian workers, often female, 
whereas the top positions were filled by Germans, most notably that of chamber master 
(Kammermeister). The position of chamber master, a sort of supervisor, was typically German 
and served as a stepping-stone towards economic independence. In the German firms of 
Brussels, this position was exceptionally well paid. In Schulz’s company, the wages for the 11 
chamber masters amounted to 2,009.70 Belgian francs weekly, an amount that was held to be 
commensurate to their dexterity. It was significantly more than the other 65 labourers earnt in 
any given week (1,469.30 Belgian francs).
366
 The Schulz chamber master Alex Knothe earned 
almost 60 francs a day and more than 300 francs in a week. More junior labourers made much 
less, earning around 4 francs a day on average. These were mostly female workers, often 
performing standardised work on the sewing machine. Male workers, who were usually 
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entrusted with the end of the production process, earned significantly more. Yet Belgian fur 
workers earned still much less (8 francs daily) than the German chamber masters, who 
enjoyed a ‘skill premium.’ 
 
The position of chamber master integrated aspects of outdated hierarchical craft organisation 
and more modern factory methods of fur garment production. As such, German industrialists 
had created an intermediate well-paid rank between ordinary labourers and the entrepreneur. 
The position replaced that of the autonomous handicraft master, the existence of which was 
threatened as a consequence. The chamber master was the source of expertise in crafting furs 
and thereby became a labour aristocrat in the modern fur factory. In Paris, this position was 
considered to be a bridge to entrepreneurship.
367
 Their status as labour aristocrats and the 
remuneration of their skill premium made self-employment easier to attain. In 1908, 
Martouffy, a former chamber master of Schulz & Cie, started a company with the Swedish fur 
worker Christianson.
368
 Employing a small number of furriers, they mainly produced orders 
for the larger workshops and operated on credit lines provided by other firms. In 1904, Joseph 
Krebs, the descendant of a German migrant to Brussels, established a new fur business after 
“he had worked as a chamber master for several houses in Brussels.”369 Richard Hempel, a fur 
worker from Leipzig, worked as furrier in several houses in Paris and Brussels: “he 
established his own business in 1906 specialised in manufacture and repairs of fur 
garments.”370 
 
The turnover of human capital was high. The management of Bernard Mayer failed to prevent 
labour aristocrats from leaving the business prematurely. Between 1904 and 1912, around 24 
Germans worked for Mayer & Katz but their stay was relatively short. Although not all of 
them became entrepreneurs (some of them returned to Leipzig and others left for different 
cities), many started business on their own. Schömann, a fur worker from the Mayer 
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company, became an entrepreneur in 1907.
371
 The skill premium also involved employees 
who had acquired insights into other areas of the local fur trade. Ludwig Italiener and his 
brother, two German accountants from Mayer & Cie, left the company on 31 April 1912 to 
found their own company called Italiener frères pelleteries en gros. Some firms tried to 
prevent their employees from starting up on their own. Norden stipulated in some labour 
contracts that former employees should abstain from entrepreneurship for at least a year after 
leaving the company.
372
 The contract was signed for Adolf Mummet, who nevertheless later 
established his own business.  
 
However, the high turnover of labour was not altogether problematic for the largest 
companies. Certainly, the fur firms had to attract new skilled workers. Nonetheless, the 
departure of fur workers was at the same time used as a way to ease the labour costs of the 
company. Just as with the incorporation of retailers in processes of horizontal expansion, 
many of these ‘new’ entrepreneurs came to operate as brokers for companies in Leipzig and 
as subcontractors for their old bosses. Former workers often agreed to dependence on external 
firms when competition became fiercer over the course of time or because they needed 
starting capital. The following example illustrates how difficult it had become to penetrate the 
market in Brussels in comparison to earlier. In 1911, the three Leipzig immigrants Beyer, 
Göhler, and Zeumer wanted to found a business but they lacked “sufficient capital to start on 
their own.”373 Mayer and Katz provided capital of 75,000 francs to establish what would be 
called the Zurichterei Beyer & Cie on 6 January 1911. Mayer and Katz dispatched their raw 
furs to Beyer & Cie where the initial preparatory work would be carried out: after this, the 
furs were returned to Mayer, who then turned them into garments. According to the contract, 
Beyer only charged Mayer a fixed profit margin on the work, which was set to the official 
“Leipzig standards.” In exchange, the members of Beyer & Cie had to pay off their debt and 
Mayer had the right to levy 10% on every invoice if they traded with other companies. Two 
years later, Göhler and Zeumer had had enough of their profitless enterprise: they bought 
themselves out of the company and left for Germany.
374
 The contrast between the success of 
the first companies and the failure of newcomers neatly symbolises the saturation of the 
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market. New entrepreneurs were facing more difficult conditions than the first entrepreneurs 
ever did.  
 
3.7 Conclusion.  
 
World War I marked the end of the German fur enclave in Brussels. Although many of the 
German immigrants in Belgium may have favoured the expansion of the German empire, the 
war was a fateful event for them. Luxury goods tend to sell badly in war times and the 
German immigrants were situated in a tense position somewhere in between the occupier and 
occupied. German shops lost their clientele en masse. After the war, there was no future for 
German business in Belgium. As with other allied countries, the Belgian government ordered 
the immediate confiscation of all German property to serve as a retribution for the damage 
incurred during the Great War. In the early months of 1919, companies owned by enemy 
nationals were officially sequestered, crushing the hopes of several entrepreneurs who had 
naively planned to return to Brussels and resume entrepreneurial activities. Arguing that their 
enterprises had established a successful sector in Belgium, several of them vehemently 
petitioned for reimbursement. However, all the stock and business buildings were put for sale.  
 
Conversely, Belgian entrepreneurs profited from the situation. The Belgian company Llobet 
& Plateau, one of the largest fur companies in Brussels, bought Mayer & Cie’s spacious 
factory and store in the summer of 1919. As such, Llobet & Plateau occupied a leading 
position in the local fur market. Somewhat surprisingly given the sequestrations, links 
between Leipzig and Brussels in the fur industry were somewhat restored in the 1920s. In 
1924, 27 of the 188 shops in Brussels brokered for one or more firms in Leipzig.
375
 
Furthermore, several former entrepreneurs re-appeared with a new firm: Otto Schulz (Société 
Génerale de fourrures Schulz & Cie), Edouard Simmel (formerly Schulz, now co-owner of 
the Belgian company Hendrick & Cie), and Müller Cie. (Bd. De Bischofsheim). While the fur 
industry remained essentially an open international trade, there are indications that the 
entanglement of both markets continued well until 1930 when the link between the Leipzig 
and Brussels fur industry finally petered out.
376
 However, the return of the Brussels-Leipzig 
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link is remarkable and shows that the immigrant entrepreneurs had created a robust trade 
system that was not easily erased.  
 
This chapter makes the case that migrants formed important links to the outside world for the 
Leipzig fur industry. The fur industry was highly mobile: labourers and furriers had 
frequently acquired work experience in the major fur centres of Germany and Europe. It was 
these mobile labourers who became entrepreneurs. Many persons belonging to this category 
had ties to Leipzig. Elements of the old craft traditions continued to play a subtle role. The 
tradition that loomed in the garment sector most strongly was the attitude that saw autonomy 
as the final stage of a linear career path. The point at which German fur workers migrated was 
typically linked to an intermediate stage in their careers. Once they arrived, their new 
employers kept the ideal of autonomy alive. Migrants working in the Brussels fur industry 
profited from the so-called skill premium. Special functions in the companies were reserved 
for newcomers: they became accountants, agents, fur workers, or chamber masters in those 
companies. The latter function in particular played a large role in the German-Brussels and 
German-Parisian fur industries and reveals immigrant businesses’ appreciation for qualified 
labour imported from the Heimat. However, the high turnover of human capital, typical of an 
immigrant niche, eventually halted the expansion of the sector. The unbridled ambitions of 
these labour aristocrats to become self-employed made the fur sector in the years before the 
First World War unwieldy. Immigrant entrepreneurship became a victim of its own success: 
whilst the supply of entrepreneurs reached a peak in 1913, the market was eventually 
saturated, thus making the situation of many entrepreneurs highly problematic. This, in turn, 
reinforced a system of decentralised production and retail from which the pioneer companies 
greatly benefited. In this sense, the supply of immigrant entrepreneurship was self-regulating.  
 
High mobility in the Leipzig fur industry offered opportunities to the small and medium sized 
businesses of the district. This was one of the many aims of the chapter: to demonstrate that 
business internationalisation could assume important alternative forms, based on personal 
networks. Recently, the role and prominence of business, especially multinational business, in 
economic globalisation has been highlighted but a lot of work still needs to be done on 
unfolding the importance of smaller actors such as immigrant entrepreneurs. This chapter 
hopes to make a modest contribution to the ‘small is beautiful’ dimension of processes of 
economic globalisation.  Many formal and informal transborder cooperative connections were 
constructed through the personal networks of migrants. Supporting an immigrant business 
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formed an attractive alternative to branching out. District firms could thus pursue an 
internationalisation strategy without setting a foot outside Germany. The transnational fur 
business also heavily supported the broad range of international communication channels like 
the fur trade press. For many smaller firms, migrants were cost-reducing factors in the 
organisation of transborder trade. Smaller firms could easily find a German broker or 
representative in Brussels. Other firms financed the establishment of migrant businesses. Two 
of the largest German firms were financed intensively with money from Leipzig. 
Collaboration did thus not only take place between economic actors in the district. As long as 
they shared a common background, collaborative inter-firm networks were established across 
borders.  
 
Migrants offered advantages to district firms in many ways besides than cost reduction. 
Immigrants were better judges of local markets and German firms could easily invest in them 
without assuming much responsibility for the burden of day-to-day management or being 
exposed to negative local developments. In a sector that was governed by small to medium-
sized businesses, the system of brokerage and transnational immigrant entrepreneurship 
offered a workable alternative. At the same time, the set of German firms in Brussels was 
characterised by its own dynamics and developments. The orientation towards Leipzig did not 
stop these companies from following an aggressive expansion policy both locally and 
internationally.  
 
With the analysis of immigrant entrepreneurship, I have once again illustrated that the 
industrial district in Leipzig cannot be studied as an isolated island. The formation of the 
industrial district was part of the international expansion of luxury consumption and 
production at the turn of the century. The growth and consolidation of Leipzig as a local and, 
more importantly, an international centre of the fur industry in this expansion phase required 
links to other poles of growth in the international trade. Through personal mobility and 
networks, the Leipzig industry was able to profit from proximate new markets like Brussels. 
The effects that the booming Brussels business had on bilateral trade were spectacular. Furs 
became one of most valuable export commodities from Germany to Brussels. Unfortunately, 
the role of migration and mobility in links between Leipzig and other new growth centers of 
the international fur industry will always remain in the dark because of the lack of comparable 
source material. 
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PART II: 
Lost Markets and Novel Products: 
The Creation of New  
Production Paradigms 
(1903- 1939). 
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4 Sheep Farming in South West Africa and the Leipzig 
Fur Industry (1900-1933). 
 
4.1 The fur industry and colonial design.  
 
In February 1909, a shipment of peculiar cargo arrived in the German colony of South West 
Africa (Namibia). Governor von Lindequist had ordered about 278 karakul sheep: they were 
transported from the Turkmenistan steppes in Central Asia to the German protectorate. 
Karakul sheep, like the Astrakhan breed, were skinned for their furs: von Lindequist 
envisioned German colonists as karakul farmers working for the fur industry in the Reich. By 
1913, about 1,155 pure breed and 21,000 crossbreed karakuls inhabited South West Africa. 
On the eve of World War I, the karakul skin trade was on the verge of becoming a major 
sector of intensive farming in South West Africa. Soon, fur farming constituted one of the 
most important sectors in the economic history of Namibia.
377
 Importantly, the arrival of the 
karakuls suited the plans of the Leipzig fur industry to create a new source of sheep skins. It 
was the fur industry in Leipzig that created the context for the karakul transplantation to South 
West Africa. This chapter is devoted to studying the involvement of the Leipzig district in 
turning karakul farming into a new production paradigm in the colonies.  
 
Most studies of German colonial business have stressed the economic irrelevance and 
unprofitability of the empire, thereby explaining the lukewarm interest of German business in 
the exploitation of their territories.
378
 Small and large businesses alike were apparently absent 
from processes of imperial exploitation. However, a growing body of literature reveals that 
interest did exist. Rather than registering business activities in the broad sweep of colonial 
trade statistics, such treatments offer a qualitative reading of colonial exploitation by seeing 
business interests in relation to scientific imperialism and the colonial state Especially 
revealing in terms of business history is the attention that has been paid to business 
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involvement in the creation of imperial infrastructures and ‘new production paradigms.’379 
The work of Zimmerman and Beckert is worth mentioning in this regard: they have described 
the endeavours of the German colonial administration and industrial representatives in the 
Colonial Economic Committee to create a cotton plantation industry for German Africa.
380
 
Such projects of colonial improvement and development, although often unexecuted, were 
interwoven with business interests that were endemic in most of the European empires. The 
karakul industry created by the fur industry was one of the most successful in the context of 
the German empire.  
 
The chapter will investigate how district firms pursued such imperial ambitions. Who were 
the main actors in the industrial district? Was it the result of individual firms or local 
collective action? Given their specialised nature, how did firms organise the creation of a new 
production paradigm in the colonies? Even the largest firms in the district arguably lacked the 
funds to attract agricultural experts or provide for the costly transport and the acquisition of 
farmland. It is assumed here that the fur business was involved in ways that were not 
significantly different from those of other business enterprises with an interest in the German 
empire. Businesses worked in close collaboration with the colonial state and with experts and 
scientists, who carefully examined the possible economic future of newly acquired colonies. 
The link with expert knowledge will be especially stressed. As Joseph Morgan Hodge has 
noted, imperial states turned to scientific expertise in order to deal with the problems of 
production and resource management both at home and abroad.
381
  
 
It is thus assumed that the participation of Leipzig firms occurred alongside the expansion of 
locally embedded networks with national, imperial, and scientific institutions. Indeed, strong 
collaborative networks between these actors were required given the ambitious goals of the 
Germans for the colony of South West Africa. In contrast to other areas of the German Reich, 
South West Africa was unique in that it formed the cornerstone of settler colonialism. At the 
same time, it was also one of the most desolate and inhospitable areas of the colonial 
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empire.
382
 Especially after 1908, the German government pursued a more active economic 
policy in what it perceived as its main colony.  
 
To a greater or lesser extent, this chapter is a chronological account of the creation of the 
karakul farming business in South West Africa. The key thread is the role of the industrial 
district in the formation of this new production paradigm in the colony. I begin by portraying 
the global karakul trade at the end of the nineteenth century. Then I will devote attention to 
the link between Leipzig fur business and agricultural science at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and how this alliance set in motion controlled karakul farming by 1914. It 
should be mentioned that the history of karakul farming in relation to the Leipzig fur industry 
did not end with World War I. The settlers and karakul farmers in South West Africa were 
one of the few links that remained between Germany and its former empire.
383
 However, the 
loss of empire necessitated a different approach towards fur farming in the interwar period.
384
 
Lacking the tools of empire, the fur industry both profited and was troubled by the expansion 
of karakul farming in South West Africa.  
 
The chapter opens the section on the industrial district and the creation of new production 
paradigms. The creation of production paradigms by the Leipzig fur industry are presented 
here as the result of various exogenous developments that took place between 1900 and 1930. 
As described above, resource scarcity and the consequent competition over resources 
characterised the modern fur industry at the turn of the century. Karakul farming in the 
colonies will be presented as a reaction against global competition. The mass production of 
rabbit skins as a process of resource-substitution during World War I is presented in chapter 5 
and fox breeding in Weimar Germany as an autarkic response to resource scarcity in chapter 
6. The section on sourcing new resources will shed light on local processes of collaboration 
and the actions of individual district firms in dealing with external developments.  
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4.2 The making of the German karakul industry (1903-1914). 
 
4.2.1 The limits of global trade and the prospects of agricultural science  
 
Karakuls were not brought directly to South West Africa. The karakul farming project was the 
result of a lengthy process that encompassed various contexts like global trade, long-distance 
transportation, and experimental farming inside Germany. In particular, the roots of karakul 
farming in the German colonies have to be sought in the context of world trade. This section 
examines the context of global trade that made the transplantation of karakul sheep to the 
German colony of South West Africa possible. 
 
Native to the steppes of Central Asia, karakul and Astrakhan sheep formed a niche in the 
international fur industry. Like the rest of the fur industry, it was a niche that was growing 
rapidly by the end of the nineteenth century. Karakul pelts were something of a curiosity in 
the fur industry. Karakul fur owed its attractiveness to the black curly locks of the lamb. 
Because these thick lamb curls rapidly changed into less valuable sheep wool, karakul lambs 
were usually slaughtered for their skins when 3 to 10 days old. Even more precious was the 
pelt of the stillborn foetal karakul lamb because of its so-called ‘moire pattern.’ The alleged 
practice of extracting foetal lambs made karakul farming one of the first targets of the early 
animal right movements.
385
 By far the most lucrative, the skins of the stillborn lambs were 
labelled and sold on the international fur market as ‘broadtails’ (Breitschwanz).386  
 
The karakul pelt became popular in Germany and Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. 
However, only a few firms in Leipzig were specialised in the manufacture of the karakul skin. 
A. Herzog created the first dyeing firm in Leipzig specialised in the processing of karakul and 
Astrakhan lambskins.
387
 The most important firm was undoubtedly that of Theodor Thorer. In 
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1882, Thorer developed a secret industrial dye to apply to this type of skin. Consequently, 
Thorer specialised in both the trading and processing of this commodity and led the Leipzig 
market in the black fur sector.
388
 By the late 1880s, Thorer was one of the leading firms in the 
international manufacture of lambskins well into the 1930s.
389
 At a later stage, the Leipzig 
auction company RAVAG also played a role in the karakul trade. Thus, the karakul trade was 
limited to only a few firms of the district. 
 
The Thorer firm was also the most active in the international karakul trade. In 1905, Thorer 
imported 385,000 of these skins worth about 6,000,000 marks from Bukhara, the main 
procurement area in the world trade.
390
 Commercial networks with the emirate of Bukhara 
were paramount in securing supplies. Paul Thorer, the oldest son of Theodor and owner of the 
firm between 1892 and 1920, personally undertook lengthy journeys to Bukhara to obtain 
karakul skins. Karakul and Astrakhan skins were also put on sale as well in the fairs of 
Nishnni Novgorod at the so-called “Wostostschnii” bazaar. The sales were conducted by a 
trustee of the emir of Bukhara.
391
 Nevertheless, the Thorer firm endeavoured to buy the skins 
at their source. In 1909, the director of the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig characterised Paul 
Thorer as “the authority in the world trade in Persian skins [karakuls]” and noted the 
exhausting travelling that came along with such eminence: “for many years, Paul Thorer has 
gone regularly to Bukhara, the country where Persian skins are produced, to acquire 
information on the situation and prospects of the karakul market.”392 In Bukhara, Paul Thorer 
was immersed in forging trade networks with local representatives who bought the skins from 
local dealers in the steppes and brought them to the Bukhara market. In addition, he set up a 
commercial network around Astrakhan furs in Tashkent.
393
 His closest business partner there 
was the German firm Wilhelm Durrschmidt.
394
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Although it seems that Thorer was quite successful in securing supply routes in Russia and 
Central Asia, the dependency on the stretched trade trajectories, the time-consuming 
travelling, and contact with the go-between traders in Bukhara produced irritation in the 
company’s management. Particularly unpalatable to Thorer was lack of dexterity among 
traders in the Emirate of Bukhara in preparing the skins for the export. He noted in 1913 that 
“this method [of preparing] is well known to me, but it is cumbersome, time consuming, not 
at all used properly and (...) dangerous to the value of the goods.”395 Reports on trading in 
Bukhara that circulated in Leipzig (the international success of the Thorer in the karakul 
market attracted a great deal of interest) suggested the unreliability of Bukharian traders and 
the difficult circumstances under which German traders operated in the Emirate. Similarly, 
trade press in Leipzig reproached the trade conduct of the wholesalers in Bukhara: “the 
Mohammedan knows no greater joy than to swindle Europeans (übers Ohr zu hauen), 
contrary to their dealings to co-believers, as mentioned, in which they are always fair and 
honest.”396 Thorer was glad about the prospect of lessening the trade with Central Asia.397  
 
The problems of long-distance trade cannot be decoupled from economic rationales. As early 
as 1903, Thorer first suggested bringing karakul farming to Germany or its colonies during a 
speech about his travelling experiences to Bukhara. With demand for karakul garments 
steadily rising, Thorer was confronted by the prospects of stagnating supply and increased 
competition. In 1910, he wrote to Bernhard Dernburg, state secretary of the 
Reichskolonialamt, that “the increased consumption of fur garments in general makes it even 
more promising to enhance karakul production in the colonies (...) it appears that the 
Turkestan steppes will not be able to increase their stock for mass-production.”398 Therefore, 
the plans to install karakul farming in South West Africa cannot be understood without taking 
this global economic dimension into account. Rather than being dependent on unreliable trade 
partners, Thorer felt that control over the supply chain was of paramount importance for the 
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development of his business. The idea to create a new production paradigm was thus strongly 
linked to a single firm in the district. From this point on, it makes sense to apply the term 
‘lead firm’ to the project of new resource creation. Theodor Thorer acted as a lead firm in the 
global commerce of karakuls and played the most prominent role in advocating the creation of 
a new supply chain inside the German empire. However, the Thorer firm needed the help of 
other partners in executing the project.  
 
4.2.2 New partners: agricultural expertise and the fur industry.  
 
While organising long-distance trade with the emirate caused Theodor Thoror problems, the 
transplantation of karakuls certainly required cooperation with other actors, such scientists 
and the colonial state. In the early stage of the project, networks with university science 
departments were the most important since karakul farming, and fur farming more generally, 
was a completely new industry. The firm chose to cooperate with a local partner, the 
agricultural institute in Halle (which was established in 1863 and was 35 kilometres from 
Leipzig). The director Julius Kühn was one of Thorer’s personal acquaintances and an 
éminence grise in the German agricultural sciences.
399
 For several decades, the Halle institute 
maintained its pivotal role in German karakul farming in South West Africa. It first tested 
karakul farming in Germany before introducing the black sheep in the colonies. In 1913, the 
German colonial administration finally appointed Halle as the official research institution for 
colonial karakul farming.
400
  
 
Halle’s task went beyond providing knowledge about animal management and scientific 
guidance. First of all, it had to convince various actors in agriculture, the fur trade, and the 
colonial administration that karakul breeding outside the native environs of the steppe was not 
an unrealistic pipe dream. Common wisdom had it that karakul lambs were a unique species 
of animal whose characteristics decayed when moved outside their natural habitat. The quality 
and uniqueness of the karakul skin evoked an almost superstitious belief about the role of the 
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steppes in determining the physical appearance of the lambskins. Paradoxically, Paul Thorer, 
the driving force behind the project, also maintained such a view. In one of their first 
discussions about transplanting karakuls from Bukhara, Thorer mentioned to Kühn that 
“everywhere karakuls are reared, the view is that it is only in the steppes that their 
peculiarities are maintained and if they go outside the steppes, the second, third, and certainly 
the fourth generations lose the qualities of the originals.”401  
 
Where did this popular perception come from? Firstly, fur traders like Thorer had observed 
the lack of uniformity in the karakul sheep’s physical appearance in Bukhara. Therefore, they 
assumed that the pelt of the karakul responded to its surroundings and was thus vulnerable to 
changes in scenery.
402
 However, these observations were false: Bukharian shepherds had been 
crossbreeding their flocks with other breeds for decades, so a ‘pure’ karakul simply did not 
exist. Nevertheless, the perception had a life of its own. Amateur breeders had a penchant for 
imitating a steppe-like environment. For instance, some keepers deliberately cut back fodder 
for the karakuls, believing that a shortage of food was a central characteristic of karakul 
herding in the emirate.
403
 Undernourishment of course damaged the quality of karakul furs 
rather than enhancing them. 
 
Peculiar as this view may seem, the influence of such popular assumptions on animal 
breeding should not be underestimated. In fact, misunderstandings regarding biology were far 
from uncommon among amateur breeders, who often perceived themselves as the ‘extension 
of the ruthless nature’ and did not acknowledge the advantages that could be derived from 
controlling the living conditions of animals in captivity.
404
 However, ‘karakul uniqueness’ 
reflected a biological discourse that was not just confined to practices of animal breeders. The 
belief that environmental factors preconditioned the physical appearance of the karakul sheep 
was not unique in that it partially reflected popular biology in Germany, which was based on 
the function of the animals. This field of study was called “animal morphology,” which 
studied “the relationship of the organism to its surrounding to determine the effect of the 
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conditions of existence upon an animal’s structures and functions.”405 Classifications of 
animals that were based on their functions, a popular practice in this form of biology, opened 
the door to the belief that animals belonged to a certain geography and climate: hence the 
scepticism about moving karakuls.  
 
Although biological paradigms were changing rapidly at the turn of the century, such 
functional approaches were still widespread. Across Europe, studies on animal and plant 
genetics that strictly separated organism and inheritance were increasingly changing the field 
of biology and challenging notions of functionalism. It is in the context of this paradigm shift 
from classic biology to genetics-based life science that the science-business networks in 
karakul farming have to be seen. Indeed, since all of the following chapters discuss animal 
rearing and farming, tensions and paradigm changes in the biological sciences form an 
important thread in this section on production methods.  
 
The paradigm shift in biology determined the development of karakul farming. Kühn, an 
advocate of Mendelian genetics, experimented on raising karakuls in Germany between 1903 
and 1908: this was designed to prove the feasibility of karakul rearing outside their natural 
habitat. Kühn and others wanted to discredit the ‘steppe perception.’ The first tests of karakul 
farming took place in Germany.
 406
 Breeding an independent and standard karakul flock in 
Germany required crossbreeding experiments with other types of sheep. The first experiments 
with karakuls were performed on 4 rams and 28 ewes: they were brought to Germany via by 
Durrschmidt in Tashkent. The crossbreeding experiments took place on the Heidegut 
Timmerloh form, located in the vicinity of Soltau.
407
 Artificial selection played a large role in 
validating karakul farming as an economic possibility.  
 
Other agricultural scientists joined Kühn in his attempts to change the negative perceptions 
surrounding karakul farming. Leopold Adametz, a professor in the K.K. Hochschule für 
Bodenkultur in Vienna, had been studying the rearing and breeding of karakuls since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Supporting the idea of having karakul herds in central 
Europe, he too crusaded against ‘steppe perception.’ Like Kühn, Adametz utilised Mendelian 
genetics to argue in favour Karakul breeding: “in the mild climate of central Europe, a good 
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breeder will be able to modify and enlarge the organism of the animals and to positively 
influence the characteristics of the karakul, especially the beautiful curls of the lamb, despite 
the absence of a dry domestic climate.”408 To Adametz, fodder, soil, and climate only 
influenced the karakuls to a limited extent, although he admitted that karakuls should 
preferably be kept on dry swaths of pasture. Adametz’s attack on the “karakul fantasy” was 
repeated again in 1911.
409
  
 
Apart from the tensions caused by changing paradigms in biology, the conservatism of 
farmers was an additional obstacle to the implementation of karakul farming in Germany. In 
1906, Kühn brought the Halle experiments on karakul breeding to the attention of the 
Deutsche Landwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft (the German Agricultural Society, henceforth 
DLG) with a notable speech entitled “the importance of karakul for the poorest fields in soils 
in Northern Germany.” This speech was an argument in favour of introducing karakul 
farming into German agriculture.
410
 Kühn tried to convince members of the DLG to start 
producing karakuls for the fur industry, especially in those areas suited only for extensive 
cattle rearing. German farmers were apparently reluctant to provide supplies for a luxury 
market that was notably more capricious than the traditional agricultural markets for wool, 
meat, and dairy products. Nevertheless, Kühn continued to promote fur farming and argued 
that “the nature of these pelts is so excellent that we can probably count on a continuous 
demand.”411  
 
Due to conservatism and the steppe perception, karakul farming failed to find popular 
reception in Germany. This stood in sharp contrast to other experiences with karakul breeding 
in continental Europe. On the eve of World War I, agricultural experts across Europe had 
successfully introduced breeding stocks. The Russians in particular had successfully created 
and maintained of half-breed karakul in particular areas. By 1912, large flocks of the Russian 
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half-breeds grazed on the meadows of Bessarabia.
412
 A few years later, Russian farmers kept 
karakuls in Iakovleva: with some 2,000 animals, they had at the largest karakul flock outside 
Bukhara.
413
 In the US and in Great Britain, the results of crossbreeding experiments began to 
unveil the possibilities of karakul breeding in domestic agriculture. Thorer’s business contacts 
mentioned the presence of American experts, in Central Asia performing studies on the 
breeding of karakuls.
414
 Confirmed exports of karakul sheep to the US took place in 1912.  
 
The lack of progress of karakul breeding frustrated Kühn’s adepts: after 1910, they more 
directly challenged the ‘conservationism’ of German agriculture. Hermann Krämer (1872-
1940), professor of animal breeding in the Landwirtschaftliche Hochschule Hohenheim and 
later Giesen was one of the challengers. In the journal of the DLG, Kraemer vehemently 
condemned the lack of progress in contrast to other European agricultural sectors: “in part, 
this may attributed to the national character of the Germans, who consider thoroughly and 
carefully before starting something new in contrast to the farmers of our more experimental 
neighbours.”415 In addition, his article once again stressed the falsity of the steppe perception. 
According to Krämer, only limited food rationing was required and the climate’s impact was 
minimal so long as the animal was not exposed to extreme colds: “if neither climate nor soil 
nor forage determines the fur locks or sudden changes in physical appearance, then it follows 
that the environment does not have a decisive influence and it is possible by ‘careful 
selection’ to preserve the quality of the fur in subsequent generations.”416 The 
internationalisation of this commodity served as an incentive to challenge the ‘conservatism’ 
in the German agricultural world, especially that associated with the DLG.  
 
The new production paradigm of karakul farming strongly emphasised the use of Mendelian 
genetics in order to re-create physical characteristics. However, these new insights were often 
difficult to implement in the world of agriculture.
417
 In Germany, interest in karakul breeding 
continued to be limited. By 1931, only 1,508 karakuls were kept in Germany, spread over 25 
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farms.
418
 An unintended consequence of the slow development of karakul farming inside 
Germany was the acceleration of the introducion of karakuls in the colonies. Extensive 
karakul farming was ‘naturally’ suited to the arid lands of Namibia and the steppe-perception 
was therefore less of a problem.
419
 Ironically, outdated biological ideas were partially 
responsible for the introduction of karakuls into the ‘steppe-like’ environment of South West 
Africa. Ultimately, the transplantation of karakuls to Africa was advantageous for genetic 
scientists as well. In South West Africa, the project could start from scratch and colonial 
authorities granted Mendelian adepts much more freedom to create a new crossbred karakul 
sheep for German colonial farmers. In the colonies, the interests of Mendelian genetics and 
the fur industry could be pursued immediately.  
 
4.2.3 Mendelian genetics as the handmaiden of the fur industry. 
 
The success of the Kühn experiments on karakul rearing in Germany attracted the interest of 
the German colonial administration in Windhuk. In particular, the project evoked the interest 
of governor Lindequist and he corresponded intensively with Paul Thorer from 1906. It did 
not take long for von Lindequist to order 120 ewes and 20 rams through Thorer’s business 
channels in Tashkent.
420
 The colonial administration’s interest in fur farming took shape just 
when migration to the colony started to soar. Between 1907 and 1913, when the first karakul 
arrived in South West Africa, the white population went from 7,110 to almost 13,000.
 421
 The 
first shipments of karakul sheep were sent to the German protectorate in Africa 1908-1909.
422
 
Small but numerous shipments formed the basis of the karakul herd in South West Africa. 
Another shipment was organised by the Thorer company in 1913. In addition, other firms also 
organised the import of karakul sheep to South West Africa: the famous animal trade firm 
Haegenbeck of Hamburg increased the size of the herd still further.
423
 At this stage, it is 
important to stress that the colonial project was no longer exclusive to the Thorer company: 
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the Leipzig dyeing factory A Herzog also entered the colonial project when it organised a 
small shipment of 6 additional rams to South West Africa.
424
  
 
Transportation was a time-consuming process. Before karakuls were shipped from Bukhara 
across Russia, German agricultural experts carefully inspected the quality of the karakuls. 
These experts, most notably Simon von Nathusius (Jena University), were assisted by 
Theodor Thorer’s business connections in Central Asia. Trains brought the karakul herds to 
Hamburg where they were put on steamers to the German protectorate. Once unloaded, the 
herd was brought to the Fürstenwalde state farm in the vicinity of Windhuk.
425
 The karakuls 
remained under the control of agricultural experts working for the industry and the colonial 
state throughout the entire journey,  
 
Tight expert supervision and the creation of the central agricultural station in Fürstenwalde 
were two of the demands of the fur industry and Paul Thorer in particular. Afraid that the 
project would drown in a quagmire of ‘amateur breeding,’ Thorer asked that the 
‘Stammherde’ be put under the supervision of ‘a strong and smart personality.’ Furthermore, 
Thorer stressed that those experts should make karakul rams available only to those farmers 
who were willing “to send goods of high quality to Germany.”426 As ‘pure’ karakuls were 
limited in the number, the success of karakul farming in South West Africa depended on the 
continuation of crossbreeding experiments. Under the leadership of its director Koeppel, the 
Fürstenwalde centre strictly monitored the sale of karakuls to German farmers.
427
  
 
The strict control over karakuls was also necessary because of an insufficiency of ‘breeding 
material’. There were two reasons for the karakul shortage. Firstly, the organisation of karakul 
shipments was quite an endeavour, as the consent of foreign powers was required. Russian 
permission was a particularly tricky issue. As the transcaucasian passage was not suited for 
large animal shipments, cargo had to go by rail from Bukhara to Moscow.
428
 Problems with 
the organisation of this long journey erupted when the Russians refused to cooperate in 
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1913.
429
 According to the German colonial administration, the Russians wanted to protect 
their own karakul farming business. By that time, the Russians had successfully established 
their own line of karakul farming in Bessarabia and had little interest in supporting foreign 
competition in this potentially lucrative agricultural niche. At the first Russian exhibition of 
karakul breeders in Moscow in 1912, Russian farmers had summoned the government to 
hinder all competitors so that the Russian breeders would not lose their grip on the market.
430
 
The German colonial administration reacted by forbidding agricultural experts to publish their 
findings on the progress of the African karakul industry, since this might upset the 
Russians.
431
 In addition, transit requests by German authorities cloaked the actual destination 
of the karakuls. 
 
Secondly, the shipments and the state farm Fürstenwalde were plagued by high mortality 
rates. A persistent lung infection killed many sheep in 1908.
432
 Between 1910 and 1912, 
another lung infection raged on Fürstenwalde and other German farms. Newspapers dubbed 
this the ‘karakul crisis.’ At the peak of the longue disease in 1910, the Colonial Office 
harboured the idea of abandoning the disease-ridden Fürstenwalde for a new location in 
Gaitsabis.
433
 The high cost of the move forced the Colonial Office to abandon this plan but 
panic among the colonial officials showed just how vulnerable the entire operation was. 
Despite the rapid spread of lethal diseases, the Colonial Office was able to save a small herd 
by 1914: Fürstenwalde had 389 animals that formed the basis for the creation of the mixed 
African karakul lamb.  
 
Due to the inability to import additional karakuls, it was finally decided to create a crossbreed 
based on the mixture between karakul and African sheep, like the Perser and Somali variants. 
Selective breeding according to Mendelian principles was the means to achieve this goal. The 
state could control this operation via Fürstenwalde. It took measures to ensure that the karakul 
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sheep sold to the colonists were used in accordance to these plans. Purchase contracts cited 
numerous stipulations with regard to the care and the mating of rams. Farmers signed a 
contract obliging them to use the rams only to ‘enhance’ crossbreeding (Aufkreuzung) with 
tdomestic Perser and Somali ‘blood’ (Crossbreeding with other species of sheep was strictly 
forbidden).
434
 Farmers had no choice other than to sign this contract as the karakul ram was a 
precious item: “given the limited number of pure-blooded rams in the protectorate and the 
uncertainty of supply of the original animals, it is an essential task of the breeder to use the 
valuable ram from the state farm efficiently and keep it capable of reproducing as long as 
possible.”435 By 1913, German colonists owned about 335 pure karakul rams and 830 pure 
ewes.  
 
Crossbreeding the karakul with African sheep made good progress in the years leading up to 
World War I. In 1913, Koeppel, the director of Fürstenwalde, personally inspected 15 farms 
in the east of South West Africa in order to assess the development of crossbreeding. The 
report made clear that German farmers had carefully followed the instructions by joining the 
karakul rams with the ‘African’ herds “until the last sheep is mixed with the karakul.” 
Koeppel was optimistic about the results in the east of South West Africa: “in regards to the 
inheritance of colour and morphological characteristics, one can be really satisfied, since 
crossbreeding started here in January 1912 and it concerns first generation breeds.”436 
Koeppel was strongly convinced that the “half-bloods” were adequately adapted to the arid 
environment of the south: “the crossbred sheep are more resistant, quieter in temperament, 
and more sociable.”437 By 1914, the distribution policy had created a herd of 21,000 mixed 
African karakul sheep, which would eventually form the core of the African fur supply for 
Leipzig.  
 
The agricultural experts who collaborated with the fur trade in Leipzig made artificial 
selection the norm in the creation of the African karakul. Genetics and artificial selection 
therefore came to play a dominant role in the daily practice of colonial farming. In January 
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1913, Koeppel explained the importance of artificial selection in producing for the fur 
industry to the Agricultural Association in Windhuk. The main yardstick for the new species 
was fur: “the pattern of fur must be equally balanced, that is, the curls must extend evenly 
over the body and its extremities. Desired is the karakul curl that is both small and firm, with 
the tip turned inward.”438 The farmers received a classification chart in order to enhance their 
breeding stock for karakul farming. According to Koeppel’s chart (see table 1), farmers ought 
to achieve this goal by focusing on a number of physical characteristics, some of which were 
quite obvious (such as the pureness of the black colour, the so-called ‘Farbenreinheit’) whilst 
others were of a more biometric nature (for instance, the shape of the nose). Colonial farmers 
were thereby given a very basic introduction to the tenets of applied Mendelian genetics. The 
classification chart translated genetics into the observable qualities of living beings and served 
as a handbook for karakul farmers in South West Africa.  
 
 Features of the mature karakul eligible for further breeding  
(Presented by Koeppel at the Landwirtschaftlichen Verein Windhuk, 25 
January 1913) 
1 Health 
2 Purity of colour (deep and pure black) 
3 Moderately developed fluff and 'under-hairs' 
4 Ears and face should be covered only with short, black hair: ears should be 
long and hanging 
5 Smooth head hairs indicate good fur quality 
6 Pronounced ram nose (convex nose-line) 
7 Broad and s-shaped curved tail 
8 Pronounced sexual proclivity 
Table 4-1: Classification chart to enhance breeding stock in South West Africa (as presented by Koeppel) 
 
This rough classification chart was only a starting point for karakul farming in South West 
Africa. Experts sought to improve it by attaching more precise biometric data to describe an 
ideal crossbreed karakul that would be suitable for further breeding. Von Nathusius, professor 
in agriculture at the Halle University, made the first attempt to deepen the rating system when 
he inspected karakuls awaiting dispatch in Hamburg. For von Nathusius, the ‘smoothness of 
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the skin’ was the indisputable yardstick for grading the karakuls but he also realised 
measurable data was required to judge characteristics.
439
 In order to create such biometric 
standards, the colonial administrators and scientists invited Herzog, an industrialist from the 
Leipzig fur industry. Under the influence of Herzog, it was decided that the classification 
system that formed the basis for artificial selection should focus on the “the character of the 
curly locks before the lamb reaches 12 days of age.”440 The biological result of crossbreeding 
was increasingly tailored according to the needs of the fur factory. As Herzog noted, “a solid 
fleece with less pronounced locks is preferred over a lose fleece with pronounced locks, since 
the former is better for dressing whereas the latter is lost during production process.”441 
Mendelian genetics was an increasingly sophisticated instrument for the fur industry.  
 
The additional discussions between experts and the fur industry led to the creation of a new 
uniform ‘list’ that gave scores to biometric data such as height, dimensions of the body parts, 
and shades of colour. At several junctions in the karakul’s life span, the farmer ought to fill in 
this document by giving marks to various characteristics of the karakul. The ultimate aim was 
to create a ‘biometric’ certificate system for the karakuls in South West Africa, with each 
karakul having its own biometric passport. The final step in the creation of the German-
African karakul was separating ‘inferior’ crossbreeds from superior ones on the basis of fur 
quality.
 442
 The system of biometric karakul certificates was never put in place because of the 
outbreak of World War I. Nevertheless, it marked an advance for genetics as an applied 
science in agricultural business. 
 
Furthermore, the selection systems and classification models mattered to colonial farmers 
from an economic point of view. Koeppel had already made clear to the Windhuk 
Agricultural Society that successfully practicing artificial selection was important for 
commercial success since the grading system of the fur industry was based on the colour 
purity and the perfection of the curls. As an agricultural expert, Koeppel was in very close 
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contact with the fur industry. When he gave his lecture to the German colonists, he had just 
returned from a work trip to Leipzig. At the demand of the colonial administration, Koeppel 
was instructed to spend his 1913 journey to Germany in Leipzig in order to gain insight into 
the Thorer factory and the “grading system for manufacturing the fur of the karakul.”443 Upon 
his return, he lectured to the farmers to the Windhuk Agricultural Society: “the production of 
a good, uniform, and even curl types of lambs (...) is the most important [thing]. A sufficient 
balance in terms of skin quality will lead to a rising and uniform wholesale price and, in other 
words, enhance the profitability of this branch of farming.”444  
 
Skin quality was the criterion of the price-setting mechanism. The fur industry made five 
distinctions in quality: the first one, the stillborn pelt, was the highest type, and it exceeded 
the price of any other karakul pelt because of its perfect moiré pattern. The second category 
(I) met the production requirements for end products such as coats and other garments. 
Supplies graded as type (II) were destined for the trimming of fur jackets. Pelts graded lower 
than this were no longer highly valued and could only be used in low value clothing products 
like hats (type III). Pelts that did not correspond to quality requirements were simply 
worthless (type IV). This classification system explicitly explained the low value of 
substandard types by reference to breeding and selection. Type III pelts were called ‘inferior’ 
whereas type IV skins were denounced as ‘unfit breeds.’445 The whole ‘blueprint’ for trade in 
African karakul skins was thus firmly undergirded by artificial selection. ‘Good’ breeders 
were to be rewarded and ‘bad’ breeders sanctioned. Successful reproduction of the black fur 
skin formed the basis of the price setting mechanism adopted by the Leipzig houses like 
Theodor Thorer.  
 
4.2.4 Further refinements to the production paradigm. 
 
Stages of the production process other than the breeding of animals were governed by similar 
patterns of cooperation between the colonial administration and the fur industry. Fur traders 
                                                 
443
 BArch, Kaiserliches Gouvernement in Deutsch SWA R 151 F, nr. N.VI.B.1, f. 14 Der Staatssekretär des 
Reichskolonialamts an den Herrn Gouverneur, Windhuk, 22.04.1913. 
444
 BArch, Reichskolonialamt R 1001, nr. 8506, f. 159. Vortrag des landwirtschaftlichen Sachverständigen 
Koeppel Fürstenwalde über Karakulzucht, gehalten am 25.01.1913 in landwirtschaftlichen Verein Windhuk. 
Abschrift.  
445
 BArch, Reichskolonialamt R 1001, nr. 8506, f. 175. Vortrag des landwirtschaftlichen Sachverständigen 
Koeppel Fürstenwalde über Karakulzucht, gehalten am 25.01. 1913 in landwirtschaftlichen Verein Windhuk. 
Abschrift 
Leipzig in Africa 
145 
 
were regularly asked to deliver feedback on developments in the first wave of African karakul 
farming. The Leipzig fur industry, and the firms Theodor Thorer and Herzog in particular, 
issued a number of recommendations on the treatment and packaging of skins. The 
Agricultural Review (Landwirtschaftliche Umschau) in South West Africa published the 
recommendations of the fur industry concerning the drying, packing, and preventative 
treatment of the skins. On behalf of the A. Herzog dyeing factory, the Umschau also 
instructed that dried skins had to be treated with the environment-polluting naphthalin instead 
of a basic salt treatment.
446
 Later, the fur industry modified its recommendations and 
suggested the use of trichlorbenzol instead of naphtalin.
447
  
 
In 1914, the Theodor Thorer firm received a batch of 25 skins from Fürstenwalde.
448
 The 
feedback that the Thorer firm transmitted made it clear that the new supply chain was still 
suffering from deficiencies. According to Thorer, some of the procedures, packing for 
instance, were still poorly executed despite previous explanations: “in several cases, the 
leather of the skins has suffered from insufficient packing and the skins are therefore damaged 
in the dyeing process in our factory.”449 Thorer’s recommendations show the German 
farmers’ initial lack of dexterity in this new line of business. He gave clear instructions to the 
state farm concerning how the procured skins should be dried: “I have to advise, once again, 
that the skins have to dried, in stretched condition, protected from direct sunlight.” The 
packing technique was also not satisfactory: “during shipping, skins have to be bound leather 
side on leather side and fur-side on fur-side in bunches of 10 or 20.” According Thorer, only 
one farmer so far had proven his dexterity in the treatment and packaging of the furs.
450
  
 
The instructions of the fur industry and the interference of the colonial administration was 
paramount in the creation of the karakul farming business. For example, several farmers 
neglected the instructions and sought to produce crossbreeds largely for wool production, a 
fact that was most unpalatable for the fur traders. Mention was made of two farms in the east 
that kept karakuls for wool production. This illustrates that the creation of fur farming from 
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scratch was not as straightforward as foreseen. Thorer testified later that “distrust in farmer 
circles had to be overcome. The farmers felt comfortable with the production of meat and 
wool, to which the karakul was ill suited. Moreover, the introduction of karakul keeping was 
perceived by many German farmers as a great increase of work because of the slaughtering of 
the lambs and the refinement of skins. Overall, farmers lacked knowledge about this special 
breed. The karakul brought a change in their perception of extensive pasture, of which the 
conservative farmer was suspiciously reluctant.”451  
 
Nevertheless, the strategy of cooperation between the colonial state and a few fur firms was 
apparently successful. When the war broke out, a supply line of karakuls from South West 
Africa was increasingly unveiling its possibilities. Even during the war, the British 
acknowledged the positive results of the German endeavour to establish fur farms in Africa. 
Despite the detailed critiques from the fur industry on the new production paradigm, the 
Westminster Gazette wrote in 1917 that “should German South-West Africa come under the 
British Flag, the caracul fur industry of that colony is likely to prove an asset of increasing 
value.”452  
 
Furthermore, the promising results of karakul breeding led to heightened attention to the 
colonial opportunities that fur farming offered. In 1910, the Colonial Office’s interest in 
creating new fur resources deepened when other eligible types of fur bearing animals were 
discussed with representatives of the industry, zoologists, and agricultural experts.
453
 The 
animal trading firm Hagenbeck and the fur trader Paul Thorer figured prominently as experts 
in this investigation. The colonial administration produced a lengthy report on “the possibility 
of elevating the production of fur and leather in Germany.” Mention was made of the soaring 
prices in the international fur trade and it was held to be possible that “fur bearing animals 
could increase the value of some poor soils” both inside Germany and in its empire. However, 
the empire consisted mainly of tropical and arid areas, which were not particularly well suited 
to keeping subarctic fur-bearing animals. The recommendations of the industry and university 
scientists were therefore limited to farming opossums and kangaroos. Nevertheless, it once 
again illustrates the link between the fur industry and imperialism in Germany. 
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In summary, this illustrates that karakul farming and the belief in the profitability of fur 
farming in models of economic exploitation are important but neglected aspects of Germany 
imperialism. Furthermore, karakul farming in South West Africa was one of the more robust 
projects of colonial developments. The links between colonial karakul farming and Germany 
did not simply disappear in the post-war period.  
 
4.3 Karakul farming, the South West African economy, and German 
revisionism (1914-1939).  
 
The war had a disruptive impact on karakul farming in South West Africa. Farmers who 
joined the military neglected their herds and, more importantly, were cut off from the market 
in Leipzig and the support of the colonial administration. Allied forces fully conquered South-
West Africa in 1915 and transplanted the Fürstenwalde herd to Ojituesu, from whence many 
karakuls were sold to the South African Agricultural school in Middelburg.
454
 However, after 
the war, farmers in South West Africa took the initiative and restored ties with Leipzig. A 
delegation of fur farmers visited Germany a few years after the war seeking to re-establish 
connections with the Leipzig industry. During the period 1920-1922, a few thousand pelts of 
South West African origin found their way to the Thorer factory.
455
  
 
Despite the renewal of ties, it was difficult for the German fur industry and the colonial 
administration (Germany retained a colonial administration despite the loss of its empire) to 
support the karakul industry. German farmers were in dire need of new pure-breed rams in 
order to counter the “degeneration and inbreeding of the African stock.”456 However, new 
karakuls could only arrive in South West Africa in very small numbers. With Bukhara now an 
integral part of the USSR, the Soviets restricted the passage of karakuls in order to prevent the 
nurture of competing karakul flocks, just as tsarist administators had done. Equally, the South 
African Union periodically blocked cattle imports from Germany, officially out of a 
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veterinary concern for foot-and-mouth disease in continental Europe.
457
 The German Foreign 
Office sporadically managed to convince the Russians that imports were only destined for 
Germany and were desired only for research purposes in order to prevent the the impression 
that the Soviets were supporting competitors in South West Africa.
458
 Under this pretext, 
small numbers of karakuls managed to leave the Soviet Union for Germany and then 
ultimately went to South West Africa. 
 
For the most part, the same actors were involved in supporting the karakul farmers in the 
former colony as before the war. Professor Frölich, who succeeded Julius Kuhn as the director 
of the Institute for Animal Breeding in Halle, Arndt Thorer (the son of Paul Thorer, who had 
died in 1920), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were actively involved in the 
transplantation of karakuls to the mandate. In 1927, they organised an expedition to Central 
Asia in order to choose a sample of karakul sheep. The Reichszentrale für Pelztier und 
Rauchwarenforschung (a research network sponsored by a number of firms in Leipzig), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Education jointly financed the costs of the 
expedition.
459
  
 
A further obstacle for the post-war karakul farming was the problematic situation of German 
colonists in South West Africa. In the early years of the mandate, the remaining colonists 
suffered from their incorporation into the Union of South Africa, as they had to abandon the 
German mark and accept the South African pound. In addition, Boers from South Africa 
crossed the border and took land from the troubled German colonists. Therefore, several herds 
owned by German farmers were in danger of falling into the hands of foreign buyers. To 
make matters worse, Namibia suffered from a severe drought in 1926.
460
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Unable to rely on the colonial administration, the problematic situation entailed more active 
involvement from the Leipzig fur industry in the former colony. From 1924 onwards, Thorer 
centralised his operations in South West Africa by establishing a subsidiary, the SWA-
Karakul-Centrale (from 1928 called the SWA Karakul-Centrale Ltd). Besides the ‘Centrale,’ 
the Theodor Thorer firm purchased a large farm in the Rehoboth district of about 7,207 
hectares. The Thorer branch became an important link in the supply of karakul skins from 
South West Africa to Germany. In order to prevent the sale of land to non-German farmers, 
the Centrale purchased farms from colonists and ran them on the basis of shared ownership. 
These were the so-called ‘half-share flocks’: the Thorer company became the co-owner of the 
flock while the farmer continued to manage it. Furthermore, the revenue was divided between 
the Centrale and the flock’s manager. By 1931, the Karakul-Centrale owned six herds of this 
type, which were worth 76,227.75 RM in total.
461
 The subsidiary acted also as a procurement 
centre for exports to the Leipzig fur industry.  
 
The influence of the Karakul-Centrale in South West Africa was based on local cooperation 
with German farmers and with the local merchant bank Olthaver & List Trust Co, which was 
in charge of financial transactions and made monthly reports to the head office. Furthermore, 
the cooperation between Albert Voigt, a member of the board, and Otto Nauen, a manager of 
the Thorer company, was important. Voigt and his brother Gustav were pioneers in the 
breeding of karakuls and other non-domestic animals in South West Africa. The first karakuls 
were grazing on the Voigtland farm in 1908.
462
 Furthermore, this farm was regarded as one of 
the best organised in South West Africa.
463
 The Voigt brothers were not only experts in 
farming in Namibia, but also popular figures of German colonialism. As such, the connection 
with Voigt was useful for promoting the karakul industry inside Germany as well.
464
 By 
cooperating with the Voigt brothers, the Thorer concern made an important alliance on the 
local level, buttressing their position in the South West African farm economy. 
 
By buying land and procuring furs directly, the main goal of the Thorer intervention gradually 
shifted from reversing the demise of the karakul herds to stimulating supply to Leipzig. Paul 
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Hollender, the manager of the Thorer business, wrote in 1932 that “the acquisition of land is 
not only done with the purpose of obtaining pastures for our karakul stock but also to 
influence the German breeders to send their skin produce to Leipzig.”465 The Thorer policy 
was also aimed at expanding the size of Karakul farming. The Centrale accomplished this 
long-term goal by extending credit to farmers, usually as advantages on future yields.
466
 As 
such, the district firm Thorer actively intervened in Africa by setting up a transcrossing trade 
flows. The Thorer firm was arguably more active in Africa after the loss of the empire.  
 
The intervention of the Thorer business had a stimulating affect on karakul farming in South 
West Africa. Most importantly, credit advances remedied economic pressures on farmers who 
were killing the lambs for immediate profits. After 1924, several German farmers thereby 
managed to restore and even expand their flocks.
467
 Farmers in South West Africa not only 
profited from the presence of Thorer: the South African government also heavily subsidised 
agriculture in its new territory. After the drought of 1926, for instance, the government 
allocated advance payments of up to £400 to replace losses.
468
 In the long run, support from 
business as well as the state led to a more secure basis for breeding in South West Africa. By 
1930, just before exports reached their crescendo, the former German colony was home to 
about 150,000 karakul sheep, spread among 1,200 farmers. To a certain extent, karakuls were 
relatively equally divided over these farms but some stood out with thousands of karakuls.
469
 
The breeding basis of Karakuls grew exponentially thereafter: the stock of African karakuls 
numbered 369,359 in 1931, 514,629 in 1932, and 552,178 in 1933.
470
 
 
As the result of direct business and government intervention, karakul pelting finally turned 
into one of the most important export products of the South West African mandate. Exports of 
karakul skins for the world market increased from the early 1920s onwards but soared in the 
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early 1930s (see figure 1). In the trade balance of mandate South West Africa, the karakul 
trade assumed a prominent position. In 1933, trade statistics estimated that about one third of 
the mandate’s total exports (£1,400,000) were generated by the karakul trade (£444,000).471 
The karakul industry continued to hold this position throughout the 1930s. Of a total export 
value of £3,689,800 in 1937, about £2,099,750 (57%) was ascribed to the agricultural sector. 
The karakul trade accounted for over half of all agricultural exports (58% or £1,222,629, a 
staggering 33% of total exports).
472
 The trade reached its apex when it overtook diamonds in 
export value in 1938. It remained one of the largest export value creators of the Namibian 
economy in subsequent decades.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Export of karakul skins from South-West Africa 1922-1936473 
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4.4 British competition in African karakul farming (1931-1939).  
 
However, the expansion of the karakul trade in South West Africa had a problem of a more 
unexpected nature. The rise in export figures does not necessarily mean that Leipzig was the 
main purchaser of African karakul skins. In fact, foreign businesses managed to absorb a large 
chunk of the new flow of karakul skins. In particular, exports from the mandate to Great 
Britain increased significantly during the early 1930s: from an export value for karakul skins 
of £40,900 in 1932, exports climbed to about £192,500 in 1933. In contrast, Germany lost its 
role as privileged importer in one year: in 1932, it attracted £99,500 of the exports whereas in 
1933, German imports were less than those to Great Britain, amounting to £178,600.
474
  
 
Taking into account the arduous efforts of the Thorer business, the Colonial Office, and the 
agricultural institutes in restoring the karakul business in the former colony, why did flows of 
this export commodity divert to Great Britain in the early 1930s? The explanation is 
obviously related to the drastic change in the political climate and the economic 
circumstances in Germany during the 1930s. The economic crisis severely debilitated the 
German economy: economic transactions declined and the provision of foreign currencies 
became scarce. Since German firms like Thorer granted advances on future karakul yields, 
currency shortages significantly hindered German trade in South West Africa.
475
 Furthermore, 
the economic problems in Germany put serious strains on any ‘patriotism’ of the German 
farmer that might encourage him to deliver goods exclusively to the German market. Over the 
course of the years, German colonists were more or less forced to conduct trade with the 
British.  
 
However, an explanation that entirely focuses on the political and economic dimensions of the 
regime change in Germany neglects a major development that took place within the karakul 
business in South West Africa. Apart from the farms connected to Thorer, a separate 
association of farmers was formed in the wake of the karakul boom in the 1930s. Despite its 
German character, this farmers’ cooperative played an important role in the loss of the karakul 
business. These farmers actively sought to upgrade their position in the fur commodity chain 
by altering the trade parameters set before World War I. Importantly, currency shortages 
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among businesses in Germany strengthened the aim of the karakul farmers for better 
econonomic and commercial conditions. Thus, the interaction of both financial problems and 
the social action of colonial farmers accounted for Leipzig’s loss of influence. The forces that 
prevented Leipzig from profiting fully from the 1930s boom in African karakuls have to be 
sought in the structure of karakul farming inside South West Africa as well as in external 
socio-economic problems.  
 
4.4.1  The Kalkfeld farmer cooperative.  
 
At the beginning of the karakul boom in the early 1930s, a large group of mostly German 
karakul farmers established a new association, the Südwest Persianer Verkaufsgesellschaft  
(SWPVG), which played a growing role in the African karakul trade. The SWPVG was 
founded by Friedrich, owner of the Zierenberg farm in Kalkfeld: ten other farmers from that 
area quickly joined.
476
 The participating farms were principally situated around Kalkfeld in 
the north of South West Africa, an area had been largely neglected by the proponents like 
Thorer and the German colonial administration. Entering the karakul trade much later, the 
northern farmers rejected the ‘Thorer monopoly’ and generally recoiled at the principle of 
‘distributive commerce’ that made profits at the ‘expense’ of the karakul farmer. Anti-
capitalism firmly undergirded its radical, if poorly developed, ideology. In one of its 
explanatory statements, the SWPVG distinguished between resource producers 
(Urproduzenten), the cornerstones of the national economy, and the world of high finance, 
“the vampire of every nation” that led the market with “cheap buying and expensive sales.” 
According to the SWPVG, the objective of commercial business was the acquistion of a 
monopoly on trade to keep the producers poor.
477
 Based on this ideology, the main rationale 
of the SWPVG was to challenge the trade arrangements set out by the African fur industry, in 
particular Thorer. The SWPVG intended to curb the power of intermediate traders and shorten 
the ‘distance’ between producers and buyers in order to converge the prices of karakul sold in 
South West Africa with those on the world market.  
 
                                                 
476
 BArch, Reichskolonialamt R 1001, nr. 8509, f. 212. Abschrift. W.v.Schönberg, Rietfontein, an die 
Überseeische Industrie und Handels-Gesellschaft, Berlin. den 18.4.1934. 
477
 BArch, Reichskolonialmat R 1001, nr. 8510, p. 360. Abschrift, Berlin, den 06.11.1936. an das 
Reichswirtschaftsministerium z.hd. von Herrn Oberregierungsrat Dr. Bertsch.  
Leipzig in Africa 
154 
 
Whilst these principles sound somewhat vague, the cooperative nevertheless had a clear idea 
about how to change the parameters of trade, namely by selling karakul skins at auction sales. 
While auctions constituted a long-standing commercial practice in London, the sales 
mechanism was increasingly adopted in fur centres all over the world, like in New York, 
Montreal, and Leipzig. Importantly, the auction companies in these cities were explicitly 
created to compete on an international level and improve the position of the fur hubs in the 
commodity chain. For a few decades, newly established auction sales had a strong impact on 
the world market of furs. The dynamism of auction sales and its meaning for the Leipzig fur 
industry is analysed in depth in chapter X. For the meantime, it is important to remember that 
resource-producing entities believed that auctions were a better market institution for their 
business. The Kalkfeld farmer Schneider declared that “before the ‘intervention’ of the 
Kalkfeld organisation, traders showed no interest in public auctions. Thorer denounced it as 
‘speculation.’ It was the aim of the traders, unaware of the quality of the products, to acquire 
the skins cheaply and to form the price in semi-darkness.”478 In 1936, when the currency crisis 
caused major fluctuations in the price of karakul skins, the Kalkfeld association wrote that “a 
fixed price for every world market product is in the first place possible through auction 
sales.”479 The Kalkfelders had apparently learnt from the main transformations in the 
international fur industry where auction sales increasingly emerged as the most important 
market institution.
480
  
 
With their preference for auction sales, the farmers’ cooperative altered the practice that had 
characterised trade in South West Africa up until that point. While the cooperative lacked the 
means to establish an independent auction company on the Leipzig market, they initially 
cooperated with one of the main Leipzig auction companies, the RAVAG (Rauchwaren 
Versteigerungs AG, an auction company). The RAVAG promised to gain better prices on the 
world market: “the merger of karakul farmers was based on the idea that, by being freed from 
the dealers who worked with high profit margins through taking advantage of economic 
fluctuations (...) and supplying our fur harvest directly to the old city of Leipzig based on our 
expertise, ‘world prices’ are achieved: as such, great benefit to the farmer will come with this 
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elimination of the middleman.”481 Cooperation with an auction company constituted a 
fundamental shift in the German-African karakul trade, since the RAVAG was a competitor 
of the Thorer company in the karakul farming business.
482
  
 
The cooperation allowed the SWPVG cooperative to change the local system of fur 
procurement. Firstly, farmers affiliated with the SWPVG exclusively delivered lambskins to 
Kalkfeld, where their value was established in advance of the auctions. Kalkfeld paid a 60% 
advance on this estimate.
483
 The skins were then sent to the RAVAG in Leipzig. This 
alternative business model expanded quickly. Despite their belated entry in the karakul 
industry, the Kalkfeld farmers sold 11,702 skins to Leipzig through the RAVAG in 1931, 
which represented 11% of total South West African fur production.
484
 By 1935, the SWPVG 
had 650 suppliers and exported 121,700 skins, 23% of the total mandate’s karakul 
production.
485
  
 
The change of the trade parameters was complemented by business practices that typified 
cooperative ventures, in particular self-help and profit sharing. The SWVPG also reinvested 
profits in order to strengthen local karakul farming. For instance, it funded a small research 
laboratory and organised informative meetings about the karakul industry to further its 
professionalisation. Furthermore, the cooperative installed solidarity mechanisms to support 
members plagued by financial troubles. In particular, the SWPVG granted emergency loans, 
the interest rates of which were reputed to be lower than that of the banks. The loans offered 
an important alternative to troubled farmers who were often forced to sell to non-German 
farmers or the fur business to make ends meet. By 1939, the SWPVG had granted £10,000 
worth of loans to needy German farmers.
486
 Between 1937 and 1939, 35 members of the 
famers’ cooperative were granted a loan.487 Thus, the SWPVG had become a powerful local 
actor and an important competitor of the Thorer-dominated trade with Leipzig.  
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4.4.2 Currency problems in Germany. 
 
Competition between those two factions explains the decline of the Leipzig fur industry in 
South West Africa. Indeed, the Kalkfelders initially cooperated with another Leipzig firm. 
However, the interplay between the association’s anti-business motives with the economic 
and financial problems inside the Reich sharpened the tension between karakul farmers and 
the Leipzig fur industry.  
 
The currency shortages that severely weakened German business operations abroad began in 
the twilight of the Weimar republic. In 1931, international short-term funding was withdrawn 
from Germany: subsequently, the government decided to leave the gold standard and 
restricted flows of capital from Germany to the outside world.
488
 The German government 
increasingly controlled payments since 1931 and avoided balance-of-payments problems by 
imposing exchange control and the licensing of imports and exports upon the country’s 
businesses.
489
 Later, the Third Reich’s plans for rearmament further restricted the availability 
of foreign currency for the consumer goods industry.  
 
Currency restrictions and import quotas coincided with the sudden swell of African karakul 
business that took place in the early 1930s. In 1932, £100,000 of a total export value of 
£141,000 went to Leipzig while £40,000 went to London.
490
 A year later, the pendulum had 
swung in favour of London: £192,000 worth of karakul pelts was shipped to London. The 
total karakul export in that year was worth £433,000 but only £179,000 from this yield went 
directly to Leipzig.
 491
 Despite the government’s promise to facilitate the growing output of 
the German karakul farmers, the lack of South African pounds in Germany became critical in 
1934. Afterwards, currency allocation increased but it was insufficient to meet growing 
demand. In 1936, this arrangement provided the sum of £250,000 for the import of African 
karakuls, of which Thorer secured “an adequate share.”492 In 1937, the currency consignment 
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in this bilateral agreement (the so-called wool agreement) provided £360,000.
493
 Depite the 
absolute increase, the proportion of £360,000 in 1937 allocated to karakul imports represented 
only 29% of the total amount of exported karakuls. karakul skins thus came to represent an 
important commodity in the trade with the former colony but it was not sufficient to absorb 
the overall exponential increase. Figure 2 clearly indicates the increase of karakul imports to 
Germany. However, yearly imports represented no more than a third of the total karakul yield 
in relative terms.  
 
 Karakul 
skins 
Total 
imports 
Ores 
and 
metals 
1931 0.52   
1932 1.11   
1933 1.89   
1934 2.09 3.2 0.96 
1935 3.24 5.2 1.41 
1936 3 6.7 2.7 
1937 4.6 8.6 2.7 
1938 4.2 10 3.2 
 (Millions of marks)  
Table 4-2: German import of South West African goods 
 
Plummeting German exports to the mandate further exacerbated currency problems. While 
exports averaged around £500,000 annually in the second half of the 1920s, they rapidly 
declined after 1929. Germany earned only £89,038 in 1932 and £133,582 in 1933, far too 
little to accomodate for the growing production of farmed karakul skins.
494
 This lack of 
currency undermined the orientation of the former colonists to the German market. The 
Colonial Office was aware that the currency restrictions put strains on the loyalty of the 
German farmers to the motherland: “South West African Germans are angry because of the 
numerous requests to the German government (...), to such an extent that many of them will 
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fall to the lure of the South African government and the English firms.”495 Furthermore, the 
Chamber of Commerce in Windhuk noted that because of the absence of pounds in Germany, 
prices of karakuls decreased by 50%.
496
 German colonists felt abandoned by the Leipzig firms 
and the German government. The currency problems made it difficult to keep an association 
like the SWPVG, which was already quite hostile towards German business, within the 
framework of post-colonial trade. 
 
4.4.3 Currency policy and the antagonism with Kalkfeld.  
 
The SWPVG in particular felt deprived by the currency allocation policy of the German 
government towards individual business. Furthermore, currency restrictions created problems 
for the Kalkfeld plan to operate more independently on the Leipzig market. In the eyes of the 
SWPVG, the currency policy favoured the Thorer firm.
497
 In the context of the currency crisis 
in November 1934, the German government agreed that fur firms could ‘convert’ the earnings 
made from fur exports to other countries in South African pounds for the purchase of SWA 
karakul skins.
498
 Although this arrangement did not exclude other firms, it was clearly 
advantageous for the Thorer firm, as this was one of the few businesses that remained active 
in the international fur business on a reasonable scale.
499
  
 
Kalkfeld and Thorer fought a bitter battle over the future of German karakul farming in 
Africa. Kalkfeld depicted the plan “of currency conversion” as “a cunning way for Thorer to 
avoid currency restrictions” but damaging overall for German farmers since it “favoured large 
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firms who keep the prices low and are only interested in the best skins.” 500 In addition, the 
RAVAG protested in 1934 that it needed at least 2,500,000RM of pounds in order to continue 
its business with Kalkfeld on a reasonable scale. Particularly unpalatable was that the Thorer 
firm managed to secure £150,000 for the purchase of Karakul skins by its Windhuk 
department in early 1935. This was reputed to be more than the RAVAG acquired for its 
dealings with Kalkfeld.
501
 
 
Kalkfeld increasingly used the currency shortages as a pretext for operating on an independent 
basis. Thorer, its main competitor, was favoured by the government and its business partner, 
the RAVAG, was unable to secure a large share of currency. Therefore, the cooperative 
demanded a budget in order to operate independently of the RAVAG. Kalkfeld demanded at 
least an equal share of £150,000 from the Reichsbank in order to operate on the market 
independently. However, the German government refused to fund the independent northern 
farms due to currency restrictions.
502
 Eventually, the tight currency policy caused permanent 
damage to the links between German farmers and business interests in Leipzig. 
 
By the summer of 1935, the link between Kalkfeld and German business was increasingly 
under pressure since the Hudson’s Bay Company was openly courting Kalkfeld.503 In 
November 1935, the Kalkfeld organisation sent 24,000 skins to the Hudson’s Bay Company 
and was planning to cooperate with the English competitor more closely in the future.
504
 The 
uncertainty about the Kalkfeld cooperative in the German post-colonial trade was reinforced 
by the noticeable prominence of the Hudson’s Bay Company in South West Africa in 1935. 
This company, capable of monopolising the entire karakul market in Africa, increased its 
visibility in the South West African trade press. In the autumn of 1936, the HBC announced 
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its future settlement in the mandate on Radio Cape Town and promised to deliver 50% 
advances to farmers who wanted to sell karakul skins through the company.
505
  
 
Despite protests from Hollender, the manager of the Thorer firm, and the Chamber of 
Commerce in Leipzig, the colonial administration finally allowed the Kalkfeld farmers to 
auction lambskin in London, albeit through the hands of the RAVAG’s division in London.506 
The RAVAG was thereby the first Leipzig firm that sold ‘German karakul’ skins on the 
London market. The permission for the RAVAG to organise auctions in London was repeated 
in the summer of 1935, since the Ministry of Economics and the Colonial Office noticed the 
growing dissatisfaction of German farmers in regards to the import restrictions. Thorer 
meanwhile positioned himself as the defender of the Leipzig-German interest. He condemned 
the fact that Kalkfeld and RAVAG sold in London and thereby damaged the German-African 
karakul trade.
507
  
 
Nevertheless, Kalkfeld remained dissatisfied with its operations through the RAVAG in 
London. The SWPVG used the presence of the HBC in Africa to put further pressure on the 
German colonial administration to resolve the currency problems and its dispute with the 
RAVAG.
508
  In particular, the auction procedures were a bone of contention. Under threat of 
losing the German interest in the former colonies to the HBC, the colonial administration 
negotiated a new agreement between the RAVAG and Kalkfeld. The administration 
succeeded in forcing the antagonists to create an agreement whereby the SWPVG sold two 
thirds of its yield via RAVAG auctions both in London and Leipzig: this was signed in 
November 1937.
509
 The agreement, however, failed to calm the relationship between the 
RAVAG and the SWVPG in the long run. In 1937, the RAVAG claimed that Friedrich, one of 
the leaders of the cooperative, held back considerable quotas of skins that should have been 
sold in compliance with the agreement.
510
 Moreover, the Kalkfelders finally established an 
auction company independent of the RAVAG. In September 1937, the Karakul SWA 
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Auctions Ltd, an agency set up by the Kalkfeld farmers Friedrich and Schneider and the 
British merchantmen Allan Rodway, organised its first auction in London offering 51,000 
skins.
511
 Allan Rodway was a former employee of the HBC and was involved in introducing 
his company to the Karakul farmers in SWA.
512
 There was therefore no longer a reason for 
the northern farmers to cooperate with the RAVAG. The SWPVG failed to deliver karakul 
skins for  a Leipzig auction sale in October 1938, which was then cancelled. The colonial 
administration now finally joined in on the attack on the Kalkfelders, accusing them of 
subordinating the ‘national interest’ to their business in London. Nonetheless, it was clear that 
German business and the colonial administration had lost their influence over the former 
colonists. 
 
All things considered, the takeover by the German karakul production was facilitated by a 
lack of unity among the farmers and the incoherence of foreign trade policy vis-à-vis karakul 
farming. With the creation of the Kalkfeld cooperative, two models were competing over 
karakul trading inside Germany. The cooperative, with its focus on solidarity between farms, 
competed with the Thorer practice, whose subsidiary in Windhuk established prices whilst the 
firm acquired co-ownership of farmland. The colonial administration, underestimating the 
grievances of the Kalkfeld cooperative, failed to accommodate the association’s desire to have 
a larger say in the commerce of karakul skins. Combined with the problems of currency 
restriction, these issues made Germany lose control over the karakul industry in the 1930s.  
 
4.5 Conclusion.  
 
The chapter has revealed that several district firms were important imperial and post-colonial 
actors in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. With the Fürstenwalde state farm 
in a pivotal role, business, science, and the state worked together in order to create the karakul 
industry in the South West African settler colony. While the karakuls and their hardy 
Turkmen shepherds metaphorically evoked the image of pastoral agriculture, in reality the fur 
industry and the colonial administration put forward a model of a disciplined and rational 
farmer who would follow a barrage of Mendel-inspired prescriptions. Expert knowledge on 
Mendelian breeding was an instrument to mould the colonial farmers in South West Africa 
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into part of the supply chain of Leipzig’s fur industry. Remuneration depended on the skill of 
the farmer.  
 
What does karakul farming reveal about the industrial district and its connections to the 
outside world? The empirical data in this chapter has established the importance of individual 
lead firms in the creation of karakul farming. The context of the creation of karakul farming 
were the problems encountered by the Thorer firm in securing supplies from Central Asia. 
The creation of karakul farming in the colonies was a reaction of a single firm towards global 
competition, not a collective one. Both the world trade and the organisation of karakul 
transplantation continued to lie in the hands of the Thorer firm. In the very first stage of 
experimental karakul farming, Thorer worked behind the scenes. Other firms, like the dyeing 
factory Herzog and the RAVAG, joined in at a much later stage. As such, the organisation of 
karakul farming as a frontier activity was not the result of the groups of firms or collaborative 
networks amongst firm owners that were so typical of the district. Rather, the role of 
independent lead dynamic firms in the construction of the new source of resources was 
fundamental. The importance of lead firms, which are best defined as “firms that are 
characterised by an autonomous strategy, capable of developing strategic decisions with a 
strong impact on the local level,” in processes of innovation and creating links to the outside 
world has been put forward in the literature on industrial districts.
513
 Even though I 
acknowledged the importance of lead firms in the introduction, my central claim was that 
reactions of the district towards exogenous developments came from processes of collective 
action. However, the importance of lead firms has surfaced strongly in this chapter. I should 
therefore continue to pay attention to lead firms and personalities in certain dynamics of the 
industrial district and its external relations.  
 
Two more remarks should be made on the actions of lead firms. Firstly, the activities of lead 
firms did not necessarily disturb firm interdependency in the district. Karakul farming 
involved a segment of the international fur industry. As such, it allowed those firms 
specialised in the trade of lambskins to adjust their local specialisation to external changes in 
resource production. Karakul farming never gave any lead firm a clear edge over competitors 
in the district. Furthermore, from a more general perspective, the benefits of the karakul 
farming project were not restricted to the lead firms involved but fertilised the district 
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economy in its entirety. In fact, the alliance of Mendelian genetics and agricultural science 
opened the pandora’s box of exotic animal domestication. The domestication of such animals 
led to the creation of fur farming, which remains fundamental to the modern fur industry 
today. The ability to adapt life forms to the demands of luxury industries marked a new 
episode in the relationship between the German fur industry and nature. Indeed, although the 
creation of karakul farming was executed by several ‘lead firms,’ the spillover effects of 
creating new sources gave a tremendous advantage to the entire fur industry. The endeavour 
to create fur farming as a source of resources opened up new production paradigms and new 
geographies of production. This played a growing role in the future of the industrial district 
and provided fertile soil for inter-firm cooperation, a theme that is further pursued in the next 
few chapters. 
 
Secondly, the way in which these dynamic lead firms participated in the colonial project 
reveals a typical tendency of district firms to externalise risks and share investment with other 
partners. Companies like Thorer acted as mediators rather than as organisers of the project. 
Firms refrained from allocating large investments to karakul farming. Indeed, such 
organisation went far beyond the expertise of these highly specialised firms. Input of expertise 
could not be acquired from the agglomeration economy, since agricultural research and the 
animal trade were lacking in the district. Importantly, the sheer scale of this project required 
the expansion of networks beyond the local dimension. Partners were found at the regional, 
national, and imperial level. Nonetheless, risk externalisation alone does not explain ‘typical’ 
district behaviour: this was also caused by the strong grip of the Colonial Office, especially 
after 1906, on the protectorate. Firms like Thorer expanded investments once they lost their 
main partner, the colonial administration, after the collapse of the empire.  
 
In conclusion, lead firms had been path breaking in the creation of new links between the 
district and the outside world. They also constructed a blueprint for future cooperation with 
science. The actions of district firms had a tremendous impact on the geography of 
globalisation, as their actions lead to the incorporation of new territory and social contexts 
into the capitalist world market in furs. As such, changes in the world market, like the 
growing demand for sheepskins, initiated a chain of events that had an impact on remote 
places in the world, a phenomenon typical of nineteenth century globalisation. Moderately 
sized firms that were part of district economies could play a leading role in opening up new 
markets.  
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5 The First World War as an External Shock: Resource 
Substitution and Collective Action (1914-1920)  
 
5.1 Introduction.  
 
World War I is often identified as a watershed moment in the development of modern 
industry and business.
514
 This was certainly so in Germany. There, the need to develop 
alternative business practices and production methods because of shortages in raw materials, 
energy resources, and labour was comparatively much higher.
515
 On the one hand, the war 
facilitated the renewal of business organisation through methods such as the substantiation of 
science-industry cooperation and the creation of new production paradigms based on 
substitute resources. Businesses also rapidly introduced methods of mass production. On the 
other hand, the state interfered with the organisation of business in an unprecedented manner. 
The German state rearranged the organisation of business by establishing the so-called war 
corporations. These were overarching private-public partnerships run by state officials and 
businessmen that led the planning of production and the allocation of labour and resources.
516
 
Via the corporations, production quotas were forced on businesses, particularly those situated 
in strategic sectors. The priorities of the war administration had ramifications for the size of 
firms since planning and larger production orders favoured big business.
517
 In raising wartime 
production, various industries, even those that were part of non-strategic sectors, were 
increasingly organised into corporations under stern state control.  
 
However, accounts dealing with the development of business during World War I have 
systematically narrowed the focus of research on big business and the larger production units 
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situated in strategic sectors. For instance, research on business and war is predominantly 
focused on big businesses in the chemical industry and steel industry. Businesses that 
procured, produced, and sold goods for consumption stand somewhat in the margins of this 
research trend. Michael Schäfer has emphasised that this bias has created a vacuum in our 
understanding of business and war in regions like Saxony.
518
 Our general understanding of the 
impact on the war economy on Saxony is therefore limited to the superficial observation that 
World War I was particularly unfavourable to the structure of the Saxon economy compared 
to other German regions, because it was characterised by a multitude of small to medium-
sized enterprises that depended on world markets and producing consumer goods.
519
 
However, major shifts in the production and trade of consumer goods undoubtedly took place 
in these sectors and industries. According to Nancy Green, the war facilitated the introduction 
of techniques of mass production and had an impact on business organisation in the garment 
industry.
520
 However, our understanding of how such businesses adapted to the exigencies of 
the war and its aftermath is limited. The same goes for the effects of the war upon the 
industrial district formation in the fur industry.  
 
This chapter will pursue two main questions. How did new production paradigms or processes 
of resource substitution affect the fur industry in Leipzig? And what were the effects on the 
business organisation in the district? Did the war lead to the institutionalisation of new forms 
of local collaboration? This chapter will pay attention to both the patterns and impact of 
resource substitution and the restructuring of local business networks because of pressures of 
the state-led war economy.  
 
The first part will study the fur industry and processes of resource substitution during the war. 
The creation of new production paradigms and resource substitution went side-by-side with 
the integration of the fur industry in the state-led war economy. While the fur industry was 
granted a relative degree of autonomy at the beginning of the war, the government 
incorporated the Leipzig fur industry into the war corporation War Fur ltd (Kriegsfell) in 
1917.
521
 The War Fur ltd, one of roughly 200 German war corporations, monopolised the 
                                                 
518
 Schäfer, Familienunternehmen und Unternehmerfamilien, 32. 
519
 Werner Bramke, “Sachsens Industrie(gesellschaft) in der Weimarer Republik,” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
in Sachsen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Werner Bramke (Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 1998), 28. 
520
 Nancy L Green, Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work: A Century of Industry and Immigrants in Paris and New 
York (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 29. 
521
 Momme Rohlack, Kriegsgesellschaften (1914-1918): Arten, Rechtsformen und Funktionen in der 
Kriegswirtschaft des Ersten Weltkrieges (Frankfurt: Lang, 2001), 216. 
The First World War as an External Shock 
167 
 
production of furs and determined what the industry could produce in the context of the war 
economy. The core of the war corporation was its partnership between the private and public 
sectors. The impact on the structure, value chains, and production methods of firms 
participating in war corporations is largely uncharted territory, especially for lighter 
industries. In particular, I will highlight the role of the war corporation in the emergence of a 
modern mass-producing fur industry. Mass production was based on the rapidly expanding 
market for rabbit skins in households throughout Germany. These skins were processed in 
Leipzig factories as a domestic alternative to the furs acquired on the world market.
522
 Rabbit 
breeding will be analysed as a new production paradigm for the Leipzig fur industry.  
 
In addition, the chapter will also focus on the impact of World War I on business 
organisation. For sure, the integration of the fur industry into the war corporation had 
ramifications for local businesses. However, the war corporation never formed an alternative 
business organisation model. It was only a very temporary stage of intra-firm collaboration 
and private – public partnership. According to Harald Wixforth, war corporations were simply 
too inefficient and so associated with nepotism that they could hardly figure as a post-war 
model for business reconfiguration or an enduring path for private-public cooperation.
523
 
Collective action and local collaboration during World War I was therefore not limited to the 
institutions that were created by the state. It went much further: collective action focused on a 
number of issues that problematised business in the industrial district, such as state 
intervention, isolation from world trade, and asymmetric developments in business 
performance in the post-war period. As such, World War I gave an important impetus to inter-
firm networks and institutionalised forms of collaboration. 
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5.2 Rabbits, Leipzig, and the creation of the corporation War Fur ltd 
(1914-1917).  
 
5.2.1 The origins of household rabbit keeping in Europe.  
 
With the invasion of Belgium on 4 August 1914, the German empire finally plunged into a 
war that many mistakenly believed would end in just a couple of months. Besides the impact 
of this widespread notion on military considerations, it had also frozen attempts to prepare the 
economy and businesses adequately for a lengthy struggle.
524
 These preparations would have 
included stockpiling raw materials for industry and foodstuffs for the people and a 
sophisticated and highly planned war economy to produce and distribute these goods. 
However, none of these crucial matters had been dealt with when the war machine became the 
largest consumer in Germany.
525
 The result is well known: shortages of raw material 
jeopardised industrial output and faltering food supplies caused famine in Germany at an early 
stage in the war.
526
 However, the establishment of the Raw Materials Section 
(Kriegsrohstoffabteiling) in August 1914 saved Germany from complete disaster. It was this 
institution that, to a large extent, designed Germany’s wartime economy and organised the 
allocation of resources or their substitution.
527
 The need to substitute resources in particular 
became more urgent for the medium-term survival of German industry. This was the canvas 
on which business activities during the war took place. 
 
In the case of the fur industry, available resources finally ran dry in December 1915. An 
alternative resource was found rather quickly in the backyard of German households: rabbit 
furs. The advantages of rabbit keeping, both for skin production and nutrition, were fully 
recognised because of the ‘shortage experience’ of World War I. As food shortages were 
endemic in Germany during the war, the German state promoted keeping small animals in 
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German households.
528
 In other countries, however, household rabbit keeping as a source of 
nutrition and pelting was already a typical phenomenon in the nineteenth century. In France 
and Belgium, rabbit keeping developed in the second half of the nineteenth century and a 
lively skin industry thrived. In Belgium, rabbit skins supplied exports destined for hat felt 
manufacture in Great Britain.
529
 In France, the rabbit skin industry was important as well. 
Exports reached 400,000 to 500,000 rabbit skins annually by 1888.
530
 However, the belated 
introduction of rabbit keeping in Germany is more comparable to the situation in England, 
where the circumstances of the Great War caused the practice to expand substantially.
531
 
Rabbit skin trading had existed in England and Wales since the 1860s, providing supplies for 
the wool and skin processing industry in London, although this trade was marginal in 
comparison with Belgium and France.
532
 Furthermore, rabbit keeping was not a uniquely 
European phenomenon. In Japan, there was a mania for buying and selling of homebred 
rabbits that was supported by the Japanese government well beyond the 1880s.
533
  
 
Given its value as an alternative resource in the wool and skin industry in various 
neighbouring countries, the belated development of rabbit keeping in Germany deserves 
further exploration. Even though more systematic research is needed in order to expand our 
understanding of rabbit mania as a European or worldwide phenomenon, the laggardly 
development of rabbit keeping in Germany should be explained with regards to socio-cultural 
factors. German soldiers learnt the practice of rabbit keeping in France during the Franco-
Prussian War and introduced the practice in Germany. Rabbit breeding advanced slowly and 
it became particularly popular among workers. Therefore, rabbit keeping was disregarded as a 
survival strategy for the lowest social strata and its practitioners often held up for ridicule.
534
 
Inept animal management and undernourishment, leading to inferior meat and skin, further 
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contributed to rabbit breeding’s bad reputation.535 Rabbit meat was perceived as food for the 
poor and German state institutions saw no future in promoting rabbit meat as a staple for the 
entire German population. In Hanover, for instance, the Chamber of Agriculture 
(Landwirtschaftskammer) evaluated rabbit keeping in 1906: “today it can still be denied that 
rabbits play any economic importance in the province of Hanover (...) and it is unlikely it will 
play an important role later: rabbit meat is simply not in line with North German taste.”536 The 
sceptical stance of German state institutions towards small-scale rabbit keeping accounts to a 
large extent for its slow development. Only with the First World War did German state 
officials embark on a policy of propagating the household production and consumption of 
rabbits.  
 
The delay and bad reputation of rabbit keeping in Germany had given the practice a dynamic 
that ran counter to experiences in France and Belgium. This is not without significance for 
wartime rabbit keeping. Since rabbit consumption developed along the lines of social 
stratification in Germany, societal and political reluctance imparted a pronouncedly social, 
perhaps even political, dimension. Firstly, despite the disapproving policy of German 
authorities, rising meat prices at the beginning of the twentieth century further enhanced the 
popularity of rabbit keeping among the lower social classes. Cheap rabbit meat became part of 
the diet in Germany, especially in the kitchens of workers and lower-ranked officials. 
Secondly, the emergence of various rabbit fancier organisations, mostly local in character, 
epitomised the success of rabbit keeping throughout Germany. These organisations had grown 
from the bottom up and fought hard for recognition in comparison to their counterparts in 
France and Belgium.
537
 By the time the magnitude of rabbit keeping became apparent for the 
managers of the war economy, rabbit fanciers had their own ‘self-help’ institutions. Local 
rabbit breeding organisations were firmly established as defenders of the practice, which 
complicated the integration of millions of rabbit breeders in the war economy after 1917. 
While war deprivation increased the importance of the role of animal breeding for food 
subsistence, local rabbit keeping organisations strongly defended the interests of fanciers 
incorporated into the Prussian War Materials Department. The social dimension of rabbit 
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keeping is of crucial importance in understanding the war economy of furs: the integration of 
rabbit keeping in the maelstrom of the war interfered with household survival strategies. It 
was therefore highly controversial.  
 
Throughout the war, rabbit breeding gained momentum. By 1918, the practice of rabbit 
keeping inside Germany began to assume large proportions because of the way in which 
thousands of households coped with daily life wartime. Rabbit meat in particular was 
increasingly consumed and rabbit skins were an important product for household husbandry. 
The agricultural census of 2 September 1918 counted 14,012,618 rabbits in the German 
Reich, the majority of which were found in the Prussian provinces (8,524,568). Saxony as 
well had turned into an important region with about 1,152,636 rabbits: there were 366,534 
rabbits in the city of Leipzig.
538
 These statistics illuminate the fundamentals of the new rabbit 
fur industry. The increase was quite spectacular: in 1913 there were only 2.5 million rabbits in 
the German rabbit breeding industry.
539
  
 
5.2.2 Rabbit production and the creation of the War Fur ltd. 
 
German rabbit fanciers and the Leipzig fur industry encountered each other at a relatively late 
stage of the war as both had managed to delay incorporation into the state-led war economy 
until the final period of the conflict. It was as late as 1917 when the architects of the war 
economy fully realised the economic potential in utilising rabbit breeding as a source for the 
production of military garments. The fur industry maintained a certain level of ‘free trade’ 
until the end of 1915. At the beginning of the war, the non-strategic fur industry was outside 
the scope of the KRA (Kriegsrohstoffabteilung) because their resources and industrial 
capacity were not of vital importance for the German war economy. Modest quantities of raw 
furs continued to find their way to Leipzig: they were mainly shipped in via neutral countries 
or drawn from stockpiled raw furs in Leipzig warehouses. The Easter fair in 1915 was held 
despite the war. In addition, private business often conducted profitable commerce with the 
army. For example, Theodor Thorer transformed his factory in Lindenau to process 
sheepskins for the army, which “successfully replaced the loss in his fur dyeing operations.” 
The profit of Thorer in the second half of 1914, 870,000Mk, was substantially larger than the 
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profit made before the outbreak of the war, which amounted only to 623,000Mk.
540
 For 
certain firms, business during the war was thus not entirely unprofitable. David Kölner, a fur 
trader from the Brühl, sold his stock of sheep furs for more than 100,000 marks to the army, a 
price that exceeded his personal expectations.
541
 
 
The initial ‘persistence’ of the Saxon fur industry in the war economy should not be 
exaggerated. Unavoidably, the wartime German economic institutions severely damaged the 
fur market as time went on. First, factories and warehouses belonging to the fur industry were 
incorporated by the war administration in order to produce armaments needed for the war 
machine.
542
 Second, in order to keep the price levels of fur garments under control, the 
Prussian war administration decided to auction furs that were confiscated from occupied 
territories. State-lead auctions meant loss of market control for the Leipzig firms.
543
 Third, by 
early 1916, the stock in the Leipzig warehouses was nearly exhausted.
544
 Thorer mentioned 
that he had difficulties in procuring new furs in 1915 and that commerce largely focused on 
liquidating the last stockpiled resources and manufactured goods.
545
 Fourth, in January 1917, 
commercial possibilities with neutral countries were further exacerbated when the Reich 
declared that all import traffic required the permission of the government and prohibited the 
export of certain types of furs in order to control the strength of the mark.
546
 
 
Furthermore, rabbit skins as resources increasingly entered onto the horizon of public 
authorities that saw the products as resources for the hide and fur industry. Due to the growing 
problems related to commerce with neutral countries, the Saxon government lobbied to 
transform Leipzig into the manufacturing centre of the new rabbit skin industry.
547
 Both 
traders and manufacturers in Leipzig attempted to gain permission from the war 
administration to import rabbit skins directly from Belgium. Simultaneously, however, the 
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war administration of Prussia also began to see the potential in the growing number of rabbits 
kept by German households as resources for the leather goods needed by the army and navy. 
By early 1917, the Prussian war administration planned to establish a new war corporation in 
order to prepare for the registration and confiscation of rabbit skins. Another option that the 
Prussian administration considered involved the procurement of rabbit skins through the 
existing war corporation War Leather ltd, which was composed of leather manufacturing 
firms.  
 
The creation of a Leipzig-based war corporation now gained momentum. Rather than running 
the risk of being integrated into the leather industry or face the prospect of a war corporation 
outside Leipzig, representatives of the trade and dyeing industry in the city preferred to 
sacrifice their independent position in the war economy and therefore proposed a new war 
corporation for the procurement of rabbits firmly attached to the Brühl.
548
 Supported by 
Saxon politicians, businessmen in Leipzig promised 1,500,000Mk for the foundation of the 
corporation.
549
 The Saxon and Brühl initiatives eventually resulted in the creation of the ‘War 
Fur ltd’ (Kriegsfell AG) in March 1917 with its headquarters in Leipzig.550 Through this 
decision, Saxony and the fur industry exerted control over the emerging domain of rabbit skin 
trade in Germany and avoided their businesses being rendered superfluous.  
 
Before looking at the activities of the war corporation with regard to rabbit keeping, a closer 
inspection of the function of the war corporations seems in order. War corporations, or 
Kriegsgesellschaften, were composed of business groups and were designed to raise wartime 
production through cooperation between the state and the private business. In the first stage of 
the war, the government established war corporations with the aim of centralising all 
economic activities related to food production and the management of scarce resources 
needed for armament production. The corporations were often organised alongside internal 
industry associations with differing degrees of state control.
551
 Strategic resources like 
chemicals (Kriegschemikalien AG) or the production of metal (Kriegsmetall AG) were almost 
immediately put under state control. The advantage of this type of corporation was that the 
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war administration could make use of the expertise of the private industry (primarily big 
business) and thereby integrate them in the war economy rather than turning off private 
initiative completely in the enormous task of war production.
552
 The hybrid form that typified 
the war corporation represented neither the triumph of state capitalism nor the incapacity of 
the military administration to run the war economy independently. The 
Kriegsrohstoffabteilung (KRA), the raw material division of the Prussian government led by 
Walther Rathenau, was the central organisation that supervised the activities of individual 
corporations.
553
 The number of resources that the KRA administered grew steadily throughout 
the war along with the level of military control that was exercised upon individual 
corporations. Thus, the system of individual war corporations was the backbone of the 
German war economy and enabled state control in economic matters.  
 
War Fur ltd, the Kriegsfell AG, the war corporation that controlled the fur industry, was 
founded on 1 March 1917. It blended together state control and private initiative in a hybrid 
model akin to those corporations established in an earlier phase of the war. The Kriegsfell 
AG, created with the aim of supplying the army with garments and conrolling the procuring 
of rabbit skin, was designed as a joint-stock company and many Leipzig fur firms participated 
in it. To a certain extent, the creation of the war corporation was the result of interfirm 
cooperation. The Kriegsfell consisted of 25 shareholders from the private industry, who were 
predominantly fur firms from Leipzig. More than half of the shareholders came from Leipzig 
while about 10 participants operated in other German cities (such as the renowned furriers 
Riccius in Munich and Louis Biberfeld in Posen). Some of the leading firms in Leipzig were 
on the list such as Theodor Thorer and Friedrich Erler: the absence of larger Jewish trading 
firms like the Eitingons and the Ariowitsch firm is striking.
554
 The motives for participation 
remain unclear but it seems that most of the participating firms possessed some kind of 
manufacturing plant: the Jewish merchants usually focused on commerce. Profits also played 
a role, although they were directly limited since profiteering by means of the war economy 
was controversial. As such, the dividends from Kriegsfell AG profits were limited to a 
maximum of 5% interest on the shares. 
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How did the private-public partnership shape the inner structure of War Fur ltd? The 
shareholders of the Kriegsfell AG elected a board of supervisors of 3 to 8 persons: motions 
were decided by a majority vote. Leipzig’s domination can be seen in the board of 1917: there 
were the Leipzig traders Paul Thorer, Alfred Nauman, Friedrich Dodel, and Richard Schmidt 
(the president of the Leipzig Chamber of Commerce), two government representatives 
(Gustav Stresemann and a spokesman for the Bavarian government), and two businessmen 
who came from outside Leipzig.
555
 Nevertheless, the board was obliged to invite 
representatives of the state to its meetings. With possession of a veto, the voices of state 
delegates weighed much more than their private counterparts. Moreover, the KRA retained 
final control over the price setting mechanisms on the new rabbit skin market. In other words, 
private actors had a large say but the final decision was always in the hands of state 
representatives. By its incorporation in War Fur ltd, the fur industry in Leipzig was finally 
integrated into the straightjacket of the state-lead war economy for the remainder of the 
conflict. 
 
However, the participation of the fur industry in War Fur ltd offered a number of 
opportunities. Most importantly, the location of the war corporation in Saxony was crucial to 
the fur industry’s continuation as one of the key sectors of the regional economy. The Saxon 
government was particularly pleased that Leipzig was chosen as the host city for War Fur ltd: 
“Leipzig was chosen as the headquarters, in particular with regard to the fact that the eligible 
commercial and industrial sectors exist there, the Saxon government and industry have long 
promoted rabbit keeping, and the creation of a competitive system to process rabbit skins.”556 
Together with the decision to place the corporation in Leipzig, the kingdom of Saxony was 
promised that the surplus rabbit skins would be distributed to fur firms based in the city. The 
Kriegsfell auctioned its first surplus of rabbit skins to the private fur industry in March 
1918.
557
 The auction meant the influx of 1,500,000 rabbit furs into private industry. The 
decision to locate War Fur ltd in Leipzig thus contributed significantly to the short-term 
survival of Saxony’s fur industry and perhaps its existence in the 1920s. The next part of the 
chapter is concerned with how the Leipzig corporation created a new production paradigm 
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based on resource substitution. This entailed the creation of a supply chain and involved 
collaboration with experts and university scientists.  
 
5.3 In the rabbit warren? Science, industry, and societal resistance in the 
making of the rabbit industry (1917-1920).  
 
5.3.1 Resource substitution and rabbit skin procurement.  
 
War Fur ltd in Leipzig was primarily created with the aim of organising the procurement, 
distribution, and production of rabbit skins. The transformation of the rabbit skin producers 
into resource suppliers formed the main challenge. Procurement was chiefly organised via 
periodic confiscations that forced rabbit keepers to hand in skins. The War Fur ltd reimbursed 
producers according to uniform price levels set by the Prussian war administration. However, 
confiscations and the price caps were highly controversial. According to War Fur ltd officials, 
the number of rabbits kept in Germany was, in all likelihood, much greater than the number 
counted by the official census (14,012,618 rabbits in September 1918). German rabbit 
fanciers and keepers tended to under-register the number of rabbits in their possession since 
cloaking the existence of additional animals was held to be an effective way to avoid 
confiscation. Therefore the administration doubted the correctness of the census and claimed 
that about 20,000,000 rabbits existed in Germany.
558
 As well as the notorious confiscations, 
rabbit keepers also had the opportunity to trade in skins to collection centres.
559
 The 
procurement of rabbit skins required an extensive network of collection centres covering the 
entirety of the German Reich. In a short period of time, War Fur ltd established 4,000 
collection centres in about 2,800 localities: however, this was still considered insufficient.
560
 
From the individual collection centres, rabbit skins were transported to a large warehouse 
rented by War Fur ltd in Leipzig, which was situated in the Katzbachstrasse part of the 
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northwest district, close to the renovated central railway station.
561
 The main site of War Fur 
ltd employed about 50 male and 70 female labourers. The workforce in the warehouse, who 
packed and graded thousands of rabbit skins, formed the backbone of this new domestic 
industry.  
 
Even though rabbit keeping spread rapidly across German cities during the war, expectations 
regarding the turnover of rabbits skins were somewhat disappointed. Lack of efficiency in 
particular was a deeply rooted problem. Between 1917 and 1918, breeders provided War Fur 
ltd 12 million rabbit skins: only roughly 8 million of these could be used in the manufacture 
of garments. Inept treatment, decay, loss, and theft in the distribution centres wasted a 
staggering 33% of this yield.
562
 On top of that, animal disease slowed down production. 
Rabbit breeding in Germany suffered badly from coccidiosis: it accounted for the death of 
about 90% of young rabbits.
563
 Moreover, rabbit production suffered from the same problems 
that plagued state-led efforts to incorporate agricultural production into the war economy. 
State dirigisme made household animal husbandry perform far below capacity.
564
 The 
unpopular system of price caps and quantity regulations drove both rabbit breeders and 
German peasant farmers out of the market.  
 
To a large extent, problems pertaining to inefficiency were located among the rabbit fanciers 
themselves. Rabbit breeding was notoriously difficult terrain to control as breeders blended 
modern principles of animal management with deeply ingrained irrational practices. The 
German historian of science Alexander von Schwerin, for instance, noted that rabbit fanciers 
preferred killing sick rabbits than applying veterinary prescriptions because they saw “rooting 
out” as a practical solution. As mentioned above, amateur keepers perceived themselves as the 
extension of ‘ruthless nature.’565 A false understanding of artificial selection based on 
Mendelian selection criteria was another irrationality. Only in the middle of the 1920s did the 
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principles of Mendelian genetics gain some solid ground in the German rabbit keeping 
industry.
566
 Problems were not only related to scientific underpinnings germane to animal 
breeding: they were present further up the new supply chain as well. Breeders were unaware 
of confiscation obligations or lacked information about the nearest collection centres. A large 
proportion of the waste was caused by the keepers’ ignorance of the proper way to dry and 
pack the skins. If rabbit breeding was to be a freestanding industry, War Fur ltd would have to 
educate its suppliers more firmly. 
 
Even though the expansion of production suffered from high levels of waste, War Fur ltd 
strongly believed in the future of the rabbit skin industry: it was held that rabbit production 
would reach 27 million skins in one or two years.
567
 Furthermore, the fur industry benefited 
almost immediately from the first yield, as we saw when the Kriegsfell put up a large surplus 
of skins for auction. The efforts of the War Fur ltd notwithstanding, the first large reports 
revealed that, compared to the production figures of neighbouring countries and in terms of 
efficiency, rabbit skin production was still developing. The Berlin fur trader and publisher 
Emile Brass estimated that Belgium’s rabbit production reached 7 million rabbit skins 
annually whilst France exported approximately 36 million skins yearly: both figures dwarfed 
Germany’s production. The creation of a rabbit skin industry was an enormous task, one that 
the Leipzig corporation wished to achieve in a relatively short period of time.  
 
Aiming at both promoting as well as rationalising rabbit keeping, War Fur ltd established a 
“department of education” (Aufklärungsamt). First, this department went on a propaganda 
offensive against both rabbit fanciers and the larger public by making itself more visible in the 
public sphere. A leaflet with summarised information and guidelines on the treatment of 
rabbit skins was published in about 500 daily newspapers with an edition totalling 3,500,000 
million. 600,000 large posters headed with an appeal to patriotism (“supply rabbit furs, the 
army needs them!”) and designed by the graphic artist Julius Gipkens were put up in 15,000 
municipalities, mainly in public places and railway stations.
568
 Training of the rabbit breeder 
was seen as an important task. The information department of the War Fur Ltd deployed 96 
“teachers” that went around the country to generally promote rabbit keeping and hold lectures 
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about the treatment of skins. However, during the war, care for the household’s animals were 
chiefly left to women and children: therefore the Kriegsfell AG brochures were also sent to 
schools. The Kriegsfell distributed about 500,000 brochures in 13,968 schools entitled “the 
value of German rabbit keeping, an exhortation to the German youth!”569 Not only did this 
information campaign focus on enhancing efficiency, it was also aimed at raising public 
awareness about the new war corporation.  
 
5.3.2 War Fur ltd and scientific development.  
 
Aside from its propaganda department, the Kriegsfell also relied on research and innovation 
in order to make the new production paradigm based on rabbit skins function. Attempts to 
rationalise production were limited to improving existing industrial process of skin tanning 
and industrial dyeing.
570
 To serve this aim, War Fur ltd formed a tannery commission, which 
brought together firm managers of the fur and leather industries in order to improve the 
production process.
571
 However, the results that this commission produced appear to be 
relatively modest. “Georg Korant,” a firm in Berlin-Friedenau, developed a chemical 
procedure to remove fur from the skin. Even though the chemical substance destroyed the 
leather, the method made it possible possible to use ‘wasted’ skins that were otherwise 
impervious to mechanical haircutting. The method reduced waste in the production process 
and significantly improved the garment industry as rabbit hairs could be used as an substitute 
in the textile industry.
572
 However, aside from the Korant procedure, the new rabbit industry 
did not spark many innovations or groundbreaking production techniques.  
 
Unlike in other industries, the main scientific contributions derived from the implementation 
of resource substitutes in the fur industry were not to be found in improved production 
methods, since manufacturing procedures for rabbit skins already existed. As mentioned 
above, the main challenge of the rabbit supply line was to reduce waste that occurred at the 
                                                 
569
 BArch, Kriegsfell AG R 8731, nr. 11. Anlage 7. Nota, s.d. Zusammensetzung der Schulen, denen unsere 
Broschüre zugestellt worden ist. Handelsschulen 584, Höh. Lehranstalten 3754, Fachschulen 1085, 
Fortbildungssch. 8565. Total: 13968 Schulen.  
570
 Kurt Nestler, Rauchwaren- und Pelzhandel (Leipzig: Dr. M. Jänecke, 1929), 46. 
571
 Sächs. HStA, Aussenministerium 10717, nr. 2473, Der Reichskanzler an die bundesregierung außer Preußen 
und an den Herrn Statthalter in Elsass-Lothringen. 2 Juni 1917. In this commission: Hollender, Nitzche (Fa. 
Flemmig & Nitsche,Kirchhain (Dobriluk), Herr Friedrich Seelig, i/Fa. Jacob & Seelig, Hersfeld, Theodor Simon, 
kirn a. Nahe, Max Stecher, i/Fa Moritz Stecher, Freiburg i. 
572
 BArch, Kriegsfell AG R 8731, nr. 20. Abschrift: Der Königliche Regierungspräsident, Potsdam, den 21.08. 
1917. Urschriftlich nebst Anlage dem Herren Minister für Handel und Gewerbe in Berlin 
The First World War as an External Shock 
180 
 
start of the production process in the rabbit pens. Solving this problem would require 
cooperation with experts in animal management and veterinary scientists. Modern animal 
management can be defined as the method that “integrates the proper feeding, breeding health 
care, housing, and handling of domestic animals to optimise their production”: it seemed 
particularly important to professionalise a production paradigm that was largely organised by 
amateurs in the field of animal husbandry.
573
 Veterinary scientists focused on the more 
pressing task of relieving high mortality levels in the German rabbit colonies. Finally, 
Mendelian genetics, which used artificial selection to enable breeders to recreate the quality 
and colour of skins, became more relevant after the war: initially, agricultural experts focused 
on the task of reducing mortality levels.  
 
The war corporation was relevant for the fur industry as a whole because it constructed 
networks with university science departments on the one hand and agricultural expertise on 
the other. Empowered by the state, the fur industry had the capacity to establish and pursue 
these links. The board of the War Fur ltd called into being a ‘breeding commission,’ which 
assembled a clutch of university professors and agricultural experts from various German 
universities and research institutes. In particular, professor G. Fröhlich of the Agricultural 
Institute of the Halle University and Hans Raebiger, the founder of the Bacteriological 
Institute and member of the Agricultural Chamber of Brandenburg (Landwirtschaftskammer 
Brandenburg), were commissioned by the Leipzig war corporation to reduce the impact of 
parasitic diseases.
574
 The largest threat to the rapidly expanding German rabbit population was 
the parasitic disease coccidiosis, ‘das grosse Sterben,’ which threatened young rabbits 
between 6 and 8 weeks old. Coccidiosis took on epidemic proportions from 1916 to 1917 and 
constituted the main threat to the ambitious plans of War Fur ltd. Therefore, Raebiger had 
started research into the causes and treatment of rabbit coccidiosis by the end of the war. 
 
Whilst studying coccidiosis, Raebiger cooperated with 15 rabbit breeding units across 
Germany. His research method encapsulated typical veterinary methods such as performing 
autopsies but he also utilised tools from animal management by investigating nutrition 
patterns and hygienic conditions in the German rabbit pens, which he found to be in a bad 
state. The first results of his research offered proof that coccidiosis was indeed a conundrum 
for the war corporation: it showed that coccidiosis was the cause of death for between 80 and 
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88% of the rabbits that had been autopsied. According to Raebiger, the epidemic was mainly 
caused by poor hygiene, the fraudulent trade of infected animals, and undernourishment. In 
terms of treatment, Raebiger distributed experimental medicines and nutrition supplements 
that he hoped would relieve coccidiosis-related death. Between July and August 1917, he 
tested 15 rabbit nests with medicines and nutrition supplements. The supplements, based on 
both dried and crystallised calcium chloride (a salt), yielded positive results in terms of 
decreasing waste: “since the [introduction of the] supplement, disease and death occur less 
frequently and the animals develop beautifully: they look lively and their furs are smooth.”575 
Nevertheless, nutrition supplements did not offer a cure against coccidiosis: they only reduced 
the high mortality levels.  
 
Raebiger’s research into coccidiosis challenged traditional veterinary policies and the attitude 
of agricultural authorities towards rabbit breeders. Raebiger tackled the lack of etiological 
understanding within circles of breeders and agricultural experts. In his view, agricultural 
education was biased towards recognising the symptoms of coccidiosis and devoted too little 
attention to preventing the spread of the disease. According to the Agricultural Chamber of 
Brandenburg, Raebiger’s home institution, the spread of the disease was mainly caused by 
contact with contaminated excrement. This meant that the cause of disease was related to the 
poor hygiene in household rabbit keeping. Raebiger’s assertion about the poor hygienic 
standards in German rabbit pens shifted the focus of agricultural policy onto breeders’ 
ineptitude and amateurism.
576
 As mentioned above, the ‘practical wisdom’ of the rabbit 
breeder prescribed rooting out the disease by killing the contaminated. This belief was 
dispelled by veterinarians like Raebiger (and Mendelian scientists) who warned that many 
animals survived coccidiosis and that the practice of “slaughter as a solution” removed 
attention from the disease’s latent form: “one must also be careful with slaughtering, as some 
of the animals are only mildly infected, (...) they often survive their disease and then, as has 
been shown repeatedly, even acquire a certain invulnerability and build up considerable 
resistance against the disease.”577 The recommendations regarding hygiene and diet formed 
the linchpin of renewed veterinary policy towards domestic animal keeping. The fur industry 
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thus found support for transforming rabbit breeders into producers amongst scientists like 
Raebiger, who attached more value to implementing practical solutions related to “sound” and 
rational animal management such as stricter sanitary conditions and proper nutrition.
578
 
 
In sum, the work of Raebiger and others increasingly interfered with the social world of rabbit 
keeping. This trend continued to be central well after the war as scientists continued to expand 
their grip on the German rabbit fancier. In 1920, the leading genetic scientist Hans 
Nachtsheim of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Genetic Science (Kaiser Wilhelm Institut der 
Vererbungsforschung) became the president of the Association of German Rabbit Breeders 
(Verein Deutscher Kaninchenzuchter), one of the largest rabbit breeding organisations. His 
central task was rationalising breeding methods in order to optimise rabbit skin production. 
Second, since state authorities had finally embraced the importance of rabbit keeping, 
disciplining the rabbit breeder according to the principles of animal management surfaced as a 
vital objective. In 1920, the Prussian ministry of agriculture proclaimed further rationalisation 
of rabbit breeding, mainly by educating the rabbit fancier on efficient breeding and ways to 
improve the exploitation of the animal. This new line of policy differed clearly from the 
laissez-faire attitude to rabbit breeding before the war when keepers were relatively 
independent and their requests for state assistance were usually denied. After the war, the 
pendulum had clearly swung in favour of intervention: “as a means of promotion, we 
recommend teaching through lectures, the organisation of training courses, instructions on 
how to rationally conduct farms, the establishment of facilities which enhance the breeding 
productions (fur value), the establishment of breeding centres with state support, and granting 
awards for outstanding achievements.”579 In addition, the Prussian agricultural authorities 
started to regulate the flourishing rabbit fairs and exhibitions. It saw in these exhibitions a 
threat to the economic exploitation of rabbit keeping since these shows promoted the keeping 
of special breeds that were useless for food and skin production.
580
 After the war, business, 
science, and industry had successfully intruded into the social world of rabbit keepers.  
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5.3.3 The resistance against the War Fur corporation. 
 
The activities of War Fur ltd generated societal resistance in a wide variety of circles and 
foremost in the world of breeders. In the years running up to the Great War, the emergent 
practice of rabbit keeping was prevalent among the lowest classes (labourers and low salaried 
employees) of German society. During the war, the need for an additional source of nutrition 
became more urgent as the administration failed to provide sufficient food supplies for its 
population.
581
 Food shortages were responsible for rising mortality rates and malnutrition, the 
impact of which was felt by virtually every German.
582
 The transition towards garment 
production based on rabbit skins meant increased control over this additional food resource 
and further fuelled class tensions. In addition, the exigencies of the war had universalised the 
practice of rabbit keeping: “people from all occupational classes, and also people who 
mocked rabbit breeders before, are now becoming fellows.”583 The estimate of 20 million 
rabbits in Germany confirms the exalted status of rabbit keeping as a widespread phenomenon 
cutting across social strata. This is not the only reason why it would be wrong to treat the 
battle over rabbits and class war as synonyms. Resistance against the war economy was not 
unique to the opposition between labour and capital over the control over the means of 
production: regions opposed centralised ‘Prussian’ production and the world of small business 
feared the creation of monopolies in the hands of the war corporations.
584
  
 
It is not hard to imagine why rabbit keepers resisted the intrusion of the fur industry. Rabbit 
fanciers lost control over an additional source of nutrition and the flourishing informal rabbit 
skin market. The fixed price caps on rabbit skins were the subjects of social controversy, as 
they were perceived as being too low. The discrepancy between the relatively high prices paid 
to businesses at the March 1918 auctions added to this controversy.
585
 Moreover, the new 
production process strictly prohibited domestic production of rabbit skin garments.
586
 The war 
corporation was accused of making large profits at the expense of small-scale rabbit breeding. 
                                                 
581
 Sönke Neitzel, Weltkrieg und Revolution: 1914-1918/19 (Berlin: Be.bra, 2008), 136. 
582
 David Blackbourn, A History of Germany, 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub., 2003), 358. 
583
 GStA PK, I. HA REP 87 B. nr.  22137, Niederschrift über Massnahmen zur Hebung der Kaninchenzucht im 
Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, Domänen und Forsten zu Berlin, am 28 und 29. Januar 1920. Anschrift 1.  
584
 D.G. Williamson, “Walther Rathenau and the K.R.A. August 1914-March 1915,” Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 23, no. 2 (1978): 113. 
585
 BArch, Kriegsfell AG R 8731, nr. 11. Gesamtbericht der Aufklärungsabteilung der Kriegsfell AG. Anlage 36. 
586
 Barch, R 8731, nr. 25. Kriegsfell AG an das Königlich Preußische Kriegsministerium, Kriegsamt, Kriegs-
Rohstoff-Abteilung. 8.03.1918.  
The First World War as an External Shock 
184 
 
It was the object of persistent accusations in the press that were often pronouncedly anti-
Semitic: “breeding circles and the press repeatedly raised the charge (...) that it [War Fur ltd] 
constitutes a Jewish society, who are filling their own pockets out of greed at the expense of 
the breeders and their diligence. Despite the fact that the corporation, both in the press and in 
speeches, pointed out that it is a mere executive organ of the German war administration and 
that its surpluses fund the Treasury, which accrue to the public interest, it did not succeed in 
eradicating this opinion.”587  
 
Furthermore, War Fur ltd encountered significant problems in controlling rabbit keeping 
organisations. The latter had transformed into bulwarks of resistance. Even the relatively 
modest task of charting the number of local ad-hoc rabbit keeping organisations proved to be 
impossible. A report of the War Fur ltd counted 3,000 such organisations but it remained 
largely unfinished. A considerable number of these associations were openly hostile towards 
War Fur ltd and refused to cooperate, or even communicate, with the war corporation. One of 
these unwilling partners was the important nationwide association Reichsverband deutscher 
Kaninchenzüchter.
588
  
 
The resistance against Kriegsfell AG had an important regional dimension since the centre of 
War Fur ltd was situated in Saxony. Friction between the Leipzig businesses in the 
corporation and local rabbit keepers surfaced strongly in 1919 when rumours about the profits 
made by the ‘monopolists’ in Leipzig out of the rabbit skin commerce ran through Germany. 
According to the Bavarian minister, rumour had it that a profit of 30 million marks was 
distributed amongst the shareholders of the Kriegsfell AG (the actual profit was 34 million 
marks).
589
 This rumour upset various rabbit keepers in his state and he called for a fair 
distribution of the spoils: “the rabbit breeders are almost always destitute, often belonging to 
the poorest districts. It would therefore be an act of justice if the rabbit breeders associations, 
to which most rabbit breeders belong, received funding to raise their farms through the 
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mediation of agricultural central offices.”590 However, the minister was misinformed: profits 
of the rabbit industry went directly into the treasury.
591
  
 
Similarly, resistance against the transformation into mass production surfaced within the 
industrial district as well. Producers of furs continued to view rabbit skins as inferior and as a 
temporary source of goods for the industry, needed only as long as the war lasted. In 1917, a 
report on the fur industry in Leipzig noted that the unpopularity had its historical roots: 
“Twelve years ago, rabbits received little attention on the Leipzig market. Also the furriers 
did not like manufacturing the rabbit skins as they were inferior in their consideration. This is 
the reason why prices for rabbits are so low.”592 The same report notes that the production of 
rabbit fur clothing was also an expensive procedure “which is actually more expensive than 
the value of the skins itself.” This narrowed profit margins significantly.593 Despite these 
problems in the final stage of the war, the rabbit skin supply line would increasingly stabilise 
after the conclusion of hostilities. 
 
5.3.4 The stabilisation and pacification of the rabbit skin market in the aftermath 
of the war.  
 
Rabbit skins remained an important resource once the war ended and the organisations that 
ran it became obsolete. War Fur ltd governed the fur industry in an unprecedented way: it was 
a powerful organisation in the sense that it could impose measures of production, stimulate 
local breeding organisations, and attract scientists who were able to modify the supply line. 
When the war ended, the war corporation lost the ability to conduct business or to steer 
production of skins for fur clothing production.
594
 Peace made the existence of the war 
corporation obsolete and undesired. However, rabbit skins remained an important commodity 
for the Leipzig trade as the naval blockade endured well into 1919 and German businesses 
remained isolated from international markets. Similarly, the breeding of rabbits remained an 
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important source of additional income and nutrition during the post-war predicament. 
Households continued to produce rabbit skins. What is more, keepers continued to make use 
of the infrastructure that had been created by War Fur ltd, such as the local collection centres. 
However, the organisation of the supply line of rabbit skins underwent several changes when 
War Fur ltd was liquidated in July 1919.
595
  
 
The main difference with wartime procurement lay in the fact that rabbit keepers created 
overarching trade cooperatives that sold rabbit skins in Leipzig directly to the fur industry. 
The revenues of these cooperatives were in turn redistributed amongst the members. By 
August 1919, these cooperatives had largely been centralised into the Association of Skin 
Producing Cooperatives (Verband der Fellverwertungsgenossenschafte or VFW). However, 
this did not include breeders in Kiel and in Saxony. The association of the latter, the State 
Association of Saxon Rabbit Breeders (Landesverband Sächsischer Käninchenzüchter 
Vereine), was the main obstacle towards forming a nationwide cooperative of rabbit skin 
producers. 
 
The organisation and sales methods of the VFW were not altogether different from those of 
War Fur ltd. The overarching skin cooperative, with a bureau on the Brühl, represented the 
interests of numerous rabbit breeding organisations throughout the Reich and cooperated with 
the Bund Deutscher Kaninchenzuchter.
596
 Oskar Eissing, the president of the VFW, was a 
former member of War Fur ltd’s propaganda department. The methods of procurement were 
similar too. The VFW bought the skins per kilo without employing a separate system of 
valuation. Meanwhile, the Saxon cooperative represented a completely different exploitation 
model.
597
 It traced the skin from keeper to trader rather than selling furs in large ungraded 
bulks. Therefore, keepers who managed to improve quality were remunerated accordingly. 
Thus, the Saxon Association was able to reconcile its interests as a rabbit breeding 
organisation with the demands of the fur industry to improve the quality of skin production. 
The Saxon cooperative believed that selling skins on the principle of grading would prompt 
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the keepers to increase their attention to better animal management and in the end would 
generate more revenue for their members: “if breeders care for the skins they produce, it will 
enhance the value of their products and result in better revenues.”598 The Saxon association 
was reasonably attractive (it had over 100 members after just few months), partly because of 
its comparably low entrance fee.
599
  
 
The Saxon Association was also more strongly connected to the Leipzig fur industry since its 
commissioner was Arthur Hermsdorf, a high-level employee of a Leipzig firm. Hermsdorf 
attained success during one of the first sales of the association when he acquired prices that 
were much higher than those of the VFW (averagely 23 marks per skin as opposed to 19 
marks). The Saxon cooperative identified itself with the interests with the local fur industry. 
On the one hand, the Saxon breeders tended to avoid speculation as well as to focus on quality 
improvement: “it is their duty to use to skins of the fellows to sell them at the highest possible 
prices, but they should not engage in speculation, which is very dangerous for fluctuating fur 
products and markets and can put fellow breeders in danger of losses.”600 On the other hand, 
the Saxon rabbit breeders were liberated from wartime price caps and were finally able to 
secure higher prices. As president Reif noted, “with this kind of exploitation, one has finally 
met the terms which breeders demanded from the war corporation, a matter that ended in 
strong opposition against the latter.”601 
 
However, the Leipzig fur district did not seem to benefit from two opposing factions and a 
unified sales mechanism was generally preferred. In particular, Leipzig’s most prominent 
businessmen objected to the alliance between the Saxon rabbit keepers and Arthur 
Hermsdorf’s firm.602 In fact, the Leipzigers seemed to prefer working with the national 
association rather than the Saxon cooperative, whose methods did not lead to the feared 
speculative price war: “Anyway, the Brühl agrees with the way in which business is done here 
by the association and also praises the range of product.”603 This is an indication that the 
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relations between the rabbit cooperative, the assocation, and the Leipzig industry began to 
calm down: they both benefited from a stable form of market exchange. 
 
With the calming of relations between the social actors in the supply chain, rabbit skins 
acquired a prominent position within the Leipzig fur cluster. According to Hans von 
Nachtsheim, rabbit skins constituted 42% of the turnover in the German fur industry in 
1924.
604
 Rabbit furs continued to propel the Leipzig fur industry.  Several of the largest firms 
in Saxony expanded because of the success of rabbit manufacturing: the Walter AG turned 
into the largest firm of the district, with 1,400 labourers in 1923, because of rabbit dyeing.
605
 
Rabbit dyeing was thus responsible for increased labour opportunities in the district, even 
though the arrival of an elephantine firm in the district disturbed size distribution. Mass 
production entered into the world of specialised businesses.  
 
Other firms also continued improving the production process for manufacturing rabbit skins 
and this led to renewed forms of cooperation. In 1920, some Leipzig fur industrialists and 
traders (Theodor Thorer, Friedrich König, and Theodor Kniesche) established a joint venture, 
the Vereinigte Rauchwaren Veredlungs Werke GmbH, with the aim of improving the 
production processes. The common goal of the new joint venture was “perfection (...) by 
sharing our experience and technical knowledge and by putting aside our special interests. 
Next, we will cooperate to refine our previous methods and create new ones. The reputation 
and history of the individual companies guarantees performance and progress.”606 According 
to these industrialists, processing rabbit furs presented an opportunity for mutual learning: 
“for employers and dyers, the risk must be reduced in producing rabbit skins: we will 
therefore create a communal way of dressing rabbits. This common procedure will be suitable 
for all dyeing methods and our operations will run consistently and uniformly.”607 The 
process of resource substitution had successfully been incorporated into the Leipzig fur 
industry.  
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By 1920, both firms and rabbit keepers had thus successfully abandoned the structures 
bequeathed by the war corporations. New institutions were successfully created in the postwar 
period in order to guarantee continuity in the rabbit supply chain. Rabbit skins became the 
linchpin of trade and mass production in the fur industry.
608
 However, rabbit breeders in 
Germany failed to serve the internal market for rabbit skins. In 1924, Germany imported 
12,000,000 gold marks worth of rabbit skins. In 1927 imports almost doubled to 23,038,000 
gold marks, which was equivalent to 18 million rabbit skins.
609
  
 
5.3.5 The war corporation and science-industry collaboration between 1918 and 
1920.  
 
Just as the rabbit trade had been successfully transformed into a post-war production 
paradigm, institutionalisation of scientific research for the fur industry followed suit. In the 
months before its liquidation, War Fur ltd continued to push for the institutionalisation of 
scientific research in rabbit keeping. In October 1918, the corporation entertained plans to 
centralise research in a permanent experimental research station. The economic and political 
stakeholders in Saxony that dominated the board of War Fur ltd were able to make sure that 
the new experimental station would be established in the proximity of the fur cluster: “Saxony 
has the largest concentration of the fur trade, whose activity has rendered the main profits of 
the war fur corporation and promoted the breeding of rabbits during the war (…) this alone 
justifies that such an institute should be in Leipzig.”610 In July 1919, Kriegsfell AG spent 
75,000 marks on installing a research institute in the buildings of the agricultural experimental 
institution in Leipzig-Möckern: this was far less than 200,000 marks originally planned.
611
 
The Leipzig Fur Merchants Association offered 10,000 marks to the new research institute. 
 
There were good reasons other than proximity for attaching a rabbit research station to the 
agricultural centre in Leipzig-Möckern. The research centre had been established in 1852 and 
was funded by the Leipziger Ökonomische Sozietät, the oldest in Germany. It met the 
increasing need for research in agricultural development and Möckern soon served as a model 
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for experimental stations across German states.
612
  The research centre was officially 
recognised by Saxony in 1879. Under the leadership of agricultural scientists Gustav Kühn 
(1867-1892) and Oskar Kellner (1892-1911), the station built its reputation in the field of 
animal food systems.
613
 Gustav Fingerling, the subsequent leader of the institute, further 
explored the animal nutrition theories set out by his renowned forerunners, the most famous 
of which was Kellner’s so-called starch equivalent system (Starkewertlehre). This expressed 
the net energy value of food relative to the net energy value of starch, its most common 
constituent, and was widely used in Europe until about 1970.
614
 The rabbit experimental 
station was thus connected to a leading and well-established agricultural research centre in the 
region. The funds for research allocated by the fur industry allowed Fingerling to apply the 
nutrition energy theories developed by his forerunner to rabbits. The first, albeit modest, 
experiments on optimising rabbit nutrition were carried out in May 1920. The research was 
directed at discovering the most ‘rational’ nutrition for rabbits and, more importantly, the 
influence of food patterns on the quality of the skins, meat, and fat of the animal.
615
  
 
Significantly, the scientific goals of the research institute in Möckern were more closely 
connected to the interests of the fur industry than those of rabbit fanciers. The objectives of 
the experimental station reads like a programme tailored to the needs of the fur industry. The 
institute was commissioned to study the nature and variables that determined the qualities of 
the skin and hair: “thorough and comprehensive scientific work is required in order to clarify 
the physiological and biological conditions of the most pertinent questions involving the skin 
and hair.”616 The research agenda designed by the war corporation was once more disturbed 
by rabbit breeders, who wanted research to focus on rabbit diseases. Hans Reif, the president 
of one of the Saxon rabbit keeping associations (Landesverband Sächsischer 
Käninchenzüchter Vereine), preferred that the Möckern centre devote its efforts to studying 
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diseases such as coccidiosis, which inflicted heavy losses upon rabbit keepers, instead of 
focusing on how to control animal characteristics that could enhance opportunities for 
economic exploitation.
617
  
 
Scientific research on animal breeding for the fur industry was now institutionalised in 
Leipzig. Networks between science and the fur industry had acquired a permanent status in 
Leipzig-Möckern. Eventually, the institutionalisation of the science-industry networks laid the 
groundwork for further scientification of the fur industry in the interwar period. In essence, 
the external shock of World War I further revealed the potential of agricultural sciences in 
finding alternatives sources of resources after the first attempt in the colonial project of 
karakul breeding. The use of agricultural research could relieve pressures on existing supply 
chains and facilitate business strategies that focused on retrenchment after the exit from the 
world market. During and after the First World War, scientists also increasingly began to see 
the advantages of cooperating with the fur industry in the creation of new production 
paradigms. Via the fur industry, scientists gained access to funding and entry to the social 
world of small-scale animal husbandry, which was unchartered territory in terms of applying 
the principles of aetiology, animal management, and Mendelian genetics. This was the 
foundation of the collaboration between industry and science collaboration in the interwar 
period, the focus of the next chapter.   
5.4 Restoring the old order. War, world markets, and local cohesion.  
 
Thus far, this chapter has placed emphasis on War Fur ltd and the impetus the war corporation 
gave to collaboration between agricultural science and the fur industry and to resource 
substitution. In the war corporation, fur industrialists were more or less forced to cooperate 
with one another and with actors outside the fur industry. Although some networks continued 
to exist, the war corporation never served as a basis for continued interfirm cooperation in 
Leipzig after its liquidation. Despite its control of the fur trade during the last stage of the war, 
the war corporation did not monopolise the collective action of the fur firms. On the contrary, 
it will be argued here that intensified cooperation between firms in Leipzig emerged in other 
contexts as well.  
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First, the firms of the business community reacted against state interference, epitomised 
precisely by institutions like the war corporation. At the end of the war, fur firms sought to re-
construct the primacy of business in the district and to escape the stranglehold of state 
dirigisme. At the same time, businesses saw modifications to the international fur market 
during and immediately after the war as a collective threat. While the dyeing and processing 
of rabbit skins expanded very rapidly, the fur industry and trade still overwhelmingly 
depended upon foreign imports. The loss of foreign markets for Leipzig-produced furs was 
equally disturbing. Both international competition and state dirigisme set in motion collective 
action in the fur cluster. These threats are of great importance if we are to understand the 
international position of the cluster in the interwar period. Through them, the war bestowed an 
important impulse towards collective action in the district. New collective entities emerged 
that would set the boundaries of later intra-firm cooperation.  
 
5.4.1 International competition and the birth of intra-firm cooperation in foreign 
trade.  
 
As was the case for many other German industries, World War I separated the Leipzig fur 
firms from the world market. At the beginning of the war, with large parts of this industry still 
operating under quasi free market conditions and the rest supplying the army, optimism about 
the future of the city was prevalent. However, such a sanguine attitude dwindled quickly.
618
 
Leipzig lost ground as an international market in the fur trade. Furthermore, the war created 
new dynamics in the international fur industry, making centres like New York and Saint Louis 
in America expand rapidly. For Leipzig, trade with neutral countries, mainly in Scandinavia, 
barely compensated for isolation from the world market. In fact, Scandinavian companies 
were increasingly competing with Leipzig rather than providing for it. As early as 1917, 
Danish and Swedish fur traders commenced dyeing and dressing of raw furs in several small-
scale production units.
619
 The attempts of Scandinavian trading companies to take over the 
‘Russian business’ were very far along. For instance, during the course of the war, Swedish 
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trading companies expanding their trading activities in Siberia.
620
 In the summer of 1918, 
leading Danish fur merchants planned to establish a company “with the explicit aim of trading 
with Russia and Siberia, but also Northern America”: the Danish plan “to replace the old fur 
marketplace” caused great turmoil in Leipzig.621  
 
The emergence of new fur centres in close proximity disturbed not only the Leipzig fur firms 
but also the regional administration in Saxony. Speculation that German companies 
themselves were involved in providing technical know-how to their Danish and Swedish 
counterparts particularly upset regional administrators, labourers, and businessmen. The 
Saxon government expected a drain on skilled labour and specialised dyeing machinery: thus, 
they sought to restrict their transfer.
622
 For example, in December 1917, Danish businessmen 
from Copenhagen approached Hollender to ask whether his company would participate in a 
new dressing and dyeing factory.
623
 Hollender made the Danish attempts public so as to prove 
his loyalty to the district. Another report from September 1918 named a Dutch factory as a 
sizeable rival and made mention of the ‘desertion’ of three German fur workers.624 Rumours 
like these meant that firms were watching each other’s actions and saw business participation 
in other markets as disloyalty to the community.  
 
The longer the war lasted, the more the firms realised that collective action was required to 
maintain or reconstruct Leipzig as a fur market. In the beginning of 1916, a meeting held 
between the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association and Leipzig’s city council centred on the way 
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in which Saint Louis profited from the war in Europe.
625
 The discussion chiefly focused on 
thwarting the development of alternative distribution centres like Saint Louis in order to 
prevent Leipzig becoming a fringe player in peacetime. It was in this context that on old idea 
resurfaced: the Fur Merchants Association proposed that the city should finance the 
establishment of an independent auction company in Leipzig. Auctions constituted a market 
institution that was both disliked and admired in Leipzig. On the one hand, it was the chief 
market institution of the Anglo-American fur trade. Auction companies had not only laid the 
foundation of London as a fur centre but had also supported the growth of new primary 
markets in North America. Through auction companies, traders in Saint Louis and New York 
had achieved what Leipzig wanted once the war ended. On the other hand, the auction as an 
instrument of competition was quite controversial in Leipzig. The British auctioneers and 
their rigid organisation had been particularly galling before the war and had sharpened the 
Anglo-German rivalry in this sector.
626
  
 
The firm Heinrich Lomer had already untaken unsuccessful attempts in the 1870s to hold 
auctions in Leipzig in order to compete with London. The first auction to take place in 
Leipzig was organised by War Fur ltd in March 1918 to sell the surplus of rabbit skins to the 
private industry. Nonetheless, many considered the practice unfair. The trade journal Der 
Rauchwarenmarkt noted that “it is a known fact that when the competition is sitting side by 
side, as it is the case in the auction hall, prices are quite involuntarily sent high, although not 
to the insane height of the last August auction, and has a harmful effect on the entire market 
and thus destroys the free business in the rabbit skins that has recently developed.”627 The 
rabbit auction remained the only such experiment for years, as the city council refused to 
finance a Leipzig auctioneering company: the original plan of a internationally important 
auction company never materialised.
628
 Yet the idea of creating auctions in Leipzig never 
really left the table. The appeal to auctions also demonstrates that the fur cluster believed that 
the strengthening of Leipzig as an international market was an objective to be attained 
through collective action.  
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Secondly, the war also offered opportunities in terms of international trade, the pursuit of 
which entailed further cooperation between individual businesses. Opportunities for the 
German industry, especially for those businesses focussed on the Russian trade, emerged 
when the eastern front disintegrated. The time between the armistice and the treaty of 
Versailles was called the ‘transitory economy’ (Übergangswirtschaft) in German business 
circles, a period in which businesses hoped to restore commercial relations with the Russians. 
The revival of economic relations with the east featured prominently in the German economic 
aspirations. According to Ritschl, the creation of a continental economic empire was one of 
the most significant aspects of the German wartime economy and it continued to frame 
postwar German economic policy and thought.
629
  
 
By the same token, firms in Leipzig believed that the city could resume its former position as 
a depot between east and west. However, external circumstances forced Leipzig firms to 
cooperate in order to pursue Siberian business.
630
 The German authorities especially 
encouraged intra-firm cooperation in conducting trade after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk: 
“international negotiations with Ukraine and Austria-Hungary will limit the number of 
merchants (Aufkaufers) and we do not even know if the governments of Ukraine and the new 
Great Russia will tolerate the activities of free traders.”631 The urgency of securing the old 
supply line and the inaccessibility of Russia further stimulated the need for stronger 
cooperation. In February 1918, the Leipzig fur industry jointly appointed Robert Ehrmann, a 
fur trader in the service of the German army, as a trade diplomat, charged with starting the 
first negotiations with Russian fur traders domiciled in Petrograd.
632
 The army eventually sent 
him to Moscow where he continued to represent the interests of Leipzig. In Moscow, 
Ehrmann started preparations for the establishment of a jointly organised ‘trade institution’ 
(Vermittlungsstelle) that would be responsible for the purchase of Russian furs.
633
 By March 
1918, the aspiration to rebuild commerce along pre-war parameters had largely been replaced 
by plans to construct trade consortiums and jointly organised operations. Also War Fur ltd 
acquired a modest role: “A number of larger Leipzig fur firms will be taking part in the 
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procurement of Russian furs (...). These raw furs will be sent to War Fur ltd, which will 
transmit the prime furs again to a consortium of fur traders and furriers in order to distribute 
them over the German market.”634 In May 1918, such a consortium was about to be 
established in Leipzig. However, because of the ongoing struggle between Bolsheviks and the 
Whites, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk remained a dead letter in terms of the much-desired revival 
of the ‘Russian trade.’635 Nonetheless, just as with the idea to establish auction companies, the 
collective action in the transitory economy had opened the door for further measures in this 
vein in regards to foreign trade. Collective action in the transitory phase would serve as a 
model for postwar trade relations between German business and Soviet channels.  
 
5.4.2 The importance of trade associations in the wake of World War I.  
 
State intervention in business life also significantly contributed to the development of 
collective action in the district. Notwithstanding the fact that the Brühl agreed to its 
incorporation into War Fur ltd in order to maintain Leipzig as the main German centre in the 
trade of skins and hides, the firms united against the disturbing impact of proliferating state 
regulations upon trade. The incorporation of fur firms into the war corporation did not manage 
to reduce these tensions. Collective action against state control surfaced more strongly once 
the war ended. Particularly unpalatable to the equilibrium in Leipzig was the perception that 
state institutions favoured particular businesses. As the Leipzig Chamber of Commerce 
protested, “it is not right that our state institutions favour one part of the Leipzig businesses. 
All firms should be treated equally by the state institutions that are involved in the 
import/export business (the Reichsbank, the Commission for Import and Export, and the 
Customs Office).”636 In general, the Leipzig firms remained in favour of ending the disturbing 
state-led economy and restoring the free economy immediately after the war ended. Thus, 
trade associations became important in the battle against state interference.  
 
In order to counter state interference, local institutions like the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Leipzig Fur Merchants Association (Verband Deutscher Rauchwarenfirmen sitz Leipzig), 
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which united the standpoints of individual commercial firms, acquired a more prominent 
status in the city, especially during the post-war years of 1918-1922. The membership of the 
Merchants Association rose spectacularly in the aftermath of the war: from 131 in 1918 to 406 
members in 1920, whereas there had been only 42 members in 1908.
637
 The Fur Merchants 
Assocation appointed a prominent leader to defend the interest of the cluster in the person of 
Paul Hollender. After the death of his father in law Paul Thorer, Hollender had become the 
spokesman of the Leipzig industry.
638
 In 1921, he was elected as the president of the Leipzig 
Fur Merchants Association and remained so until the early 1930s. The Fur Merchants 
Association was not the only institution that defended the interest of the district. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, representation followed the lines of specialisation in the district. The 
trade association for the industrial manufacturers, the so-called Association of German Fur 
Dressers and Dyers (Verband Deutscher Rauchwaren Zurichtereien und Färbereien), was a 
strong association with headquarters in Leipzig. Amongst its members were 120 Leipzig firms 
and 90 firms outside the city.
639
 Finally, the Association of German Furriers (Verein 
Deutscher Kürschner: after 1922, Reichsbund der deutschen Kürschner) was a prominent 
association after World War I.  
 
In the postwar years, the associations in Leipzig had to lobby because of the ongoing state 
interference in the management of the economy, which became particularly strong when 
battling the unstoppable inflation that raged until 1923.
640
 The Fur Merchants Association 
continuously negotiated with the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Trade about the position 
of furs in Germany’s international trade.641 The bewildering number of import/export 
restrictions, new taxes, and regulations often severely disturbed the business equilibrium in 
the district. It is almost impossible to reconstruct the details and outcomes of such 
negotiations with the various state institutions and ministries that took place between 1918-
1923, as these negotiations dragged on for years and the results, if any, are often hard to 
evaluate. Furthermore, it is not my aim to fully reconstruct the complicated post-war state 
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intervention: rather, I want to demonstrate its effects upon the internal arrangements and 
foreign trade of the industrial district. Nevertheless, to give an impression of the 
complications caused by political regulations, I will point to two problems that institutions 
like the Fur Merchants Association lobbied about to the government. 
 
Firstly, in the aftermath of the war, the Leipzig fur industry was subordinated to the decisions 
of the Leather Trade Department (Aussenhandelstelle der Lederwirtschaft) in matters relating 
to import and export. Imports were regulated through such institutions due to the pressing 
foreign currency shortages in the post-war years. In January 1920, the Leather Trade 
Department imposed an export tariff on garments produced using rabbit-skins. 
Unsurprisingly, fur traders, industrialists, and rabbit keepers were irritated. The Fur 
Merchants Association noted that rabbit-based production would facilitate the foreign trade 
from Leipzig: “another 20% levy on the rabbit products is burdening the German fur trade, it 
is making it impossible for the fur industry to re-conquer its position on the world market. 
This article cannot compete abroad with an increase of 20%.”642 The tax increase was 
received in a similar fashion by rabbit keepers. The rabbit industry, as an important factor in 
food supply for the people, warned about the negative impact on food prices: “rabbits have 
become a cheap source of tasty and nutritious meat: if the sales of the hides goes down, this 
will have an upward effect on the price of the meat.”643 Lobbying eventually forced Berlin to 
abandon the idea of a new tariff.
644
 Furthermore, the Fur Merchants Association even 
managed to ‘liberate’ the fur industry from the Leather Trade Department in 1923.645 Instead, 
a separate Fur Trade Department was set up. The Fur Merchants Association emerged as a 
powerful lobby in the early 1920s, a status they would maintain throughout the interwar 
period.  
 
The Fur Merchants Association, which chiefly represented fur traders, was only one of the 
many business groups and associations that lobbied against new taxes and restrictions in 
Leipzig. The financial troubles after the First World War pressured the German Reich into 
issuing new taxes or increase existing ones. One that heavily affected furriers and producers 
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was the so-called ‘luxury tax’ (Luxussteuer), which amounted to 15% on the sale of luxury 
goods. This affected a considerable number of industries, such as goldsmiths, leather tanners 
and piano makers, before it was finally abolished on 1 April 1926.
646
 The Association of 
German Furriers disputed the implementation of the luxury tax. From the point of view of 
consumption history, the fur industry’s fight against the luxury tax took an interesting turn. 
Although the fur industry was perceived as a supplier of luxuries to more affluent consumers 
in society, its representatives sought to distance their business from such a reputation. 
Supported by recent developments, they identified furs as a product for mass consumption, 
arguing that fur garments ‘protected against cold’ and that ‘rabbit furs were for the people.’647 
However, reports on fur consumption during World War I seemed to suggest the opposite. 
Rabbit fur was initially consumed as an ersatz product by those who could no longer afford 
the high costs of luxury garments during the war.
648
 The identification of the fur industry with 
alternative patterns of consumption was a strategy that the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association 
used to protest against the heavy burden of the luxury tax.
649
 In contrast to the battle against 
export tariffs, lobbying here was less successful: it took until 1924 for the government to 
reduce the luxury tax to 10% with the aim of reducing price levels in Germany.
650
 
 
It should be noted that lobbying was a delicate business. In particular, the absence of a unified 
trade association that represented all the firms of the district was an Achilles’ heel. Separate 
lobbying caused frictions since regulations or uneven developments disturbed the equilibrium 
between different sectors of the industry. For instance, in the immediate postwar years, the 
dyeing industry in Leipzig was able to recover much sooner than the traders, since the latter 
were dependent on damaged foreign trade networks. The dyeing industry recovered much 
quicker not only because of the supply of resource substitutes like rabbit skins but also 
because foreign trade companies placed their orders in Leipzig directly, shipping the raw furs 
purchased outside the city and receiving back the processed skins. Such actions disturbed the 
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traditional link between industry and trade. Inflation made the export of dressed furs much 
cheaper but caused difficulties for traders importing raw furs. Foreign firms circumvented the 
traditional traders on the Brühl who were still not able to deal in pre-war quantities. The 
Leipzig fur traders managed to convince the German government to impose a ‘special tax’ on 
the export of these ‘foreign furs.’ This decision, initiated by the commercial segment of 
Leipzig, flew in the face of the Association of German Fur Dyers in Leipzig, as it was in their 
interest to keep their factories competitive with new dyeing plants abroad.
651
 Despite heavy 
protests, in July 1922 the Aussenhandelstelle decided in favour of the commercial sector of 
the Brühl and declared that the tax revenue would be used for “scientific research in the area 
of fur trade and industry and to support the training of labourers in our sector.”652 Actors in 
the district thus prevented one sector from excluding another.  
 
In conclusion, collective action and collaboration had acquired a more prominent position in 
the Leipzig district. Despite its importance before 1919, the war corporation was not the 
model used to permanently institutionalise collective action. Rather, collective action was 
connected to defence against state dirigisme, especially the war corporation itself, since it 
often disturbed competition between individual businesses.
653
 The growing importance of 
trade associations was part of a wider development in Saxony. The region suffered more from 
state dirigisme and isolation because of its dependency on world trade. In danger of becoming 
a ‘problematic or declining region,’ institutions like the Association of Saxon Industrialists 
(Verband Sachsischer Industrieller or VSI) and the Leipzig Chamber of Commerce 
transformed into a bulwark of resistance against the multitude of social and political changes 
after the war.
654
 The growing awareness that surfaced amongst Saxon entrepreneurs that their 
region was changing from a powerhouse into a problem region underlied the expansion of the 
trade associations.
655
 The strengthening of trade associations in Saxony thus epitomised a 
growing regional self-consciousness and a pro-active attitude towards external challenges. 
Such institutions were able to address problems that were related to re-admission to the world 
                                                 
651
 BArch, R 3101 Reichswirtschaftsministerium, nr. 382, f. 63. Verband deutscher Rauchwaren-Zurichtereien 
und Farbereien. 27.06.1922.  
652
 BArch, R 3101 Reichswirtschaftsministerium, nr. 382, f. 107. Aussenhandelsstelle der Lederwirtschaft, 
Abteilung Rauchwaren an das Reichswirtschaftsminsiterium. Berlin. 10.09.1923 
653
 van de Kerkhof, “Public-Private Partnership im Ersten Weltkrieg? Kriegsgesellschaften in der 
schwerindustriellen Kriegswirtschaft des Deutschen Reiches,” 133. 
654
 Jens Adolph, “Die Wirtschaftspolitik des VSI 1928-1934,” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Sachsen im 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Werner Bramke (Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl., 1998), 158. 
655
 Titel Volker, “Wirtschaftsraumliche Orientierung als Unternehmensstrategie. Das Beispiel der Leipziger 
Handelskammer während der Weimarer Republik,” in Unternehmen im regionalen und lokalen Raum: 1750-
2000, ed. Ulrich Hess, Petra Listewnik, and Michael Schäfer ([Leipzig]: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2004), 91.  
The First World War as an External Shock 
201 
 
market or state intervention slowing down foreign trade. The need for this kind of 
representation never ceased to exist in the interwar period.  
 
5.5 Conclusion. 
 
The chapter has examined the Leipzig fur cluster during the First World War. In particular, 
emphasis has been placed on the ramifications of the war on local production regimes and 
business organisation. In terms of the structure of production and commerce, a number of 
important transformations have been unveiled. Firstly, the chapter has cast attention on the 
discovery of rabbit skins not only as a resource substitute for furs but also as an item that 
enabled mass production. Firms in Leipzig created dyeing processes on new resources that 
were produced en masse by German households. Whereas the relationship with household 
rabbit breeders, the pillar of the new production regime, was tense at first, the industry and 
keeper cooperatives were able to pacify previous conflicts and profited from a stable market 
exchange after the war. Rabbit skins continued to serve as an important resource for the 
Leipzig fur industry after the war whilst the industry was still isolated from the world market. 
Therefore the fur industry had expanded its possibilities significantly through the new 
production paradigm based on rabbit skins. Old and new factories in Leipzig focussed on the 
production of this new item.  
 
Secondly, in the construction of the new production paradigm, the war intensified  
‘scientification’ in light industries like the fur industry that were incorporated in the war 
machinery. The cooperation between science and industry was generated by the war 
corporation, which had united private and public interests. Once the war corporation was set 
up, linkages between science, experts, and the industry were more firmly established. In 
making use of applied agricultural and veterinary expertise to ‘manage’ the supply line of 
rabbit skins to Leipzig, the fur industry turned into a more ‘science-based industry.’ The 
cooperation with agricultural scientists, Mendelian genetics, and veterinary science in the 
early twentieth century was one of the key steps in the development of the modern fur 
industry, which is almost entirely based on the supply of farmed pelts instead of hunted 
wildlife. The process of resource substitution was successfully completed after World War I, 
when several factories in Leipzig became specialised in the mass production of rabbit skin 
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garments. The trading and manufacture of rabbit pelts remained an integral part of the district 
and alleviated pressures from the world market.  
 
What we have learnt from studying the fur district is that although such processes of 
scientification were of great importance to small firms and industrial districts, they generated 
different effects in terms of business organisation. Unlike other industries, however, processes 
of scientification did not lead to in-house research departments inside individual firms. In 
other words, an increasingly scientific production paradigm did not leave a trace on individual 
business organisation. Instead, the fur industry created links with experts and university 
science in institutions external to the firms themselves. The cooperation with agricultural 
science was institutionalised in separate, collectively sponsored, and local research centres. 
This can be seen in the foundation of the agricultural research centre in Leipzig-Möckern. 
However, even though these institutions were external to the firm, the research was tailored to 
the needs of the fur industry. As with the karakul breeding project, the importance of science 
and expert knowledge for the Leipzig fur industry was situated in networks.  
 
Although the war corporation had facilitated business-science networks, War Fur ltd never 
became a model for postwar collective action or public-private partnership. In fact, state 
intervention and interference in the world of business generally triggered alternative forms of 
collective action in the cluster. The war corporation epitomised the lopsided balance between 
private and state interests. Collective action of firms focused on reversing the war economy 
headed by the state. The proliferation of new regulations that concerned trade and industry 
increased the importance of lobbying for the district firms. Therefore, trade associations in 
Leipzig surfaced more strongly as pressure groups for the interests of the cluster. Collective 
action not only focused on the disadvantages produced by state intervention. Intra-firm 
cooperation emerged in affairs pertaining to foreign trade. Haphazard networks between firms 
transformed into collective projects that sought to reconstruct the market institutions of 
Leipzig. This was the case with the trade consortia, business groups that sought to reconstruct 
the trade with Russia Siberia after the peace of Brest-Litovsk. In particular, the idea to jointly 
establish an auction company acquired a more prominent position in the minds of urban 
planners and traders: they were seen as institutions that could facilitate Leipzig’s return to its 
former status as a fur trade centre. Both collaborative networks between firms in the pursuit of 
foreign trade and the growing importance of agricultural science for the modern fur industry 
are crucial for understanding the developments of the fur district in the interwar period.  
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6  Fur Farming and the Leipzig Fur Industry in the 
Interwar Years. 
 
6.1 Introduction.  
 
Describing the role of the Leipzig industry in the creation of fur farming in the interwar 
period is the objective of this chapter. After World War I, fur farming entered Germany at an 
almost unprecedented pace. Between 1921 and 1931, about 1,000 new fur farms were 
constructed across the country. By the end of the 1930s, fur farming, primarily centred on the 
production of silver fox skins, had transformed into an important wellspring of resources for 
the industry in Leipzig. The fur farming business did not emerge separately from the 
industrial district in Leipzig. On the contrary, it was the Leipzig industry that initiated the 
formation of the first experimental farms and firms continued to exert influence over farming 
well into the 1930s. The industry’s support for fur farming ripened because of the postwar 
problems in international trade. Leipzig businesses encountered difficulties in supplying the 
district with resources.  
 
An important dimension of fur farming was research and development. Fur farming was an 
innovation: it entailed the creation, distribution, and application of new knowledge. As such, 
the creation of a new production paradigm based on fur farming heralded a period of 
entanglement between Leipzig business and science. The business-science nexus in the 
creation of fur farming in Germany runs parallel to the previous chapters on rabbit and 
karakul breeding. Fur farming was especially linked to breakthroughs in experimental and 
applied genetics, which increasingly unveiled their potential to the agricultural sciences and 
anthropology.
656
 Applied genetics involved the ‘improvement’ of animals, plants, and humans 
through artificial selection or sterilisation.
657
 Applied genetic science was of paramount 
importance to the development of fur farming. Breeders used the rules of artificial selection in 
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the production of rare and valuable colour variations such as the silver fox, a ‘melanistic’ 
mutation of the red fox.
658
 However, in the 1920s, the institutionalisation of genetic science in 
Germany was still in a developing stage, especially when compared to the US.
659
 Frustration 
at this state of affairs enhanced the willingness of genetic scientists like the prominent Hans 
von Nachtsheim to participate in new fields of agriculture like fur farming. However, I will 
show that the contribution of science to the development of fur farming was not limited to 
genetic science alone: it also required expertise in animal domestication and management, 
research into nutrition patterns, and veterinary science. In sum, fur farming was associated 
with a broad range of experts and scientists who sought to standardise production through the 
use of artificial selection and to improve efficiency by introducing sanitation methods and 
animal management. 
 
The literature affirms that one of the advantages of industrial district is that the need for 
innovation is easily perceived and district firms are able to set in motion new innovation 
processes.
660
 How did these smaller businesses communities organise scientific research and 
implement innovations in a field that was remote from their commercial activities? The 
organisation of agricultural research in the context of an industrial district forces us to re-think 
the classic image of in-house industrial research departments or corporate laboratories. The 
chapter will focus on alternative approaches that put forwards scientific research as a flexible 
network activity. Kees Boersma presented a refreshing approach when he argued that firms 
not only established internal structures in order to conduct research but also created “methods 
of interacting with the environment that transcended the laboratory’s boundaries.”661 The 
acknowledgement that processes of innovation and research can take place outside the 
business is of great value to this chapter. Here, research into fur farming will be studied as a 
network activity. Indeed, it never took the form of an in-house department but existed in the 
form of social networks between district firms, university science, and experts. The chapter 
will emphasise the alternative ways in which the district organised research on fur breeding 
and whether it was able to implement the findings of such research into the sourcing of new 
resources. 
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In general, the examination of fur farming in Germany and the business-science cooperation it 
entailed aims to make contributions to two separate fields of historical research. Firstly, the 
development of farming as a source for the fur industry is part of a larger process whereby 
science achieved ever-increasing prominence in the function of modern business. Businesses 
both in Germany and beyond became increasingly science-based, meaning that “scientific 
research and systematic applications of their results to the process of the production of goods 
turned into a routine activity of the company.”662 The position of small and medium-sized 
businesses in such processes is easily ignored and has been. Research has overwhelmingly 
focussed on the development of ‘research and development divisions’ and laboratories within 
big business, focusing on Hechst, BASF, and others. However, business scientification 
occurred in many more areas than just industrial production. As Szöllösi-Janze rightly pointed 
out, surprisingly little is known about the institutionalisation of agricultural research and, by 
extension, the role of business in the development of such research.
663
 Fur farming, 
developing at the intersection between the fur industry and science, is such a case. 
 
Secondly, the examination of fur farming in connection to the Leipzig industry leads us into 
territory as yet unchartered by the research literature. The chapter is a pioneering contribution 
to the history of modern fur farming. We know surprisingly little about fur farming on the 
European continent and only slight more in regards to North America.
664
 The creation of fur 
farming nevertheless constituted a major wider historical development in the conquest of 
nature and the domestication of new types of animals. In 2007, about 88% of all furs 
consumed came from farms whereas hunting constituted the major source well into the 
1930s.
665
 Fur farming of the early twentieth century constituted a major transformation in 
ecological history: it alleviated the pressures on animal population from fur trapping and 
hunting, which was a severe problem in North America and Siberia.
666
 This research lacuna is 
all the more astonishing since Europe is currently the number one producer of farmed furs in 
the world. Moreover, fur farming today is a highly controversial sector of animal-based goods 
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that still features prominently in political debates in European and American societies. By 
placing the emergence of fur farming in Germany in this wider context, the chapter 
contributes to the historical understanding of one of the most controversial farming niches in 
contemporary society. 
 
6.2 Fur farming: a new business?  
 
Before turning to the development of fur farming in Germany, I will describe its emergence as 
an international phenomenon. Fur farming started in a region was already one of the largest 
fur producers in the world, North America. Prince Edward Island in the Saint Lawrence gulf 
formed the cradle of modern fur breeding. Fur breeding commenced on the island as early as 
1887: apparently, a few pioneer farms had emerged by around 1894.
667
 On the eve of World 
War I, 277 farms operated on the island. However, the war made the number of Prince 
Edward Farms temporarily shrink to 252 in 1919.
668
 The practice accelerated again after 1921 
when Canada’s environmental policy was heavily influenced by the conservationist 
movement, which furthered the proliferation of small fur farmers at the local level.
669
 As such, 
the total number of fur farms in Canada reached 1,240 units in 1923. Prince Edward Island 
remained the Eldorado of North American fur farming with 448 farms: 41% of Canadian 
ranched fur was produced on the island.
670
 Monoculture was the norm. Only 61 farms reared 
animals other than silver foxes.
671
 
 
By the beginning of the 1930s, fur farming formed a significant sector of the Canadian fur 
industry. In the procurement of raw furs (table 1), the percentage of ranched furs increased 
from 3% in 1920/21 to about 19% at the end of the decade. In the early 1930s, when the real 
value of the raw fur yield decreased, ranched furs represented about 30% of Canadian fur 
production. This upward trend continued to characterise the Canadian fur trade at least until 
the beginning of World War II. By 1938, fur farming generated almost 50% of the total value 
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of production. In addition, farming increasingly diversified when producing silver foxes on 
Canadian farms decreased.
672
 During the 1940s, however, over-production made prices drop 
and therefore rendered fur farming less attractive. Traditional trapping in North America even 
regained some of its attractiveness, as its costs were much lower.
673
 Nevertheless, in 
importance and magnitude, Canadian fur production on farms far exceeded that of countries 
on the European continent. 
 
 Value of Canadian 
raw fur production (in 
dollars) 
Percentage of 
farmed furs 
1920-21 10,151,594 3 
1921-22 17,458,867 4 
1922-23 16,761,567 4 
1923-24 15,643,817 6 
1924-25 15,441,564 4 
1925-26 15,072,244 5 
1926-27 18,864,126 6 
1927-28 18,758,177 11 
1928-29 18,745,473 13 
1929-30 12,158,376 19 
1930-31 11,803,217 26 
1931-32 10,189,481 30 
1932-33 10,305,154 30 
1933-34 12,349,328 30 
Table 6-1: Percentage of farmed furs in Canadian fur production
674
 
 
Similarly, the rearing of silver foxes had entered the US by the end of the nineteenth century. 
Although fur farming was big business there as well, figures are scantier than in the case of 
Canada. In 1922, the Biological Survey registered the presence of 500 breeders farming one 
or more species of fur-bearing animals.
675
 Farmers in the United States also specialised in the 
silver fox, a mutant of the common fox, a popular item on the world market: they also bred 
raccoon and mink, although to a lesser extent.
676
 By 1940, the US had 2,644 fox farmers.
677
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The production of silver fox skins in the US was larger than in Canada. Between 1931 and 
1933, Canada produced 95,000 silver fox skins on average, whereas production in the US 
exceeded the 100,000 benchmark (110,000 skins in 1931, 130,000 in 1932, and 150,000 in 
1933).
678
 After 1940, however, the dictates of fashion required the furs of other animals like 
mink, which made fox farming steadily decrease in popularity. While taking these minor 
differences into account, both Canada and the US were leading countries in the production of 
farmed furs. The growing success of farming across the Atlantic inspired traders and farmers 
in Europe. The first fur farms in Europe were created in Scandinavia: in Norway (1913) and 
in Finland (1916). In the interwar period, Scandinavia emerged as the centre of European fur 
farming. Norway had around 20,000 relatively small fur farms prior to World War II.
679
 
6.3 Fur farming in Germany: the first stages (1921-1925) 
 
The first mention of fur breeding in Germany was made shortly after the end of the Great War 
and was inextricably connected to the name of the Munich professor in zoology, Reinhard 
Demoll (1882-1961).
680
 In all likelihood inspired by the successful foundation of 
experimental farms in Scandinavia, Demoll published various pamphlets and texts about the 
potential for a self-sufficient domestic industry in luxury pelts.
681
 However, the Bavarian 
government rejected his plan to establish an experimental farm in the southern German state. 
Demoll’s ideas concerning fur farming resonated more strongly in Saxony. In 1919, Die 
Kürschnerzeitung, one of the leading trade journals in Leipzig, enthusiastically portrayed fur 
farming as a promising venue to replace the destroyed supply routes from tsarist Russia.
682
 In 
the immediate post-war years, the Leipzig fur industry was still cut off from international fur 
supplies because of the civil war in Siberia and its isolation from the world market. In contrast 
to the Bavarian government, several Leipzig firms supported Demoll’s plan to create an 
experimental farm and they formed a partnership with him. In 1921, a Leipzig business group 
established the Experimental Fur Breeding Farm (Versuchszüchterei Edler Pelztiere GmbH & 
Co). The farm, located near Hirschegg-Riezlern in the Bavarian Alps and close to the border 
with Austria, was headed by Demoll. The farm was a cooperative venture between several 
businessmen in Leipzig: Friedrich Erler & Co, Theodor Thorer, Heinrich Lomer, Emil Zahn, 
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and A. Nathan & Co.
683
 While Demoll headed the practical management of the farm, Walter 
Krausse, a manager of the Erler firm, was appointed as the head of the overarching project. 
The breeding on the experimental farm started at the end of 1922 with the introduction of four 
foxes purchased in Canada. In 1923, the first ‘German’ foxes were born in captivity.  
 
The fact that the first farm was situated in the Bavarian Alps was not a coincidence: it 
reflected the widespread idea that the successful breeding of arctic furbearers required the best 
possible imitation of their living environment. The association between climatic surroundings 
and the rearing of furbearers bears remarkable similarities to the environmental determinism 
that held sway over the karakul breeding project. Authorities, not least the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, did not believe that fur farming in Germany was technically possibile: “the 
farming of such animals may be possible in America and Canada. In Germany (...) the climate 
will degenerate the fur of the animals.”684 Less radical views suggested that only certain areas 
in Germany were suitable. In a pamphlet that discussed the possibilities of fur breeding for 
Bavaria, Jean Beck wrote, “Bavaria’s climate is perfect for the breeding of wild furs. This has 
been confirmed by all German professionals. They refer particularly to Upper Bavaria (...) as 
the ideal area for this breed,”685 Just as the plains of Namibia seemed like a natural 
environment for the steppe Karakuls, the cold and snowy mountains of Bavaria were thought 
of as the ideal German heimat for subarctic animal species. It may not come as a surprise that 
the few farms founded in Saxony were located in in the mountains south of Dresden, the so-
called ‘Sächsisches Schweiz.’ One of the largest Saxon farms, Edelpelztierfarm Malepartus, 
was established in the summer of 1925 in Langenhennersdorf in this part of the region.
686
  
 
The belief that Bavaria, or mountainous areas in general, formed the ideal fur breeding 
environment reflected the popular biological discourse that environmental surroundings 
determined the ecology of animals. In short, it was based on the functional discourse in 
German biology that, according to Lynn Nyhart, “viewed the organism as a living being 
embedded in nature, whose survival depended on its ability to interact successfully with both 
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its physical environment and the other organisms around it.”687 The success of farming in 
Scandinavia and North America had probably nurtured the idea among German farmers that 
success in domesticating fur bearing animals was determined by the environment in which the 
animal lived. However, unlike karakul breeding before the war, the importance of functional 
morphology or environmental determinism lost ground in the 1920s and never formed a 
hindrance to the expansion of fur farming throughout other regions in Germany. It was, 
however, important in the initial stages of fur farming’s development.   
 
In the wake of the Bavarian experimental farm and its expanding silver fox population, 
numerous farms were set up throughout Germany. Figures on the number of fur farms in 
Germany in the 1920s are patchy. Contemporary publications estimated 44 farms in 1925.
688
 
There exists a rather detailed publication by Ernst Stakemann, a fur farmer in Eastern Prussia, 
who counted 56 fur farms in Germany in the summer of 1926. More than anything else, the 
difference reveals the rapid pace by which fur breeding in Germany grew. Additionally, 
Stakemann’s numbers illuminate the geographical distribution of fur farms, showing that the 
majority of farms were situated in Prussia and Bavaria. By 1925, fur farming had clearly 
descended from the mountains, although 28 farms were at least 500m above sea level.
689
 It is 
noteworthy that altitude was still considered relevant. These first farms mainly focused on the 
rearing of silver foxes (770 animals) and mink (270 animals). The development of fur farming 
in Saxony, the heart of the German fur industry, was relatively small.  
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German State  Farms 
Prussia 23 
Bavaria 21 
Baden 5 
Mecklenburg 1 
Saxony 2 
Thüringen 2 
Lübeck 1 
Hessen Nassau 1 
Germany 56 
Table 6-2: Fur Farms in Germany, 1926690 
 
Farming as a new source of furs for the industry was still far off in the horizon. In this 
experimental and expansive phase, fur farmers were hardly concerned at all with pelting for 
the market in Leipzig: the sale of fur skins represented only a marginal share of the total 
supply. Stakemann mentioned the symbolic sale of 26 white fox skins to the fur industry in 
1926: the ‘best skins’ were sold for 435RM on average.691 Most of the first farms 
concentrated on re-selling foxes to provide breeding stock for other farmers. According to 
Stakemann, profit was mainly derived from such ‘speculative’ commerce in breeding stock. 
In 1925, 136 silver foxes were sold to fur farms in and around Germany and their commercial 
value was said to equal 407,600RM, a considerable sum.
692
 Advertising about high profit 
margins was widely circulated in this period, thereby attracting new farmers. Unrealistic 
expectations were attached to this new line of business. Several villages even hoped that 
breeding could reverse local unemployment.
693
 This all contributed to a gold-feverish attitude 
to this mushrooming agricultural niche.  
 
The first phase of breeding in North America, which lasted significantly longer than it did on 
the European continent, had suffered from similar problems. First, profits in Canadian 
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farming prior to World War I were mainly extracted from trading with breeding stock and not 
by selling pelts. So long as the demand for fur-bearing animals remained high, such 
speculative trade in living animals made considerable profits and attracted an even larger pool 
of fortune-seekers. In September 1909, a new fur farmer could pay up to $3,000 for a silver 
fox pup on Prince Edward Island. Four years later, high demand had pushed prices for a pup 
up to a staggering $16,000.
694
 George Colpitts demonstrated that this high-profit phase in 
Canada was particularly pronounced between 1920 and 1929.
695
 Similarly, Ashbrook of the 
American Bureau for Agriculture mentioned that farming had ended its speculative phase by 
1930. Prior to this, new farmers in the US paid up to $11,000 for a pair of foxes.
696
 In sum, fur 
speculation was not a distinctively German problem: rather, it was typical in the early stages 
of fur farming. 
 
6.4 Fur industry and science in the late Weimar period. 
 
6.4.1 The creation of a research institute as a network activity (1926-1928). 
 
When the number of fur farms in Germany proliferated, so too did various representative 
institutions for the farming business. However, the landscape of fur farming increasingly 
splintered over the years and the federal state remained largely absent as well. Competing 
factions had emerged from the very start of fur breeding. The major cleavage in the 
organisation of fur farming occurred because of the conflict between Demoll and the Leipzig 
fur industry: this forced Demoll to leave the experimental farm in the autumn of 1922. 
However, Demoll maintained a personal interest in fur farming and established the German 
Fur Breeding Union (Die Deutsche Pelztierzüchter-Vereinigung) in Munich: it unified the 
majority Bavarian fur farms in 1925.
697
 In Eastern Prussia, farmers joined together in the 
Association of Eastern Prussian Fur Farmers (Vereinigung Ostpreussischer 
Edelpelztierzüchter) with its headquarters in Allenstein. Thus, farming organisations were 
chiefly established along regional lines. The associations mentioned above operated 
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independently from the fur industry in Leipzig. Threatened with a loss of influence over the 
expanding farming business, the Leipzig industry established an organisation, the Association 
for Silver Fox Breeding (der Verband für Silberfuchszucht), which gathered chiefly fur farms 
in Saxony together.  
 
While the split between Demoll and the Leipzig industry had splintered the emerging farming 
business, firms tried to transform the city into the centre for the study of farming. The most 
important development in this respect was the creation of the research centre, the Institute for 
Furbearing Animals and Fur Research (a rather unwieldy translation of Reichszentrale für 
Pelztier und Rauchwarenforschung, henceforth the Reichszentrale). Founded in 1926, the 
Reichszentrale hoped to assemble expertise on fur breeding. Additionally, the fur industry 
hoped to mould the fur breeding movement into an efficient supply source through this 
scientific institution.
698
 The need to influence fur farming stemmed largely from the negative 
experience during the war when the attempts to rationalise rabbit keeping collapsed in the 
face of widespread social resistance. Walter Stichel, a member of the Reichszentrale, wrote in 
1926: “fur farming falling on the same track as rabbit keeping must be avoided at all costs (...) 
the invested capital for fur farming is simply too high to allow for experimentation and 
imperfections.”699 A central rationale behind the research centre was therefore not only the 
support of research but also the promotion of an attitude of professionalism in fur farming. 
For instance, in 1929, the director of the Reichszentrale Paul Schöps wrote pointedly in one of 
his many newspaper articles that “fur farming means work and not leisure.”700  
 
In contrast to the in-house laboratories or research and development centres that typified 
scientific research in larger corporations, the Reichszentrale resulted from joint firm 
investments and never resembled anything like a fully independent research division within 
the walls of one business. The organisational aspects of the institution mirrored the 
collaborative networks between fur firms in Leipzig. It also revealed links between these 
firms and those political stakeholders of the region interested in strengthening the local 
economy. Regional public authorities in fact played a major role in the creation of the 
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research institution. While the 20,000RM budget of the Reichszentrale was rather modest, it is 
particularly striking that firms provided only 3,500RM (the Fur Merchants Association 
2,000RM and various firms 1,500RM). Regional governments and public institutions raised 
the remainder of the sum. Both the Chamber of Commerce in Leipzig and Saxony’s Ministry 
of Economy donated 6,000 RM, making them the chief sponsors.
701
 It is striking that local 
industry did not even provide a third of the necessary funds for the research centre. The 
balance between public and private funding did not change later. In 1927, the total budget was 
raised to 28,000RM but funding from the fur industry only increased to 6,000RM.
702
 
 
Of course, the rather modest funding was reflected in the organisation of the Reichszentrale 
itself. The research centre was run by firm personnel and its offices were initially housed in 
one of the trading houses on the Brühl. The Reichszentrale was closely connected to the 
Friedrich Erler & Co firm, which specialised in the treatment and sale of fox skins. Paul 
Schöps, the appointed leader of the Reichszentrale, was neither an agricultural expert nor a fur 
trader but rather a high ranked official in the Erler firm. When he joined the firm in 1922, 
Schöps had already established his name in both the academic and commercial field. He 
prepared a thesis on the German metal industry at the Jena University after he concluded Carl 
Zeiss’ merchant training program in Jena in March 1913.703 Schöps’ appointment 
demonstrated the role of Erler as one of the lead firms of the district, especially in the field of 
innovation. I have alluded earlier to Erler’s leading position in the development of the 
synthetic fur dyeing industry in Leipzig with the chemist Stieglitz. The Erler firm embodied a 
tradition of close cooperation between industry and science. Aside from the leading role of 
Erler, the meetings of the Reichszentrale were followed by entrepreneurs from the largest 
trading and dyeing businesses in Leipzig, like Arndt Thorer (Theodor Thorer), Richard König, 
and Walter Krausse (Friedrich Erler & co).  
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The low budget and loose organisational structure of the Reichszentrale flies in the face of the 
classic image we have of research and development centres in industries at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Rather than conducting research independently, the Reichszentrale was 
intended as the central node inside a research network that was aimed at assembling experts 
who worked on the scientific, economic, and practical underpinnings of fur breeding. The 
Reichszentrale generally eschewed participating in direct research, with the notable exception 
of an experimental farm that was set up in Connewitz, a town south of Leipzig.
704
 The 500m
2
 
experimental farm was situated in the local forest and its research focused largely on aspects 
of animal management like the study of nutrition patterns and finding suitable pens for 
different types of furbearers. The creation of the experimental farm coincided with a budget 
increase of the institute in 1928, which almost doubled to 41,975.61RM. Almost half of the 
budget was spent on the infrastructure of the research institute while 14,736RM was donated 
to associated professors and institutions.
705
 
 
Aside from having its own experimental farm, the most important feat of the Reichszentrale 
was assembling an epistemic community of experts. The centre had a more or less permanent 
body of researchers at its disposal that formed a “commission of experts.” The commission 
advised on the main issues of contemporary fur breeding. These experts, eleven scientists 
from German-speaking academia, remained attached to their home institutions. It is not 
inconceivable that many of them never physically went to the research centre. They did not 
exclusively author the barrage of works, recommendations, instruction books, lectures, and 
leaflets published by the centre after 1926 but nevertheless, the expert commission formed the 
core of Reichszentrale.  
 
Let us focus more closely on the commission of experts in order to study the geography of the 
research network in the industrial district. Remarkably, the commission of experts was firmly 
rooted in Leipzig or its immediate surroundings. Five of the eleven experts worked in an 
academic institution in Leipzig or in one of its neighbouring cities. The fur industry especially 
profited from the expansion of Leipzig University, then the third largest in Germany, which 
opened a new veterinary and animal-breeding faculty in 1923. The extended veterinary 
faculty became an important scientific advocate for the development of fur breeding. 
Members supported the research network and even incorporated fur farming into teaching 
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activities for veterinary students.
706
 Three scientists of the expert commission had been 
appointed at the new faculty of the university of Leipzig: Johannes Richter, Carl Scheunert, 
and Curt Sprehn. Sprehn and Scheunert worked as veterinary scientists at the Leipzig 
University, though in different departments. Johannes Richter, a veterinary surgeon, was 
associated with the Leipzig Institute for Animal Breeding and Animal Obstetrics (Institut für 
Tierzucht und Geburtskunde der Universität Leipzig). Richter soon included the diseases 
furbearing animals suffered by into his research.
707
 Two scientists of the network were in the 
immediate vicinity of Leipzig: one of them was Gustav Fröhlich, who had headed the Institute 
for Animal Breeding and Dairy in the Halle University (Institut für Tierzucht und 
Molkereiwesen der Universität Halle/Saale) since 1915.
708
 Another was Heinrich Prell of the 
Zoological Institute of Tharandt College (Zoologisches Institut der Forstlichen Hochschule in 
Tharandt), where he was appointed rector in 1927.
709
 Prell was awarded one of the first 
research grants issued by the Reichszentrale in order to visit and report on why the American 
fur breeding industry was successful.
710
 In addition, Prell received a 500RM monthly subsidy 
to make use of research infrastructure at the Zoological Institute in Tharandt on behalf of the 
Reichszentrale.  
 
In addition to being strongly embedded within the region, the fur industry’s research centre 
adorned the network with leading scientists throughout German-speaking academia. Two such 
scientists lived in Munich: Reinhard Demoll, despite his quarrels with the Leipzig industry, 
and Heinrich Henseler, who was active in Halle between 1910 and 1920 and thereafter was 
associated with the Munich University, were both members of the research network. In 
addition, three university scientists lived and worked Stuttgart (A.R. Walther), Insbruck (Karl 
Told), and Hanover (Miessner).
711
 Last but not least, there was the renowned genetic scientist 
Hans von Nachtsheim of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Genetic Science (Kaiser Wilhelm 
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Institut für Vererbungsforschung) in Berlin-Dahlem, whose scientific contribution to the 
development of animal breeding has been acknowledged in historical scholarship.
712
 As a 
colleague of Erwin Baur, the most renowned genetic scientist in Germany, he ranked as one 
of the most influential members of the research network. 
 
In sum, the organisation of research showed a few particular traits that should be kept in mind 
for the reminder of this chapter. First of all, the reduction of costs was apparently paramount. 
Firms demonstrated a certain reluctance to make large investments in the research institute. 
This is revealed by the fact that public expenditure dwarfed private funding. Of course, such a 
corporatist model was not exceptional in Germany. Still, the participating firms refrained 
from allocating a larger budget to the Reichszentrale, a fact that was incompatible with the 
ambitions invested in the research institute. Additionally, the institute’s management was 
divided among employees of the participating firms, with the Erler firm in a leading role. No 
experts or other personnel from agriculture were attracted. Apart from the modest 
experimental station in the Connewitz woods, the centre hardly performed or funded scientific 
research in its own name. Rather, it assembled leading scientists throughout German 
academia into a network with Leipzig as the hub. Secondly, the network was regionally 
entrenched. The Leipzig fur industry profited from the expansion of the local university and 
its connections with university institutions in the vicinity, such as Tharandt and the 
agricultural institute in Halle. The research network typified the organisational underpinnings 
of the industrial district: such business organisations seek to extract resources from their 
immediate surroundings. Such was the case with scientific research as well.  
 
6.4.2 Research in Leipzig from a comparative perspective. 
 
Scientific research into breeding existed in other regions where fur farming was on the rise. 
However, the corporatist research model was unique in the worlds of fur farming and 
international fur business. In the US, scientific research was subsidised and executed by the 
government and remained largely outside the context of business. In the 1920s, the 
government established the Fur Animal Experiment Station in the Adirondack area of the 
state of New York. According to the Department of Agriculture, under whose authority it fell, 
                                                 
712
 Michael Engel, “Hans Nachtsheim,” accessed February 12, 2014, http://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/sfz67745.html. 
Fur Farming and the Leipzig Fur Industry. 
218 
 
the prime object of the station “is to determine the most efficient methods of producing fur 
bearers in captivity.”713 In practice, the station’s research concerned nutrition patterns, 
modern sanitation methods, and disease control. The program did not extend to applied 
genetics. The connection between genetic science and the agriculture was already more 
institutionalised in the US than in Germany. American professors were more prone to do 
fieldwork than the German professoriate. The availability of expertise in agriculture in 
America was precisely one of the conditions that Hans Nachtsheim and Erwin Baur envied.
714
  
 
In Canadian fur farming, research was connected to business but it was chiefly concentrated 
in the Hudson’s Bay Company, the firm that dominated the trade.715 Like in Germany, 
farming was part of processes of scientification in the fur business. In 1926, the interest in fur 
farming and other new fields of activity led to the creation of a ‘development department’ 
within the Hudson’s Bay Company. This ‘development department,’ controlled by a small 
laboratory in Kent, exemplifies the company’s interest in new production processes and the 
modernization of business activities relating to fur farming. However, unlike in the German 
case, research and development was more profoundly institutionalised and was organised as 
an in-house department. It had a staff of 14 members and the salary bill exceeded £6,000. In 
order to express its interest in the mushrooming farming industry, the HBC acquired an 
interest in McLure and Kinnon, one of the largest fur farms on Prince Edward Island: they had 
been breeders since 1911.
716
 Fur farming formed one of the core activities of this development 
department. In 1928-29, it established several new fur farms, some of which were located far 
away, such as on the island of Mingan and in Cartwright Newfoundland. The company 
predominantly focussed on experimentation and improving animal nutrition.
717
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In addition, the HBC’s research was also organised as a network activity, although only to a 
limited extent.
718
 The HBC used a small number of ‘external members,’ the most well known 
of whom was Charles Elton, founder of the Bureau for Animal Population at Oxford 
University. Elton, enlisted as the ‘ecological consultant’ of the HBC, conducted research on 
animal population and studied cycles in the abundance and scarcity of animal types: this 
resulted in his seminal publication Voles, Mice and Lemmings, Problems in Population 
Dynamics (1942).
719
 In sum, the corporatist research institution of Leipzig and its focus on 
scientific research as a network activity was a unique model in the world of fur farming.  
 
6.5 The activities of the Reichzentrale (1926-1929).  
 
The main activities of the Reichszentrale were the promotion of research into differing aspects 
of fur breeding and encouraging professionalisation among the numerous new amateur 
farmers. The latter was seen as an important task since it was the underlying aim of the fur 
industry to develop farming as a reliable resource supplier. Some scientists saw no harm in 
reconciling scientific research with commercial aspects. Alexander Sokolowsky, a Hamburg 
professor who published through the Reichszentrale, defined the field of research as follows: 
“the domain of the study of furbearers is limited to the keeping and breeding of fur breeding 
animals and (…) the study of the fur coats of these creatures for the tasks of the fur trade.”720 
Other scientists wanted to change practices of animal breeding rather than support the fur 
industry. The desire to instil an attitude of professionalism in the new farmers was shared by 
university scientists, mainly from the fear that amateurism would sabotage scientific 
advances. The practical knowledge of breeders was based on “shared knowledge” derived 
from “personal experience” with animal keeping rather than scientific principles or the 
insights of basic animal management.
721
 The promotion of Mendelian genetic among amateur 
breeders was a major motivation for genetic scientists like von Nachtsheim.
722
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The Reichszentrale gave an impetus to this new field as the bulk of the expenditure went 
directly to research. In 1927, the Zoological Institut in Tharandt received 6,000 Reichsmarks 
and director Prell got 1,200 RM for his research in America. The Reichszentrale did not pay 
wages but reimbursed travel costs (3,000 RM). Research was not limited to fur farming: 
dyeing received 2,000 RM and another 2,000 went to various other research projects.
723
 So, 
with only a little spending, the Reichszentrale was able to set several research projects in 
motion. Curt Sprehn and his assistants at the Leipzig University performed dissections on 940 
deceased animals on German fur farms to establish the main causes of death.
724
 The Leipzig 
veterinary facility did not receive any funding for this research. Drawing on support and 
goodwill from associated academics, stimulating research with minimal investments was a 
strength of the Leipzig research network.  
 
The role of the Reichszentrale as a facilitator of research can also be seen in its efforts to 
publish and circulate the research of scholars working on fur farming. These publications also 
reveal the kind of research being performed. The Arbeiten der Reichszentrale, a compilation 
of the 26 most important publications between 1926 and 1930, dealt with multifarious topics, 
although animal management clearly stood out as the most important. About 12 publications 
related to this subject and included reports on experiments into breeding new species and the 
acclimatisation of furbearing animals in Germany. About 7 publications were devoted to 
aetiology of furbearers: this was the second largest genre published in the compilation. Like 
the majority of scientific publications on rabbit breeding during World War I, such 
publications chiefly focused on the most common causes of death and on diseases or 
pathogens that affected the quality of the breeding stock. If these scientific publications are to 
be trusted, farmed animals suffered from parasites most of all and scabies to a lesser degree. 
Indeed, parasites were the largest cause of death among silver foxes. 23 fox pups died in 1926 
because of parasites: the overall total loss from that year was 72 foxes. This was a painful loss 
                                                                                                                                                        
genetics required a paradigm shift in the everyday experiences and practices of amateur breeding. Genetic 
scientists like Hans von Nachtsheim pursued such an agenda. 
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of production capital since a new fox would easily cost 3,000 marks.
725
 Finally, several 
contributions can be defined as curiosities, like Pell’s publication on the reproduction of 
brown bears, which was only remotely connected with the development of fur breeding in 
Germany. A publication of the representation of fur bearing animals on ancient coins was 
another miscellanous contribution.
726
  
 
While the previous publications mainly served a public of peers interested in various aspects 
of fur farming, the results of scientific research were also popularised for laymen and amateur 
breeders. Leipzig published its own journal, Die Pelztierzucht, which had become one of the 
leading journals on fur farming in Germany since 1924. In addition, an important publication 
series were the so-called leaflets (Merkblätter) designed as instruction notes for fur breeders. 
They aimed at rationalising fur breeding by suppressing amateurish practices. I have been 
able to track two of these leaflets and it is not clear if more were issued. The first leaflet 
explained the necessity of hygienic measures in order to counter the spread of diseases.
727
 The 
Leipzig University scientists Richter and Sprehn issued a second leaflet that demonstrates 
more clearly the endeavour to professionalise fur farming and safeguard the interests of the 
fur industry.  
 
The leaflet was written on the subject of slaughtering. The authors insisted that “the killing of 
furbearers for the extraction of skins has to be done fast while avoiding damage to the value 
of the skin.”728 Sprehn and Richter rejected the killing methods of amateur breeders, which 
not only damaged the skins but were also unnecessarily cruel. Amateur methods largely 
revolved around suffocation: strangling with the knee (Totknieen), drowning the animal in 
buckets of water, or suffocation by carbonic acid. Instead, experts sought to ‘refine’ killing 
with ‘cleaner’ and less cruel methods that involved the usage of chemicals (preferably the 
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injection of chloroform) and electrocution that, most importantly, minimised the risk of 
damage to the skin. 
 
Unfortunately, few such leaflets have survived the passage of time but they did not form the 
only channels of communication to amateur breeders. Publications in Die Pelztierzucht 
conveyed similar information about the practices and methods of fur farming. Topics ranged 
from adequate nutrition patterns to the optimal size of animal pens.
729
 In one article, von 
Nachtsheim carefully explained the Mendelian laws that governed the breeding of different 
rabbit types, the so-called Rexkaninchen. Other articles dealt with issues of a commercial 
nature. An article by the Natural Intelligence Service of Canada on the professional 
‘preparation of pelts for the market’ was translated by a Leipzig bureau and appeared in the 
journal in 1928.
730
 However, despite the importance of professionalising their future 
suppliers, the fur industry refrained from investing in any other educational material beyond 
the editing of publications and indirectly supporting research. In 1929, it entertained the idea 
of organising training courses for farmers, since it considered the courses organised by farmer 
associations insufficient and one-sided. However, the industry was reluctant to invest in 
teaching and demanded financial compensation for the organisation from the city council, 
which the latter refused.
731
 A one-off course eventually took place at the International Fur 
Exhibition in the summer of 1930.
732
  
 
The research network also prioritised the fight against speculation. As mentioned above, the 
resale of fur-bearing animals still generated most of the profits for pioneering breeders. 
Consequently, it prevented breeders from orienting their production to the market of Leipzig, 
the so-called ‘pelting stage.’ Von Nachtsheim, for instance, was particularly worried that 
unrealistic profit expectations would damage fur farming because of the appeal to fortune-
seekers: “in several newspapers and journals, fox breeding has been represented as an 
industry for gold diggers, promising profits of 180% and more. (...) This disinformation 
campaign is attracting the wrong people to fox farming, thereby turning it in to a fiasco.”733 In 
1927, the Reichszentrale warned animal traders, often representatives of American dealers, 
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about advertising unrealistic profit margins. The Reichszentrale reported that “if the prospects 
in fur farming for well-funded and experienced breeders are by no means unfavourable, these 
exaggerated descriptions on profitability contrasts the realistic circumstances of today.”734 
Equally, Paul Schöps published more ‘realistic’ analyses describing the start-up capital and 
personnel needed to turn a new fur farm into a sustainable enterprise. Needless to say, Schöps 
warned speculators that profits would be shortlived: “sales of expensive animals will only 
grow gradually once money is scarce.” Instead, he argued that the farms should be based on 
profits derived from the production of skins.
735
  
 
In the fight against amateurism, academics and experts called for more official control over 
fur farms. Scientists inspected the farms that were associated to the Leipzig Association of 
Breeders. They were convinced of the benefits to be derived from expanding the system of 
control: “if it is possible to introduce strict measures and we manage to implement official 
controls, there will be no fear that the industry of fur animals will suffer from diseases like 
some other types of animal breeding, which lack uniform and strict supervision.”736 In 
addition, scientists looked across the border in order to copy success stories. Heinrich Prell 
legitimised the intervention of experts and the state in fur farming by referring to the 
successes of the American government in planning fur farming.
737
 In the summer of 1925, 
von Nachtsheim visited three fur farms in Norway to examine the potential of the new 
production paradigm and linked success in fur breeding to the personal qualities of the 
farmers themselves. While only one Norwegian farm was founded with the ‘despicable’ aim 
of animal trading, the other two farms convinced him of the importance of personal 
dedication. He linked the best result in breeding in the third farm to the farmer’s “passion for 
the animals.”738 According to von Nachtsheim, small fur farms with devoted farmers had to 
form the basis of farming. The fur industry naturally supported the ‘small is beautiful’ maxim 
in its demands regarding resource quality.
739
 The fight against speculation and the will to 
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intrude into the social world of breeding formed the groundwork of the business-science 
alliance after 1926. 
 
University experts also attempted to intrude into the world of breeders when it came to 
exhibitions. As in other types of animal breeding, exhibitions were landmark events for 
animal breeders, since awards gave them prestige.
740
 Additionally, they attracted a great deal 
of public interest. In a certain sense, they encapsulated the fur frenzy of the 1920s. The 
National Fur Exhibition (Reichsedelpelztierausstellung), held in Berlin between 16 and 18 
November 1928 and organised by the Leipzig farming association, was one of the first large 
furbearing animal exhibitions.
741
 Reports mentioned that women were holding tame foxes 
“caressingly in their arms and let themselves be photographed with the intelligent animals.”742 
However, the proliferation of fur farming exhibitions was challenged by the Reichszentrale 
because the events used differing evaluation and price rewarding methods, most of which 
were not considered beneficial to the development of fur farming.
743
 Experts defined fur 
farming exhibitions as belonging to the traditions of amateur or sport breeders, which saw 
‘aesthetic quality’ as the most important outcome of breeding. Prell proposed to create a 
unified evaluation system that would cover the bewildering number of exhibitions. He stated 
that this yardstick should take into account biological breeding qualities and the worthiness of 
the animal for use in the industry.
744
 Thus, scientists who were part of the Leipzig network 
had two important functions. Firstly, they tried to rationalise the field of fur farming and 
secondly, they were important channels through which the fur industry tried to govern and 
control the practice of fur farming.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
animals in order to get them healthy requires so much work that a rising number of animals will stop 
profitability.” 
740
 Marie, “For Science, Love and Money.” 
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6.6 Shortcomings of the research network (1928-1932).  
 
6.6.1 Internal struggles and scientific authority.  
 
Despite the numerous ideas to break into the social worlds of animal breeders, the results 
were far from spectacular. Attempts to create uniform exhibitions and the fight against the 
speculative animal trade proved largely ineffective. The Reichszentrale’s power was limited 
because of the decentralised organisation of fur farming in Germany and the state’s refusal to 
set out a legal framework. Each competing fur farming association followed its own agenda, 
organising separate exhibitions with differing valuation methods. The main competing lobby 
group, the Union of German Fur Farmers’ Associations in Munich (Bund Deutscher 
Pelztierzüchter-Vereine), was led by Reinhard Demoll. They operated independently of the 
Leipzig-controlled Association of German Fur Famers (Reichsverband deutscher Edelpelztier 
Züchter, hereafter the Reichsverband). Both organisations heavily competed with one another 
to gain the widest representation. While most of the agricultural experts had gathered around 
the Leipzig organisation, the Munich organisation exceeded the Leipzig one in the number of 
farms. In terms of the number of foxes held, the former (8,000) dwarfed the latter (4,000).
745
 
Whereas the Leipzig organisation was bent on integrating farming into the city’s fur industry, 
Demoll’s organisation assumed the role of defender of the small farmers and breeders.  
 
The Demoll organisation formed an important obstacle to the authority of Leipzig as both a 
centre of learning and as a lobbying network.
746
 The antagonism between Munich and Leipzig 
was exacerbated in 1928 when contrasting views on the role of animal trade in fur farms 
surfaced. The main cause for the dispute stemmed from the request of the Munich group to 
impose veterinary controls over the import of new fur-breeding animals into Germany. 
Arguing that the increasing animal shipments from North America to Germany led to the 
spread of infectious diseases, Munich proposed that the government should survey the imports 
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more strictly.
747
 To the Leipzig Association, the Reichszentrale, and the Reichsverband, 
Demoll’s request was seen as a pretext to take control over the domestic market of fur 
farming. If imports of new animals were curtailed, the position of the speculative fur breeders 
would be reinforced and this would, in turn, extend the phase of breeding animals for resale 
rather than for their skins.  
 
Veterinary control over the import of furbearers gravely destabilised the plans of the fur 
industry to transform fur farming into a source for the industry. In 1929, production from 
German fur farms was still marginal and an import restriction was a further delay.
748
 The 
Reichsverband expressed this line of thought: “the fur breeding industry in Germany is only 
viable when a sufficiently large breeding base of fur animals is available, so the demand for 
‘fresh blood’ can be satisfied within our country.”749 The chief point, however, is that both 
commercial interest groups justified their arguments with scientific window-dressing. On the 
one hand, Professor Demoll and the Munich group suggested a relationship between fur 
import and the rabies that plagued pets and domestic animals.
750
 On the other hand, the 
Leipzig experts expressed the opinion that current supervision sufficed to prevent the 
expansion of animal diseases in Germany. Leipzig put forward its own control model instead 
of border controls: “Through its strict evaluation system, the Reichsverband (...) eliminates 
inferior breeding material. And our institution is trying to use scientific research more than 
ever for the needs of fur farming, first to prevent and curb the occurrence of epidemics and 
diseases.”751 The Leipzig University scientist Curt Sprehn examined official reports on 
diseases and disclosed his conclusions in a fifteen-page long paper to the government: “I 
assume that the import of fur bearing animals has brought no epidemic disease whatsoever to 
the German stock of fur breeding animals and (...) other species and humans as well.”752 Paul 
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Schöps also wrote a paper in 1930 on the situation of the fur breeding industry and concluded 
that concerns about importing disease were exaggerated.
753
  
 
However, the Reichszentrale suffered from disloyalty amongst its community of experts. 
Members of the Leipzig members began to change their opinions on the importing of 
furbearers. While Sprehn and Schöps had tried to playdown the impact of epidemic diseases 
from imports, von Nachtsheim turned against the lobbying of the Reichszentrale. He 
vehemently wrote against the Leipzig network and in particular against the agenda of Schöps: 
“Dr. Schöps says that the German fur breeders desire to shut off Germany completely from 
foreign supplies, and not so much because they fear the introduction of diseases, but 
especially to eliminate foreign competition and thus ease the sales of own their own 
production.”754 Moreover, von Nachtsheim revealed that Schöps was personally involved in 
the transit trade as member of the experimental fur farm. From Nachtsheim’s point of view, 
the measures to control imports made sense: “on the basis of my experiences and general 
deliberations, veterinary control over the import of fur-bearing animals is not only desirable 
but also very necessary.”755 The consequences of disloyalty were far-reaching, especially 
since the Ministry of Health (Reichsgesundheitsamt) ultimately decided to impose more strict 
measures upon the imports.
756
 The previous discussion shows that membership of the research 
network was not synonymous with ownership of scientific authority. It is clear that organising 
research in the form of a network harboured several advantages to the fur industry in terms of 
cutting costs but this negated the advantages of in-house research like loyalty to the firm or 
identification with commercial purposes. The research network constructed by the Leipzig 
industry suffered from internal struggles and failed to produce a unified view amongst 
scientists who remained independent in the loose affiliation of the Leipzig research network.  
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6.6.2 The internationalisation of autarky.  
 
Aside from the internal problems that the Reichszentrale suffered, the fur industry itself 
substantially revised its support for fur farming. The revival of the international fur trade in 
the second half of the 1920s refocussed the interest of the fur industry away from fur farming. 
Trade relations with the USSR were fully re-established after the treaty of Berlin in 1925. 
Whereas initial fur farming projects were clearly inspired by autarkic principles, the German 
advances in breeding were increasingly being used in the context of foreign trade relations. In 
particular, the Leipzig experimental farm and several researchers of the network supported the 
development of fur farming in the Soviet Union.
757
 The potential of farmed fur there was 
deemed much higher, as Schöps wrote in 1928 to the Saxon Ministry of Economics: “[fur 
farming] will have a totally different meaning for the Russian economy than it would for 
ours.” In the same letter, he stated that fur farming in the Soviet Union should be supported: 
“it is after all pleasing to see Russia build its fur farming with the help of the Leipzig 
district.”758 This reveals that the Reichszentrale and the fur firms suporting it were sceptical 
about the potential of fur breeding inside Germany:  sourcing farmed furs in the USSR was 
seen as a viable alternative. This meant a major shift from the initial autarkic visions that had 
undergirded the participation of the industry in farming. Is the internationalisation of fur 
farming an explanation for the limited investments made by the Leipzig businesses in 
scientific research?  
 
An important amount of resources and human capital of the Leipzig research network was 
indeed invested in the internationalisation of fur farming. The Reichszentrale held support to 
the USSR to be paramount since fur farming lagged far behind in Russia in comparison to 
other fur producing countries. Earlier attempts to establish fur farming there had tragically 
failed. A single fur farm established on the eve of the First World War was inevitably lost in 
the quagmire of the civil war. In 1925, the Soviet trade agency Gostorg established a new fur 
farm on a small island on the Enissei river near Dudinka in northernmost Siberia. However, 
the farm was poorly equipped and later shut down.
759
 It took until 1927 before the Soviet 
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authorities finally decided to pursue a more energetic policy towards fur farming: importantly, 
they secured the help of the Leipzig associations, foremost the Reichszentrale. With the 
support of German shipping companies and the Leipzig research network, the Soiuzpushnina 
(the Soviet fur syndicate) arranged a Canadian animal transport and shipped about 100 silver 
foxes and 900 muskrats through Hamburg to Leningrad. The animals purchased from 
Canadian farms were selected by the Deutsche Versuchszüchterei edler Pelztiere GmbH, the 
firm that was in charge of the Leipzig fur farm in the Alps.
760
 
 
The Leipzig farming association not only supported the organisation of animal transports but 
also provided assistance for the construction and supervision of new farms. In 1928, Fritz 
Schmidt, the manager of the abovementioned Leipzig farm, left for the Soviet Union in order 
to support the establishment of a large farm near Archangelsk. After Archangelsk, Schmidt 
went to Pushkino (north of Moscow) where he was appointed scientific director at the Central 
Instructional Farm. There, he devoted himself to the study of Russian sables in captivity.
761
 
Schmidt stayed in Pushkino until 1934. Other experts travelled temporarily to the USSR: Curt 
Sprehn followed Schmidt to Pushkino to teach Russian biologists about animal diseases. 
Friedrich Joppich, a German expert on rabbit breeding, travelled to the Soviet Union as 
well.
762
 Instead of protecting its findings from foreign interests, the Leipzig research network 
shared them with the Soviets.  
 
The helpfulness of the Leipzig network failed to transform Soviet fur farming into a reliable 
source for the Leipzig industry.
763
 As we will see shortly, the Soviets radically modified their 
foreign trade policy, abandoning the New Economic Policy (NEP) in favour of Stalin’s 
ambitious five-year plan. Instead of focusing on the export of resources, the five-year plan 
shifted attention to the export of industrial goods. Consequently, the resource exports from the 
Soviet Union dramatically decreased. The Leipzigers’s gamble to export expertise on autarkic 
fur farming to the USSR failed not only because of the collapse of the NEP: it was also due to 
the fact that the USSR failed to convert foreign expertise into practical full-scale fur 
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farming.
764
 Whereas the farming business in the Soviet Union reached levels in 1930 that 
were comparable those in Germany in 1926 (738 silver foxes and 258 blue foxes), growth of 
fur farming largely stagnated afterwards.
765
 In fact, fur farming in the USSR only acquired 
prominence after World War II. This is rather surprising given the larger agricultural potential 
and suitable climatic conditions for fur farming. This delay was partially connected to the 
Soviet Union’s negative stance on genetic science. Applied Mendelian genetic science fell 
into disgrace in Russia: the Soviets adhered to the neo-Lamarckian ideas proposed by the 
peasant plant-breeder Lysenko.
766
 Between 1936 and 1964, genetic science was denounced as 
capitalist and bourgeois.
767
 Only in the late 1950s did experiments with fur farming attain 
momentum again and state fur farms continued to expand well into the 1980s. Genetic science 
revived only after World War II: this was epitomised by Dmitrii Beliaev’s world famous 
experiments on taming foxes. With the support of Soviet fur farming and the neglect of 
domestic fur farming, the Leipzig industrial district and its research network had taken a few 
fateful decisions in their attempt to use fur farming as a resource base for their businesses.  
 
6.7 The collapse of the Reichszentrale and the stabilisation of German fur 
farming, 1930-1939.  
 
Let us return to the situation of fur farming in Germany. I have demonstrated that the Leipzig 
network was plagued by external tensions between farmers’ organisations and internal 
tensions between prominent members of the network. I have also described how fur farming 
ceased to be a priority in the second half of the 1920s when firms placed their hopes in the 
revival of international trade and sought to generate fur farming outside Germany. This 
section expands on these observations by examining developments in the 1930s, during which 
the link between the industry and fur farming drastically altered. The crisis of 1930 and the 
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continuous expansion of fur farming meant the end of the collective action in the industrial 
district in terms of agricultural research.  
 
The economic crisis occurred at the point when German fur farming reached significant 
levels. The fur breeding business grew spectacularly between 1926 and 1934 (see figure 4). 
From 56 farms in 1926, the figure multiplied to an astounding 1,074 farms in 1931. Their 
geographical distribution remained largely unchanged. Bavaria and Prussia were stilld the 
central hubs of fur farming, although Prussia had clearly achieved predominance by this date. 
Nonetheless, the Bavarian Alps remained a central location for farming:  Upper Bavaria was 
home to 123, which was significantly more than the two densest farming regions of Prussia, 
Eastern Prussia (42 farms) and Niederschlesien (about 90 farms).  
 
States Farms 
Prussia 577 
Bavaria 254 
Saxony 41 
Württemberg 74 
Baden 13 
Thüringen 26 
Hessen 29 
Others 60 
Total 1,074 
Table 6-3: Geographical distribution of German fur farms (1931) 768 
 
The motley variety of furbearing animals on the German farms is a particularly striking post-
1926 development (figure 5). German farms domesticated up to six types of fur bearing 
animals. However, most farms remained specialised in the rearing of silver foxes (8,593) and 
mink (7,019). Germany’s silver fox farming was still dwarfed by Canada (58,000) and 
Norway (35,000).
769
 The popularity of silver fox breeding corresponded with changing 
patterns in the consumption in the interwar period, which favoured this variety of the common 
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fox.
770
 Before the Great War, only about 3,000-4,000 silver foxes were sold annually on the 
world market: by 1931, turnover had climbed to an incredible 330,000.
771
 World production 
of silver foxes continued to climb, reaching 400,000-500,000 skins in 1932, despite the 
economic crisis.
772
 Farming was an important part of the global silver fox industry. Between 
1932 and 1933, about 40,000 silver foxes were traded on the autumn and winter auctions in 
Leipzig: 10,000 of the pelts originated in German farms and the rest came from Austria, 
America, and Scandinavia.
773
 By 1934, German fur farms had a breeding stock of 16,564 
silver foxes.
774
  
 
Animal 
species 
Farms Number of 
animals 
Silver fox 467 8593 
Arctic fox 
(blue fox)  
43 306 
Mink 441 7019 
Raccoon 136 932 
Nutria 179 1926 
Karakuls 25 1508 
Table 6-4: Species of fur bearing animals raised on German farms (1931) 775 
 
However, German fur farming’s entrance onto the market coincided with the economic crisis 
of the early 1930s. This utterly shattered the high profit expectations that many had seen in 
the business. In the first place, lower demand and significant overproduction created 
downward pressures on price levels. In the early 1930s, the Reichszentrale feared for the 
future of fur breeding in its current form and ceased to welcome newcomers into the industry: 
“it must be noted that employment in fur farming has little future. A very large part of the 
German and other European fur farms operate today unprofitably. (...) The prices for these 
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skins [silver fox and mink] had been increasing for a short time but now the value of silver 
fox pelts has decreased so drastically that the majority of farms need to cover the cost of 
farming.”776 Good quality pelts were still sold between 150 and 200RM but this was a 
massive decrease from pre-1930s levels when they were sold for over 1000RM. Furthermore, 
it was estimated that 150RM was of the cost raising a fox and lower graded pelts fell under 
this price level. This meant that many breeders were operating at a loss.
777
  
 
The Reichszentrale sang its usual tune, blaming the various propaganda campaigns for 
fostering the speculative animal trade and creating an ‘unrealistic’ representation of the 
breeding industry.
778
 Breeders, on the other hand, increasingly held the fur industry 
responsible for the low price levels. The first auction sale of German silver fox skins 
organised by the Leipzig fur industry, in November 1931, formed the starting point of the 
conflict. Fur farmers were largely unhappy about the outcome. The crisis and low price levels 
made the relationship between the industry and fur farming associations tense. An earthquake 
struck the relationship when the Association of German Fur Breeders, the organisation of 
breeders closely affiliated to Leipzig, decided to leave the Reichszentrale. Schöps and Walter 
Krausse (a director of Friedrich  Erler & Co), the managers of the Reichszentrale, left the 
board of the Association of German Fur Breeders.
779
 Attempts by members of the research 
network like Walter Stichel to convince breeders to cooperate with the fur industry failed to 
bring the conflict to an end.
780
 Due to the rupture within the fur farming association, the 
Reichszentrale and the farms had lost one of their closest and most important allies in the 
world of farming.  
 
Instead, fur farmers organised a new association independent of the fur industry, the Sales 
Cooperative of German Fur Breeders (Fellverwertungsgenossenschaft Deutscher 
Edelpelztierzüchter). Its discourse, organisation, and practices were surprisingly redolent of 
the rabbit breeding organisation established after World War I. The cooperative and its 
techniques of self-help undermined the creation of a chain favourable to the Leipzig business. 
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First, it formed a forum against business interests in farming. In early 1932, the cooperative 
continuously blamed the fur industry for deliberately keeping prices down. A farmer from 
Langenhennersdorf noted in 1934 that the fur industry “succeeded in refining the imitation of 
furs and the sales of Germany’s farmed furs is obstructed by the imports of skins from [other] 
countries to lower production costs.”781 Second, the German fur farmers entertained a plan to 
serve foreign markets. The London market appeared to be an attractive alternative for the 
Cooperative: “in contrast to the Leipzig market, the number of silver foxes sold on the 
London market amounted to 66,000 and 55,000 items in January and February 1932 
[respectively]. During both auctions, the entire offer has been fully sold at good prices, while 
the sales in Leipzig went slow and furs were sold at very low prices.”782 Mention was made 
that the fur breeders were negotiating with foreign dealers, and the Theodor Thorer company, 
one of the founders of the Reichszentrale, would operate as the go-between. The 
Reichszentrale was infuriated by this development: “the way of dealing proposed by the 
Cooperative, sending German farm skins to London so that they are then bought again by 
German fur dealers there, who will have pay the not inconsiderable auction fees to the 
English, is a preposterous proposal.”783 If even a firm like Thorer was operating contrary to 
the interests of its own research institutions, the latter’s influence is questionable. 
 
With its loss of influence over fur farming, the research network became superfluous. In 
addition, fur firms, plagued by the economic depression, tried to lower their contribution to 
the Reichszentral. Similarly, state funding, especially that from the City Council, the Leipzig 
Chamber of Commerce, the Saxon Government, and the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, 
was severely curtailed.
784
 By 1932, it was clear that the existence of a joint research network 
was no longer desirable. Hollender and Krausse tried to transfer the institution to the Leipzig 
University, since it could no long afford to rent its location, let alone perform its basic 
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tasks.
785
 However, the university refused to house Reichszentrale within the university 
walls.
786
 The Reichszentrale thus owed its survival to a lack of interest of the university but its 
role was marginal after 1932. Attempts to push the network towards research into synthetic 
dyeing were equally ineffective. In times of crisis, no firms or public institutions were willing 
to fund the research institute.  
 
The rolling back of research funding was an international phenomenon. The Development 
Department of the Hudson’s Bay Company was also shutdown in 1932.787 A consensus within 
the firm had grown around the supposition that the company’s involvement in fur farming 
was too costly and not only because of the isolated locations required. It was reputed that the 
company had lost most of its $350,000 investment since 1926 without much visible return.
788
 
The company decided to stop its activities in traditional fox farming and henceforth followed 
a less intensive variant whereby local governments leased out large preserves of animals 
populations.  
 
Nevertheless, German fur farming continued to grow unabated, despite the economic crisis 
and the discordant relationship with the industry. In 1934, the number of fur farms had 
doubled to 2,015 farms.
789
 Therefore, the role of fur farms as a supplier to the fur industry 
continued to grow. Relations between business and farmers finally calmed when the effects of 
the crisis petered out and the Nazis started to organise the practice of fur breeding and its 
commercial exploitation. In contrast to the Weimar administration, the Nazis were 
sympathetic to the autarkic potential of small-scale animal breeding. Like many other groups 
of small animal breeders, the Reich Food Corporation (Reichsnahrstand) incorporated the fur 
farmers in an overarching institution, the Reich Professional Assocation of Fur Farmers 
(Reichsfachgruppe Pelztierzüchter).
790
 State dirigisme and the focus on self-sufficiency 
central to Nazi economic policy made farmed furs increasingly prominent at the Leipzig 
auctions. In 1935, the RAVAG noted that German products acquired a larger role in the fur 
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market: “due to the expansion of fur farming in Germany, larger deliveries for auctions are to 
be expected in the near future.”791 In 1938, the RAVAG concluded an important deal with two 
fur farming cooperatives in Berlin. The contract involved the sale of an unprecedented 
number of farmed skins, 14,000 silver fox and 25,000 mink.
792
 In turn, the RAVAG granted a 
300,000RM advance to the farmers. It was therefore the first large contract between the 
German fur industry and the farming business. The contract adequately illuminates the 
progress of the German fur farming after 1935. The auction company generally sold around 
30,000 silver fox skins and 5,000 mink skins annually in the period between 1934 and 
1936.
793
 In 1936, the RAVAG only sold 3,000 farmed fox skins in Germany but in 1938 they 
increased the number to 14,000. While firms had failed to establish Leipzig as a centre of 
expertise, fur farming was now an integral part of the economy of the Leipzig district on the 
eve of World War II.  
 
6.8 Conclusion. 
 
The development of fur farming led to collective action in the industrial district. The result 
was the foundation of the Reichszentrale, whose function it was to create networks with 
scientists and experts. The institution was not a traditional research station that worked on 
behalf of a number of firms. It was never the intention of the industry to fund a fully equipped 
research centre: rather, it was intended to profit from the formation of an epistemic 
community of scientists. The structure and geography of the network resembled the way in 
which the district participants tried to profit from local resources and endowments. The large 
majority of researchers connected to the centre came from Leipzig or university towns nearby. 
The industry profited especially from the creation of a veterinary faculty at the Leipzig 
University. Aside from the two experimental farms in Leipzig and in the Alps, the institute 
had little infrastructure other than its bureaus in Leipzig. However, it made use of the 
infrastructure of adjacent research institutions like the Zoological Institute in Tharandt.  
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However, the centre’s underlying aim, to unify the interests of university scientists, farmers, 
and industry, largely failed. Firstly, the creation of a production paradigm suffered from 
problems comparable to those described in the previous chapters. It was not a straightforward 
task to incorporate and govern new resource producers as suppliers for the industry. Similar 
tensions between resource producers and the fur industry have been also been unearthed in 
karakul farming in South West Africa and seemed endemic to fur farming. In addition, 
processes of rationalisation and professionalisation were difficult to introduce into the social 
world of breeders. Secondly, the relationship between Leipzig and several of its most 
prominent scientists was lukewarm at best. Initially, agricultural experts and the industry 
found common ground in their shared disdain for the speculative animal trade, a practice that 
endangered the stabilisation of fur farming as a resource supplier. However, in regards to 
different subjects, scientists followed rationales other than those set out by the institute and 
the industry. Several scientists refused to accommodate themselves to the desires of the 
industry. The veterinary protection of the domestic farming industry was a particular bone of 
contention.  
 
The Reichszentrale never came close to fulfilling the ambitious aim of transforming Leipzig 
into a centre of fur farming and other related activities. The main reason for this was related to 
the fact that the Leipzig institute possessed few means of accomplishing this goal. Why did 
firms not significantly increase the budget for the institute that financed research into 
agricultural research and synthetic fur dyeing? Firstly, the reluctance can be explained by the 
unattractiveness of investing in expertise and development that was remote from the 
specialised activities of their businesses. It proved difficult to transcend individual specialism 
and join an overarching project. Secondly, it is not unusual for certain innovations to be 
slowly implemented by district participants. Michael Porter has argued “that a sort of 
groupthink can suppress new ideas or create rigidities that prevent improvements.”794 So, 
whereas firms perceived the potential of fur farming relatively quickly, inertia characterised 
the further expansion of research and thus the development of fur farming. Firms and 
members of the institute lost their belief in fur farming within German borders and returned to 
the traditional perception that saw the sourcing of furs as an object of foreign trade. Thus, 
members of the Leipzig-owned experimental farm lent their support to the creation of fur 
farming in the USSR. With the revival of international trade in the late 1920s they saw no 
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harm in giving up the prospect of self-sufficiency, whichw as after all the main advantage of 
fur farming. 
 
However, comparisons have stressed that the failure to create research and development in 
Leipzig were not specific to the region. I have pointed out that it was hard for fur firms to 
generate substantial return on investments in fur farming. Even the Hudson’s Bay Company, a 
company that rested on a comparatively large infrastructure, failed to integrate fur farming 
into its business activities. In America, universities and the government monopolised 
research. Without wanting to overstretch this asymmetrical comparison, a few elements of the 
fur farming’s development in Germany should be nuanced. There was the problem of 
speculation, which delayed fur farming entering a stable pelting phase. Equally important is 
that reluctance towards investment in fur farming was not a unique feature of Leipzig but was 
to be found across German borders as well. Returns on investments were generally low. 
Moreover, there were learning costs as well. Many decisions made in the initial stage led to 
cost increases. For instance, fur firms in Leipzig and the HBC were inclined to stimulate fur 
farms in isolated places, an expensive practice. The failure to link fur farming to the world of 
business had its roots both in the traditionalism of fur businesses and the unstable basis of fur 
breeding in its early stages. In sum, the problematic relationship with farming was endemic in 
the international fur business. This has to be seen alongside the tension between the interests 
of fur breeders and the Leipzig fur industry and the equally troubled relationship between 
university scientists and industry in explaining the shortcomings of its network-based research 
and development model.  
 
Nevertheless, the examination of a small institution has shown that processes of 
scientification can take alternative shapes in the context of an industrial district. Historical 
scholarship should continue to pay attention to alternatives to the classic models of in-house 
research, formalised partnerships between business and university, and public-private 
partnerships. Many processes of innovation were set in motion as a result of network activity. 
It should be stressed that the functioning of the network was not inimical to the development 
of fur farming. On the contrary, the network was able to generate research on various aspects 
of fur farming and its members did influence the farming business in terms of animal 
management and sanitation. Nonetheless, processes of innovation in the industrial district 
were messy: they were set up relatively easily but fell into inertia just as quickly since a 
common strategy for the implementation of innovation was absent. 
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PART III: 
The Golden but  
Turbulent Twenties. 
Local Adaptation and World 
Market Restructuring. 
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7 Business as usual? The Leipzig business community and 
adaptation to world market restructuring, 1919-1925. 
 
7.1 Introduction: a new context for internationalisation.  
 
During and after World War I, the international fur industry underwent considerable 
transformations. North American markets and manufacturing centres gained more prominence 
and the formation of the Soviet Union drastically changed the parameters that governed the 
trade in Siberian furs. The position of the Leipzig fur industry in the commodity chain was 
traditionally based on its historical favourable position in the East-West transit trade. Part III 
of the thesis is entirely devoted to the impact of world market restructuring on the industrial 
district of Leipzig. What was the future of Leipzig and its SMEs in the post-war trade? How 
did firms react to the transformations in the world market? What were their effects on local 
embeddedness? As the title of this chapter indicates, it will stress patterns of continuity in 
both local arrangements and international trade. These will show how the industrial district 
carved out a future in the new trade system. However, it is also impossible to ignore 
discontinuities like the formation of new economic institutions and the spatial developments 
that characterised the international fur trade after World War I. This chapter is therefore also 
devoted to examining the changing patterns of the world market and connecting them 
systematically with the industrial district in Leipzig.   
 
One of the most radical transformations was the creation of the Soviet monopoly on foreign 
trade. The USSR state monopoly not only changed the parameters of international trade but 
also caused a process of spatial redistribution in the fur trade. In essence, its creation 
complicated the international commerce of private firms. Firstly, the firms that controlled the 
organisation of foreign trade lost their privileged access to raw materials. Secondly, the state 
monopoly limited the number of potential transactions. Russian private businesses and 
middlemen were replaced by a complex myriad of Soviet trade institutions. In particular, the 
trade delegations outside the USSR, primarily those in London (ARCOS), New York 
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(Amtorg) and Berlin (Handelsvertretung der UdSSR), controlled most exports.
795
 The Soviet 
Department of Trade determined the trade flows and controlled the currencies allocated to 
import and export.
796
 Firms thereby lost control over various stages of the commodity chain 
and were forced to adjust to this new framework.
797
 In sum, transactions no longer took place 
in a ‘free’ market system in the fairs inside and outside Russia and steered by tariffs, but were 
hosted by state agencies of various kinds and made subject to the domestic and international 
political considerations of the new communist state.  
Despite the complexity surrounding the trade monopoly, it has often been argued that 
industrialists during the early years of the Weimar republic remained oriented towards trading 
with the east. The experiences of the profitable ‘Russian trade’ (Russengeschäft) before World 
War I were central for post-war trade revival: historian Pogge von Strandmann has called this 
the “pressure of continuity.”798 However, few attempts have been made to empirically study 
firms’ strategies in the pursuit of the ‘Soviet trade,’ except for big businesses like Siemens, 
which managed to adapt their international business strategies to the framework of trade 
opportunities set out by the Soviet monopoly.
799
 The narrow focus on big business has 
emphasised the formation of international cartels and close ties between businesses and 
government to revive Soviet trade.
800
 Indeed, dealings with the Soviets seemed to favour 
increases in size. Smaller entities have far largely been neglected in the so-called Russian 
business of the 1920s and processes of internationalisation. Does the “pressure of continuity” 
also apply to district participants with a similar track record of trading in Russia? Moreover, 
what strategies did firms follow to meet the conditions set out by the Soviet monopoly and to 
profit from opportunities in the changing nature of international trade?  
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Indeed, despite the “bureaucratisation” of trade, commerce with the Soviets was certainly not 
impossible. Foreign trade, and therefore connections to trade partners, ranked high among the 
priorities of the economically troubled USSR. The monopoly was exploited in order to level 
the balance-of-payments, which was running a problematic deficit. As such, the need for 
foreign currencies was highly pressing in the USSR: this stimulated the resumption of 
exports. As a result, the Soviet export trade continued to place the obtainment of credits and 
advance payments central in foreign trade relations, just like in the tsarist era.
801
 In addition, 
the monopoly created opportunities in other ways. It was heavily contested and attempts to 
circumvent it initiated the search for alternative trade routes. The power vacuum caused by 
the civil war opened up competition in the frontier regions of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
smuggling became a widespread practice because of deficiencies and loopholes in the new 
trade system. It is important to note that fur firms oriented themselves towards both 
opportunities and the impositions of the trade monopoly. The district firms had to reinvent the 
position of Leipzig as an international market with regard to the Russian trade in between the 
loopholes and official partnerships. In addition, they had to take increased competition from 
North American business into account.  
 
In the introduction, I noted that reactions towards macroeconomic changes entailed two 
reactions in the district. On the one hand, the lead firms that acted as gatekeepers in creating 
links with between the industrial district and the outside world surfaced. On the other hand, 
the central assumption of this research is that exogenous challenges set in motion processes of 
collective action in the district. This third part of the thesis encompasses both patterns in the 
light of the changes in the commodity chain that occurred before the outbreak of the economic 
crisis in 1930. Although emphasis has been placed upon inter-firm collaboration, the 
strategies of individual firms mattered, especially in the immediate aftermath of the war when 
the global economy of furs was being restructured and the new system of trade was still 
highly unpredictable. As we saw in chapter 2, several lead firms were more active on foreign 
markets than others. Thus it has been established that several firms had the status of lead firms 
and linked the industrial district to foreign markets. The chapter will examine the actions of 
the lead firms of the industrial district in the 1920s and question their role in the re-admission 
to the world market. In addition, I will also examine the extent to which the function of lead 
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firms had ramifications on the social structure of the industrial district. The other two chapters 
of this section will then examine processes of inter-firm cooperation in the light of exogenous 
changes.  
 
The chapter is divided in two large parts. In the first part, I devote attention the changing 
parameters of international trade pertaining to the commodity chain in furs in the aftermath of 
World War I. I will pay attention to the developments in transatlantic trade, where North 
American cities and their trade institutions acquired a more prominent position. More 
profound and vital for the foreign relations of the Leipzig district were the developments in 
the trade of Siberian furs: this was characterised by the introduction of the Soviet state 
monopoly. The construction of the Soviet trade and its dealings with Leipzig firms is 
therefore highly prominent. In the second part, I will consider processes of spatial 
restructuring in the international fur trade from the point of view of Leipzig so as to acquire a 
better understanding of its international position immediately after World War I. The section 
on the new spatial dimension of the post-war fur trade is concluded with reflections on the 
embeddedness of the Leipzig fur industry and new processes of internationalisation. 
 
7.2 Emerging markets and interfering states. The transformation of the 
international fur commerce in the 1920s.  
 
7.2.1  Emerging fur industry and trade in North America.  
 
An important development in the international commerce of furs was the growing importance 
of North America, not only in commerce and manufacturing but also in terms of consumption. 
Particular cities across the Atlantic surfaced as leading manufacturing centres either before or 
during World War I, when warfare obstructed transatlantic trade with London and continental 
markets. North American cities emerged as new markets and were chiefly constructed around 
auction sales. A number of New York fur firms established the New York Fur Auction Sales 
Corporation in 1916.
802
 The foundation of the New York Fur Auction had a surprising 
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connection to the fur business in Leipzig. Many merchans of German or Jewish descent who 
were involved in the new auction house had ties to the business world in Leipzig. Saint Louis 
established itself as a centre earlier than New York: both auction centres replaced sales of 
particular types of furs in London and kept profits in America. In Canada, Montreal came to 
play an important role in terms of trade and manufacturing: it was joined by Toronto and 
Winnepeg.
803
 Montreal transformed into a prominent fur auction centre when Canadian fur 
dealers established the Canadian Fur Auction Sales Company in 1920.
804
 At the first auction, 
the company sold 949,565 pelts valued at $5,037,114.
805
  
 
The development of new buying structures across the Atlantic meant heavy competition for 
London as a market for international furs. Before World War I, London dominated the 
organisation of Canadian fur sales. Of the $5,100,000 of undressed furs destined for the USA 
and Great Britain, $3,000,000 went to the latter. Between 1915 and 1930, most of the shipped 
Canadian raw furs were sent to the United States. At that time, 20 to 40% of the Canadian fur 
exports went to Great Britain on average.
806
 Particularly revealing are the Canadian export 
figures of 1923: the British market absorbed $4,473,968 of the $16,206,225 total while the 
American merchants purchased most of the rest.
807
 
 
However, London’s role as a staple centre of North American furs was not yet over. The loss 
of market share because of the war had sharpened the collective identity of British firms in the 
fur industry, particularly so in London. After the conflict, firms there founded institutions to 
safeguard the interests of London as a primary fur market. In 1919, the London Fur Trade 
Association was established and it was followed by the nationwide British Fur Trade Alliance 
in 1924. Both these bodies united the majority of employers and lobbied for matters relating 
to trade and labour.
808
 In the long run, the market share of London was gradually restored and 
balanced with North American markets. In the early 1930s, the London market once again 
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dominated the trade of Canadian undressed furs. Between 1932 and 1934, London’s share in 
the sale of Canadian raw furs fluctuated at around 64%.
809
 Nevertheless, the commodity chain 
in American furs had changed: it was increasingly characterised by prominent new markets, 
foremost New York and Montreal. 
 
7.2.2  The creation of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly in the fur trade (1921-
1925).  
 
In the commodity chain of Siberian furs, changes were more far-reaching. On 22 April 1918, 
Lenin’s decree “On the Nationalisation of Foreign Trade” began an earthquake in the 
international trade. It stipulated that foreign trade was to be conducted by official institutions 
of the Soviet Union. Therefore, foreign firms that imported or traded with the Soviet Union 
were forced to deal with the state agencies that replaced Russian traders and foreign firms.
810
 
The monopolisation of trade by the state theoretically ended the privileged access of foreign 
firms to fur resources and the organisation of exports. In practice, however, the monopoly of 
foreign trade remained dead letter, at least until 1923. It was difficult to establish a state 
monopoly in Russia for numerous reasons. Firstly, exigencies complicated the drastic 
transformation of economic organisation. The Russian economy had already suffered heavily 
from the loss of sales markets during the war and the trade deficit had deepened rapidly.
811
 
The civil war and the accompanying system of war communism further ravaged the economy. 
 
Secondly, there was the refusal in the capitalist world to acknowledge the victory of 
communism in Russia. Trade relations normalised slightly when the Soviets signed a 
temporary trade agreement, negotiated by Leonid Krasin, with Great Britain in 1921. As a 
result, the Soviets established a trade delegation in London, the All Russian Cooperative 
Society (ARCOS).
812
 Although the temporary agreement signified both a commercial and 
diplomatic breakthrough, it failed to produce a ratchet effect on the USSR’s foreign trade. 
Western businesses and government representatives remained highly sceptical of the Soviet 
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experiment. Trade relations further ‘normalised’ in favour of the Soviets in the wake of the 
failure of the Genoa conference in 1922. The Soviets and the Germans signed a separate 
agreement in Rapallo as an alternative to Genoa: this further disrupted attempts to adopt a 
unified trade policy towards the Soviet Union and opened the door for international 
competition over the export of Russian commodities.
813
 
 
For the USSR, the trade monopoly and the search for foreign trade partners were of crucial 
importance since foreign trade was paramount for economic recovery. The idea was to 
stimulate the export business in order to gain the currency necessary to import the machinery 
and goods needed for the construction of an industrial infrastructure.
814
 Illustrative are the 
plans made by officials of Gosplan for yearly exports in the early twenties. Lacking 
alternatives, the schemes centered on a surge in the export of agricultural commodities and 
resources. However, due to the assault on ‘kulak’ landownership, grain production slowed and 
failed to meet the export quotas designed by Soviet planners. However, the share of oil 
products, flax, and furs in the structure of trade increased spectacularly, largely because 
underachievement in the production of agricultural commodities. Due to these factors, the fur 
trade acquired a prominent position within the overall trade structure. In fact, furs came to 
serve as one of the strategic pillars of the Soviet foreign trade in the 1920s, creating a relative 
export value that floated around 10% (see figure 1). The strategic role of furs (and not only 
during the NEP) in the economic consolidation of the Soviet Union is largely overlooked in 
Soviet economic history. 
 
 
Total export 
 (in 1,000 roubles) 
Furs export 
 (in 1,000 roubles)  
Furs relative to total 
export  
 
1913 5,297,822 22,597 0.43% 
1921/22 221,120 7,709 3.49% 
1922/23 466,527 17,702 3.79% 
1923/24 1,300,458 64,621 4.97% 
1924/25 2,013,555 234,600 11.65% 
1925/26 2,450,924 241,493 9.85% 
Table 7-1: USSR export value of furs (1921-1926)815 
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The comeback of furs as a revenue pump in the economic transition of the early Soviet Union 
was uncannily redolent of pre-Petrine times, when they had been one of the key commodities 
of the Muscovite tsardom. Furs had lost their strategic value in the long interlude. Whereas 
export of furs before 1914 represented no more than 1%, the Gosplan gave the Russian fur 
trade a larger role after 1921: it accounted for up to 5.5% of the Soviet Union’s predicted 
exports. Indeed, between 1923 and 1927, the Russian fur trade exceeded the prospects set out 
by Gosplan as it contributed an astonishing 10.7% of the actual exports on average. At that 
time, only grain exports exceeded the value of furs.
816
 The strategic value of furs is an aspect 
to keep in mind while considering the position of Leipzig in the interwar international fur 
business. The Soviet Union needed foreign sales markets for this strategic resource. This 
created both opportunities and pitfalls for foreign firms.  
 
How did furs become so important to the Soviets? Firstly, the strategic importance was owned 
to the comparatively rapid resumption of fur procurement. Expressed in quantities, Soviet fur 
exports had already reached 70% of pre-war levels in the 1922-23 season, whereas fur 
procurement was only at 28% in 1921.
817
 In comparison, foreign trade in its totality only 
reached 38% of pre-war levels in 1926. The gap in fur procurement between 1912 and 1924 
narrowed because of the ending of the civil war: Siberia had been one of the central stages of 
the fighting. Secondly, it is possible that the standstill in the Russian fur trade during the war 
reversed the exhaustion of wildlife in the Siberian woodlands. Unfortunately, this interesting 
environmental dimension cannot be pursued here due to the lack of source material. In any 
case, the resumption of fur procurement once again came at the expense of wildlife. The 
priority given to the export plans overruled the implementation of environmental regulations 
and the desire to create a sustainable fur trade in several Soviet economic circles.
818
 In 1924 
and 1925, reports warned about the serious depletion of fur-bearing animals.
819
 The 10% 
export level reached at that time was therefore an almost absolute boundary imposed by 
ecology. Thirdly and finally, the Soviets profited from price upswings determined by the 
world market, which largely had their source in the growing demand for furs in the USA. 
Pelts attained prices on the post-war market that were, on average, 259.9 % higher than in 
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1913.
820
 These were the three defining features that made the fur trade paramount within the 
Soviet monopoly.  
 
7.2.3 The foreign markets for Siberian furs, 1921-1925.  
 
Who were the main partners of the new Soviet fur monopoly in furs? Initially, the Soviet 
government saw Great Britain as its main trade partner, a tendency evinced by the bilateral 
trade agreement and the establishment of the London trade agency ARCOS in 1921. Great 
Britain therefore emerged as the principal costumer of Russian fur exports in the first half of 
the 1920s, as can be clearly seen in table 2.
821
 Germany took a secondary role, with import 
levels that were much lower than the years leading up to World War I when German traders 
imported averagely between 60 to 80% of Russian furs. The efforts of Leipzig firms to re-
enter the Russian business, which will be discussed later, only yielded a modest result. The 
exception was the 1922-23 season when Germany attracted 30% of the Soviet exports. Thus, 
as table 2 demonstrats, London temporarily turned into the main trade hub for Siberian furs. 
 
 To Germany To Great Britain To the USA 
Year In 1,000 
roubles 
% of fur 
exp. value 
In 1,000 
roubles 
% of fur exp. value In 1,000 
roubles 
% of fur 
exp. value 
1921/22 0 0% 742 10% 0 0% 
1922/23 5,252 30% 1,917 11% 655 4% 
1923/24 12,459 19% 20,928 32% 16,174 25% 
1924/25 29,156 12% 12,1261 52% 53,747 23% 
1925/26 42,320 18% 10,9042 45% 41,246 17% 
Table 7-2: Soviet fur exports to Germany, Great Britain, and the US822 
 
These observations on the fur trade dovetail with Soviet-German economic relationships in 
the interwar period, which were only restored systematically in the second half of the 1920s. 
Initially, the Rapallo treaty between Germany and the USSR, which involved the most 
favoured nation principle, led to heightened economic activity in 1923 between the two 
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countries.
823
 However, economic and political relationships reversed during the next few 
years. Firstly, after the withdrawal of Belgium-French troops from the Rhine area, Germany 
followed a course of reconciliation with Western powers that deprioritised efforts centred on 
the Soviet trade. In addition, other countries also established trade relations with the Soviets 
out of fear that Germany would dominate trade with the USSR.
824
 Second, German relations 
with the Soviet Union were not good, despite the rapprochement in Rapallo. Germany refused 
to grant the Soviet trade agency in Berlin (established in 1921) extraterritorial rights. A police 
raid on the agency in 1924 (it was accused of financing communist activities) and Soviet 
support for German communist uprisings further disrupted trade relations between the two.
825
 
Furthermore, domestic developments in the Weimar republic, inflation in particular, had 
soured the reputation and position of German traders in international trade.
826
 Imports were 
more expensive due to the inflation and had a ratchet effect on the export of manufactured 
furs.
827
 
 
The result of these developments was that the British market became the principal supplier for 
the German fur trade. Particularly in the early 1920s, the prominent position of Britain (which 
it probably owed to the export of Russian furs) is clearly visible (see figures 1 and 2). Despite 
a decrease in Canadian furs, the British trade acquired a prominent position in the Soviet fur 
business in the first half of the 1920s.  
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Figure 7-1: Suppliers of raw fur to Germany (1920-1925) in tons. 828 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Suppliers of raw furs to Germany in millions of marks. 
 
However, the graphs above reveal that the leading position of Great Britain was maintained 
only for a short period of time. The trade statistics of Germany reveal a continuing preference 
for trading with the Soviet Union, which manifested itself strongly in the second half of the 
1920s. In terms of quantity, Great Britain became the largest supplier. However, in terms of 
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value, Siberian furs represented a larger share after 1925. This suggested that raw furs from 
Siberian formed a relatively large share of imports to Germany in the second half of the 
1920s. Thus, after 1925, the Soviet Union was the main provider of furs for Germany, 
especially in terms of value. Indeed, after the treaty of Berlin between the USSR and 
Germany in 1926, the commercial intentions of the Rapallo treaty were finally put into 
practice. With a subsequent credit arrangement of 300,000,000RM for exports, bilateral trade 
flows significantly improved. Consequently, fur exports to Germany followed the same 
upward trend.  
 
The framework sketched out above allows us to examine the actions and strategies of 
individual fur businesses during this time. From the trade figures analysed, we have learnt that 
the German fur trade was progressively restored in the 1920s and that the Soviet fur trade 
assumed in an ever-increasing role in this comeback.
829
 International political economy 
established the framework for trade but how did businesses adapt to the new framework? In 
the first place, we are interested in trade networks with the east. Given the position of Leipzig 
in the pre-war Russian fur trade and the resumption of the Soviet-German fur trade after 1925, 
it is reasonable to expect a similar orientation and “pressures of continuity.”830 Indeed, 
prominent actors of the fur cluster had high hopes for the ‘Russian trade’ in the reconstruction 
of Leipzig’s fur market. The Leipzig Fur Merchants Association, the most important one in 
the city, stated in one of its 1921 general meetings that “if the Leipzig traders serve 
themselves from the old sources in Russia, pay for large quantities of Russian and Siberian 
staple goods in marks, and bring them to Leipzig to be manufactured again and exported, only 
then Leipzig will fully regain its old place in the world trade of furs.”831 The idea that Leipzig 
should link up to the Russian trade was prevalent among businessmen. The next section will 
study the international orientation of the Leipzig fur firms, paying particular attention to the 
‘old ties’ with the Russian market. 
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7.2.4 On fur firms and the trade monopoly: An inquiry into old friendships and the 
‘nationality’ advantage (1920-1925). 
 
This section will analyse the way in which Leipzig firms were able to reconnect with the 
Soviet foreign trade institutions. First of all, a certain ‘pressure of continuity’ will be 
described at the level of individual firms: the firms that were able to re-create bilateral 
contacts with the Soviet state agencies had already played a leading role in the Russian fur 
business prior to World War I. It should of course be noted that the Soviet trade monopoly 
was a source for inter-firm cooperation in the industrial district. The next chapter is devoted to 
that topic: here, we restrict ourselves to the initial stages of the monopoly and the actions of 
individual firms. Amongst the most prominent businesses active in the Soviet fur trade were 
the businesses created around the Eitingon, Biedermann, Thorer, and Ariowitsch families. 
Indeed, the trade conditions of the monopoly (bigger contracts and payment in advance) 
favoured larger businesses. However, the degree of continuity was not solely based on the 
size of the firm. As I will try to demonstrate, networks and connections, often based on pre-
war business contacts in the Soviet Union, played a more prominent role as a pattern of 
continuity than has been hitherto assumed.  
 
The Eitingon firm in particular had good connections with the London ARCOS export agency 
that exported approximately 70% of the furs procured in the Soviet Union between 1920 and 
1923. The first fur contract issued by the ARCOS was granted to the ‘Eitingon-Schild 
holding,’ for the sum of $1,750,000.832 The value of this contract cannot be underestimated: it 
was the first million dollar deal between the Soviets and a western firm and was heralded as a 
breakthrough in international fur commerce. However, the ARCOS deal also reveals a 
‘locational’ power shift within the Eitingon firm. The deal with the Soviets coincided with the 
ascent of Matwey Isakovitsch Eitingon, nephew and son-in-law of the founder Chaim 
Eitingon, in New York. After the war, Matwey Eitingon returned from Moscow to the US to 
work in the New York branch led by Waldemar Eitingon, the oldest son of Chaim.
833
 When 
Waldemar died in June 1920, the leadership of the New York business was taken over by the 
ambitious Matwey, who preferred to call himself “Motty,” a less Russian sounding name for 
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American ears.
834
 It was through his personal networks in Moscow that Motty Eitingon won 
the first contract in Siberian furs issued by ARCOS. In addition, Monya Eitingon, a cousin of 
Motty and his former trustee in the Moscow branch, became the head of the important 
London branch.
835
 With Motty as director of the New York branch and mastermind behind the 
first Soviet fur contract, the centre of power in the Eitingon family moved from Leipzig to 
New York.
836
 I will come back later to what this shift meant for the embeddedness of the 
Eitingon firm in Leipzig. Let us first concentrate on the dealings of fur firms with the Soviet 
trade agencies where personal networks played a prominent part. 
 
Motty Eitingon’s fur deals with the Soviets show a rather unexpected continuity on the 
personal level. It is well known that the USSR incorporated a large group of former private 
entrepreneurs, traders, manufacturers and artisans, in order to speed up the process of 
economic recovery in the context of the NEP.
837
 The historian Alan Ball described these 
businessmen and traders as “NEPmen” or, more thoughtfully, as “Russia’s last capitalists” 
(since his book on the NEPmen was published before the collapse of the USSR, he could not 
have known about how inaccurate such a claim ultimately turned out to be). These NEPmen 
were tolerated by the Soviet authorities so that they could conduct trade and business in a 
semi-private fashion while their businesses were integrated into trusts or subordinated to state 
agencies.
838
 They also played a leading role in trade agencies and foreign commerce as the 
need to set up export trade (foreign trade was seminal in economic recovery) forced the 
Soviets to make use of the expertise of private businessmen. Lenin, for one, realised that the 
Foreign Trade Commissariat was inefficient because of its inexperienced personnel.
839
 
Persons with important business functions before the war therefore reappeared both in the 
lower and higher echelons of the USSR’s trade organisation. For instance, both Leonid 
Krasin, the minister of foreign trade after 1920, and Boris Stomoniakov, the leader of the 
Soviet delegation in Berlin, were former employees of the Siemens-Schuckert company in 
                                                 
834
 Mary-Kay Wilmers, The Eitingons: A Twentieth Century Story (Place? Verso Books, 2012). When the 
Moscow branch was liquidated in 1917, Motty Eitingon refused to leave Russia. In 1918, the Bolsheviks locked 
him into the ‘Butaika,’ the public prison of Moscow. Only after paying half a million roubles was he released. In 
terms of his name, he is referred to as Motty Eitingon in almost all correspondence, so we will henceforth do the 
same. 
835
 Ibid. The London house was named after the famous house in Moscow “The Moscow Fur Trading 
Company”. 
836
 StA-L, Deutsche Bank, Filiale Leipzig 21017, nr. 309. Filiale Leipzig an Deutsche Bank Filialbüro: 
05.06.1920 
837
 Alan M. Ball,  ussia’s Last  apitalists: T e Nep en, 1921-1929 ( University of California Press, 1990), xvi. 
838
 Alan Ball, “Building a New State and Society: NEP, 1921-1928.,” in The Cambridge History of Russia. The 
Twentieth Century., ed. Ronald Suny, vol. 3 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2006), 169. 
839
 Quigley, The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly; Institutions and Laws, 30. 
Business as usual? 
255 
 
Germany and Moscow.
840
 By the same token, former private fur dealers were integrated into 
the state agencies that ran the fur trade, especially since furs played a prominent role in Soviet 
foreign commerce. 
 
A systematic account on NEPmen in the Soviet fur trade is unfortunately not available but 
several sources do affirm their infiltration of the new economic institutions. Their presence is 
to be found at every link in the fur chain: NEPmen acted as hunters, the middlemen of 
procurement agencies, and agents in foreign trade bureaus. According to Douglas Weiner, the 
implementation of hunting regulations in the USSR was heavily obstructed by “formerly 
independent fur traders and middlemen who brought not only their expertise but also their 
ethics to their Soviet positions.”841 Western fur dealers also described the infiltration of 
NEPmen in the Soviet agencies, often without revealing their names or the institutions they 
worked for. The Russian commissioner who organised the abovementioned contract between 
Eitingon and the Soviets in London was said to be a “former Siberian agent of the Eitingon 
corporation.”842 Eitingon had friends in higher places as well. Alexander Tyranovskii, a tsarist 
fur dealer and acquaintance of Motty, became the leader of one of the Soviet state agencies 
that procured furs.
843
  
 
Continuity in the Siberian trade meant the continuity of old friendships and personal business 
relations. The personal connections with ARCOS in London gave Motty Eitingon a 
tremendous competitive advantage and it formed the basis for subsequent contracts. In 1923, 
another large share of the Russian raw fur export through London was transferred to Eitingon 
Schild & Co. The new contract involved the Eitigons paying $3,000,000 to ARCOS. The 
Deutsche Bank in Leipzig, an important creditor for the Leipzig fur industry, noted in 1923 
that “this contract caused a sensation in the fur trade because the already powerful position of 
Eitingon is further strengthened and the outlook of their situation is the most promising 
because of their connection to ARCOS.”844  
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Another very specific advantage in the early Soviet business, and in international trade more 
generally, was based on advantages derived from citizenship: many Leipzig entrepreneurs 
with a migration background profited from this. The Eitingons, originating from Skhlov in 
Belarus, could travel more freely than their German counterparts in a world that was still 
inhospitable towards former enemies. Motty and Chaim travelled with their Russian passports 
after the war.
845
 It is important to note that Russian Jews profited from their citizenship in 
another remarkable way. Despite a military law that ordered citizens of enemy nationalities to 
leave the city of Leipzig, the law was never strictly enforced against those of vital economic 
importance. In other words, Russian fur traders were allowed to stay in Leipzig throughout 
the war.
846
 In addition, a special law in Leipzig prevented their possessions from being seen as 
enemy assets. Clearly, the local government was aware that strict implementation of the laws 
against enemy citizens would severely damage local business.  
 
The Russian Jewish entrepreneur David Biedermann profited from the same nationality 
advantage. Biedermann was one of the few fur firms with connections to Leipzig that simply 
continued the Russian business during the war. When the war broke out, most of the firm’s 
goods were still stockpiled in Russia but, unlike the Eitingons’ Russian belongings, they were 
not sequestered. David Biedermann was therefore able to sell this stock in Britain and 
America. Furthermore, Biedermann’s brother, residing on the other side of the eastern front, 
continued trading activities and visited the fairs in Nizhnii Novgorod on behalf of the 
Biedermann firm.
847
 Profits reached 1,000,000 roubles in the fur business and 1,400,000 
roubles in the wool and animal hair trade between 1914 and 1917.
848
 Many of Biedermann’s 
factories and trade posts in in Manchuria and Mongolia remained operational long after the 
war. Biedermann’s representatives continued to launch caravans into central Asia to barter for 
furs with local tribes. In the Far East trade, it was said that “Biedermann dominated the fur 
trade conducted at the Russian-Chinese border and even the Eitingon Schild concern remains 
of secondary importance over there.”849 This system remained operational until 1924. 
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While many entrepreneurs with a Russian Jewish background escaped the restrictions 
imposed upon German citizens and therefore resumed trade much earlier, German fur firms 
were able to strike similar deals with the USSR at the beginning of the 1920s. In 1922, Arndt 
Thorer purchased furs first hand in the Soviet Union, mainly the skins of karakul and 
astrakhan sheep in which his firm specialised.
850
 In 1923, Thorer’s quota of imported 
sheepskins grew from 185,000 to 205,000, thereby reaching pre-war import levels.
851
 With 
the dyeing factory running at full speed again, Arndt Thorer and Paul Hollender resumed 
serving customers in Italy, France, and the US: thus Thorer regained his status as a leading 
firm in this market sector.
852
  
 
Inside the Thorer business, they were aware of the importance of the “personal continuity” in 
the organisation of Soviet fur sales. Arndt Thorer mentioned in 1921 that “according to our 
information in Moscow, the Soviets established a consortium that consists mostly of former 
fur traders, who managed to get a concession from the government to procure furs in Northern 
Europe, Siberia, and later also from Central Asia.”853 The Thorer firm easily established 
connections with the new trade institutions crowded with former Russian fur dealers. Thorer 
reported on one of Hollender’s first journeys in 1923: “the travel of Herr Hollender to Russia 
in the summer of 1923 was accompanied by good fortune, because significant quantities of 
karakuls could be acquired at first hand. The transactions with the Russian authorities and the 
semi state-owned organisations in Moscow were carried out very smoothly and much to my 
satisfaction.”854  
 
The connections between other firms and Soviet foreign trade agencies largely followed the 
same pattern. The Ariowitsch firm in Leipzig, for instance, resumed trade with the Russians 
during the early 1920s in roughly the same conditions. It was said that this firm profited from 
associations with NEPmen as well: “Ariowitsch (...) has the best possible dealings with 
Moscow (...) and a former employee of the Ariowitsch branch in Moscow has now been 
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appointed in the Soviet fur trade.”855 Owing to the family fortune, the Ariowitsch firm was 
able to finance the large contracts almost entirely out of its own means. In 1926, it was 
“making the largest business on the Brühl after the Eitingon family.”856  
 
Unfortunately, my analysis is limited to these larger leading firms due to the lack of sources. 
This is not to say that no other German companies on the Brühl benefited from personal 
connections: however, Eitingon, Theodor Thorer; David Biedermann, and J. Ariowitsch 
certainly emerged as leading firms in the Russian trade. To an even greater extent than before 
1914, those firms had developed into lead firms in the sense of connecting the Leipzig district 
to the outside world. As mentioned above, these entrepreneurs continued to profit from pre-
existing networks, as many of the personal connections were transplanted into the Soviet state 
monopoly. In the final part of this chapter, I will come back to the internationalisation these 
firms were involved in and what this meant for the size distribution of the industrial district 
and local embeddedness. The activity of lead firms as gatekeepers to international trade seems 
to be at odds with their embeddedness in local activities. Certainly, for firms like Chaim 
Eitingon, which underwent significant internal restructuring at the same time as it achieved 
success in the Soviet business, it was not clear whether the association with the Soviet trade 
was beneficial to the industrial district as a whole or if the Eitingons profited from being a 
multinational family firm. We will come back to this dilemma later.  Having established the 
impact of the shifting parameters of trade, I will now examine the position of Leipzig in the 
changing geography of international trade.  
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7.3 Contested trade spaces: Leipzig as an international fur centre, 1918-
1924.  
 
7.3.1 Frontier competition: Pacific currents in the Siberian fur trade 
 
The Russian revolution and the subsequent civil war were the harbingers of new spatial 
dimensions in the international fur trade. Throughout the 1920s, new geographical dynamics, 
alongside changing trade parameters, generally affected the international fur industry and the 
position of industrial district of Leipzig on the historical East-West trade routes. Such routes 
were blocked and it was uncertain whether they would reopen. After the revolution in 1917, 
furthermore, the easternmost parts of the Russian empire turned into one of the main theatres 
of the civil war and Allied troops controlled the region’s main harbour Vladivostok until 
1922.
857
 The Soviets lost control over resources in these regions because of the intrusion of 
allied armies and the foreign capital and business interests following in their wake.
858
 The 
monopoly was challenged by the penetration of firms that profited from the chaos of the civil 
war and the general economic disorganisation. 
 
Foreign business intrusion was particularly well developed in the Russia’s Far East and 
Western Siberia, where British and American business threatened to dominate the fur trade 
that ran historically across the Urals. The post-war turmoil provided British firms in particular 
the opportunity to increase their hitherto minimal role in the Siberian and Far Eastern trade at 
the expense of the Germans.
859
 The Hudson’s Bay Company seized the opportunity to take 
over the largely abandoned trade infrastructure. Its fur trading operations in Russia were 
redolent of the way in which the company ran its business in Canada as an imperial entity. 
Firstly, the company rapidly installed a series of trade posts along the coast of Kamchatka, 
often by contracting locals as intermediaries. Like in North America, these posts functioned as 
collection centres for furs. The majority of these coastal posts were to be found at the side of 
Kamchatka bordering the Bering Sea, within reach of the Vancouver harbour. In the 
Oliutorskii district, the small port town of Anadyr (Novo-Mariensk) functioned as the 
headquarters. Secondly, fur procurement followed the logic of barter. Since the civil war 
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prevented provisioning the Russian Far East and Western Siberia, the company shipped in 
supplies directly from Vancouver during the warm season in exchange for furs from Russian 
and native middlemen (the company did not deploy its own staff in Russia).
860
 The supply 
ship brought back furs to Canada. This was significantly different to the old historical routes 
that had used trade fairs to dispatch resources to Europe and European Russia.  
 
The looming threat to German trade interests from a Pacific alternative in the Siberian fur 
trade expired once the Soviets reconquered the Far East. The HBC tried to save their position 
by concluding procurement deals with the Soviets but the company seriously underestimated 
the hostile attitude towards foreign intrusion that held sway over communist Russia.
861
 
Although the HBC and the Soviet agency Vneshtorg concluded a deal, local Soviet customs 
offices complicated trade with unexpected taxes and duties. In April 1924, local governments 
further stirred up hostility towards the British fur company with a press campaign against the 
foreign monopoly: as a consequence, the company’s assets in Petropavlovsk and other posts 
were arrested.
862
 Business came to a complete standstill and the Kamchatka business went 
into liquidation. 
 
The intrusion of British-Canadian business interests in the Russian fur trade, which lasted 
until the summer of 1924, was a threatening development for Leipzig. Instead of utilising 
markets that linked Leipzig in Irkutsk, Nizhnii Novgorod and Moscow, the HBC attempted to 
transform the Siberian commodity chain into a transpacific flow that went through Vancouver 
into North America. German businesses were relatively powerless in this post-war re-
territorialisation process. The Leipzig fur industry was not in a position to set up trade 
infrastructure in the remote areas of Soviet Russia. Several German firm consortia in other 
sectors, like the cotton industry, did attempt to obtain resource concessions.
863
 However, 
comparable endeavours were absent from the fur industry, probably because large-scale 
exploitation structures fell outside their expertise and means. Instead, fur firms had no choice 
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but to forge connections with the state institutions of the Soviet monopoly. The stabilisation 
of the Soviet Union offered more opportunities for Leipzig as a centre in the trade. Once the 
British left Siberia, the availability of intelligence and market information in Leipzig was a 
considerable advantage.  
 
7.3.2 Leipzig as a gateway to the East?  
 
Information and intelligence were of strategic importance in the fur business of the 1920s. In 
contrast to the trade under the Romanovs that had been organised by foreign merchants, only 
scant information was available on procurement in Siberia and the size and composition of 
future yields. Due the elimination of foreign firms in the Soviet Union, Siberia was a blind 
spot on the maps of Western businesses. Nonetheless, since the fur trade was still a highly 
speculative business, the need to have an overview of Siberian production was a necessity. An 
important development that supported the German-Leipzig fur industry was marked by the 
restoration of consular representation in the USSR. The German consulate in Novosibirisk 
(the former Novonikolaievsk) re-opened in 1923 and became an important institution for trade 
information.
864
 Headed by consul-general Georg Wilhelm Grosskopf, it was one of the first 
foreign consulates to re-open in the USSR, and certainly in Siberia. Diplomats replaced, albeit 
to a lesser extent, the traders and German middlemen who had delivered insights about trade 
developments prior to World War I. 
 
The reports of the Siberian consulate provided key information on Soviet fur procurement and 
business opportunities. Firstly, the Germans gained a precise insight into the drop in the 
absolute number of fur exports. The German Fur Trade Association in Leipzig positively 
received the reports drafted by consul Grosskopf in Novosibirsk: “if every German 
representative conveyed such good and well oriented reports as consul Grosskopf, then the 
German export trade and industry would have a safe guide to evaluate foreign markets and 
also a valuable aid in the extremely severe competition.”865 Reports were often published by 
subsidised newspapers like the Ostexpress and the Ostwirtschaft, the latter of which existed 
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between 1911 and 1944.
866
 These newspapers depended upon novel sources of newsgathering 
like consular reports. Yet investigations into the Siberian fur market were not a 
straightforward enterprise and the Soviets disliked the consulate’s reports gaining publicity. 
Grosskopf reported to Berlin: “I beg you to ensure that the reports are treated confidentially: 
they are certainly not to be published in the Ostwirtschaft, as occurred before. Because of the 
publication of these reports, damage has been done to the consulate, which up until now has 
been difficult to remedy.”867 Foreign consulates and their information-gathering diplomats 
were carefully monitored by the Soviet secret police.
868
 The impact of information structures 
and newsgathering on the political economy of the early twentieth century should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, as has recently been demonstrated, the involvement of global 
newsgathering was one of the principal elements of German globalisation that survived World 
War I and continued to render political and economic advantages.
869
  
 
The activities of the consulate were wider than just describing the situation in Siberia. In 
making thorough analyses, the consulate paid attention to loopholes in the Soviet procurement 
system, making clear to the business world that the Soviet trade monopoly was largely a 
utopian ideal. By revealing the loopholes in the system, business opportunities surfaced. 
Despite the comparatively efficient resumption of procurement in Siberia, the consulate made 
clear that several districts were unable to meet the export quotas. In the Altai region of Siberia 
in 1926, hunters apparently were only able to deliver 50% of the Moscow production quotas. 
The orders placed by Tsentrosoiuz on the district Enissei were lowered by 33% at the 
instruction of the Siberian institution Sibkraisoiuz a few months later.
870
 Furthermore, since 
the Soviet agencies paid low prices for their furs, there was the suspicion that hunters were 
holding back a significant part of the harvest.  
 
Widespread smuggling in the long border areas caused another deficiency in the trade 
monopoly. The Uriankha region close to Mongolia exemplified the lack of control over the 
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geographically dispersed fur trade. Despite Soviet political and economic supremacy, the fur 
trade was not able to secure a significant share of the production in the Uriankha area because 
“since autumn 1925, the Soviets had established a subsidiary of the Russian state bank in the 
capital city Krasnoje [capital city of the Uriankha area]. Yet only 8% went to the Russians. 
(...) the Russian state trade is therefore making frantic efforts to secure this valuable area and 
to oust Chinese traders from the area.”871 In particular, the reports made clear that the long 
border between the Soviet Union and China was an invitation for smuggling. 
 
Deficiencies in the economic organisation of the Soviet Union created new dynamics in the 
international fur business. The consulate rightly foresaw the growing importance of China in 
the legal and illegal transit trade of Siberian furs.
872
 Indeed, throughout the 1920s, many 
international fur dealers opened branches in Manchuria and in the city of Harbin, close to the 
smuggling areas. Harbin was not just a depot in the illegal fur trade: the border south of 
Siberia was inhabited by valuable fur bearing animals like the expensive and rare sable and 
the mid-priced solongoi and foxes. Jewish refugees who had fled Russia after the revolution 
and settled in China organised this irregular commerce in furs. Besides Harbin, Jewish traders 
settled in the city of Taijin, which exerted a similar function in the irregular commerce in furs. 
Over 100 Jewish fur firms were domiciled in this city.
873
  
 
Firms sent agents en masse to China, many of them from Leipzig. Ariowitsch and Bromberg 
in particular participated in a Chinese division, the Siberian Fur Trading company: they 
jointly invested 2,000,000 RM.
874
 As mentioned above, Biedermann remained active in this 
border zone. It may come as no surprise that Eitingon opened a subsidiary office in China 
during the 1920s. A report of Martin Lentschner, the German manager of the Eitingon-Schild 
corporation and an expert on the Soviet trade, reported on smuggling in 1924: “I do not want 
to leave unmentioned that the smuggling trade is lively this year. Especially at the Chinese 
and Mongolian border, but also at the Finnish, Latvian, and Polish borders, one finds a 
flourishing smuggling trade where traders are willing to pay higher prices for the furs [than 
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Soviet agencies]. Similar things are happening during the procurement season in Bukhara.”875 
The area bordering China “where procurements are virtually non-existent and where the 
hunters mainly sell their furs to Chinese smugglers” remained a loophole in the Soviet fur 
trade well into the late 1920s.
876
 The trade in Siberian furs was thus more international than 
official channels would lead us to believe. Intelligence became highly important if one wanted 
to profit from such international dynamics.  
 
High quality information and business connections with the trade monopoly fortified 
Leipzig’s position in more ways than just informing companies as to the availability of 
opportunities. They also strengthened Leipzig as a centre of trade with the east. This can be 
seen in the fact that several foreign companies decided to re-establish a presence in Saxony’s 
commercial hub. As early as March 1921, the Hudson’s Bay Company appointed the German-
Russian trader Sascha Hopfenkopf, a former agent of the British auction company A&W 
Nesbitt in Moscow, as a correspondent in Leipzig. Representation on the Brühl was required 
in order to keep up with the market in Soviet furs. Hopfenkopf was charged with the task of 
“keeping in touch with the developments of the Russian fur trade and proceed to Moscow if 
and when circumstances allowed.”877 In addition, he was allowed to conduct consignment 
trade, possessing a budget of £100,000.  
 
Hopfenkopf was part of a wider network of informants in manufacturing cities: 
correspondents were also appointed in Paris, Vienna, and New York.
 878
 Nevertheless, Leipzig 
was considered to be especially interesting because of its international dimension, particularly 
the links with the Siberian fur trade: “The services of the Leipzig correspondent were retained 
not merely for the present duty of reporting on the Leipzig market but also to secure the 
benefit of his experience in regard to Russian furs, and with a view of using his services in 
connection with the development of Russian business when that becomes feasible.”879 
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Hopfenkopf stayed despite the malaise on the Leipzig market caused by monetary instability 
between 1923 and 1924. The HBC refused to withdraw him and stated that representation in 
Leipzig had become indispensible since “Leipzig had become far too important a fur trade 
centre.”880 Once trade with the Soviets expanded, many more firms followed. Frederik Huth 
& Co, heirs of the German immigrant Frederik Huth who had opened a merchant bank in 
London in 1809 and were active in the fur trade from 1912, opened a branch in Leipzig in 
1927. The Dresdner Bank estimated the capital basis of Huth’s division in Leipzig to amount 
to £500,000.
881
 The renewed interest of several major international fur firms in settling in 
Leipzig reveals that the city still played an important role in the international trade.  
 
7.4 Internationalisation and embeddedness. 
 
It is clear that internationalisation remained a defining feature of the fur trade in the 1920s. 
Firms in Leipzig resumed activities on the international stage relatively early. Businesses 
made connections to the Soviet Union, there were new promising trade junctions in China, 
and trade with London was on the rise. Experiencing various degrees of success, Leipzig 
firms continued to be active in the Soviet Union and in China’s new growth markets. 
Furthermore, New York was an attractive market, one that Leipzig firms could no longer 
ignore. A few foreign firms reappeared in Leipzig because of new trade connections and the 
availability of information about the Soviet market.  
 
While foreign trade was one of the pillars of the success of the industrial district prior to 
World War I, it is questionable whether the industrial district benefited from patterns of 
internationalisation pursued by individual firms. In this period of time, the entire German fur 
trade was at a low ebb. Exports and imports had stabilised but at levels much lower than prior 
to 1914. However, several Leipzig firms did play an important role in the international fur 
trade. Did Leipzig firms evolve into more international entities so as to avoid regional and 
local problems? What was the relationship between new patterns of internationalisation and 
embeddedness? The question is an important one. A drain on business and human capital is 
commonly identified as one of the largest threats to decentralised production systems in a 
                                                 
880
 TNA, Hudson Bay Company Archives (Microfilm Copy). Public Record Office, BH 2734, A 92/71/21, fo. 
57. Memorandum with reference to fur intelligence. Mr. S. Hopfenkopf. 26.09.1925.  
881
 StA-L, Dresdner Bank in Leipzig 21018, nr. 79, f. 34. Filiale Leipzig an Direktion der Dresdner Bank, Berlin. 
27.05.1927. 
Business as usual? 
266 
 
changing macroeconomic environment. Having suggested that many firms profited from their 
international organisation, this section will investigate whether the industrial district as a 
whole profited or lost from new processes of internationalisation. I closely examine the 
pressures on Leipzig firms to expand their activities outside Leipzig but also ask whether the 
local area remained a central element of business strategies.  
 
7.4.1 Finding the epicentre of the Eitingon business (1919-1928). 
 
The most complex case of an increasingly international Leipzig firm was the Eitingon firm. 
The Eitingons changed the focus of their business both according to geopolitical 
transformations and changes in the family. This was already the case before the Great War, 
when business activities were spatially divided between Moscow, Leipzig, and New York. 
The Moscow – Leipzig axis was at that time central to the Eitingon business structure. Chaim 
Eitingon was one of the few Jewish merchants that the Tsar allowed to stay in Moscow after 
the pogroms in 1882: as a transnational entrepreneur, he divided his time between Leipzig and 
Moscow. In 1914, Chaim Eitingon finally moved to Leipzig and lived there until his death in 
1932.
882
 The Chaim Eitingon business was one of the largest firms in Leipzig, running on a 
business volume of 5 million marks, a size comparable to that of the Thorer firm. The New 
York business was arguably of minor importance in the pre-war trade, since it was only 
established in 1912. In 1919, power shifted to Motty Eitingon who had taken over the New 
York division from Chaim’s son Waldermar, who died in 1919. Hereafter, the New York 
branch transformed rapidly into the main part of the Eitingon business and growth was 
expansive.  
 
When the firm closed its million dollar deals with ARCOS in and after 1921, the Eitingons 
gained a clear edge over their competitors. The initially strong position of the company in 
terms of the import of Russian furs provided the Eitingon-Schild holding with an average 
annual profit of $1,454,982 in the years between 1923 and 1925.
883
 Profits continued to be 
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staggeringly high later, amounting to $1,827,268 in 1926 and $1,912,310 in 1927. Their 
advantages on the fur market increased the size of this family business. In 1925, the Eitingon 
family business was transformed into a holding, the Eitingon-Schild group. However, 
business remained principally a family matter, since 80% of the Eitingon shares were in the 
hands of the family.
884
 The assets of Eitingon–Schild were estimated to amount to more than 
17 million dollars after 1925.
885
  
 
Profits were reinvested in such a way that allowed the Eitingon family to transform their firm 
into an international business empire. The pre-war axis between Leipzig and Moscow was 
expanded into a larger network of about 17 branches and agents, with New York as the central 
node. Noteworthy were the new houses founded in 1920, the Moscow Fur Trading Co 
(London) and the Société Anonyme de Moscow pour le commerce de pelleterie (Paris).
886
 A 
striking extension of operations was the Polish textile manufacturing plant N. Eitingon & 
Partners in Lodz, established by two cousins Nahum and Boris: they turned it into one of the 
leading factories in the region.
887
 By the mid-1920s, Eitingon branches covered the most 
important countries in Europe and their agents procured prime furs across South America, 
Siberia, and China. 
 
However, the investments of the Eitingon-Schild group overwhelmingly flowed into business 
operations in North America. Motty followed a policy of expanion in the USA by acquiring 
important rival trading houses. Notable were the acquisitions of Funston Bros. & Co and 
Fouke Fur Co, which operated on the market of Saint Louis.
888
 Investment banks supported 
Eitingon’s expansion on the North American market. In 1926, the Chicago-based Hasley 
Stuart and Co (notorious because its bond issuing contributed to the economic bubble of the 
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1920s
889
), together with the private bank E. Naumburg & Co, issued Eitingon debenture 
bonds on the market worth about $4,000,000 at an interest rate of 6%.
890
  
 
Within the international and American expansion of the business empire, the Chaim Eitingon 
AG in Leipzig represented, in official terms, a separate entity within the Eitingon Schild 
holdings: its function in the business structure was described as a ‘commissioner.’891 While 
the Eitingon firm had undoubtedly become ‘more multinational’ after the First World War, 
local stakeholders in Leipzig, not in the least the commercial banks and his competitors, still 
perceived of Chaim Eitingon as the centre of the Eitingon business empire. The Dresdner 
Bank described the link between the Eitingon family and businesses as “very close.”892 The 
Leipzig division was said to profit from “the American business and its close contacts with 
the Soviets, as Chaim Eitingon was able to draw on large supplies at profitable conditions 
from the holding.”893  
 
It is, however, a difficult task to gain an accurate insight into the flow of goods and capital 
between the different branches of the Eitingon concern. It is likely that a significant part of the 
contracted Russian furs ended up in Leipzig. Certainly, once trade relations between Germany 
and the USSR stabilised, the trade of the Eitingon concern through Leipzig division became 
more important. The contract of 1928 is one of the few that offers us some insight into the 
division of furs between the subsidiaries of the Eitingon concern. In June 1928, the Eitingon 
concern concluded a 12 million dollar deal with the Soviet trade department in Berlin: 50% 
was paid for in advance.
894
 Accordingly, Motty Eitingon purchased raw furs for $12,000,000, 
$5,000,000 (or 22,000,000RM) of which were destined for sale in Leipzig: these resources 
were “consumed by local traders and the Leipzig fur dressing and dyeing industry.”895 
However, the remaining $7,000,000 were sold elsewhere. This example shows that the 
Leipzig division was not unimportant in the multinational structure. But there is no evidence 
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to suggest whether this 1928 deal reveals a recurrent pattern or merely an incidental sales 
strategy. What we do know is that the Eitingon’s business volume in Leipzig still ranked 
among the most prominent: it fluctuated between 1926 and 1928 at around 25 million RM, 
twice the volume of the Thorer firm.
896
  
 
The fact of the matter is that Motty Eitingon followed an independent course in New York but 
the success of the Eitingon empire enabled Chaim to do the same. As long as founding father 
Chaim lived, the Leipzig division remained an important part of the Eitingon empire. Indeed, 
Chaim’s activism meant that the Eitingon branch in Leipzig remained an active participant in 
the fur district. In 1920, for instance, valuables of the Eitingon family in bank safes included 
2,000,000 marks worth of securities. These assets reveal investments made in various German 
firms, including several regional companies: Seidel & Naumann (sewing machines, Dresden), 
Schubert & Salzer (textile machine construction, Chemnitz), and Hansa Lloyd (car 
construction, Bremen).
897
  
 
More pronounced were investments related to the local fur industry. In 1920, the Eitingon 
family financed the factory Walter AG, a fur dressing and dyeing company in Markränstadt, 
close to Leipzig. Walter AG was one of the largest factories in the wider Leipzig fur district: 
it employed about 1,400 labourers and 100 white-collar workers in April 1923.
898
 It was also 
the only joint-stock company in the Germany fur industry. By May 1921, the Eitingon family 
owned about a third of its shares (697 of 2200), which corresponded to an investment of 
700,000 marks.
899
 Chaim later expanded his investment to 1,500 shares, worth a total of 
1,500,000 marks. In addition, the investment granted Chaim and Martin Lentschner, the 
manager of Chaim Eitingon AG, places on the factory’s board.900 The Eitingon firm invested 
in the dyeing factory at a point when the exchange rate between dollar and the mark continued 
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to widen.
901
 Businessmen like Chaim, who had access to foreign currency, were in an 
advantageous situation when it came to buying assets in Germany.
902
 The family also invested 
in real estate in Leipzig and, to a lesser extent, in Berlin according to the same principles.  
 
However, investments were not solely limited to opportunities offered by inflation since the 
Eitingons entertained the idea of founding their own dressing factory in Taucha (a town in the 
vicinity of Leipzig). The construction of the factory started in 1927. The factory in Taucha 
meant an additional 1,000,000RM investment.
903
 Chaim also invested in developing auction 
sales companies, several of which emerged in Leipzig during the 1920s. Eitingon joined one 
particular auction company, the RAVAG. Auction companies were new forms of interfirm 
cooperation in the industrial district, meant to stimulate foreign trade: they are discussed in 
the following chapter. Their many investments in the local industry nuances the picture of the 
Eitingon firm as a multinational business empire growingly detached from the district. 
 
Finally, Chaim Eitingon’s interest in Leipzig went beyond business and industry. He was also 
one of the leading figures of the Jewish society in Leipzig. In 1922, he established and solely 
financed the Ez-Chaim-synagogue, the largest orthodox synagogue in Saxony with space for 
2,000 visitors.
904
 Six years later, he opened (with the support of Motty) the so-called ‘Eitingon 
Clinic’ (Israelitische Krankenhaus-Eitingon-Stiftung), which also treated gentile patients (an 
explicit demand of its founders).
905
 Even if the epicentre of the business undoubtedly moved 
across the Atlantic, the Eitingons did not disconnect from the Leipzig cluster and the family 
was not invisible in the social fabric of the city and in its religious community. 
 
7.4.2 The robustness of embeddedness: examples from other firms.  
 
The same can be said of other firms in Leipzig: multinational business organisation took more 
important proportions throughout the interwar period while leaving local embeddedness 
intact. Ariowitsch established branches in Paris (Société d’Importation de Pelleteries, Paris), 
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London (Ariowitsch & Jacop Fur Co. Ltd), and Stockholm (Svenska-Norska Pälsvaru-
Actiebolaget).
906
 However, these branches were mainly used to further interests in Leipzig. 
Only when the Nazis’ ascent to power curtailed Jewish entrepreneurship did Max Ariowitsch 
gradually turn his London division into the firm’s headquarters.907 Ariowitsch also opened a 
New York division between 1910 and 1914. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that Ariowitsch 
remained absent from the American market immediately after the war. Ariowitsch re-entered 
the American market only at the beginning of the 1930s with the Anglo-American Fur 
Merchants Cop. The embeddedness of the firm in Leipzig was associated with the roots of the 
Ariowitsch family in the local Jewish community. In 1916, they converted one of their 
buildings in the Färberstrasse into the Beth-Jehuda synagogue.
908
 
 
In the case of the Thorer firm, the balance between internationalism and embeddedness was 
clearly in favour of the latter. Despite the limited value of the New York branch of the Thorer 
firm before the war (see chapter 2), the American branch did gain a more prominent position 
within the Thorer business empire after the conflict. During the war, Speer, the American 
manager of the branch, took over business entirely, transforming it into the Speer Fur 
Corporation. Paul Hollender reclaimed control over the Speer division in 1923.
909
 As with the 
other examples considered, the internationalisation of the Thorer firm did not run counter to 
district participation. In fact, the New York division played an important part in the recovery 
of the Leipzig headquarters since the lion’s share of the processed furs (garments made from 
karakul and Astrakhan skins) flowed to the North American market.
910
 To give an impression 
of the importance of the American market, the turnover accounts of 1928 indicate that of the 
11,191,000RM total volume, 4,562,000RM came from sales made to the New York branch.
911
  
 
International operations were thus beneficial to the industrial district: Thorer combined 
international trading activities with manufacturing in Leipzig. His factory remained a typical 
Saxon firm, dependent upon the world market for the import of raw material and the export of 
processed consumer goods. The factory in Leipzig-Lindenau, which was a source of 
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employment for over 500 workers, remained central as it connected the supply routes of 
Siberia and Central Asia to consumer markets in Western Europe and across the Atlantic. 
Furthermore, the Thorer family continued investing in the local fur district. In 1924, just when 
the hyperinflation had hit the fur industry hard, Thorer expanded his operations in the dyeing 
industry by taking over Karl Adolf Schneider AG, which specialised in rabbit skin dyeing.
912
 
A final point to note is that the Thorer firm was traditionally successful in creating new links 
between the industrial district with the outside world. Before the war, Paul Thorer had 
established links with the sheepskin market of Bukhara. The Thorer business remained 
internationally oriented as it managed to establish good relations with the Afghan court, a 
growing exporter of karakul and Astrakhan skin. These good relations translated into 
increased commercial activities. Afghanistan increased its karakul farming exports from 
100,000 to 150,000 skins per year to about 700,000-800,000 pieces in 1927. In March 1928, 
the Afghan king Aman Ullah, also known as the ‘reformer king,’ visited Leipzig and the 
dyeing factory of Theodor Thorer, the principal consumer of Afghan karakul skins. It was 
noted that Leipzig promised the Afghan King “to expand the trade relations between the 
Afghan skin trade and the city of Leipzig.”913 Even though the reformer king was removed 
from power in 1929, his visit epitomises the importance of the Leipzig fur industry for the 
growing German commercial influence in Afghanistan after 1923.
914
  
 
In conclusion, the local embeddedness of the leading firms remained robust even while they 
expanded their multinational business activities. Internationalism did not weaken the 
industrial district in the way that macroeconomic developments did. In other words, even 
though internationalisation was an important feature of the fur trade in the 1920s, it is 
inaccurate to state that firms expanded internationally at the expense of investments in 
Leipzig. Rather, they did both. However, there was an important delay between the recovery 
of the German fur trade and that of the international fur trade. It took the German fur trade 
until the second half of the 1920s to restore its pre-war market share (figure 7). Initially, 
volumes of imported furs were much lower than pre-war levels. In 1921 and 1922, Germany 
imported raw furs at levels that were only 25% of those in 1913. In 1924, still facing the after-
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effects of hyperinflation, import quantities stabilised at 50% of the 1913 level. Only after 
1925 did imports reach pre-war levels once again and the level of exports soared, largely 
because of the stabilisation of bilateral trade relations with the Soviet Union. However, the 
dynamism of individual firms as players in the world market is but one of the explanations for 
the recovery of the trade. In order to fully grasp the recovery of the 1920s, we need to 
examine processes of interfirm cooperation as well. This will be the subject of the next 
chapter.  
 
 
Year 
Import Export 
Raw furs (Semi-)processed  
furs 
Raw furs  (Semi-)processed 
furs 
Million 
Reichsmark 
% Million 
RM 
% Million  % Million % 
1923 151,580 2.5 22,808 0.4 21,319 0.4 109,665 1.8 
1924 126,561 1.4 37,226 0.4 21,133 0.3 126,956 1.9 
1925 124,795 1 40,025 0.3 32,034 0.3 147,340 1.6 
1926 102,486 1 36,068 0.4 38,948 0.4 154,970 1.5 
1927 185,323 1.3 61,756 0.4 69,637 0.6 226,389 2.1 
1928 235,526 1.7 64,721 0.5 92,552 0.8 305,255 2.5 
Figure 7-3: German import and export of furs.915 
 
7.5 Conclusion.  
 
This chapter has dealt with the restructuring of the international fur industry in the first half of 
the 1920s. Emphasis has been placed upon the interaction of transformations in the 
international political economy with the industrial district in Leipzig. I have examined in 
depth the emergence of competitive North American sales markets and the generally 
increasing value of trade and manufacturing across the Atlantic as well as transitions in the 
Siberian business. The situation in the Russian fur trade before 1914 was characterised by 
dependency on foreign firms and merchants who governed the export trade of Russian 
commodities. After World War I, the Soviet state agencies assumed ownership over the 
procurement and export of resources. Initially, the trade monopoly was not a separate entity. It 
was compartmentalised into various Soviet institutions and agencies that were allowed access 
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to foreign sales markets under differing terms, like ARCOS in London and the trade 
representation in Berlin. What is more, the trade in furs had become strategically important to 
the Soviets, since their export economy was largely based on the extraction of raw materials: 
here, traditional agricultural products such as grain underachieved and commodities like furs 
and oil far exceeded the planned quota.  
 
Despite the changes in international trade, there were patterns of continuity that enabled 
district firms to participate in international trade. In particular, the concept of the “pressure of 
continuity” adequately describes the enduring focus of German businesses on trade with the 
east in the interwar period. Firstly, many of the traditional firms active in the pre-war Russia 
trade were able to restore commercial ties in the trade of Siberian furs relatively quickly. The 
fact that the Soviets favoured ‘familiar’ trade partners was not a coincidence. With the 
pressing aim of generating foreign currency, the Soviets incorporated former fur merchants 
into the institutions that conducted foreign trade and organised procurement. Whilst my 
source base prevents a complete analysis of the networks between former fur merchants, the 
NEPmen, and companies in the West, it is clear that several fur firms could rely on ‘old’ trade 
networks at the first stage of the NEP. In other words, the transition to the Soviet trade 
monopoly had left several personal networks between private Russian fur traders and German 
businesses intact. Second, local businesses profited from a well-structured intelligence and 
trade information network that was seminally important in the re-creation of Leipzig as a 
commercial junction. Both aspects formed important elements in the recovery of the industrial 
district in the early 1920s.  
 
Firms specialised in the pre-war Russian trade and fortunate enough to have friends in high 
places emerged as lead firms of the district. The Eitingons became tremendously rich, along 
with the Biedermann and the Ariowitsch families. Since many ties with the Soviet agencies 
were established outside Germany and given the growing market opportunities across the 
ocean, these leading firms increasingly internationalised throughout the 1920s. There was a 
danger of firms detaching from the district and economic actors were sceptical of the impact 
of the internationalisation upon Leipzig as a primary market. Nevertheless, it has been 
established in the concluding section that these lead firms pursued both international and local 
strategies. In fact, international successes allowed leading firms to invest in local business 
activities, real estate, and charity. The examination of investment patterns reveals that these 
firms, to varying degrees, continued to place the local central. Just as before World War I, 
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transborder activities dovetailed with local embeddedness. The businessmen were embedded 
in a robut social structure that was defined by cultural, religious, social, and economic 
elements. This tendency will become even clearer as I deal more systematically with 
processes of cooperation betweens firms and also between local economic actors. Increased 
cooperation was aimed at creating links to the outside world during the turbulent 1920s.  
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8 Market Engineering. Joint-ventures and interfirm 
cooperation as vehicles of world market re-admission 
(1922-1929).  
8.1 Introduction.  
 
The period from hyperinflation to the crisis of 1929 could be described as the comeback of 
the Leipzig fur industry. The number of labourers and firms around 1925 had never been 
higher: around 11,000 labourers worked permanently in the industry.
916
 The growth of the 
local fur industry was largely due to its reintegration into the world market. As mentioned 
above, fur firms preferred to be oriented towards the market rather than investing in autarkic 
alternatives. Moreover, overall economic parameters had gradually improved. The German 
economy was characterised by an upward trend in this period, especially after the Dawes plan 
had resolved inflation and restructured German debts.
917
 Furthermore, the treaty of Berlin 
allowed German firms to resume dealings with the Soviet Union at levels that were 
reminiscent of prewar standards. However, the Leipzig ‘comeback’ cannot solely be 
explained by pointing to the more favourable economic climate. We have established the 
importance of Leipzig as a gateway to the east and also pointed to the successful international 
activities of individual Leipzig-based firms, the so-called lead-firms. Nonetheless, the 
transitions of the international economy were a source of collective action and interfirm 
cooperation as well. This chapter is devoted to such processes. I will consider two main 
themes: bank-business relationships in the 1920s and the inter-firm cooperation that led to the 
creation of joint-venture auction companies.  
 
Firstly, the cooperation between fur firms became a major component in the construction of 
links between the outside world and the industrial district during World War I. The growing 
importance of collective action with regard to foreign trade was represented by the developing 
role of the Fur Merchants Association in Leipzig immediately after World War I and in the 
willingness to resume trade after the peace of Brest-Litovsk in a collective framework (see 
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chapter 5). This chapter further expands on local collaboration in the pursuit of restoring 
foreign trade by presenting the most ambitious and effective efforts of collective action in the 
district: the auction company. Auction companies had a long pedigree in the international fur 
trade. Auction sales formed the foundation stone of the fur trade in London and in new 
markets like New York and Montreal. Between 1874 and 1878, some Leipzig firms (Joseph 
Ullmann, Heinrich Lomer, Dodel, and Joseph Finkelstein) had already attempted to form 
auction sales in Leipzig.
918
 While such attempts were unsuccessful, the idea revived in the 
1920s against a background of world market restructuring. Auction companies in Leipzig will 
be presented as economic institutions that renewed the way in which market transactions were 
organised locally in order to converge with a world market that was increasingly organised by 
auctions sales. The chapter will examine how auction companies were formed in Leipzig and 
in what ways they contributed to the international dimension of the local fur industry.  
 
The symbiosis between banking and the fur industry is a thornier issue. As we have seen, the 
cross-fertilisation between the competitive bank system in the local economy and the fur 
industry was one of the major pillars in the foreign trade of the fur district prior to 1914. What 
shape did this fruitful alliance assume in the 1920s? Academic debates on the role of German 
banks in the recovery of trade and industry in the interwar period have failed to advance an 
unequivocal answer. Many have questioned the existence of “symbiotic relationship” between 
finance and industry and have stressed that firms were forced to find alternative sources of 
credit.
919
 It is certain that monetary instability of the early 1920s, with the hyperinflation of 
1923 as its nadir, deeply eroded the ability of the banking system to act as a financer of 
industry and trade. The relatively prosperous golden years that followed were not sufficient to 
build up substantial reserves or to restore the troubled banking system.
920
 Nevertheless, few 
would disagree that unstable economic parameters automatically result in conservative 
banking policies. For instance, the financial historian Harold James noted thoughtfully that 
“the German banks, weakened because of the standstill of the inflation years, were not able to 
finance according to pre-war standards, but also took irresponsibly high risks to 
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compensate.”921 Depending on the perspective from which one views the problem, the 
relationship between banking and business in interwar Germany remains a multifaceted 
puzzle. However, the problem of banking behaviour and its relationship with German 
economic recovery only interests me to the extent that it reveals collaborative patterns 
between economic agents in the industrial district. 
 
8.2  Banks: the closest neighbours of the fur industry.  
 
8.2.1 Banking and the fur industry in the aftermath of the war.  
 
While the position of German banking as a financer of industry and commerce in the interwar 
period is not unequivocally established, I will attempt to examine the embeddedness of the 
banks in the district and their role as financers for the fur industry in the 1920s. Did banks in 
Leipzig redefine lending conditions and their favourable policy to the fur trade? What was the 
relationship between banking and district participants? A concept that is often used in 
clarifying the position of banking operations in a local economic structure is the so-called 
banking dilemma. The dilemma is foremost represented in the position of the banker: does he 
adapt himself to specific demands and local customs, thus exposing the bank to the risks of 
sector fluctuations, or follow a restrictive credit policy with the peril of losing clients to other 
banks in a competitive environment?
922
 The contours of this dilemma have already been 
shortly discussed in chapter 2, wherein banks and businessmen were presented as part of the 
same social structure and the competitive banking market facilitated the access of fur firms to 
credit. How did this system evolve in the 1920s?  
 
First of all, Leipzig remained the largest financial centre of Saxony, larger then Dresden and 
neighbouring cities. In 1927, Leipzig housed 69 bank divisions, 22 of which were joint-stock 
banks.
923
 In total, the Leipzig banks possessed a capital of 55,099,000RM, much higher than 
that held by the banks in Dresden. In the capital of Saxony, there were 54 bank divisions (24 
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of which were joint-stock banks) with a capital of 44,386,000 RM. The Leipzig credit market 
was thus comparatively large. Secondly, there was the continuity of personal connections, 
especially between the fur industry and the two largest joint-stock banks, the Deutsche Bank 
and the Dresdner Bank. Eugen Naumann remained director of the Deutsche Bank and von 
Klemperer headed the Dresdner Bank until the banking crisis of the early 1930s. As discussed 
in chapter 2, these men had fortified the new bank branches on the pre-war local market by 
primarily investing in clustered sectors like the fur industry.  
 
After the war, these banks adopted a similar approach to the fur industry. In the first place, the 
changing nature of the international fur trade provided new opportunities to the banks. The 
sudden expansion of the Eitingon holding (see chapter 7) in particular allowed Naumann to 
compete with the Dresdner Bank, the latter being the exclusive creditor of the Chaim Eitingon 
holding until 1920. After establishing informal contacts with Motty Eitingon and Martin 
Lentschner, a highly ranked official of the Eitingon holdings in Leipzig, the Deutsche Bank in 
Leipzig offered Eitingon a credit line of about 15,000,000 marks.
924
 Additionally, Naumann 
offered the company an extra $250,000 in order to support its foreign trade.
925
 Naumann’s 
competitive strategy failed only because the Berlin office of the Deutsche Bank interfered. 
Berlin feared the return of a highly competitive situation comparable to that before World 
War I. After contact with the Dresdner Bank, the head office noted: “the Dresdner Bank 
cherished (...) the wish that at least the neighbouring banks will not allow themselves to 
become the victims of an unhealthy competitive struggle and to enter into an extensive 
exchange of views on the limits of lending in general and in individual cases.”926 After the 
reprimand from Berlin, the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks jointly provided 15,000,000Mk.
927
 
Thus, the Deutsche Bank barely prevented Naumann from increasing banking competition in 
Leipzig even further.
928
  
 
Businesses like that of the Eitingons were attractive investments because Jewish owners 
resumed trade much earlier than their non-Jewish counterparts. In this regard, the David 
Biedermann merchant house forms an additional example of rapidly resumed bank 
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investments in the post-war fur trade. Parallels in the relationship between the Deutsche Bank 
and Biedermann can easily be drawn with the bank’s relationship with the Eitigons: both had 
maintained business in Russia and Great Britain during and after the war. Before 1914, 
Biedermann was already one of the largest accounts of the Deutsch Bank: they shared it with 
the Bankhaus Meyer & Co, a private bank, and the Bank für Handel und Industrie. Yet the 
Deutsche Bank was the chief financer. Naumann was impressed by Biedermann’s business 
and expected the firm to become a major player after the war: “Biedermann maintains the 
Russian business to the broadest extent and can thus achieve higher profits than ever possible 
during peace time. After the war, Biedermann will be a customer who will bring us great 
benefits.”929 In line with these growing expectations, the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig granted an 
unsecured credit line for 2,000,000 marks in 1920: it had previously been restricted to 
400,000 marks.
930
 After hyperinflation ended, Naumann restricted the credits to a mere 
100,000RM. Nevertheless, Naumann continued to place great trust in Biedermann, even 
though the firm was plagued by dubious problems. Naumann guaranteed the Biedermann 
firm’s £75,000 debt to the Midland bank in Britain.931 In 1927, the Biedermann firm was 
subject to a fraud investigation related to customs and tax evasion.
932
 Naumann came to the 
rescue. He issued a bank guarantee allowing the firm to reimburse the tax claim and fines. 
 
The allocation of credit was not solely confined to the success stories of Jewish fur business. 
The Deutsche Bank, for instance, increased its commitment towards the Theodor Thorer firm 
as well. In 1919, Hollender asked the banks to double credit so that his firm could resume 
international trade. Particularly revealing was the strong position of the Thorer firm in 
negotiating the lending terms. Hollender, the leader of the Thorer firm, refused to put up 
additional collateral for the extra credit. The Berlin head office of the Deutsche Bank realised 
the powerlessness of the banks towards the Thorer firm: “we assume that the other banks did 
not receive cover for the doubled credits, so our situation is not much better than theirs. The 
tremendous increase in value of fur products renders the desire for the improvement of 
financial freedom of the firm more understandable, even though it is not pleasant to see that 
so much money is used for luxury products (...). However (...) significant amounts seem to be 
destined for exports again and therefore a corresponding portion of foreign currencies will 
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become available.”933 Again, competition between banks gave way to the softening of lending 
conditions. Only two of the smaller Leipzig banks refused Thorer’s proposition for unsecured 
credit. With the support of the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and others, Thorer attained 
4,600,000 marks worth of credit. 
 
8.2.2 The short-term credit market and foreign operations.  
 
The banks not only allowed larger businesses to resume trade by expanding credit lines: the 
fur industry was probably one the principal recipients for medium and short-term credits 
issued by the Leipzig banks. The 1924 cashbook of the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig illustrates 
that the vast majority of short-term acceptance credit flowed to the fur industry. The register 
mentions the grant of acceptance credit to about 103 firms in that year, 45 of which were fur 
firms. Many district firms consumed such short-term loans. Such short-term credit was an 
important instrument for the organisation of transborder trade. For example, most of the 
acceptance credit granted to the fur industry was issued in pounds sterling, presumably in 
order to allow for a visit to the auctions in London. Acceptance credit to the fur industry from 
the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig amounted to £394,600, which represented 66% of the total 
credit issued. Credit to individual firms ranged from £5,000 to £30,000 on average. The 
largest sum (£35,000) granted went to Mihran Allalmedjian, a somewhat unknown trader, 
while Thorer was granted £25,000.
934
 
 
Although we lack an exhaustive overview, the Deutsche Bank similarly enabled Leipzig firms 
to visit the London auctions by issuing short-term acceptance credit. In 1921, Biedermann, 
one of the first firms to resume trade in Britain, received short-term loans £10,000 in May and 
£30,000 in July on the occasion of a London auction. For the May auctions in London in the 
following year, the Deutsche Bank granted acceptance credit to Biedermann (£20,000), David 
Dubiner (£20,000), Silberkweit & Goldberg (£15,000), and Adolf Schlesinger Nachf 
(£10,000).
935
 The support for Biedermann is surprising, since it was one of the few Leipzig 
firms still in the possession of a branch in London. For the winter auctions in 1922, the 
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Deutsche Bank provided Reichenstein, Goldstaub, Dubiner, David Biedermann, and Theodor 
Thorer the sum of £62,000 between them.
936
  
 
During the years of inflation, the provision of foreign credit was expensive for the German 
banks and meant a considerable effort. The availability of foreign currencies was of the 
utmost importance for the fur firms, especially in the first half of the 1920s, when London 
dominated the trade in Siberian furs. In the provision of pounds, the Deutsche Bank profited 
from its connections to the merchant bank J. Henry Schröders, one of the leading London 
bank houses in the beginning of the twentieth century: through this connection, it was able to 
provide money for fur firms trading in London.
937
 Such credit enabled firms to operate on the 
London market and provide Leipzig with furs at a time when the raw fur market in Leipzig 
was at a low ebb.  
 
We should also take into account that most of the Leipzig firms profited from multiple bank 
connections for short-term loans, general banking affairs, and acceptance credits. By early 
1926, Thorer made use of acceptance credits in pound sterling sourced from no less than 4 
German banks in Leipzig (ADCA £ 25,000, Dresdner Bank £ 25,000, Meyer & Co £ 10,000, 
and Reichskredit AG £25,000) while 2 other banks provided dollars (Darmstädter und 
Nationalbank $100,000 and the Stadtbank $75,000). Despite the fact that Thorer possessed a 
branch in London, they mainly relied on the neighbouring bank offices in Leipzig for the 
provision of pounds. In fact, the head office of Thorer in Germany obtained more credit in 
foreign currencies than the branch of the firm in London. Only two London banks provided 
credit to Thorer’s London division for the auctions (Japhet £25,000 and Goschens and 
Cunliffe £20,000).
938
 Furthermore, Thorer’s bank partners domiciled in London’s financial 
district had German roots. First, Goschens and Cunliffe was the result of a 1920 merger 
between the bank Fruhling and Goschen and the Cunliffe Brothers. The Fruhling bank was 
established in 1814 by German merchants whilst the Cunliffe Brothers was a product of 
British bankers. Secondly, Japhet & Co was established by Saemy Japhet, a Jewish banker 
from Frankfurt, in 1895.
939
 Larger businesses like Thorer obviously profited from multiple 
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bank connections, both regional and international. Nevertheless, it is clear that banking affairs 
were centred on Leipzig.  
 
8.2.3 Banking competition in Leipzig (1920-1929).  
 
The Eitingon firm undoubtedly gathered the highest number of credit lines from various 
banks. It may very well have been the largest firm account in Leipzig’s financial world. By 
1929, the Eitingon concern enjoyed a 2 million dollar credit line (or 8,400,000RM) with the 
Dresdner Bank, substantially more than that of the Deutsche Bank, the ADCA (both 
$1,200,000), and the Commerzbank ($750,000).
940
 In fact, the Eitingon family, in particular 
Martin Lentschner, had refined the art of playing rival Leipzig banks against each other. In 
1927, the head office of the Deutsche Bank wrote: “the Eitingons declared to you that they 
have been served by other banks more accommodatingly. We cannot help but notice that this 
is a deliberate strategy of the Eitingons to exert pressure on us so as to indulge their wishes 
and in all likelihood they employ this strategy towards other banks as well.”941 The success 
story of the Eitingons and their ability to profit from many bank connections substantially 
expanded the firm’s role as a consumer on the local lending market. 
 
Nonetheless, less powerful medium-sized businesses also used more than one bank, albeit 
usually not more than two. David Kölner, a fur trading business that had a trade volume of 
almost 2,000,000RM in 1926, received auction credits from both the Deutsche and the 
Dresdner Banks.
942
 The same went for Semi Goldstaub, a Jewish fur trader who divided his 
bank affairs between the two largest competitors on the Leipzig bank market. Thus, 
businesses like Goldstaub also made clever use of the competition between the largest joint-
stock banks. Goldstaub wrote in 1927 that he opened a credit line with the Dresdner Bank 
simply because the Deutsche Bank refused to extend his credits: however, “he was willing to 
withdraw his affairs from the Dresdner Bank if the Deutsche Bank granted him an extra credit 
of 200,000RM.”943 Goldstaub nevertheless kept both his bank accounts. Additionally, both 
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banks offered him acceptance credit (unsecured by the Dresdner Bank and partially secured 
by the Deutsche Bank) to a maximum of £30,000 for the London sales in 1929.
944
 
 
Just as before 1914, the competition on the lending market put strains on the relations 
between the bank branches in Leipzig and the head offices in Berlin. This was particularly so 
in the case of the Deutsche Bank. In December 1921, the head office asked Naumann to 
reconsider the “liberal” agreement with the Eitingon family. According to Berlin, the Eitingon 
multinational mainly used the credits to ship raw furs directly to New York. Therefore, the 
impact on trade and industry in Leipzig was smaller than expected: “the gentlemen [of the 
board] agreed upon the fact that it cannot be the task of a German bank to lend dollars to an 
‘American firm.’ We gladly support needs in Germany with our currency but we have to 
abstain from lending our scant currencies to foreign firms.”945  
 
It should be noted that conflicts between the head office and regional offices were not 
exceptional in the history of the Deutsche Bank. The conflict between the local directors, 
prone to grant credits to local firms and friendly industrialists, and the bank leaders in Berlin, 
who were worried about “lenient” credit conditions, loomed large throughout the 1920s.946 
Historical research has never empirically investigated the mechanisms that made this risky 
bank policy possible nor have issues like local embeddedness been taken into account. Here, 
the lenient lending behaviour of the Leipzig bank division was coloured by its position as an 
actor within the district economy. Furthermore, the bank clearly suffered from competition 
with the other joint-stock banks in the district. Finally, fur firms made it a deliberate policy to 
establish multiple bank connections in order to ease lending conditions.  
 
In contrast to the board in Berlin, local bank officers did not feel uncomfortable with the fur 
firm’s strong position on the lending market. On the contrary, it could be argued that the bank 
division identified itself strongly with the fate of the local industry and endeavoured to be a 
reliable partner. Bank directors and fur businessmen were on a good footing with each other. 
Banks and businesses were practically neighbours in downtown Leipzig. The building of the 
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Deutsche Bank at the Rathausring was within walking distance of the Brühl.
947
 Perhaps more 
important was a shared view on local affairs. Similar to the fur magnates themselves, the 
director of the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig saw the international activities of successful fur 
concerns as the launch pad for trade revival in Leipzig. International operations were seen as 
an absolute necessity for the survival of the fur district. Naumann, for instance, wrote to 
justify the credit for the Eitingon firm in the early 1920s: “The credit is justified from our 
point of view because the fur trade is essentially international and it fertilises the dressing 
industry in Leipzig, where the German fur industry is concentrated.”948 Naumann personally 
trusted the fur businessmen, including Motty Eitingon: “Motty Eitingon is an ingenious, and 
rarely clever man in his best years” and his firm is a “world firm.”949 The same admiration 
applied to the Biedermann business. Naumann wrote that the “Russian enterprises of the 
Biedermann concern, which continued commerce with England and the US during the war, 
achieved fabulous profits and nowadays ranks amongst the largest and most well-funded fur 
firms.”950 It was his personal conviction that an association with these firms would not only 
increase bank profits but also reanimate Leipzig’s fur agglomeration. Demands for credit were 
therefore easily permitted, even when the head office in Berlin tried to restrict the link with 
the fur industry.  
 
The lenient policy of the Deutsche Bank was not altogether different from other local Leipzig 
bank divisions. The Commerzbank and the ADCA had a large number of customers in the fur 
industry as well, although they focussed on smaller businesses. The local office of the 
Dresdner bank was widely known for its lenient lending policy towards the fur industry, 
especially the larger firms. The difference was that Dresdner Bank’s head office seemed less 
concerned by the activities of its local branch vis-à-vis the Leipzig fur industry. Was the local 
division of the Dresdner Bank simply more independent than the Deutsche Bank? A clear 
answer cannot easily be established. In any case, it should be noted that the Dresdner Bank in 
Leipzig did not simply throw money at the fur industry but rather employed an assessment 
system of the firms to which it granted credit. However, the rating system was not very 
sophisticated: lending conditions were determined by personal networks and subjective 
assessments. The assessment not only took trade volume and the nature of business into 
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account, but also considered the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur and the 
relationship between the bank director and business leaders.  
 
The Dresdner Bank did impose restrictions once it found that entrepreneurs were taking too 
many risks or when doubts were raised about the personal capabilities of the entrepreneur. 
Leopold Apfel, a fur trader, was graded as “very decent but stupid” and therefore “credit for 
him is now not in order.”951 Positive traits were not always a guarantee of favourable credit 
conditions. Ephaim Kirschner was highly esteemed but his commerce was seen as too risky: 
he was forced “to show the annual trade balance until 1930” and “no unsecured credit was 
allowed.”952 Again, personal friendships and relations played a considerable role. The traders 
of Wachtel & Eskreis were seen as “very cultivated and a solid firm” and “should be treated 
very well.”953 The Dresdner Bank characterised the fur dealer David Chardack as a “trustee” 
of the bank: “he can acquire any credit he wants; he is very careful and has good 
customers.”954 The members of the Fein family - “a solid Jewish family” - were equally 
considered as “old friends of the Dresdner Bank,” even though they maintained connections 
to the rival Danat and Commerzbank. The relationship between the bank and its fur customers 
was therefore highly subjective and reputational. Personal connections and impressions about 
the character of the entrepreneurs mattered in shaping the local lending market.  
 
It should be stressed that the entanglement between the fur trade and banks was also the result 
of exogenous developments. The importance of London for the international fur market in the 
immediate post-war years gave impetus to the short-term lending market in Leipzig. In 
addition, the dealings with the Soviets were one of the main causes for the growing 
involvement of the financial sector in the fur trade. Even for a firm like Ariowitsch that 
operated relatively independently, the credit preferences of the Soviets and the large contracts 
were a challenge: “the firm J. Ariowitsch represents one of the soundest and strongest fur 
firms. The firm is (...) able to finance its imports to a large extent autonomously and therefore 
only seldom makes use of its rather small bank credit. (...) The nature of Russian affairs forces 
the firm to appeal to a larger amount of bank credit (...).”955 However, the ever-expanding 
involvement of the banks in the foreign affairs of the fur firms only added to the troubled 
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relations between the local bank with the head office of the Deutsche Bank. Berlin presaged 
deficiencies in the trade with the Soviets: “if Mr. Ariowitsch indicates that he was able to gain 
special advantages in dealings with the Soviet Russian authorities because of his relations 
with those officials, we believe indeed that he will make large profits. But the question arises, 
how much longer? An old proverb says: the pitcher goes so often to the well that it finally 
breaks. If something should go differently than expected, it could be possible that the good 
relations of A(riowitsch) with certain Soviets will turn into the opposite and could lead to 
large losses for your customers.”956 The head office in Berlin believed that Leipzig was taking 
enormous risks through its indirect participation in foreign trade while local bankers 
considered it a necessity. In Leipzig, foreign trade was the compound of business-bank 
relationships.  
 
Even here it is not clear whether Ariowitsch profited from bank competition or whether the 
credit was really required. Whereas several Leipzig banks supported his dealings in the Soviet 
Union, Ariowitsch did not depend on credit to the same degree as Thorer and Eitingon. Up 
until 1927, Ariowitsch was able to conduct commerce with the Soviets independently, as a 
report of the Dresdner Bank makes clear: “Ariowitsch arranges his supplies in Russia out of 
his own means and frequently in cash (...) we estimate the wealth of Ariowitsch to circulate 
around 20,000,000 RM.”957 But why should Ariowitsch invest personal capital if he could use 
unsecured bank credit? Several banks indeed feared that Ariowitsch made use of the 
favourable lending market to externalise the risks of its international operations on to its bank 
partners. Nevertheless, banks did not refuse his quest for additional financial assistance. Both 
the Deutsche and the Dresdner Bank supported Ariowitsch’s growing demand for money.958 
The banking dilemma ended in favour of the fur firms and their international dealings.  
8.3 Inter-firm cooperation and the creation of new market institutions in 
Leipzig.  
 
Having established the important link between banking and the fur industry, let us now turn to 
collaborative networks between individual fur firms. In the pursuit of restoring links to the 
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outside world, two main axes of collaboration between firms in the fur district surfaced. 
Collaboration between firms lead to the formation of trade consortia and to the creation of co-
owned ‘auction houses.’ While trade consortia turned out to be less successful, the ‘auction 
companies’ organised by a large number of fur firms became the most relevant joint ventures 
in the Leipzig district between the wars. The role of the banks in this chapter does not end 
here. The local banks acted as important supporters and mediators in interfirm cooperation. 
Links between banks and firms in the district also centred on trade consortia and auction 
companies since both institutions had large financial requirements.  
 
8.3.1 The failure of trade consortia.  
 
First, a small note on the phenomenon of the trade consortium in Leipzig as a project of 
interfirm cooperation. In the early 1920s, only one such consortium appeared and it was 
unsuccessful. However, it does give insight into the mechanisms of interfirm cooperation in 
the district. Under Thorer’s leadership, a number of traders in Leipzig planned to form a 
temporary trade consortium in 1920. The consortium was set up with the aim of establishing 
trade relations between the Soviet Union and Leipzig. In particular, use was made of Thorer’s 
remaining personal connections in the USSR. The consortium appointed Strauven, an 
employee of the former German firm Dürrschmidt in Tashkent, as a trade representative of the 
consortium in Moscow. Strauven was an important representative of the Thorer firm in Russia 
and Central Asia well before the war: he played a crucial role in moving karakul herds from 
Central Asia to German South West Africa (see chapter 4).  
 
Arndt Thorer, who had just succeded his deceased father in 1920 as owner of the Thorer firm, 
made his network resources available to a wider set of local firms. Importantly, he did so 
because he believed that the restoration of trade networks went beyond the individual interest 
of the firm he headed. Instead, Thorer believed himself to be part of a broader agenda, one 
that burdened him with responsibility towards Leipzig. He wrote in 1921 that “it has to be 
prevented that new Russian exports are sold in England or the USA (...) These exports belong 
to our trade and dressing industry and will contribute to the recovery of Leipzig’s old 
reputation in the international fur trade.”959 Such motives indicate that a lead firm like Thorer 
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adhered to the wider goal of restoring Leipzig as an international marketplace. In other words, 
strengthening the ‘local’ was an important motive for firm strategies and stimulated processes 
of amalgamation into interfirm collaborative structures.  
 
Nevertheless, the trade consortium failed to make a deal in Moscow. In November 1921, the 
government curtailed the actions of the consortium since it feared that sending Strauven to 
Moscow at this stage might inflict damage on the still fragile diplomatic relations with the 
Russian trade representation.
960
 The early attempts of the Leipzig district to collectively gain 
concessions inside Russia were a failure, which worked to the advantage of individual firms 
like Eitingon and Biedermann, who inserted themselves into ‘new’ gateways to Soviet trade 
like New York and London. Not all processes of interfirm cooperation lead to success. 
Collective action was strongly context-bound and was highly dependent on timing. Failure 
was the fate of the consortia, despite the fact that it was a common practice by which German 
businesses organised foreign trade in the period between the wars.
961
 Nevertheless, the trade 
consortium once more reveals the predisposition towards interfirm cooperation in the district.  
 
8.3.2 Auction companies as inter-firm cooperation 
 
Whereas consortia were a common practice for German businesses in the interwar period, 
auction houses in Germany were something of a novelty. As mentioned in chapter 7, auction 
sales had surfaced strongly on fur markets in North America since the turn of the century. 
While the Anglo-American experience with auctions was undoubtedly inspiring, the 
formation of auction companies in Leipzig directly followed from the successes of various fur 
auctions in Leipzig that were organised independently by the Soviet government. The first 
Soviet fur auction, organised by the Soviet trade representation in Berlin, took place in 
Leipzig on 28 September 1921. In terms of their readmission to the world market, the 
symbolic value of the auction for both the Soviets and the Germans cannot be underestimated. 
The visit of 500 merchants, 57 of whom were from France, reveals a large international 
interest in the sale of Siberian furs.
962
 In the first auction sale, the Soviet government sold furs 
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with the total value of 250,000 goldmarks.
963
 Although further information on the first auction 
sales is scarce, the auctions were said to approach world market prices.
964
 The next Soviet 
auction in March 1922 achieved sales worth $1,000,000.  
 
The symbolic value notwithstanding, the independent Soviet auctions were a particular 
disadvantage for the district as they put pressure on the trading firm as the traditional 
intermediary between Russia and the Leipzig industry. Since the Soviet state agency in 
Germany (Russischen Handelsvertretung in Deutschland) organised the sales independently, 
auctions threatened the specialised trading houses on the Brühl. A quote of Arndt Thorer in 
1921 captures the stalemate: “when the Russians organise auctions, the foreigners buy directly 
in Leipzig and ignore the German fur trade completely. Nevertheless, we want to be, once 
again, the supplier of the other countries for Russian, Siberian, and central Asian skins and 
this way will recoup foreign currencies.”965 While the initial independent sales undoubtedly 
generated commercial benefits for the industrial district as a whole, it drained activity away 
from individual fur businesses in the long term. In order to safeguard trade interests, self-
organised auction companies were formed as a solution to this problem.  
 
In total, six auction companies were established in Leipzig during the early 1920s: the 
RAVAG, the Rauchwaren-Lagerhaus GmbH, Geverko, Mucrena, Ramico, and Norsia 
(Nordische Silberfuchs Auktion). In 1920, the Mucrena was the first auction company 
established in Leipzig. Upon reading an advertisement for the Mucrena, it becomes clear that 
the creation of the auction company was deeply rooted in the context of the changing 
international trade: “in 1920, the need was felt to provide the German and foreign fur trades 
with new provisions of raw furs.”966 Additionally, the organisers were clearly inspired by the 
success of auctions sales in other fur markets in North America; “for Germany these auctions 
are relatively new, but, in contrast, are common practice in London and St Louis.”967 
However, the Mucrena was not a company established by Leipzig fur dealers: rather, it was a 
division of a hide and skin dealing firm in Berlin.  
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In contrast, the new companies Rauchwaren Lagerhaus GmbH and the RAVAG were the 
result of inter-firm collaboration in the district. The Lagerhaus (established in 1922) in 
particular significantly extended the horizon of interfirm cooperation in Leipzig. No less than 
39 firms participated in the new auction company, providing capital of 300,000 marks in 
1922. Several firms dominated the list of participants. The firm Gaudig & Blum provided the 
largest sum, 60,000 marks, followed by 20,000 marks from Theodor Thorer and 15,000 marks 
from Friedrich Erler.
968
 The fact that these firms in particular played a leading role in the new 
auction company reveals an important transnational dimension in the formation of auction 
companies. Both Thorer and Gaudig & Blum had ties to the new auction business in New 
York, The New York Fur Auction Sales, established in 1916. Charles S. Porter, the 
representative of Gaudig & Blum in New York, was appointed president of the New York Fur 
Auction Sales in 1916. Similarly, Edward Speer, head of New York branch of Thorer, was 
named treasurer of the same company.
969
 It is likely that these businesses’ involvement in 
New York partly explains the foundation of an auction company in Leipzig. The joint venture 
model was also inspired by the same example, since the New York auction was based upon 
the participation of many firms. The successes of New York auctions in competing with 
British auction houses were undoubtedly appealing as well.  
 
Thus, the unifying and participative model was effectively copied. Aside from the three firms 
listed above, capital investment divided relatively equally between the remaining 36 firms: 11 
firms provided 10,000 marks, 10 firms provided 5,000 marks, and the remaining 15 firms 
provided 3,000 marks each. Over the course of the years, however, a smaller number of firms 
came to form the core of the auction company. A milestone in the development of the 
Lagerhaus took place in 1926, when it was transformed into a joint-stock company. This 
allowed larger firms to assume a more prominent role. By the early 1930s, Theodor Thorer 
owned 35% of the shares.
970
 The firm Friedrich Erler and other trading companies of the 
Brühl (M. Bromberg & Co, Eisenbach & Stern, and Fein & Co) owned the remainder of the 
company shares. Initially, the firm epitomised an unprecedented scale of interfirm cooperation 
within the district but ultimately it came into the hands of a smaller circle of firms.  
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The other new auction company besides the Lagerhaus, the RAVAG (or 
Rauchwarenversteigerungs AG) was established only slightly later, in March 1923. In contrast 
to the Lagerhaus, it was formed by only six firms from the Brühl.
971
 These were Eisenbach & 
Stern, Max Feiler Gmbh, Rosenfelder & Sohn, Wienwurzel & Lorch, Ferdinand Salm, and 
Kurt Wachtel. An additional shareholder of this auction company was the Commerzbank in 
Leipzig, which illustrates the interest of the banks in processes of interfirm cooperation. The 
RAVAG gained additional eminence when Chaim Eitingon joined the firm as an expert “in 
the grading of the furs” and as a shareholder. Martin Lentschner was appointed as an 
additional member of the board. Again, it is important that the participation of larger firms 
like Theodor Thorer and Chaim Eitingon in interfirm cooperation reveals that business 
strategies of larger firms were not restricted to individual trade with the Soviets. These firms 
had appropriated the goal of strengthening commercial activity within the city through 
collective action.  
 
Both auction sales were organised according to the same principles. First, the Leipzig fur 
auctions were organised as “English auctions,” which were characterised by selling via 
ascending bids. Second, the Leipzig auction companies issued advance payments relative to 
the value of furs put for auction sales. The auction company graded the value of the goods and 
then paid advances to suppliers.
972
 Firms, foreign trade agencies, or farmers could entrust 
their goods to a wider arena of buyers and diminish the risk of losses. The practice of advance 
payment naturally attracted trading firms, fur farmers, and the Soviet trade agencies in need of 
money. The RAVAG, for instance, granted advances to firms and agencies that were 
interested in placing their furs on auction for about 6 weeks and for 50-60% of its expected 
value.
973
 The Lagerhaus similarly granted “transport credit” (or Lombard credit) to the Soviets 
and other suppliers with the furs acting as the collateral. In this respect, the auction company 
corresponded to the development of ascending world market prices and to what could be 
called a “financialisation” of the fur trade. 
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Competition between the auction companies, especially the Lagerhaus and RAVAG, was kept 
at bay. Two factors explain the lack of competition. Firstly, the Jewish firm Eisenbach & 
Stern, the only business with an interest in both auction companies, made good relations 
between the two auction houses possible. On the advice of Eisenbach & Stern, the Lagerhaus 
opened its warehouses and storerooms in 1923 to the recently established RAVAG.
974
 The 
warehouses of the Lagerhaus were located in the north of Leipzig, a few blocks away from the 
main railway station. Later, the RAVAG rented a depot inside the freight train station. As 
such, both auction houses were strategically located close to the railway hub. Secondly, both 
companies focused on different market sectors. The Lagerhaus was arguably much more 
internationally oriented, in particular to the trade with the Soviet Union. The auctions of the 
Lagerhaus primarily brought commodities on behalf of the Soviet trade representation to the 
Leipzig fur market. On the other hand, the RAVAG predominantly, albeit not exclusively, 
organised the sales of farmed furs, like rabbits and other furbearing animals that were 
increasingly being bred in Germany as well as in neighbouring countries.  
 
Let us examine the activities of the auction companies more closely. The Lagerhaus was 
created with the aim of taking over the independently organised Soviet auctions but it also 
organised the sales of fur trading companies. The Rauchwaren-Lagerhaus commenced 
auctioning furs in a commission for the Soviet trade agencies as early as 1922.
975
 The first 
auction of the Lagerhaus took place in the prestigious Krystallpalast in Leipzig, an epicentre 
of the urban bourgeoisie with salons, meeting rooms, and a theatre. Later auctions of the 
Lagerhaus were held in the Neue Handelsbörse, a large building in the north west of Leipzig 
that also housed the Chamber of Commerce.
976
 Soviet auctions organised by the Lagerhaus 
were held every six months between 1922 and 1926.
977
 The auction sales of the Lagerhaus 
supplied Leipzig factories and international customers with a variety of prime furs. Take the 
offering from September 1923 for instance. At this sale, 171,611 grey squirrels, 32,572 
ermines, 13,912 karakuls, and almost 1,000 high value Russian sables were sold.
978
 The 
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private auction companies revived trade with the Soviets as the market institution of collective 
sales dovetailed with a number of Soviet preferences, such as payment in advance and the 
transaction of larger quantities. I will return to this convergence later. 
 
Equally, auction companies tapped into the booming, albeit less international, circuit of 
farmed furs or subprime furs (foremost rabbits) produced by small scale husbandry in 
Germany and neighbouring countries. The auction company Mucrena in particular continued 
selling Landwaren, skins produced domestically, a legacy of the wartime economy. Foremost, 
this concerned the sale of rabbit skins in bulk. Mucrena procured furs not only from German 
farmers and animal keepers but also functioned as a European sales agency, dealing with 
suppliers form the Balkans, France, and Switzerland. In addition, its auctions were not only 
important for fur traders but also for shoe-makers, leather traders, and hat manufacturers, who 
all bought raw material from these sales.
979
  
 
Second, the RAVAG combined the sales of domestic fur skins with those that were imported. 
In terms of quantity, skin dealers who procured furs farmed in Germany were the principal 
suppliers of the RAVAG. This can be seen in table 1. The RAVAG mostly dealt in rabbit 
skins, 1,952,737 of which were sold at the 1924 sales. Nevertheless, the RAVAG offered 
significant quantities of imported prime furs as well, like 37,366 foxes and 36,675 skunks. 
The RAVAG also sold high valued prime furs in very low quantities (like otter skins), ranging 
from 2,000 to 3,000 items.
980
 All these types were sold during a number of irregular auctions 
throughout the year. For instance, in 1924, the RAVAG managed to hold 10 auctions, in 
which it sold almost double the quantity from 1923, when 7 auctions were held.
981
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Table 8-1: The sale of subprime furs by the RAVAG (1923-1929). 
 
Table 8-2: The sale of prime furs by the RAVAG (1923-1929). 
 
Since auction companies financed suppliers in advance, the participation of the local bank 
system was necessary. The financial demands of the Soviets in particular warranted 
cooperation that went beyond the limits of inter-firm cooperation in the fur sector. In fact, the 
banks became influential shareholders of the Leipzig auction companies. In the RAVAG, 
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credit was provided by the Commerzbank, which also acted as a shareholder.
982
 A new release 
of shares in 1928 made the Commerzbank the largest shareholder of the auction company.
983
 
The Dresdner Bank surfaced as the main financial force behind the Lagerhaus, especially after 
1926.  
 
In the spirit of restrained competition between the Leipzig auction houses, the practice of 
auctioning was neatly divided between the offices of the Dresdner and Commerzbank in 
Leipzig. The Dresdner Bank supported the Lagerhaus, while the Commerzbank did the same 
for the RAVAG. The Deutsche Bank, somewhat surprisingly given its interest in the district 
economy, refrained from participating in the auction hype. However, competition over the 
auction companies did surface when the Dresdner Bank attempted to establish connections 
with the RAVAG in 1929. Indeed, several businessmen involved in the RAVAG advocated a 
second credit line with the Dresdner Bank. However, Georg Kosterlitz, the director of the 
Commerzbank and representative on the board of the RAVAG, prevented this from 
happening.
984
 Nonetheless, bank competition produced beneficial effects on lending 
conditions. The Commerzbank offered unsecured credit. The Dresdner Bank refrained from 
demanding extra securities in their offer to the RAVAG, which consisted of credit to the limit 
of 400,000RM: “the Commerzbank issues loans in unsecured form, so we will give loans 
according to the same conditions.”985 Aside from individual links with fur businesses, the role 
of local banks was of seminal importance in processes of interfirm cooperation as well.  
 
It should be underscored that the new market institution had to win over the trust of both 
buyers and sellers. To begin with, the RAVAG appointed an independent auction leader, 
Büttner, who was “sworn” into office.986 The practice of auctions was alienating for several 
observers. A journalist of the newspaper Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten visited a Mucrena 
auction in 1929 and wrote about auctions as if they were something from another world.
987
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The journalist acquired the impression that the auction was something for insiders: “members 
of the Brühl” dominated the auction room, often by using “secret non-verbal language” and 
rapid bidding: “The settlement of the auction appears to be mysterious for laymen. 
Nonetheless, it has the advantage that sales proceeds more rapidly and the swift decisiveness 
resembles business conduct on the Brühl, from where most of this auction participants come. 
And as on the Brühl, everything is treated confidentially as possible, so you will also not let 
the competition know what and how you bought. Hence the secret signs and body 
language.”988 The journalist concluded that the auctioneer must know every participant 
personally, since this mode of sale would otherwise be impossible. 
 
Suspicion of the auctions pervaded widely, especially for actors unfamiliar with the 
transnational dimension of auction sales and for those outside the Leipzig fur trade. 
Particularly galling was the perception of artificial price fixing. Leather traders in Germany, 
for instance, accused the members of the RAVAG of artificial price inflation. According to 
the HUFA, the Union of the Leather Trade, auctions disturbed the process of price making, 
leading to price levels that were generally too high. In particular, the leather traders referred to 
what is known in auction theory as “vendor bidding.” Vendor bidding describes a situation in 
which sellers of the goods participate in the auction process and thereby artificially increase 
the price. The practice of vendor bidding was not forbidden by law but naturally caused 
discontent among the buyers. An article in the Leather Journal  (Lederzeitung) stated that “the 
suppliers of skins had been participating at the auctions.”989 In 1930, the RAVAG and the 
HUFA made an agreement concerning the practices governing the sale of leather hides, in 
which the RAVAG abstained from bringing large bulks of hides destined for the leather 
industry on the market via auctions. Auctions were also not regulated, in contrast to the 
situation in Great Britain, where laws were in place to monitor them. However, apart from the 
conflict with this professional group, auctions were relatively easily accepted by the Leipzig 
fur industry. Auctions were not an alien practice for them or remote from their experiences. 
The advance of auction sales in Leipzig was therefore irreversible. 
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Picture 3: Fur auction in Leipzig (between 1920-1940). Stadtarchiv Leipzig. 
 
8.4 Auction companies and market engineering.  
 
An important dimension of auctions was their ability to compete with rival fur centres. 
Auctions had a long pedigree in this regard and can be traced back to the ambition of the 
Leipzig merchant Heinrich Lomer to organise a private auction in order to take over 
commodity flows to London in the 1870s. The implementation of this market institution 
reflected the long-standing desire of local firms to maintain and reconstruct Leipzig as a fur 
capital, capable of competing with other centres. Auctions were a clear rupture with the 
tradition of selling furs at the fairs and the organisation of foreign trade by individual 
businesses. In other words, the foundation of auction companies stood central in processes of 
market engineering by district firms. In contrast, traditional market institutions, especially the 
Leipzig trade fairs, seemed too outdated to serve this function in the changing international 
fur trade. The decline of the fairs diverged remarkably with the situation of wholesalers and 
smaller firms in many other industries: for them, the Leipzig trade fair remained a robust 
‘umbrella institution’ for international trade throughout the interwar period.990 However, the 
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Leipzig trade fairs became increasingly less important for the international fur trade, a trend 
that was already noticeable prior to World War I. Owing to the format of the sample fair that 
was introduced in 1895, the fairs were more important for the retailing sector than for 
wholesaling. Sample fairs therefore turned to a more national public. Illuminating is the 
national success of fur fashion exhibitions organised by the association of German furriers at 
the Leipzig trade fairs from 1924.
991
 Walter Leiske of the Leipzig city administration stated in 
1928 that auctions were a more important phenomenon for the fur trade than the fairs.
992
  
 
8.4.1 The international operations of the RAVAG.  
 
Indeed, auction companies (especially the Lagerhaus and, to a lesser extent, the RAVAG) 
deliberately followed an international course. Once the practice of auctions sales were firmly 
established in Leipzig, the RAVAG pursued a more aggressive policy on foreign markets. In 
1928, the RAVAG forged plans to overtake the sale of Australian rabbits, which at that 
moment was in the hands of the British auction company Anning & Cobb.
993
 The RAVAG 
managed to secure support from several Leipzig banks and auctioned 650,000 Australian 
rabbits in the following winter. In the early 1930s, the RAVAG became the principal partner 
of the German farmers’ cooperative in Kalkfeld (South West Africa), on whose behalf they 
sold karakul skins and competed with the Thorer firm.  
 
The international policy of the RAVAG also aimed to make Leipzig the centre for furs that 
were produced and procured in European countries.
994
 The RAVAG focused on rabbit-skin 
producing countries like Belgium and the Nordic countries, where fur farming was developing 
at a much more rapid pace than in Germany. This internationalisation strategy, a trend of 
regionalisation expressed by the geography of fur farming, was conducted with the support of 
the Commerzbank, the main shareholder. By the early 1930s, the RAVAG managed to 
organise the sale of fox skins farmed in Sweden and Norway. Indeed, the sale of farmed furs 
from Germany and neighbouring countries would become the core business of the RAVAG 
(see Chapter 6).  
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8.4.2 Auctions and market engineering in the Soviet trade.  
 
The Lagerhaus focused on an entirely different market sector, that of the business of Siberian 
furs. In order to understand the activities of the Lagerhaus, we need to take into account the 
development of the international political economy in the second half of the 1920s. The 
Lagerhaus was able to exploit the opportunities in the Soviet business available at that time.
995
 
I have already mentioned that the fur trade benefited from the treaty of Berlin (1925) which 
tremendously improved bilateral trade relations between Germany and Soviet Union. In 
addition, improved German-Soviet relations occurred simultaneously with a diplomatic crisis 
between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. An alleged espionage incident involving the 
Soviet trade firm ARCOS in London caused a complete diplomatic shutdown. On 12 May 
1927, about 150 policemen unexpectedly raided the ARCOS buildings in Moorgate looking 
for documents that would provide evidence that ARCOS was being used by the Soviet 
government to spy and incite subversive communist activities in Britain.
996
 The accusations 
towards ARCOS should be seen in the context of strong anticommunist sentiments in Britain, 
stoked by the latest general strike in England and the communist uprisings in China.  
 
Irritated by the actions of the British police, the Soviets immediately reconsidered the role of 
London in the organisation of foreign trade.
997
 Martin Lentschner expected sizeable 
repercussions: “on the one hand, concerning exports to England, the situation will likely 
inflict damage; on the other hand, Germany can benefit from it, since the Russians will send 
all raw products via Berlin, and likewise their financial transactions.”998 Lentschner’s 
prediction about the future orientation of the Soviet fur trade towards Germany would turn out 
to be correct. After the raid on the ARCOS buildings, the Soviets diverted exports normally 
destined for Great Britain to Germany over the course of several months. 
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 Export to Germany Export to England Export to USA 
Year 1,000 
rbl 
% 1,000 
rbl 
% 1,000 
rbl 
% 
1925/26 42,320 18% 109,042 45% 41,246 17% 
1926/27 126,743 42% 103,079 34% 29,697 10% 
1927/28 211,124 51% 96,527 23% 31,666 8% 
1928 31,003 51% 16,230 27% 3,509 6% 
1929 185,338 50% 105,449 28% 41,497 11% 
1930 137,388 51% 78,178 29% 17,726 7% 
1931 85,029 43% 79,690 41% 3,506 2% 
1932 63,394 43% 49,833 34% 9,570 6% 
1933 70,626 53% 25,072 19% 11,769 9% 
Figure 8-1: Soviet fur export to Germany, Great Britain and the USA, in thousand roubles.999 
 
Indeed, between 1925 and 1933, German fur merchants and companies assumed a leading 
role in the Soviet fur trade (as seen in figure 1). However, unlike pre-war trade, domination 
never tipped into monopolisation. Britain and the US remained vital customers, dividing 
between them 30 to 50% of Soviet fur exports. Nevertheless, the shift of the Soviet trade 
towards Germany coincided with a general rise in the export value of furs. Export values of 
furs almost doubled from 1925 until 1927. In 1925-26, Soviets fur exports totalled 241 
million roubles: this jumped to 415 million roubles in 1927-1928. Only 4 years before, the 
total export of Russian furs was worth no more than 17 million roubles.
1000
 In 1921, the 
quantity of the fur exports represented 835 tons (7,709,000 roubles), whereas in 1927 the 
Soviets managed to export 3,423 tons (211,124,000 roubles). Put differently, the value of 
Soviet fur exports increased exponentially (multiplied by 27) whereas quantity only 
quadrupled. The discrepancy between value and quantity further signalled ascending world 
market prices. Throughout the interwar period, fur exports from the USSR never achieved 
levels higher than those between 1927 and 1928.  
 
Auction companies in Leipzig played an important role in the Soviet trade revival after 1926, 
largely because of their financial capabilities. An important consequence of the sudden 
change of policy in the wake of the ARCOS raid in London was that auction companies 
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suddenly needed larger amounts of money in order to seize the opportunity presented by the 
international political economy. In addition, world market prices were on the rise. In order to 
expand the financial potential of the auction companies, the local bank system began to play a 
larger role as a partner in these joint ventures. The Dresdner Bank in particular assumed a 
much more active role in the auction sales of the Lagerhaus. In the second half of the 1920s, 
the bank would systematically increase its role in the Lagerhaus company: it became a 
financial intermediary between the auction company and the Soviet state agencies that 
organised the export of Siberian furs.  
 
In early 1926, the Leipzig office of the Dresdner Bank acted as a financial intermediary 
between the Lagerhaus and the Soviet trade agencies. Direct associations were made not only 
with the Berlin trade representation (the German counterpart of the ARCOS) and the 
Selskosoiuz GmbH in Berlin, but also with the Moscow Narodny Bank ltd in London. The 
branch reported in October 1926 that “the relationship [with the Berlin trade representation] 
has existed since early 1926 and has now expanded considerably, rendering high profits to our 
branch.”1001 The activities of the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig differ from the general image of 
the role of German banks in the Soviet trade during the Weimar Republic. The main role of 
the banks in the Soviet trade was in the provision of export credit that allowed the Soviets to 
pay for German imports.
1002
 In contrast, the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig issued “import credit” 
in order to attract raw furs for auctioning. 
 
In October 1926, the Dresdner Bank granted a Lombard credit of 1 million dollars (or 
4,200,000RM) directly to the Soviet trade representation in Berlin (Handelsvertretung der 
UdSSR in Berlin). The Lagerhaus pawned furs from the Soviets in exchange for credits. The 
Dresdner Bank thereby expanded its role in the fur trade by functioning as a financial 
intermediary. Given its financial investments, the Dresdner Bank even hired extra experts to 
grade the pawned furs that were stored in the Lagerhaus in Leipzig.
1003
 As a rule, 25% of the 
value of the Siberian furs acted as a collateral in advance loans to the Soviets. The Soviets re-
paid the loans with earnings made on the auctioned furs. The system of trade relied entirely on 
Soviet credit requirements. Advances or loans were issued to the Soviets on almost all 
transactions. Kleiber, the leader of the fur department of the Soviet trade delegation, noted the 
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chief importance of the export of furs: “Russia needs money, it needs advance payment for its 
exports so it can pay for its imports.”1004 The main challenge for the Leipzig trade thus lay in 
financing the Russians, a problem which they had solved by partnering their auction 
companies with the local banks.
1005
  
 
The Dresdner Bank further expanded its activities as a financial intermediary when it 
concluded a trade deal with the USSR State Bank in 1927, which exported furs along with the 
Soviet trade representation in Berlin. The USSR State Bank obtained $2,500,000 worth of 
acceptance credit from the Dresdner Bank for sending furs to Leipzig.
1006
 The new credit was 
managed by the head office in Berlin but the goods arrived in Leipzig and were inspected by 
the officials of the bank in the city. Later, the Dresdner Bank divided credit between the 
USSR State Bank, the Garantie und Kredit-bank für den Osten (or Garkrebo, a German bank 
specialised in trade with the Soviet Union), and the Moscow Narodny Bank ltd. By 1927, the 
USSR State Bank made use of $2,000,000 of acceptance credit, the Garkrebo $1,780,000, and 
the Moscow Narodny Bank $1,700,000.
1007
 All these institutions delivered furs to be 
auctioned in Leipzig in exchange for credit. In turn, the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig opened new 
sources of credit in order to finance in the influx of furs. The bank received $1,000,000 of 
credit from the National Bank of Commerce in New York, while the head office in Berlin 
granted $2,000,000 to their Leipzig branch.
1008
  
 
The expanding role of the Dresdner Bank in financing Soviet trade agencies on behalf of the 
Lagerhaus had a ratchet effect on the importance of auction sales as a gateway for foreign 
trade. The sales of the auctions held by the Lagerhaus were worth roughly $3,000,000 on 
average.
1009
 In the spring auction of 1927, the Lagerhaus auctioned raw furs for a total value 
of about $2,000,000.
1010
 During the September auctions of the same year, the value of the 
total furs almost doubled to about $3.7 million: most of the goods were sold to Leipzig 
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firms.
1011
 According to observers, this was one of the largest auctions ever held in Leipzig.
1012
 
These two auctions roughly accounted for 10% of the total furs imported to Germany from the 
Soviet Union in 1927. Seen from a regional perspective, auctions were even more important. 
The Dresdner Bank estimated that the value of $2,500,000 imported in furs represented 20-
25% of all Soviet fur supplies to the Leipzig district. Auctions continued to deal in large 
values: $4,700,000 in September 1928 (7% of all German imports) and $4,200,000 in the 
spring auctions of 1929 (or 6.7% of the total German fur imports).
1013
  
 
It should be noted that the figures for 1928 and 1929 are incomplete and the imports through 
Soviet auctions must have been much higher. Nevertheless, with the creation of auctions as an 
umbrella institution, the Leipzig fur district clearly reinforced its position as a marketplace in 
the trade of Siberian furs. Auctions supplied many Leipzig firms and factories and also 
attracted an international pack of fur dealers. Leipzig firms profited indirectly from these 
sales: “the sales go, directly or through Leipzig firms, to North American, South American, 
English, French, Belgian, and Austrian fur traders.”1014 The auctions attracted international 
customers and allowed Leipzig firms to supply local factories with raw material.  
 
The auction company brought a relative, if temporary, stability to the dealings with the 
Soviets. Banks, firms, and Soviet agents seemed satisfied with the way in which trade was 
organised. The Russian trade representation expressed their satisfaction about the business 
with the Dresdner Bank and painted a promising picture for possible future trade: “Mr. 
Kleiber [leader of the fur section of the Russian trade representation] declared his satisfaction 
regarding the loans issued by the Dresdner Bank (...) he furthermore declared that the trade 
representation had no loans from other banks at its disposal. Mr. Kleiber held out the prospect 
of the arrival of more goods next January and February, and made a stronger appeal to the 
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services of our bank.”1015 Furthermore, disputes about trade parameters were settled relatively 
easy. For instance, Kleiber made attempts to modify the lending conditions to the benefit of 
the Berlin agency. Instead of 8.35% interest on transport credit, the Soviets demanded that the 
interest rates be lowered to 7.5%, declaring that other German banks were offering better 
conditions. The Dresdner Bank therefore dropped the interest rate to 7.75%.
1016
 Later, the 
bank increased interests rates again to 8%. Kleiber accepted the modification without protest. 
Similarly, Kleiber agreed when the Dresdner Bank increased the collateral from 25% to 35% 
on the value of the furs.
1017
 The business parameters were set by mutual understanding and 
without much conflict, something German business and banks were wary of. 
 
8.5 Auctions: some local and international considerations.  
 
8.5.1 Auctions at the service of the district.  
 
The success of auction companies had an important impact on the local industrial district, 
both in terms of other forms of collective action and on the relationship between firms and the 
banking system. Firstly, joint venture auction companies completely overshadowed other 
forms of interfirm cooperation in restoring foreign trade. In particular, attempts to create 
consortia were hindered by the success of auction companies. In 1926, several firms of the 
Brühl, supported by the banks and the government, hatched a plan to forge a consortium in 
order to attract large volumes of furs. Several Leipzig fur firms pooled capital in order to 
generate more imports from the Soviet Union and sought $666,000 (or 2,797,200 RM) to pay 
an advance to the Soviets. Six firms of the Brühl were at the basis of this consortium: three 
lead firms (Ariowitsch Biedermann, and Thorer who each put up $ 100,000) and several 
smaller firms like Ehrmann, Lotz & Co, Eisenbach & Stern, and David Kölner with smaller 
amounts of money (ranging from $20,000 to $40,000).
1018
 A group of banks including 
ADCA, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner Bank was willing to provide additional credit of 
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$1,400,000 to the consortium: thus, it was able to provide an advance of $2,000,000. The 
negotiations dragged on until early 1927, when the shape of the consortium became more 
concrete, thanks to Thorer’s intervention.  
 
The reason behind the construction of a trade consortium was that the participating Leipzig 
firms hoped to secure an influx of Siberian furs through a multiannual deal. The fur 
businessmen in Leipzig realised that neither scruples nor local infrastructure would prevent 
the Soviets from diverting their affairs to a more interesting primary market: “a financial 
arrangement remains in the interest of the Leipzig fur industry in order to firmly attach the 
Russians to Leipzig, who will otherwise leave at the first opportunity.”1019 In early 1927, the 
Soviets changed the design of the initial plan because of Anglo-Soviet problems, increasing 
the quota of furs they put for sale to $8,000,000, with an advance of $3,000,000.
1020
 The 
gigantic $8,000,000 deal was almost signed but was abandoned at the last minute. It seems 
that the growing success of the Soviet auctions rendered the need for a consortium obsolete. 
Indeed, the quotas of furs that the Soviets sold on auctions reached record highs in 1927.
1021
 
 
The consortium is nonetheless interesting from the point of view of local collaborative 
networks. As with the 1921 consortium, firms showed a remarkable willingness to cooperate 
in order to attract more ‘Russian business’ to their city. Mechanisms of mutual support were 
at play here. The fact that solidarity underpinned these consortia was often explicitly 
mentioned. Although the consortium was not necessary for his business, Ariowitsch 
nonetheless wished to have his name attached to the project. Naumann of the Deutsche Bank, 
who closely followed the development of the consortium, noted that “Ariowitsch will not 
stand on the sidelines for reasons of solidarity.”1022 Ariowitsch was willing to put financial 
resources at the disposal of the consortium, even though his commerce could function 
perfectly well without it. However, the success of collective action that led to auction 
companies overruled alternative forms of collaboration and solidarity.  
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Secondly, the creation of the auction companies influenced interfirm networks in a multitude 
of ways. The auction companies should be seen as one of the most important umbrella 
institutions for the facilitation of international trade in Leipzig since the fairs. Auctions were 
engineered in order to attract trade to the city. These commercial spillover effects were 
central: business profits came only second. The auction companies never became a big 
revenue pump for the participating firms. Rather, they served as an umbrella institution for the 
supply of the fur industry. Despite the enormous amounts of furs that were sold under the 
hammer of the auctioneer, the RAVAG’s annual profits between 1924 and 1929 never 
exceeded the sum of 70,000RM, even when business volume expanded rapidly. Although the 
profit levels of the RAVAG were stable and increased until 1929, they were much lower than 
individual profit levels of the larger or even medium-sized firms in the Leipzig district. 
 
 
Table 8-3: Profits and business volume of the RAVAG (1923-1929). 
 
Profit levels of the Lagerhaus were generally higher, although they fluctuated more. In 1926, 
a record profit amounted to 124,543RM. In comparison, David Kölner, a typical small-sized 
firm, attained a profit of 154,305RM in the same year. Thus, even the internationally oriented 
Lagerhaus never managed to achieve profit levels approaching those of the lead firms in the 
district. The modest profit level was primarily caused by the nature of the auction sales. First, 
the auction house acted as an intermediary between sellers and buyer, conveying bulks of furs 
that belonged to a number of sellers to a sizeable arena of buyers. It only derived revenue 
from auction fees and commission percentages. Second, the RAVAG and the Lagerhaus 
chiefly relied on their bank connections, and not on the firm capital, to provide loans and 
advances to suppliers. It is likely that a large amount of the profits made on advances and 
credit flowed directly to the banks. They claimed a large share of the profits by issuing credit 
and arranging payment traffic on the auction. In 1929, for instance, the Dresdner Bank made a 
profit of $31,000 (130,200RM) and an additional $9,000 (37,800 RM) through simply 
 Profits Business 
volume  
1924 29,732 165,992 
1925 15,790 288,630 
1926 46,057 454,621 
1927 64,899 654,591 
1928 69,711 727,200 
1929 50,517 608,576 
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granting credit to the Russian state bank in exchange for furs. The profits of the banks on 
loans to the Soviets easily equalled those of a medium-sized firm. In addition, by participating 
in the auction company, banks wielded substantial influenced over the fur business. Whereas 
the first part of this chapter showed how local traders manipulated competition between 
banks, banks in turn assumed a strong position on the local market in furs and upon processes 
of interfirm cooperation. Thus, the observation that fur firms set the terms of commercial 
banking is nuanced when taking into account the influential role banks played in auction 
companies and thereby in the local fur trade.  
 
8.5.2 The Leipzig auctions and the magnitude of the Soviet fur trade.  
 
To conclude this section, I would like to point again to the international dimension of auctions 
in Leipzig and to the worldwide dynamics produced by this economic institution more 
generally. Firstly, it should be stressed that the fur trade was a cornerstone in the revival of 
Soviet-German commerce. The exports of furs to Germany played a huge role in the balance 
of trade. In fact, the revival of the German-Russian fur commerce noticeably disrupted the 
trade balance of Germany with its trading partner in the east. After 1926, Germany ran a trade 
deficit of 36.8 million RM, as opposed to the surplus of 55 million in 1925. As imports like 
furs increased in value, the bilateral trade balance in 1927 registered a deficit of 103.2 million 
RM in 1927.
1023
 As the following table indicates (table 2), the imports of the German fur trade 
were to a large extent responsible for this bilateral trade deficit. Fur imports from the Soviet 
Union burdened the trade balance significantly more after 1925: proportions reached 14% of 
total imports in 1927 and furs represented one quarter of all German imports from the USSR 
in 1928 (see figure 2).
1024
 As such, furs were big business in terms of bilateral Soviet-German 
economic relationship, a dimension that is often overlooked. Moreover, the strategic 
magnitude of furs increasingly impacted upon the local Leipzig fur industry, especially in the 
1930s.  
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 As % of 
total 
imports 
In mill. 
RM 
1923 7% 6 
1924 13% 15 
1925 5% 14.5 
1926 6%  23.3 
1927 14% 64.9 
1928 24% 92.1 
1929 23% 100 
1930 18% 80.2 
Table 8-4: German Imports from the Soviet Union. 
Secondly, the growing importance of auctions was very much a transnational process. 
Auctions were being successfully used to transform cities into fur trading markets, especially 
in North America.
1025
 Similarly, the Leipzig auctions allowed firms to resume the trade of 
Siberian furs and tap into the growing market of subprime and farmed furs in Europe. 
International markets in the fur industry thus increasingly converged in terms of organisation. 
Auction sales surfaced as the principal mode of transaction and as the ruling market 
convention in the wholesale trade for both farmed and hunted furs. Furthermore, auctions 
commanded new dynamics in terms of governance of the commodity chain. Economic actors 
around the globe increasingly saw auctions as a key institution in redefining their position in 
world trade. Auctions diminished the distance between resource producers, markets, and 
manufacturing. As we have seen in chapter 4, auctions were held to be instrumental by farmer 
cooperatives in South West Africa in order to improve their disadvantageous position in the 
commodity chain. The Soviets were also not blind to the advantages of auctions sales. They 
perceived auctions to be a more modern and advanced business practice than the system of 
trading through fairs, which had epitomised pre-war penetration of foreign capital into the 
Russian fur trade.
1026
 In 1926, the Soviets also realised that auctions could be instrumental in 
transforming Russian cities into fur centres. In Soviet trade agencies, Leningrad was 
increasingly seen as the future centre of the Russian fur trade. 
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The Soviet desire to decrease dependency upon foreign fur trade centres also has to be seen in 
the context of the strategic importance of furs in the Soviet economy. By 1925-1926, exports 
of furs destined for the international fur market represented over 10% of the total Soviet 
export structure. However, the Soviets were well aware that earnings through foreign trade 
greatly relied on the export of furs. Isvestiia reported in 1929 that furs represented 15 % of the 
Soviet export value.
1027
 The strategic importance of furs played to the disadvantage of the 
industry in Leipzig. The Soviet economists realised that foreign trade was based on a few 
strategic resources like fur and was therefore vulnerable to shifts in global demands. For that 
reason, the Soviets entertained plans to modify trade institutions even further: “precisely 
because of the boom, they fear fluctuations in the world market even more, as this will cause 
severe losses and the collapse of their own foreign trade.”1028 Firms in Leipzig realised that 
the Soviets were reluctant to put fur exports into the hands of one single market. The 
consortium of 1927 made explicit mention of this problem. This observation was justified. 
The expanding German business interests were flying in the face of economic ideology in the 
USSR. The Soviet press forcefully attacked the interests of German business: as Pravda put it 
on 3 March 1928, “the Soviet Union will act against the monopolistic attempts of German 
industrial and financial milieus (...).”1029 Thus, the Soviet administrators planned to construct 
auction companies inside the USSR as alternatives to London and Leipzig. Trade with the 
USSR would therefore never regain its pre-war stability and predictability, despite the 
flexibility of the new economic institutions and cooperation between actors in the district. 
 
8.6 Conclusion.  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine processes of interfirm cooperation in the interplay 
with world market restructuring. Two main areas of cooperation between economic actors 
have been discussed in depth. One domain of cooperation, that between single businesses and 
banks, links up to existing pre-war collaboration patterns, whereas the other one, the creation 
of auction firms by local firms and banks, signalled a breach with trade conventions in the 
Leipzig district. The suffocating competition between banks on the local lending market was 
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favourable to many fur businesses. Traders and industrialists had access to cheap capital and 
to acceptance credits in foreign currency. The readmission of the Leipzig fur industry onto the 
world market was to a large extent based on the availability of local financial resources. The 
conditions of the lending market were set in by fur firms, which allowed them to play a 
leading role in foreign trade. It should be noted that the accessible credit market was not 
solely caused by bank competition. Tension between firms and local bankers were largely 
absent. Bank directors were personally acquainted with the fur traders and often shared a 
common view on local business affairs. The view that firms should participate in foreign trade 
continued to gain the upper hand in Leipzig business circles that included local bank directors. 
 
The local banks were of key importance to the re-admission of Leipzig firms onto the world 
market, not only by providing credit to individual firms but also because of their involvement 
in mutually led auction companies. These companies were not only unprecedented in scope, 
but also changed the way in which market transactions were organised. Auction companies 
pooled together the capital of a number of firms and they were run by a few entrepreneurs 
who headed fur firms in the district. The joint venture model enabled economic actors to tap 
into the new markets that defined the international fur industry of the 1920s. One auction 
house in particular, the Lagerhaus, specialised in the sale of Soviet furs and was thereby 
transformed into a central institution of the international fur business. Other auction 
companies tapped into the equally important and growing circuit of farmed furs. This initially 
entailed the sale of subprime furs like rabbits but increasingly became centred on prime furs 
farmed in Europe, foremost fox farming. Auction companies were thus a vehicle to establish 
Leipzig as a sales market in farmed furs, a key component of the ‘modern fur industry.’ In 
that sense, joint venture auctions companies were important instruments in creating links 
between the industrial district and the new geographies of world trade.  
 
In examining the involvement of the banks as participants in the auction companies, a more 
nuanced picture than that of the banking sector’s role as handmaiden of the fur industry 
emerges. Certainly, local banks were in a weak position in setting the terms of the credit 
market. However, because of their contribution to auctions house, fur traders and industrialists 
became increasingly dependent upon the participation of the banks. In fact, the interests of 
local banks and businesses became intertwined because of the auction companies. In its 
activities with Soviet trade institutions as part of its role as the house bank of the Lagerhaus, 
the Dresdner Bank became an important participant of the international fur trade. In this 
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regard, the chapter has again made the case that banks should be understood as a participating 
economic actor rather than a related service industry.  
 
The introduction of auctions, hitherto an institution used in Anglo-American markets, shows 
that the Leipzig fur district was not an insular community. The practice of auctions was 
implemented in a wide variety of contexts: from resource-producing areas in South West 
Africa to emerging markets in North America and declining transit markets like Leipzig. As 
such, auctions came to structure international competition and provided the playing field for 
global commerce. Leipzig firms principally adopted foreign business practices in the belief 
that they could strengthen the locality in which their business was embedded. Interfirm 
cooperation was able to re-create a foreign economic institution that radically altered 
commercial practices and market conventions at the local level. Consequently, interfirm 
cooperation made the embedded economy converge with conventions that governed the 
global fur market 
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9 The International Fur Exhibition (IPA) as a Joint-
Marketing Venture (1926-1930).  
 
9.1 Introduction. Exhibition culture and joint marketing.  
 
In the long and rainy summer of 1930, the International Fur Trade Exhibition (Internationale 
Pelzfach Ausstellung; IPA hereafter) held Leipzig under its spell from early June to the end of 
September. The IPA was one of the last international trade exhibitions of its kind to be held in 
Saxony and it specifically aimed to promote the Leipzig fur industry both at home and abroad. 
It appealed to the broader masses as well as international businessmen and experts. Almost 
800,000 visitors headed to the fur exhibition, paying for a 1RM ticked that allowed them to 
visit the ‘educational trade exhibition’ and its related festivities. The exhibition was truly 
international as well: more than 11 exhibit stands of various countries were to be found in the 
exhibition halls, including ones from fur centres like the United States, Great Britain, and the 
Soviet Union. Important multinationals like the Hudson’s Bay Company had stands at the 
exhibition. On the sidelines, the International Fur Congress was held, wich aimed to set up a 
federation to regulate the conduct of international business. The IPA was arguably the largest 
national and international promotion campaign the Leipzig industry ever held. 
 
The IPA was part of the venerable tradition of German, and particularly Saxon, exhibition 
culture. First, a distinction should be made between the classical ‘trade exhibition’ (Industrie 
und Gewerbeausstellung), organised on a national, regional or local scale, and the world 
exposition. World expositions in Germany were rather rare, with the notable exception of the 
Berlin world exhibition of 1896.
1030
 German exhibition culture centred on organising 
moderately sized trade exhibitions. Trade exhibitions are either universal, putting the entire 
regional industry in the spotlight, or specialised, highlighting one particular sector 
(Fachausstellung). Trade exhibitions were popular in Saxony too, the first one being held as 
early as 1824. Whereas universal exhibitions dominated exhibition culture at first, specialised 
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trade exhibitions in Saxony gradually gained the upper hand. These exhibitions have chiefly 
been analysed from an ‘internal’ perspective, as instruments to support Saxony’s early 
industrialisation and as institutions that helped form Saxon particularism on a material level 
by exhibiting the products and practices that typified the region. Exhibitions were analysed as 
a stage for “Saxon quality” and “as a form of communication to regional customers by giving 
a clear overview of the range of products made in Saxony.”1031 The role of exhibitions as 
drivers in regionalised consumption patterns have somewhat overshadowed the international 
dimension of such events., Hochmuth has acknowledged the importance of the international 
function of Saxon exhbitions, which originated from “the pressure to defend regional markets 
with competitive products against imports as well as finding international outlet markets for 
local products.”1032 Kiesewetter noted that exhibitions were necessary instrument for business 
in Saxony: “the export oriented industries have to compete on international markets (...) 
exhibitions were therefore necessary to open new ways for technology transfers and 
communication.”1033 Thus, the international context was an important dimension in staging 
Saxon exhibitions, both for international marketing and as ways to diffuse new technologies 
and products. 
 
Furthermore, the exhibitions in Saxony increasingly gained a transregional dimension because 
of their size. This was an important aspect in the 1897 universal Thüringisch-sächsische 
Industrie und Gewerbe Ausstellung in Leipzig, which assembled 3,500 exhibits and attracted 
2,300,000 visitors.
1034
 The universal exhibition of 1897 served to underline the importance of 
Leipzig as a mercantile and industrial centre of central Germany.
1035
 However, this was the 
last universal exhibition that took place in the city: after this, specialised exhibitions 
dominated the scene in Leipzig. In 1913, the International Construction Exhibition (IBA or 
Internationale Bau-Ausstellung) took place, assembling the main actors of the German 
construction industry and attracting an enormous crowd of four million visitors. Industrial 
districts in Leipzig made use of the specialised trade exhibition for promotional and marketing 
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purposes. In 1914, the BUGRA (Internationale Ausstellung für Buchgewerbe und Graphik) 
represented the book-printing industry, the other major industry clustered in the city of 
Leipzig: it was organised by the Leipzig Book Printing Assocation (Buchgewerbe Verein).
1036
 
Importantly, the book-printing exhibition was used to promote the city of Leizpig as both a 
national and international centre of the printing industry. The BUGRA reinforced Leipzig’s 
leading role in the world of book printing by transforming the classical format of the book 
trade fair into a world exhibition. As such, its appeals to internationalism were in the cultural 
(“book-printing as a binding cultural force”) as well as the economic sphere (“by illustrating 
the importance of Leipzig as leading world centre in book-printing”).1037 The pre-war 
exhibitions set useful examples and a high standard for their neighbours in the fur industry.  
 
The 1930 IPA was thus part of a venerable tradition of Saxon exhibition culture that 
increasingly shifted from supporting regional economic development to international 
promotion and self-fashioning. The exhibition will be analysed from a local and international 
perspective. Firstly, exhibitions allow us to gain a deeper insight into the local social structure 
that organises them. Alexander Geppert noted that “exhibitions are considered historical 
gadgets (...) under which it is possible to gain immediate insights into societies as they 
represent and regard themselves.”1038 Due to high investment costs, exhibitions were usually 
the result of collaborative efforts between local economic agents and the public authorities. 
Therefore, exhibitions are an important part of my claim that transregional links in the 
industrial district resulted from local collective action. By analysing the organisation of the 
IPA, we are provided a window into the organisation of local networks in the industrial 
district and processes of collective action. Secondly, the exhibition will be analysed as an 
aspect of translocal connectivity, as a ‘pipe-line’ to the wider world. I will make the case that 
the IPA suited Leipzig businessmen’s strategies ‘to restore the position of Leipzig’ within the 
international fur trade. Exhibitions were a useful form of advertising in that regard. Rather 
than selling and conducting trade, exhibitions had a magnet function, drawing attention to the 
sector and attracting people from great distances. This magnet function and its usefulness for 
constructing translocal connections is one of the principal reasons why firms organise 
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exhibitions.
1039
 In sum, the IPA exhibition allows us to link localised processes of cooperation 
in the district with the creation of connections to the outside world.  
 
9.2 The origins of the IPA (1926-1929) and patterns of local collaboration.  
 
9.2.1 Domestic origins, international consequences. 
 
In this part, I will discuss the forms of local collaboration that made the emergence of the IPA 
possible. The purpose of this section is to situate the exposition plans within the social 
structure of the industrial district. While the IPA was constructed to advertise the fur industry 
on the national and the international levels, its immediate emergence was deeply rooted in a 
regional context. The IPA was primarily a reaction to fur industrialists in Berlin who, in 1926, 
planned a fur exhibition in Berlin for the near future. After Leipzig, Berlin contained the most 
significant concentration of fur businesses and furriers in Weimar Germany. Moreover, 
Berlin, a more cosmopolitan city than Leipzig, was also seen as the national fashion centre. 
The Messeamt in Berlin planned the exhibition as a large national exhibition for the fur 
industry that would advertise Berlin-made luxury clothing. Needless to say, businessmen in 
Leipzig felt somewhat threatened by the Berlin plans. They saw no harm in propaganda for 
the fur retailers of Berlin but feared that an exhibition in the capital would end up being larger 
than announced and that the Berlin promotion would put the Leipzig fur district in the 
shade.
1040
  
 
Plans to counter the Berlin exhibition with an alternative Leipzig exhibition were soon 
discussed in the city’s town hall, especially between the City’s Economic Department 
(Wirtschaftsamt) and the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association.
1041
 In October 1926, it was 
concluded that “everything must be put in to place in order to counter the plans for a Berlin 
fur exhibition. The Leipzig plans should illustrate that Leipzig is still the headquarters of the 
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German fur industry and that Berlin is the fashion headquarters.”1042 The pressure increased 
when the leading newspaper in Leipzig, the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, described the 
intentions of the Berliner Messeamt and called the local fur sector to react.
1043
 The economic 
department and the Fur Merchants Association therefore made the plans for a Leipzig 
exhibition public. However, the schemes soon outgrew the very specific context of rivalry 
with Berlin. For the Fur Merchants Association, the exhibition had more to do than advertise 
Leipzig’s national importance. It had to allude to the international magnitude of the local fur 
industry. This was the official starting point for the creation of an international Leipzig 
exhibition. 
 
However, the local fur trade’s initial reception of the exhibition plans was lukewarm at best. 
The furriers and independent retailers in Leipzig, an important part of the district less 
concerned with internationalisation and whose economic interests differed greatly from the 
merchant houses on the Brühl, criticised the international concept of the IPA, fearing that it 
would draw attention to foreign products instead of the German fur industry. Especially 
galling was the prospect of competing with ‘trend-setting’ French fur producers.1044 Concern 
about the promotion of foreign fur production loomed until the beginning of exhibition itself. 
Only when the organisers finally prohibited selling at the stands and downplayed the 
commercial dimension of the exposition did the Leipzig furriers more keenly participate in the 
IPA.
1045
 Scepticism was not confined to the furriers alone. The German fur trade was equally 
half-hearted about the IPA, despite the fact that they were arguably the ‘objective’ allies of 
the international exhibition. During one of the meetings of the Leipzig Fur Merchants 
Association in 1927, during which the leaders of the association discussed the terms of the 
IPA, a majority of members predicted the failure of the ambitious exhibition. These traders 
feared the lack of interest in the fur industry and lamented the “exhibition fatigue” that held 
sway over Germany.
1046
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Despite resistance in the sector, several entrepreneurs were able to push the idea on the fur 
trading community. Again, the importance of lead firms as facilitators should be stressed. In 
the early stage of planning, the ‘usual suspects’ (firms like Theodor Thorer, Friedrich Erler, 
and Chaim Eitingon AG) played a large role. The lead firms were precisely those that had 
been involved in other forms of inter-firm cooperation, like fur farming and the establishment 
of auction companies. Members of these firms occupied high positions in the trade 
associations. Moreover, the organisation of the IPA furthered the ascent of Paul Hollender as 
the Leipzig fur industry’s leading man. Hollender was the president of the Leipzig Fur 
Merchants Association and was later appointed to be president of the IPA organisation 
committee. Walter Krausse, a manager of the Friedrich Erler firm, held the position of vice-
president.
1047
 At least in the initial stages, the organisation of the IPA depended on figures in 
leading firms. However, the organisation expanded quickly. As the idea of the IPA further 
matured, organisational subcommittees were filled with representatives of the dyeing and 
dressing industry, furriers, and university scientists (like Hans Nachtsheim).
1048
 Thus, once a 
block of lead firms had overcome initial resistance, the IPA organisation came to resemble a 
microcosm of this local production system. 
 
While domestic concerns and rivalry with Berlin dominated the initial discussions of the 
IPA’s organisation, the ambitions of organisers soon expanded. It was emphasised that the 
IPA should not only symbolise Leipzig as the domestic centre of the fur industry, but also 
support Leipzig’s return to the world stage. The IPA committee described the basic rationale 
underlying the IPA, which stressed the international dimension: “the IPA should not be a vain 
reflection of our activities, but an advertisement for labour and a support of our world 
economic interests.”1049  The overarching aim was “the propagation of Leipzig as one of the 
leading European fur metropolises (...) and to regain the position of Leipzig as a centre of the 
fur trade that was lost after World War I.”1050 This aim formed the foundation for local 
cooperation between economic agents of all segments of the industrial district: the fur trade, 
the industry, furriers, and experts on fur farming. Since selling was forbidden, it was believed 
that the exhibition would generate benefits for the local industry in an invisible yet valuable 
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way. Instead of direct commercial gain generated by a traditional trade fair, “a successful 
exhibition will strengthen the national as well as the world economic position of the fur 
industry in Leipzig and will reverse the negative post-war trade cycle.”1051 
 
In the pursuit of past glory, the exhibition had to take place on the location that housed the 
modern trade fairs and the grand pre-war exhibitions, the ‘old fair grounds’ (Alte 
Messegelande). This urban space between the National Library and the Monument to the 
Battle of the Nations (Völkerslachtdenkmal) was constructed for the occasion of the first 
large-scale specialised trade exhibition of the IBA, a mass event which welcomed 4,000,000 
visitors. The IPA committee and the city council made explicit references to the IBA and 
BUGRA exhibitions held in this new civic locale.
1052
 Since 1920, the infrastructure hosted the 
Leipzig trade fairs, which it continued to do well into the late 1990s. The IPA was to be held 
at the same location. The halls could demonstrate the technical aspects of the fur industry and 
there was sufficient space to organise entertainment. As such, the context and historical 
precedents were ready and waiting to turn the IPA into a prestigious specialised exhibition 
capable of hosting a mass public audience. 
 
9.2.2 “In the pursuit of past glory”: The IPA and local collaboration. 
 
The goal of ‘international revival’ was widely accepted as the underlying aim of the 
exhibiton. Such a goal had been the foundation of earlier projects of local cooperation 
between firms and other local actors. The exhibition as a ‘pipeline’ to the wider world became 
one of the most broadly supported events in post-war Leipzig. Public figures, both in the city 
council and the Saxon government, played leading roles in the IPA committee, its 
organisation, and financial maintance. Most important were Walter Leiske in his capacity as 
head of the Leipzig Traffic Office (Leipziger Verkehrsamt) and Dr. Klien, the director of 
Saxony’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (Sächsisches Wirtschaftsministerium). Leiske devoted 
his career to regional economic planning at a time when this discipline was still 
underdeveloped. After his appointment as director of the Traffic Office in 1926, Leiske 
developed ideas to redefine the region of Saxony as part of a new economic geography, 
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middle Germany (Mitteldeutschland), with Leipzig as the central commercial node.
1053
 Leiske 
published his thoughts on propelling the economy of Leipzig in his influential publication 
series Leipziger Verkehr und Verkehrspolitik.
1054
 In 1928, he released a seminal memorandum 
entitled ‘Leipzig and Middle-Germany,’ in which he proposed to redefine the internal borders 
of Germany with a strong ‘Middle-Germany’ as its powerhouse. As such, Leiske saw the fur 
industry as a major regional asset and the IPA suited his scheme for stimulating regional 
economic activity. He therefore devoted a publication in his series on Mitteldeutschland to the 
IPA and its importance for local economic development at a relatively early stage in the 
planning.
1055
 The commitment of the city administration reflected a more proactive stance 
towards local economic dynamism. 
 
A more delicate matter was that of finance. The committee hoped to receive contributions 
from the various political wings of the Reich: the governments in Berlin, Saxony, and the city 
of Leipzig. This was to be matched by a contribution from local economic agents in Leipzig. 
These included both the fur sector and the banks, whose involvement in the international 
business has been underlined before.
1056
 The first round of fundraising, an important test for 
the ambitions of the IPA committee, was held in the spring of 1929. Although the Reich 
refused to finance the exhibition, the IPA enlisted the support of local public authorities and 
economic actors. Firstly, the city council’s involvement was more substantial than mere 
political support. The city guaranteed bank loans to the sum of 250,000RM on behalf of the 
IPA.
1057
 This decision was motivated by the following: “in the city’s (...) economic policy, 
there will be close help to facilitate the recovery of the lost pre-war position of the important 
fur trade in Leipzig, which contributes to the labour market in the city and country, and 
because the inner forces of the industry have been set in motion during recent years to 
overcome the catastrophic setback of the war years.”1058 Following a similar kind of 
reasoning, the government of Saxony offered a guarantee for about 100,000RM. This action 
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was noteworthy because the Saxon government had normally refused to support new 
exhibitions since the early 1920s. Politicians in Dresden were willing to make an exception 
for “important locally concentrated industries like the book printing and fur industries in 
Leipzig.”1059 In addition, Klien emphasised the role that the fur trade played in the region’s 
international standing: “the economic goal [of the exhibition] is to strengthen Leipzig’s 
position in the world fur trade (...) because the value of the pre-war trade (...) has almost been 
reached again.”1060 
 
This picture closely resembled precedents from other local exhibitions. Economic agents and 
political actors also jointly financed the BUGRA, the 1914 exhibition of the book printers in 
Leipzig. The contribution of public actors represented 40% of the 1,000,000 marks needed for 
this exhibition.
1061
 Local economic actors supplied the rest. In the case of the IPA, the 
contribution of private actors was slightly smaller than that of the city and the Saxon 
government. Banks and fur firms raised the sum of 250,000RM. Participation in the IPA was 
affordable for all firms, since the amount of contributions apparently corresponded to the size 
of the business. Contributions never exceeded the sum of 10,000RM, while smaller firms 
contributed between 1,000 to 5,000RM on average. It was clearly intended to allow for as 
many firms as possible to make a contribution. This intention was realised: 58 firms 
transferred sums between 1,000 and 10,000RM to the IPA committee. Judging from the high 
number of participants, the interest in the IPA had surged in comparison to the indifference in 
the initial stages of organisation.  
 
Despite the large participation, the actual amount raised by the fur industry was still relatively 
modest when compared to that of public authorities. Moreover, firms funded only 75% of the 
250,000RM raised by private industry. Large firms adhered to the maximum contribution of 
10,000 RM. Only three leading fur firms contributed the maximum sum: David Biedermann, 
Chaim Eitingon AG, and Thorer. Ariowitsch, one of the wealthiest fur businesses of the 
Bruhl, provided only 8,000RM. Despite the presence of their man Krausse on the IPA 
committee, the company Friedrich Erler contributed a mere 5,000RM, although its associated 
dyeing factory Stieglitz & Co paid an equal amount.
1062
 In contrast, the largest banks made a 
considerable contribution to the IPA budget of about 61,500RM: 25% of this sum came from 
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the Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Darmstädter, and ADCA.
1063
 The Dresdner Bank donated 
7,500RM and several private banks gave smaller sums. As I have already mentioned, the 
banks had a large interest in the Leipzig fur trade. The financial makeup of the IPA was thus 
strongly corporatist and locally entrenched, divided between the state and many embedded 
economic actors. In addition, this first round of fund-raising shows that the organisers had 
succeeded in gaining local support.  
 
9.2.3 Unwieldy ambitions and pressures on local collaboration.  
 
Not long after the first round of fundraising, the initial collaborative atmosphere between the 
city and the IPA committee waned very quickly. The disruption of collaboration was 
primarily caused by exceeding the terms of budget: misjudgements were made in calculating 
potential revenue and expenditure. Furthermore, the IPA committee had painted an 
exaggerated picture of the IPA’s promise whilst also entertaining high ambitions. The rental 
on the exhibition infrastructure (ironically run by the city administration) turned out to be 
much higher than expected. Expenses amounted to 250,000RM rather than the 50,000RM that 
the committee had budgeted for. Simultaneously, the committee increasingly realised that 
revenues from renting out the exhibition spaces would be much lower than expected. 
Hollender reported that potential partners like the US, Canada, England, and the Soviet Union 
were not willing to pay the proposed price of 50RM per square metre.
1064
  
 
To a large extent, the overspending was also caused by the ambitious extra plans made by the 
IPA administration. In the summer of 1929, important additions were made to the original 
intentions when the committee doubted the allure of a technical exhibition that solely 
demonstrated the fur manufacturing process. This format was held to be insufficient to attract 
large masses of the general public to the IPA.
1065
 A new plan designed to lure people to the 
IPA entailed the creation of an expensive ‘theme park’ (Vergnügungspark), which would 
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consist of a restaurant, a swimming pool, and, of course, a beer hall. This emphasis on 
entertainment ran counter to austere developments in German exhibition culture in the 1920s, 
where large-scale amusement attractions in specialised exhibitions had been rolled back.
1066
  
 
As a result, the budget skyrocketed under the new plans, a fact that caused friction in the 
relationship with the town hall. The IPA told the city council in November 1929 that it needed 
an additional 1,865,000 RM, without which “the IPA could no longer function.”1067 The city 
responded to this extra pressure by proposing a plan in which the municipality would take 
over 1,000,000 of this deficit on the condition that the IPA revised expenses related to the 
amusement park. When the committee rejected the strongly remodelled plan in December 
1929, a nadir was reached.
1068
 Walter Leiske, the intermediary between local politics and the 
organisers of the exhibition, was heavily criticised in person by the IPA committee for his part 
in the city’s resistance against the budget.1069 With financial exigencies looming, the 
relationship with local politics further destabilised when Karl Rothe, the incumbent mayor of 
Leipzig, declared his resignation after twelve years of service.
1070
 Besides the fact that Rothe 
was one of the most ardent advocates of the IPA, the timing of his resignation, to occur in 
April 1930 just before the inauguration of the exhibition, was most incovenient: “the 
resignation of the incumbent mayor will damage the IPA because it will be read as if Rothe 
has lost his belief in the successful outcome of the IPA and therefore his resignation now will 
be less controversial than it would be after an unsuccessful exhibition.”1071 In the year before 
the exhibition opened, the relationship with the town hall was far from optimal.  
 
In dire need of new bank loans, which could only be obtained if they were guaranteed by the 
city, the committee started to approach political factions in the city council separately to 
persuade them to back its financial plan. The move of the IPA was somewhat surprising since 
the city council itself only had limited power: it was the College (Rat) that controlled city 
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decisions and supervised the council.
1072
 In addition, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
(DNVP), controlled city politics from 1929 to 1932 and was the objective ally of the 
economic bourgeoisie. Paul Hollender nonetheless sought to create a broader political alliance 
for the extended IPA plans and personally contacted the faction leaders of the Socialists 
(SPD) and the Leipzig faction of the National Socialists (NSDAP). According to Hollender, 
such an alliance would prove “the support for the IPA in all layers of society and positively 
influence indecisive municipal councillors.”1073  
 
Given the many Jewish members of the district, the call for support was surprisingly well 
received in the Leipzig branch of the NSDAP. Klien also exerted pressure on them. Hollender 
wrote of their meetings: “we have the impression that the National Socialists followed our 
case meticulously by trying to understand the difficult financial state of affairs.”1074 While 
supporting Jewish firms indirectly, the only condition they put forward was proof that the IPA 
would repay their bank loans. Ernst Frenzel of the SPD fraction in Leipzig gave a similar 
message. Hollender assured the socialists that the amusement park in tandem with the 
exhibition would attract two million visitors to Leipzig and thereby generate enough income 
to repay the loans.
1075
  
 
The strategy of directly rallying support in the Rathaus was eventually successful: in February 
1930, the political factions agreed to an additional security of about 1,000,000 RM but they 
imposed extra conditions on the organisation of the IPA. The Rathaus avoided receiving the 
final IPA bill and the exhibition’s committee was forced to reserve 70% of the receipts to pay 
the instalments on this bank loan. In addition, they had to allow inspection of their accounts 
by bookkeepers working for the city administration.
1076
 It can be concluded from the more 
formalised and conditional support for the IPA that the organisaners of the exhibit had 
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stretched cooperation between the fur industry and the city administration beyond its previous 
informal limits. 
 
The fact was that it was now too late for the city to withdraw: a cancellation would have 
damaged the commercial reputation of Leipzig beyond repair. The new mayor of Leipzig Carl 
Goerdeler (in office from April 1930 until early 1937) found that his predecessor had 
manoeuvred himself into the uncomfortable position of being responsible for the lion’s share 
of the IPA’s outstanding debts and any possible deficit. The ambitious and costly plans for the 
amusement park therefore remained a constant nuisance to the city council.
1077
 The committee 
was aware that a ‘bankruptcy scenario’ was increasingly worrying for local public opinion. In 
1930, the professional press of the fur industry responded to a growing body of written 
criticism on the exhibition: “The IPA has nothing to do with all the inflationary and 
ostentatious exposition politics which caused so much damage in recent years to German 
municipal finances and which caused the spread of so many false opinions about us.”1078 In 
the years preceding the exhibition, the local side of IPA story was characterised by dynamism: 
however, the exhibition gradually became more controversial.  
 
9.3 The search for international partners.  
 
While the original plans for the Leipzig exhibition were connected to the national context, the 
collective marketing operation gradually outgrew its domestic dimension and increasingly 
turned more international. The promotion of the local fur industry was to a large extent seen 
as an international task. Like rallying political and financial support locally, the task of 
assembling an international exhibition was not straightforward. At the same time as the 
relationship between the city administration and the IPA worsened, the exhibition committee 
planned to draw attention to the Leipzig industry abroad, especially from the cities and 
countries that were the main potential trade partners: Great Britain (London), the US (New 
York), and the Soviet Union. The promotion campaign would only be effective if leading 
firms and trade departments in these countries participated at the IPA.  
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In its international endeavours, the Leipzig fur industry was supported by an important ally: 
the diplomatic services of the German Foreign Office. Stresemann, the minister of Foreign 
Affairs, was known for his pragmatic foreign policy: he realised that German economic power 
could only be restored by re-entering the world market.
1079
 Apart from supporting the return 
of German business to the world stage, Stresemann enjoyed good connections with the Saxon 
industry. Before he learnt the political craft, Stresemann worked for the chocolate 
manufacturing association in Dresden and was one of the founders of the Saxon 
Manufacturers Association in 1902 (Verband Sächischer Industrieller VSI).
1080
 In December 
1928, Stresemann’s Foreign Office listed the IPA as an “exhibition of national importance,” 
which meant that the organisation could expect support from the diplomatic services.
1081
 In 
practice, this meant that invitations and information were distributed via diplomatic channels 
to foreign governments.  
 
The promotion campaign in London, which started in the fall of 1928 when the exhibition 
plans were still vague, was based on two pillars: attention in the British press and the lobbying 
of Paul Hollender. The transnational dimension of the fur trade press should be highlighted. 
The British professional fur trade played a leading role in introducing the idea of the IPA to 
London business community. As early as November 1928, the professional journal The 
British Fur Trade published an interview with some eminent managers in Leipzig and the 
plans of the IPA. The article downplayed the importance of the exhibition for Leipzig whilst 
highlighting its international dimension: “And let me emphasise this, that it is not a German, 
or a Saxon or a Leipzig exhibition and Congress which is being prepared and on which we 
count; it is an international event, in which we hope to see the British Empire, the United 
States, France, Russia and Austria taking as prominent and credible a part as the German trade 
itself.”1082  
 
The interest of the British press in the IPA should be ascribed to William Purvis, the editor of 
The British Fur Trade. Purvis, who frequently visited Leipzig, was supportive of good Anglo-
German relations. Moreover, his role in the specialised fur trade press expanded significantly 
at this time. Due to a conflict of interest between the journal and the fur industry, Purvis left 
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the editorial office of The British Fur Trade and created his own trade journal, The Fur 
Record, which provided even more space for the Leipzig exhibition.
1083
 He shared a mutual 
feeling of nostalgia with the organisers of the IPA, not so much for the strength of Leipzig but 
rather towards the ‘openness’ that had characterised the pre-war fur trade. Mention should be 
made of Purvis’ travel reports from Leipzig in the summer of 1929, which were presented as a 
series called ‘The Anglo-German Fur Trade’ and ‘Leipzig revisited.’ In these reports, Purvis 
called for the revival of old practices, such as the system of exchange between German and 
English fur apprentices: “through such reciprocal movements we shall create the best 
guarantee for the future peace and prosperity of the world.”1084 Attention to the IPA was of 
course not limited to the abovementioned journals but it was Purvis who introduced the 
British fur community to the IPA at a relatively early date.  
 
The second reason for the IPA’s early successes in Great Britain can be ascribed to the 
individual lobbying of Paul Hollender. Hollender pursued the agenda of the IPA through 
‘trade diplomacy,’ which involved attending banquets, delivering speeches, and negotiating. 
In November 1928, he was invited to the banquet of the London Fur Trade Association and 
delivered a speech illuminating his plans to organise a large-scale international exhibition. 
The moment was well chosen, as several international guests were present at the autumn fur 
auctions that preceded the banquet.
1085
 Although mention was made of the success of 
Hollender’s stay in London, it is difficult to estimate the impact of this kind of diplomacy. To 
be sure, it did not raise unequivocal support for the IPA. In March 1929, there was resistance 
among British firm managers convinced that participation in the exhibition would favour their 
competitors in Saxony.
1086
 Moreover, the British government refused to accept the official 
invitation sent by the German ambassador in April 1929. Participation was thereby restricted 
to the private British fur trade and industry.
1087
 Fortunately for Hollender, the Hudson’s Bay 
                                                 
1083
 TNA, Hudson Bay Company Archive, BH 2735, A 92.77. 22, f. 188. Memorandum with reference to ‘the 
Fur Record”. Beaver House, London, 18.02. 1929. William Purvis allegedly left The British Fur Trade because 
of the involvement of Cyril J. Ross, alias Rosenberg the man behind the journal and an influential British fur 
trader who had acquired interests in all sections of the fur trade. He used his controlling interest in The British 
Fur Trade and was therefore accused of being biased. Purvis created a new ‘impartial’ fur trade journal, which 
was supported by by several important British firms such as PR Poland & Sons, CW Martin & Sons Ltd, The 
Moscow Fur Trading Co Inc, and George Smith & Sons Ltd.  
1084
 The Fur Record, September 1929, p. 106. Anglo-German Fur Trade. Leipzig Revisited by William Purvis.  
1085
 PA AA, Ausstellungswesen, R 117065, The Fur World, 03.11.1928. The LFTA Dinner. A Record gathering.  
1086
 PA AA,  Austellungswesen, R 117065, Deutsche Botschaft. London, den 25.03.1929. An das Auswärtiges 
Amt. betrifft. Internationale Pelzfachausstellung 
1087
 PA AA, Ausstellungswesen, R 117065, Foreign Office London, 18.06.1929.  
The International Fur Exhibition IPA  
330 
 
Company decided to participate in the Leipzig exhibition. By January 1930, the HBC had 
reserved about 900 of the available 3,000 square metres of exhibition space.
1088
  
 
The IPA committee largely followed the same set of strategies to lure the Americans to 
Leipzig: a promotion campaign in the specialised trade press, diplomatic invitations, and a 
lobbying tour by Hollender, the face of Leipzig’s fur industry. A month after his stay in 
England, Hollender travelled to North America and visited Washington, Chicago, Toronto, 
and Montreal. He promoted the IPA most intensively in New York by unfolding the detailed 
plans of the IPA at a luncheon of the Fur Merchants Club.
1089
 American dyers and 
wholesalers were particularly interested: they instantly decided to found an American IPA 
committee. However, American participation was made possible because of the powerful 
family networks between Leipzig and New York, most notably those embodied by the 
Eitingon family. Motty Eitingon, leader of the successful Eitingon-Schild Corporation in New 
York and a regular visitor in Leizpig, was the president of the American IPA section. He 
promptly reserved 5,000 square metres of the IPA exposition on behalf of the American 
committee at his own personal risk.
1090
  
 
An important difference from Great Britain was the official support of the American 
government for the IPA, particularly from the State Department of Agriculture. Inspired by 
the uniqueness of the event, the State Department of Agriculture stated that “the fur industry 
should be suitably represented (…) the United States is the largest commercial fur-producing 
and fur-consuming country in the world.”1091 The government argued that the IPA offered an 
unique opportunity to promote the booming American fur business: “the taking of a 
substantial part of American fur-products by the European market as represented by the 
valuation of $31,000,000 placed upon our fur exports, is to the advantage of the American 
farmer and a Government exhibit at the Leipzig exhibition would without question aid in the 
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further development of this export trade.”1092 Another reason for participation could be found 
in the activities of the Department of Agriculture itself. It heavily supported the growth of fur 
farming as a new agricultural activity: “the Secretary of Agriculture states further that foreign 
countries look upon the US Department of Agriculture as a pioneer in the field of 
investigational work in fur-animal production.”1093 The participation of the US Department of 
Agriculture gave an important impetus to the international dimension of the IPA.  
 
The attempts to connect to the Canadian fur industry were less successful, even though 
interest in the IPA was considerable, especially in business circles. Private businesses in 
Canada saw in the IPA a way to reinforce Canadian market institutions. In particular, they 
hoped to promote the new Canadian fur auction sales, especially in Montreal. Extremely 
similar arguments about the usefulness of an international exhibition for the strengthening of 
local institutions circulated in the Canadian fur trade: “considerable quantities of furs are 
disposed of through the various auction companies operating in Montreal (...) hundreds of 
thousands of dollars worth of furs are shipped out of this country, to be sold by the Auction 
Companies in London, Paris and NY, and the commission on these sales (...) are definitely 
lost to Canada.”1094 Nevertheless, the Canadian government refused to fund a “dominion 
exhibition” for the promotion of these relatively new market institutions, despite significant 
pressure from numerous firms.  
 
The Soviet Union confirmed its participation in the exposition relatively late, less than a year 
before the IPA started. Attempts to lure the Soviets to the Leipzig halls looked less persuasive 
when compared to the diplomatic courtesies extended to representatives in England and North 
America. Nonetheless, the Soviets responded eagerly and were preparing a section far ahead 
of other “fur nations.”1095 The Soviet zeal in participating at the IPA can be explained from 
their unfavourable position on the world market. Firstly, Soviet trade agencies often found 
themselves excluded from international business agreements. Moreover, Soviet sales 
representatives were often manifestly distrusted as secret agents of some sort, as was 
illustrated by the raid of Scotland Yard on ARCOS in May 1927 (see chapter 8). The Soviet 
fur trade certainly needed some international advertisement. Secondly, participation in the 
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IPA was necessary because of the strategic importance of furs. Narkomtorg, a Soviet trade 
secretariat, noted that “the fur trade occupies a vast dimension of our economy and in our 
international trade. Therefore, expectations for the Soviet section at the exhibition is 
apparently high (…) and we must be careful that we do not disappoint these expectations: [we 
must] prepare our exhibition in time and reveal an extensive picture of our fur industry so that 
we take a prominent and honourable place at the exhibition.”1096 Together with the 
involvement of the US, the Soviet interest expanded the international dimension of the IPA, 
even though the British and Canadian governments had refused to participate. The goals set 
by the Germans regarding the international dimensions of the IPA thereby found a sufficient 
degree of foreign support. It is important to note that many other countries participated as 
well. Symbolic for the German fur trade, especially for karakul trading, was the participation 
of mandate South West Africa. Countries like Austria, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland also confirmed their participation.
1097
 
 
Picture 4: The South West African exhibition on the IPA next to the Polish stall. (Stadtarchiv Leizpig, BA 1986 
20741).  
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9.4 The IPA: between specialisation and universalism.  
 
This part of the chapter is devoted to the actual content of the exhibition. The organisation of 
the IPA was based on two main pillars. On the one hand, it made reference to the successful 
pre-war exhibitions in Leipzig, the BUGRA and IBA, which had set high standards as 
prestigious crowd-pullers. On the other hand, the exhibition was essentially international and 
aimed to promote Leipzig as an international centre in the commerce, production, and 
distribution of furs. The public of this promotion campaign were traders, experts, and 
businessmen in Germany and the wider world. Through the connected fur congress held in 
Leipzig, the IPA committee hoped to institutionalise an international community of fur 
businessmen that could collectively deal with problems that pertained to the organisation of 
the trade. The ultimate aim was that the IPA should become a starting point for a stabilised 
international fur business. The end result was an exhibition that focused both on advertising 
furs to the broader public and on the educational aims of a specialised trade exhibition. This 
dualism was noted in one of meetings of the IPA committee in 1929: “Although the IPA has 
to be tailored for the big masses, the exhibits have to show what is both fine and rare so that 
the specialised character of the exhibition is preserved.”1098  
 
9.4.1 The IPA as a crowd-puller.  
 
On 31 May 1930, the IPA officially opened. The 800,000 visitors during the summer found an 
exhibition space that was divided into five large sections: a general hunting exhibition, the 
German Hall, the Nation Halls, the Science and Technology Halls, and the Amusement Park. 
Central to the IPA was the Nation Hall, where exhibits could be seen from 11 foreign 
countries. Great Britain (900 sqm), France (1000 sqm), and the USSR (2000 sqm) ranked 
amongst the most visible foreign exhibits. The Austrians had created a separate section, the 
‘Wiener Haus.’1099 However, this classic exhibition format was held to be insufficient to 
attract the broader masses. Just as during the universal exhibition of 1897 and the IBA 
exhibition of 1913 in Leipzig, the IPA also built an ‘amusement park,’ designed to be a pure 
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crowd-puller, an airy antidote to exhibition fatigue. The centre of the amusement park was the 
swimming pool but it also possessed a wine bar with music and cabaret acts and a genuine 
Wiener cafe.
1100
 The Austrian exhibition was staged in the amusement park. The IPA also 
involved other media in order to advertise to the wider public. Notable was the promotion 
film created by the Leipziger Werk und Werbefilm GmbH. The 72 minute long film was 
called ‘Fur’s Worldwide Importance’ (Die weltumspannende Bedeutung des Pelzes) and was 
translated into 12 languages. It formed the backbone of the IPA mass advertising campaign, 
as it was broadcasted across various European cinemas.
1101
 
 
It was clear from the onset that the IPA hoped to reach a large public in Germany not only 
through the amusement section but also with the specialised expositions.
1102
 The hunting hall, 
an eclectic assemblage of national and international hunting trophies and historical objects co-
organised by the Reich Hunting Association (Reichsjagdbund), was tailored to fit the need for 
a broader appeal.
1103
 The Soviet provided a major attraction, as they brought along a large 
collection of live fur-bearing animals. With the zoo, the exhibition began to resemble imperial 
expositions. Around 56 different species of animals were placed in a decor that replicated 
ecologies of the fur business’ frontiers. As such, the zoo was a representation of the world fur 
trade. For instance, one of the main attractions was a herd of about 50 karakul sheep.
1104
 In 
order to spark the imaginations of the public, the herd was housed on a set that imitated the 
living conditions of the sheep in Bukhara and included Turkmenian shepherds in “native 
garbs and nomadic huts.”1105 The natural environment of other fur animals was reconstructed 
as well in order “to convey a natural image of the original environment in which these 
animals live.”1106  
 
The advertisement of fur work to the broader public not only followed the examples of the 
preceding local exhibitions as crowd-pullers but also reflected major societal trends. In the 
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first place, mass production in recent decades had initiated mass consumption patterns. 
During the First World War, the industry experimented with the production of garments based 
on ‘substandard’ fur and new production processes that enabled the imitation of prime furs. 
These substitutes expanded existing consumption patterns. Whereas previously access to furs 
was limited to the bourgeoisie, the consumption of fur garments increasingly expanded to 
lower ranks of society, especially during the second half of the 1920s. The IPA’s appeal to the 
larger public can thus also be read as a consequence of growing fur consumption throughout 
the 1920s. During the Weimar republic, the consumer was increasingly identified as a relevant 
actor and consumerism was recognised as an underlying force both in business and 
politics.
1107
 It was this redefinition of luxury consumption and the emergence of Weimar 
Germany as a consumer society that pushed the fur industry into advertising to a larger public. 
As the committee noted, “the IPA entails large-scale propaganda for fur. The public, which 
nowadays can only be convinced by sizeable advertisement, should be drawn to the beauty 
and importance of fur, thereby causing a massive uplift of consumption.”1108  
 
In general, however, European luxury industries struggled to adjust themselves to such new 
consumption patterns. Simply put, mass consumption and luxury production were conflicting 
trends. According to Jean-Claude Daumas, mass consumption patterns offered increased sales 
opportunities but also put pressure on the status of industries within ‘the universe of luxury’ 
that justified higher prices and the use of labour intensive production processes.
1109
 This trend 
was all the more complicated for the German fur industry because of the controversial status 
of luxury products in Weimar Germany. The experience of destitution during World War I 
and hyperinflation had made German consumers highly sensitive to the availability and price 
of consumer goods. Consumerism in Weimar Germany was characterised by high 
expectations and the desire to improve living standards while at the same time the population 
was traumatised by the fact that basic needs remained unfulfilled.
1110
 Luxury thus had 
negative connotations. Politics also increasingly intervened in consumption, making basic 
needs accessible while at the same time targeting the consumption of luxury goods through 
taxes. This tension in the promotion of fur consumption is revealed by the fact that the IPA 
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consciously avoided association between the fur industry and luxury: “the goal of the IPA is 
to explain to the domestic public about fur fashion, which is by no means ‘luxurious,’ but 
[consists of] solid, durable, and well made pelts that are beneficial and economical in the long 
run.”1111 
 
 
Figure 9-1 A drawing of the IPA exposition (Neue Pelzwarenzeitung, 1930, p. 516). 
 
9.4.2 The IPA as a specialised exhibition. 
 
Having discussed the areas designed for the public spectator, I will now turn to some 
specialised sections presented for a more select public. The Nation hall, the German hall, and 
the Halls for Science and Technology formed the main chunk of the exhibition reserved for 
those interested in the advancements of the fur industry. These sections were created by a 
number of specialised committees, consisting of industrialists and experts. These reveal some 
of the developments in the modern fur industry that had defined collective action in the 
district.
1112
 The group responsible for the section on fur farming was made up of members of 
the Reichszentrale für Pelztier und Rauchwarenforschung, the research network in 
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Leipzig.
1113
 The Deutschlandhalle demonstrated the organisation of fur farming in Germany 
and the investigations into it sponsored by the industry.  
 
The science and engineering section in hall 4 showcased a dressing and dyeing plant in 
operation and was organised by industrialists and chemists. Covering about 200 square 
metres, it showcased a production process that turned raw pelts into processed furs ready to be 
sent to tailors and retailers. While the imitation plant was at the centre of this hall, individual 
firms from the dressing and dyeing industries occupied stands as well.
1114
 As the backbone of 
the industrial district, the fur production process was adequately represented at the exhibition. 
Yet it was difficult to hide the fact that the industry was affected by the economic crisis. One 
of the largest dressing factories of the Leipzig hub, Walter AG from Märkranstadt, had 
withdrawn from the IPA in early 1930 because it was on the verge of bankruptcy.
1115
  
 
The German hall similarly devoted attention to the complicated nature of production. Stages 
in dressing and dyeing were illuminated by exhibits of prime skins and the relatively new 
processes that imitated prime furs. This general overview of production stages not only served 
to inform the larger public or to glorify the skilfulness of the German dyeing and dressing 
factories. According to a report of the Hudson’s Bay Company, several aspects of this exhibit 
achieved their educational purpose by anticipating future developments of the international 
fur trade, especially in terms of reducing the prices of more luxurious furs and garments: “the 
German fur trade acted wisely in showing their skilfulness in processing furs (...) the much 
improved imitations may be having an influence in reducing the price of the fine furs, since to 
the unpractised eye the imitations are so good that the great [price] difference between them 
and the real article seems unjustifiable.”1116 Other exhibits in this hall were staged to glorify 
the history and future of the German fur industry. The committee had given sufficient space to 
the German furriers guild to present a somewhat pompous glorification of German 
craftsmanship (Meistersaal, Kürschnersaal), exhibiting pieces of art and historical objects 
related to German fur work.
1117
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Although little is known about the substance of the international exhibits, the impressive 
Soviet stall was undoubtedly an eye-catcher for contemporary observers. It was composed to 
impress the general public while at the same time portraying the new organisation of foreign 
fur trade and the advancement of the USSR’s dyeing industry. The Soviet section impressed 
visitors because of architectural experimentation with the stall’s set up. Soviets architects 
made use of ‘futuristic’ designs, thereby rendering the Soviet section one of the most 
surprising and intense parts of the exhibition. A German observer noted that “the Soviet 
exhibition sets the objects as functions of the form. The Soviets are using the exhibition space 
to the fullest extent, both in terms of height and breadth (...) the stance exhibits many 
thousands of raw bundled skins to attract attention (...) the Soviets have designed artefacts that 
extend to the roof.”1118 For many attendees, the exhibition also offered a unique opportunity 
to gain insight into the current situation of the Soviet fur industry. The exhibition allowed the 
capitalist businessmen to gather information about the system of the state-led fur exploitation 
in Siberia. The Hudson’s Bay Company noted the following: “It [the Russian exhibition] is 
childish, futuristic and clumsy in appearance but when carefully examined is of great interest, 
especially as so little is actually known in the outside world of what is going on in Russia (...) 
if the facts shown are accurate (...) the organisation now in existence for collecting the furs is 
very much larger and better than before the revolution.”1119 The specialised exhibition was 
thus valued both for the information it provided on new production techniques and for the 
knowledge given about international markets. 
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Picture 5: The exhibition stall of the USSR, IPA 1930 (Stadtarchiv Leipzig, BA 1986 20745). 
 
9.4.3 The IPA congresses and internationalism.  
 
The congresses held in the margins of the IPA were at least as important in promoting 
international trade as the exhibition itself. The congresses gave the IPA an important 
transnational dimension. Three congresses were organised: the most important was the 
general assembly held by international fur businessmen and industrialists, the ‘World Fur 
Congress.’ The Leipzig organisers hoped to construct a more stable international system of 
trade by taking advantage of the presence of many foreign delegates and businessmen. There 
were also meetings of the International Garment Workers’ Federation (Internationale 
Bekleidungsarbeiter Föderation) and of the International Rabbit Breeders Congress 
(Internationale Käninchenzüchter Kongress). Debates in the garment workers’ congress, held 
between 15 and 17 June, mainly centred on the stimulation of labour exchange across national 
markets and the prevention of occupational diseases. Fur workers were often exposed to 
longue and skin diseases caused by the chemical substances used in the manufacturing 
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process.
1120
 The conference of German rabbit breeders, suppliers to the fur industry since 
World War I, was organised by Hans Nachtsheim. Nachtsheim was an ardent advocate of 
small-scale animal breeding and co-founder of the National Association of German Rabbit 
Breeders (Reichsbund Deutscher Kaninchenzüchter). The international guests conferred about 
animal diseases, the economic exploitation of rabbit breeding, and on the diet of rabbits.
1121
 In 
contrast to other small livestock keepers, the rabbit breeders had national divisions but lacked 
an international form of organisation.
1122
  
 
The World Fur Congress was undoubtedly the most important conference. It was a historical 
congress too. Never before had businessmen of the international fur industry conferred 
together about issues that related to the global fur trade. The World Fur Congress was 
arguably the culmination point of a spirit of internationalism in the realm of business that 
surfaced more strongly in the interwar period. In contrast, prior to World War I problems in 
international trade had caused conflicts between German and British merchants, especially 
regarding conflicting fairs and auctions. However, there was now support for international 
coordination.   
 
For example, collisions between events in the industry calendar continued to have an effect on 
relations between businesses in London and Leipzig. In the plans for the 1928 season, the 
spring auctions in London and the Easter fur fairs in Leipzig once again largely overlapped. 
Instead of a boycott and mutual threats, the problem of colliding agendas now led to bilateral 
negotiations. They took place between the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association and the London 
Fur Trade Association. Trade associations had gained significance in both cities in the early 
1920s. Besides remedying local issues, these institutions were the principal channels for 
conducting international negotiations. The Leipzig representatives were able to find a 
compromise that involved postponing the Leipzig fur fairs for a week.
1123
 However, the 
compromise was rejected by other Leipzig firms. Despite the failure of international 
coordination in this specific case, a tradition of international coordination was in the making. 
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It was in this context that the World Fur Congress was held and plans to establish an 
International Trade Association were forged.  
 
By inviting many international guests, the IPA provided the opportunity for the first World 
Fur Congress. Key figures of the international fur commerce attended the World Fur Congress 
along with the representatives of the major national trade associations: Curtis Lampson, 
manager of the large auction company Lampson & co and also president of the London Fur 
Trade Association, Ch. Hanau, president of the French fur trade association Fédération de la 
Fourrure, and finally J. H. Bleistein of the National Association of the Fur Industry in New 
York.
1124
 As in the earlier meetings, the members of the national trade associations played a 
leading role on the conference. Representatives of the Soviet fur trade were not invited. 
Similarly, they had been left out of the international business meetings that preceded the 
World Fur Congress. Coordination was based upon either inter-firm relations or trade 
associations, both of which were absent in the Soviet fur trade.  
 
The conference itself lasted 7 days (between 22 and 29 June) and was held in the halls of the 
Zoological Gardens. It was divided into twelve sections, where no less than 100 papers and 
speeches were delivered. While a wide variety of issues were addressed, the main thread in 
the debates concerned removing obstacles to trade. Discussions on how the fur industry could 
homologate paying conditions and synchronise various cultural-bound trade practices resulted 
in the ambition to set international standards for transactions. In addition, the debates not only 
touched upon customs and financial issues but also upon matters of standardisation. For 
instance, discussions took place on reaching an international consensus regarding the 
nomenclature of fur products.
1125
 Topics ranged from patenting to the trade press and issues 
related to retailing and consumption. However, these speeches and discussions were infused 
with a nostalgia for the international trade prior to World War I. This underlying thought 
instigated debates on reviving “old practices” like the system of exchanging young 
apprentices or merchants between European fur businesses. International exchange was a 
common practice in family-run German merchant houses and workshops prior to 1914.
1126
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In order to facilitate the revival of the pre-war order and to set international standards, the 
conference ultimately aimed to establish an international fur federation, an overarching 
institution for the international fur industry. The shape and extent of such an international 
institution was a matter of debate between the British and German businesses represented by 
Lampson and Hollander respectively. Lampson opposed the idea of an international bureau 
and pleaded for the organisation of annual congresses for representatives of the international 
fur industry. He promptly proposed that the next session be held during the London auctions. 
In contrast, Hollender defended the view that the international bureau should form a 
permanent institution, composed of representatives of national associations. The German fur 
trade won the vote and Hollender himself was elected as the first president of the international 
fur federation: its bureau was established in Leipzig.  
 
While the establishment of an international bureau was a victory for German intentions, the 
spirit of cooperation did not last long. It declined as the economic crisis deepened. The 
follow-up meeting of the International Association, planned for 1932, never took place.
1127
 
Internationalism in the fur industry was thus only short-lived. Nonetheless, it preceded the 
post-war internationalism and the creation of a more robust institution, the International Fur 
Federation, in 1949. The effects that the IPA hoped the exhibition would generate were also 
short. The deepening of the international crisis prevented any benefits from spilling over into 
the fur industry.  
 
9.5 The IPA bankrupted.  
 
This section mainly deals with the financial problems that emerged during the International 
Fur Exhibition and its aftermath, which burdened local forms of cooperation and effected the 
promotional aspect. In terms of local relationships, the failure of the IPA was perhaps even 
more pronounced in its effects. The budget deficit and the additional guarantee of the city 
council on behalf of the IPA in February 1930 have already been discussed above. The 
opening of the IPA was not the end but the beginning of a summer full of financial 
exigencies. Not only did the IPA committee systematically underestimate the expenses, the 
earnings of the IPA were far less than had been anticipated. The gap was caused mainly by 
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the disappointing results in subletting exhibition space to domestic and international fur 
representatives. Rent revenues had been estimated at 600,000RM but the actual revenues 
reached only half this amount.  
 
The difficulties in renting exposition sites was principally due to the carefulness of the 
German firm-owners, who were increasingly unwilling to spend money at the IPA in times of 
crisis.
1128
 Particularly unpalatable to the IPA committee were the attempts of Brühl firms to 
withdraw the renting contracts they had concluded with the IPA. The same was true for the 
international participants: in particular, the smaller countries, where the national fur sector 
was of a minor importance, withdrew their presence. Countries entertaining the prospect of 
participating, such as Norway, dropped out early 1930.
1129
 Others cancelled their agreement. 
The Belgian fur delegation, Union Professionelle des Tanneurs & Teinturiers de Peaux de 
Belgique, saw no other solution than to cancel their presence when the Belgian government 
withdrew its financial support.
1130
 Attendance figures were dramatically lower than expected 
too: only 40 %, or 800,000, of the estimated 2,000,000 visitors showed up. The IPA was by 
no means a crowd-puller like the prestigious pre-war exhibitions. 
 
So, after the opening weeks of the exhibition, it became increasingly clear that the IPA would 
end with a considerable deficit. While the IPA committee had continued to hope for a 
successful exhibition, it was finally forced to reveal the problems to its main partner, the city 
administration. According to Hollender, the deficit would range between 600,000 to 
1,400,000RM, depending on how long the IPA lasted. The public officials had no other 
choice than to continue their support for the IPA: the exhibition was a source of urban 
economic growth because it provided a temporary increase in external economies.
1131
 An 
immediate bankruptcy would precisely cause financial problems for both public and private 
suppliers of the IPA.
1132
 Hollender also admitted that the financial section of the IPA had been 
run haphazardly and problems had been hidden. A month later in July, when it became clear 
                                                 
1128
 Sächs. HStA, Wirtschaftsministerium 11168, Nr. 795, f. 19. Protokoll Prasidialsitzung. 24.2.1930.. During 
the months January and February, members of the IPA committee were traveling again through Germany in 
order to convince the German furriers and firms to rent a space at the IPA.  
1129
 PA AA, Ausstellungswesen, R117066, IPA an das auswärtiges Amt, den 13.02.1930 
1130
 PA AA, Ausstellungswesen, R117067, IPA an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft Brüssel, 26.031930. 
1131
 Juan, Rubalcaba-Bermejo, Luis Cuadrado-Roura, “Specialization and Competition amongst European Cities: 
A New Approach through Fair and Exhibition Activities,” Regional Studies 32, no. 2 (1998): 133. 
1132
 Sächs. HStA, Wirtschaftsministerium 11168, nr. 796. ff. 199-205. Niederschrift über die Besprechung in der 
Harmonie am 23 Juni 1930 nachm. ½ 4 Uhr, auf Einladung von Herrn Ministerialdirektor Geheimer Rat Dr. 
Klien mit führenden Häusern der Pelzbranche.  
The International Fur Exhibition IPA  
344 
 
that the building expenses had also been underestimated, it was apparent that the book-
keeping was simply not functioning correctly, quite surprising given that city officials had 
controlled the books since February 1930.
1133
  
 
The IPA tried to postpone payments to its suppliers in a systematic way: therefore, in early 
August, the creditors decided to jointly put pressure on the IPA’s financial department. Before 
then, the financial problems stayed off the public radar and were largely kept indoors. 
Hollender in particular was worried that a public controversy about the new IPA deficit would 
damage the ongoing exhibition. He therefore increased pressure on Carl Goerdeler, the new 
major of Leipzig (who happened to be on a month long vacation), to gain his support in 
transferring the debts of the IPA to Leipzig’s and Saxony’s treasury. Again Hollender warned 
Goerdeler that the IPA would drag the suppliers down with it: “I am defending the private 
economy and I cannot consciously shift the amount (...) on to the shoulders of these people. 
Many of them would perish completely, which is of course not to the advantage of Leipzig’s 
tax department.”1134 While Goerdeler refused to return to Leipzig in order to reassure the 
IPA’s creditors, Hollender was able to strike a moratorium with the creditor group. The 
creditors complied with this secret moratorium on the condition that the IPA promised to 
refund the creditors equally and make no distinction between them.
1135
 Confronted with the 
problem of exposing numerous regional firms to an IPA bankruptcy, Leipzig and Saxony 
extended the credit lines. The initial 1928 guarantee of 600,000 marks was largely insufficient 
(the additional 1,000,000 had been spent on the amusement park) and so an additional 
guarantee of 360,000 marks was provided by the Rathaus (150,000), the industry (150,000), 
and Saxony (60,000). 
 
When a barrage of rumours was spreading rapidly about the precarious financial situation of 
the fur exhibition, Hollender made the financial problems public. He declared that the IPA 
was facing severe problems in paying its suppliers and that the IPA needed more money from 
Saxony, the city, and the fur industry. The IPA was unable to close the deficit in the last 
weeks of the exhibition. The full amount of the deficit aggregated to no less than 1,680,000 
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RM, of which 960,000 had already been cleared.
1136
 The committee’s main task was finding 
an acceptable solution for the creditors and clearing the remaining deficit of 720,000.
1137
 With 
additional support from the city council and the state of Saxony, the IPA managed to pay off 
76.4% of the claims.
1138
 The city and the state continued to support the IPA and provide more 
means but this was insufficient to close the financial gap.  
 
To be sure, earlier exhibitions in Leipzig had been concluded with similarly large deficits and 
the city and the regional government had covered the shortages. Few exhibitions had in fact 
made profit. However, the bankruptcy of the IPA in a time of full crisis was poorly received. 
When the Rathaus and the government of Saxony continued to cover the deficit bequeathed 
by the IPA, venomous criticism followed suit.
1139
 It broadly targeted the bourgeois alliance 
between local politicians and industry that characterised Leipzig politics. The socialist 
newspaper the Leipziger Volkszeitung vehemently attacked the IPA as the “International 
Failure Exhibition” (Internationale Pleite Ausstellung).1140 Other attacks were pitched in a 
clearly anti-Semitic tone, mocking the failed exhibition as the “Jewish-Bankruptcy 
Exhibition” (Jüdische-Pleite Ausstellung).1141 Blame went the other way as well. Since the 
event had witnessed such a poor turnout in terms of visitors, the IPA organisers felt 
abandoned by the local population. To the astonishment of the committee, the local 
population had completely misjudged the importance of the event: “A large part of Leipzig’s 
population did not visit the exhibition (...) those who went only at the end of the exhibition 
were surprised by its beauty. It is in the nature of the Leipziger that it takes very long, before 
he wants to see something new. We have to exhibit them this indictment!”1142 It did not seem 
that that the promotion campaign had a positive outcome locally. The fur business had lost 
goodwill with large segments of the local population and the relationship with public 
authorities had soured as well.  
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9.6 Conclusion. 
 
Despite the efforts made by the organising committee, the IPA largely failed to accomplish 
the ambitious aim of promoting the Leipzig fur industry at home and abroad. Obviously, 
potential economic and commercial benefits were undone by the harmful effects of the 
economic crisis. In terms of international business relations, the stimulating effects of the 
exhibition were almost immediately erased by the economic meltdown. The economic 
protectionism and autarky that came to characterise the 1930s cast a large shadow over the 
spirit of pan-national cooperation and the plans to revive a pre-war international fur trade. The 
economic crisis also accounts for the organisational failure of the IPA, although 
mismanagement also played a role. Disappointing admission revenues deepened the deficit 
and the budget gap badly effected the local reputation of the industry. 
 
Still, structure and performance should to be separated. The failure of the exhibition does not 
mean that it was not the result of district processes. In other words, the exhibition should not 
be defined by its failure but rather as an umbrella institution organised by local actors as a 
way to act upon the international stage. Exhibitions remain important for marketing in 
Germany and controversies about their cost effectiveness still overshadow the organisation of 
exhibitions.
1143
 Regardless of its efficiacy, the organisation of the IPA was the result of 
collective action to deal with challenges from abroad, namely the changing world market of 
furs. It was an attempt to collectively improve the wellbeing of the local business system. 
Similar to fairs and auctions, the IPA was a temporary umbrella institution connecting the 
district to the wider world. The IPA was not meant to conduct trade: rather, it was hoped that 
it would produce a ‘magnet’ effect on the local industry. In debates about ‘cost effectiveness,’ 
such considerations gained the upper hand. The goal was to improve the situation of Leipzig 
in the international commerce indirectly. There was also an important symbolic dimension in 
Leipzig’s hosting of the international business community. What was salient in the IPA, and 
particularly in the World Fur Congress, was the desire of local businessmen to construct 
collaborative networks at the international level. In this regard, the IPA served as an umbrella 
institution to stimulate business in Leipzig but also to lead in the creation of permanent forms 
of coordination and a more stable international environment. The foundation of the 
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international bureau was the climax of the spirit of internationalism that was articulated in 
local collaborative networks.  
 
The way in which the international fur trade was to be organised in the new international 
organisation was a projection of local forms of governance in Leipzig and, perhaps, in other 
fur centres as well. Firstly, it reflected the rise of the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association as 
the dominant trade association in the city and confirmed the role of Paul Hollender as the 
leading figure of the industry. After the IPA, Hollender was appointed as president of the first 
International Fur Federation. Trade associations were to form the core of the bureau and act as 
coordinating institutions, just as they did locally. Secondly, the IPA and the International Fur 
Federation was about the construction of the international order in the fur trade: it was to be 
divided between capitals of the fur industry and based on the institutions that organised fur 
trading in these centres. The IPA reflected a world fur market that was divided into several 
major districts: business activity pertained to location. Businesses in Leipzig acted 
accordingly. Ideas that were spread in the World Fur Congress centred on the regulation of 
international competition in order to create an international order based on coordination 
between trade associations in the capitals of the fur industry. Leipzigers saw international 
coordination largely as a matter of ‘cluster-to-cluster’ relation and to a large extent tried to 
maintain this world. Surprisingly, little attention was paid to either integrating resource 
producers or the delegation from the Soviet Union, despite the importance of such actors for 
the international fur industry. Trade associations in ‘visible fur cities’ monopolised the 
movement of internationalism.  
 
There can be no doubt that the IPA was one of the most ambitious forms of collective action 
in the city of Leipzig since World War I. The strength of the alliance with regional and local 
politics and the city’s fur industry, a dimension of local cooperation that was not expressed so 
clearly in other forms of collective action, has been revealed in the chapter. The importance of 
the Rathaus in stimulating local exhibitions had its roots in the precedents of several large-
scale exhibitions in Leipzig since the end of the nineteenth century. The close involvement of 
the city administration, based on its historical commitments to exhibitions, was present in 
several instances: the initial idea of the exhibition was born in inner circles of city politics and 
was closely linked to the post-war policy of stimulating local industry. Once the IPA gained 
shape, financial support followed. However, the good relations between the fur industry and 
the Rathaus became increasingly troubled when the plans of the IPA became more detailed. 
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The first tensions with the city erupted because the incremental planning of the IPA caused a 
severe underestimation of costs. The city council and the mayor continued their support even 
though the deficit deepened severely during the exhibition. While the alliance was not broken, 
the relationship between politics and local industry had taken a severe blow. The spending 
limits of the government and the loss of goodwill in the local population impinged on the fur 
industry’s ability to tackle problems collectively in the future.  
 
Once more, the importance of the lead firms in the organisation of border-crossing activities 
has been revealed. A number of firm owners dominated the organisation committee and 
continued to be at the forefront of the IPA as caretakers of establishing contacts with foreign 
firms and governments. As mentioned in other chapters throughout this section, lead firms of 
the Leipzig fur industry integrated local concerns such as ‘the international position of 
Leipzig’ into their business and personal activities. While several factions of the local 
industry were initially opposed to the idea, the lead firms, together with the city 
administration, managed to convince many other businesses to participate in the IPA. They 
played the role of facilitators in projects of local collaboration with the aim of improving the 
status of Leipzig as an international fur centre. The lead firms headed local alliances but were 
also of seminal importance in constructing international links.  
 
Rather than reviving international trade and stabilising relationships within the international 
fur industry, the IPA heralded a new international trade system that would be fundamentally 
dissimilar. The international bureau drowned helplessly in the currents of protectionism and 
autarky. The plans to create an international bureau that dealt with matters of discordance 
between the capitals of the fur industry remained a pipe dream. The spirit of cooperation that 
emerged in the second half of the 1920s did not survive in the 1930s. The disruptive impact of 
external developments and the new political economy was simply too large to remedy through 
local collective action. Painfully, the IPA marked the end of the economic order that the 
organisers had hoped to revive. The Leipzig industrial district entered the different world of 
the 1930s, one characterised by political and economic instability.  
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10 Collective action and local collaboration in times of 
political and economic crisis (1929-1939).  
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding part of the thesis, the relationship between internationalisation and the local 
economy was described as dynamic and interactive. Collective action was brought to the 
foreground as an important instrument for district participants in the pursuit of re-admission to 
the world market. In part, local economic institutions and networks were flexible in relation to 
external challenges stemming from the transformation of the world market in the early 1920s. 
New forms of inter-firm cooperation led to the creation of novel economic institutions like 
auction companies that replaced obsolete institutions such as the Easter fur fairs. Local 
identity led to the creation of ambitious projects like the international fur exhibition, a joint 
venture in global marketing. Similarly, economic actors intensified cooperation, as we saw in 
the relationship between the local bank system and the fur industry. Furthermore, firm leaders 
clearly put the ‘local’ central in their efforts to restore the locality as an international fur 
market. Individual business activity was designed with the purpose of strengthening the local 
market: solidarity was a motivating factor. Such motives were strong and structured the 
actions of many economic actors and local stakeholders. As such, small firms and economic 
actors were surprisingly dynamic in preserving the manufacturing hub from the changing 
tides of international commerce in the early 1920s.  
 
In demonstrating the relative successes of collective action in terms of international trade, the 
thesis has situated itself in a recent historiographical trend that challenges the view that the 
beginning of World War I marked a radical breach in terms of economic organisation. 
According to this view, the 1920s were a period of protectionism and heralded the reversal of 
world economic integration. However, recent groundbreaking works like Harold James’ End 
of Globalisation or Rosenberg’s A World Connecting 1870-1945 have claimed that, from the 
point of view of economic connections, the period following World War I resembled pre-war 
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standards rather than being a radical departure.
1144
 The fact that the 1920s resembled the pre-
war era was the result of deliberate strategies by many businesses across Europe. Previously I 
have stressed the importance of those intentions and strategies directed at ‘restoring the old 
ties’ or reviving old trade patterns rather than adapting to what was new. In other words, the 
‘old economic order’ shaped mental maps and business strategies. This mental framework 
also formed the foundation for collective social action in the industrial district and led to 
collective strategies to restore old trade patterns.  
 
Leaving the “the turbulent and golden twenties” behind us, we have arrived at the 1930s. This 
is a period when the political and economic developments that disturbed internationalism or 
transborder business activities can no longer be downplayed or ignored. Three developments 
will be examined more closely: firstly, the global economic crisis initiated by the Wall Street 
stock market crash at the end of the 1920s; secondly, the changes in the USSR’s foreign trade 
policy that turned the main trade partner of Leipzig district into an autarkic entity; and finally, 
the disruptive impact of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich on the social composition of an 
industrial district based on a balance between Jewish and gentile firms. Whereas all three 
developments were damaging, it is their interplay that furthered the decline of the Leipzig fur 
industry.  
 
It should be remembered that the performance and the features of the industrial district should 
be strictly separated. Economic decline and the contraction of a local production system do 
not mean that mechanisms for cooperation and sharing disappeared. It could simply indicate 
that these mechanisms are not working properly or were ineffective against the challenges 
faced. In this epilogue, I want to reflect on the impact of political and economic crises upon 
the social structure of the industrial district. How did the district adjust to these turbulent 
times? What forms did collective action take or was the impact upon social cohesion simply 
too disturbing for collective action to form? In this sense, this chapter still places emphasis on 
the mechanisms of the Leipzig fur industry as an industrial district and to what degree the 
threefold challenges of the early 1930s eroded or reproduced these mechanisms. 
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10.2 The stock market crisis in 1929 and the Leipzig district.  
 
10.2.1 The impact of the crisis on the capital intensive fur trade.  
 
Although it was not the only cause of decline, the years of commercial buoyancy of the 
Leipzig fur industry ended abruptly in the wake of the stock market crash in November 1929. 
Many saw the economic backdrop as a temporary interlude, yet matters rapidly worsened. The 
internationally-oriented Saxon economy was badly affected, just as its reputation as the 
“storm centre of the trade cycle” would suggest. Between 1926 and 1932, Saxony experienced 
unusually high levels of bankruptcies: 35.7% of all businesses, much higher than the national 
level of 25.8%.
1145
 Between 1930 and 1931 alone, 131 firms in Leipzig were suspended from 
the trade register.
1146
 In 1932, the labour market in the city reached rock bottom with 185,392 
unemployed workers.
1147
  
 
The fur industry suffered from a similar avalanche of insolvencies. Between 1929 and 1933, 
the local district was drawn into a maelstrom of bankruptcies involving several key firms that 
affected both trading and dyeing businesses. The crisis hit the fur industry hard. In the mid-
1920s, the Saxon fur industry had reached its zenith, registering 11,170 workers in 1,091 
firms: in the early 1930s, employment levels dropped sharply. In 1933, the number of firms 
dropped to 888, which coincided with a dramatic reduction in the work force to 6,119 
employees. While the number of fur workers still represented 34.2% of the Reich’s total, 
about half of all such employees lost their jobs and over 200 firms in Saxony’s industry had 
disappeared.
1148
 The fur industry continued to lose ground at a severe pace. Only one year 
later, the number of workers decreased again to 5,200. Over the course of five years, the 
Saxon fur industry lost more than 50% of its workforce.  
 
The crisis had ramifications on the district in a variety of ways. Firstly, as we have seen, the 
boom in the international fur industry since the late nineteenth century had been largely 
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represented by ascending prices. The international depression caused a stunning deflation in 
fur prices of about 40 to 70%.
1149
 The economic crisis thus marked the end of the boom that 
had characterised the international fur trade since the middle of the nineteenth century and 
had laid the groundwork for the development of the Saxon fur industry. Second, fur contracts 
traditionally took a long period of time to fulfill and therefore were particularly vulnerable. If 
they had been agreed upon before the crisis, the value of the raw furs had almost completely 
vanished by the time they actually reached the world market. This threatened precisely those 
firms that specialised in commerce with the Soviets, who had a penchant for large contracts. 
Finally, the bankruptcies of larger and smaller firms as well as international insolvencies had 
an infectious effect on the solvency of the surviving firms in the district. The Fur Merchants 
Association in Leipzig mentioned that 183 firms went bankrupt in the international fur 
industry in 1931.
1150
 Firms contaminated by the defaults of others were unable to respect deals 
and payment deadlines. Banks and fur firms therefore increasingly called in their debts. More 
importantly, the defaults also affected the networks and connections that undergirded the 
social structure of the fur cluster.  
 
The erosion of the social structure because of international insolvencies will be illustrated 
with the decline of several lead firms in Leipzig: Chaim Eitingon AG, David Biedermann, and 
the Walter AG. Just as the Eitingon-Schild Co embodied the 1920s boom, the financial 
problems of this firm came to epitomise the malaise of the international fur industry. 
Problems in the Eitingon concern had started already in 1929, affecting all the company 
divisions from New York to Leipzig: the firm finally went into liquidation in 1935. The same 
goes for David Biedermann, which went bankrupt at the end of 1930. The crisis not only 
affected firms active in the commercial sector: the spiral of price decline and lower demand 
put an end to Walter AG, the largest dyeing factory of the Leipzig district. Other lead firms 
like Theodor Thorer and Friedrich Erler survived the crisis. Nevertheless, losses and mistrust 
caused by the crisis curbed the ability of the surviving firms to take action. In particular, the 
crisis in the fur industry put an end to the excellent bank-business relations, one of the pillars 
of foreign relations in the industrial district.  
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Take the example of the Eitingon firm, one of the most important for both the Leipzig and 
international fur trades. By 1929, the Eitingon family had access to a staggeringly large credit 
line.
1151
 Just before the stock market crash, the Eitingon-Schild group enjoyed a credit line of 
$4,950,000 (almost 20 million RM) from the banks in Leipzig.
1152
 The size of Leipzig bank 
investment in the Eitingon empire is further illustrated when compared with the support of the 
American banks, which amounted to $14,000,000.
1153
  
 
The Eitingon-Schild group took the international crisis very badly. Various types of prime 
furs, purchased from the Soviets, lost value over the course of a few months and were sold 
with heavy losses. In 1929, the Eitingon Schild group reported a loss of $1,100,000. In 1930, 
the Leipzig division suffered a loss of about 257,326RM. Nonetheless, Motty Eitingon, the 
director of the international group, managed to convince directors and shareholders to 
continue business with the Soviets: he was hoping to revitalise profits over the next three 
years. Initially, the Leipzig banks supported Motty Eitingon’s course of action. Believing that 
the economic crisis was temporary and traditionally having faith in the benefits of 
international fur trade contracts for the local fur industry, the German bank consortium lent 
financial support to a contract between the Eitingon Holding and ARCOS to the extent of 
$2,950,000: the recently merged Deutsche Bank and Disconto Gesellschaft (the DD Bank) 
and the Dresdner Bank gave the largest shares (30% each).
1154
 The German banks formed the 
main creditors of this contract whereas Goldmann Sachs & Co, the only participating 
American bank, provided just 10% of the credit.
1155
 In October 1930, the same German bank 
consortium was willing to provide an advance payment of $850,000 on a $1,850,000 contract 
(again this was equally divided between the DD bank and the Dresdner Bank, with each 
providing 32.5%).
1156
 Despite the crisis, the Leipzig banks still placed a great deal of 
confidence in the Eitingon family. 
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However, the Eitingon policy of spending its way out of loss generated an adverse affect. The 
deflation plaguing the fur market reinforced the hopeless spiral of losses and debt 
aggregation. The company suffered from losses amounting to $1,149,354 in 1931 and an 
incredible $5,650,000 deficit in 1932.
1157
 With losses aggregating and the central European 
bank crisis in the summer of 1931, German banks at long last refused to grant fresh credit.
1158
 
In the summer of 1932, the bank consortium agreed upon a moratorium running until 8 April 
1933, allowing the Eitingon family to restructure their firm.
1159
 The looming threat of 
bankruptcy put a time bomb under the local bank system in Leipzig. By the end of 1932, 
Eitingon debts totalled about 8,415,000RM to German banks and roughly 17,000,000RM to 
their American counterparts. As the largest creditor with a claim of 4,700,000RM, the 
Dresdner Bank was the most badly affected. Next came the DD Bank with 2,377,000RM and 
the ADCA with a claim of 1,338,000RM.
1160
 
 
The death of Chaim Eitingon in December 1932 worsened the position of the German banks 
vis-à-vis the Eitingon family. Chaim was the founding father of the family enterprise and a 
leading figure of the Jewish community: he had personally kept the interests of the Eitingons 
in Leipzig alive. Tensions between the Leipzig and New York branch had implicitly been 
present in the power structure of the family firm. With his father-in-law gone, Motty Eitingon 
rapidly liquidated the Leipzig division as part of a policy to retrench the firm’s activities even 
more strongly in North America. Under the name of the Eitingon Schild Fur Corp and with 
the support of the American bank creditors, Motty even managed to avoid bankruptcy and 
transformed bank claims into long-term credit. Consequently, the move of Motty put an end 
the hopes of the Leipzig banks that they could place their claims on the entire business 
empire.  
 
With an international liquidation off the table and the Leipzig branch sold off, German bank 
claims turned into a matter of American business law. The bank consortium in Leipzig 
therefore agreed with limiting their claims on the German assets of the Eitingon business, 
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since a lawsuit against the ‘new’ Eitingon firm was unlikely to be successful. The Leipzig 
banks partially reclaimed their credit by taking control over the real estate assets of the Chaim 
Eitingon AG. Chaim Eitingon had placed these assets (including a villa in Berlin-Dahlem, the 
company buildings on the Brühl, and the Zeisighaus in Leipzig) under a different company, 
the AG für Geschäftsbau in Leipzig. The real estate of the company was estimated to cover 
4,175,000 goldmarks of the debts and so was transferred to the banks.
1161
 In the end, the 
decision to oppose the restructuring of the new Eitingon firm was fortunate. In contrast to the 
American banks, the Leipzig ones were able to limit losses by disconnecting from the new 
fully Americanised Eitingon business. The ‘restructured’ Eitingon firm suffered from a record 
losss of $5,650,000 in 1933. It finally went into liquidation in 1935. Nevertheless, the Leipzig 
banks had incurred severe losses by blindly following the success of the Eitingons before 
1933. 
 
A second major blow to the fur cluster was delivered by the downfall of the David 
Biedermann firm. The collateral damage of the Biedermann insolvency for the Leipzig district 
was much higher than that of Chaim Eitingon’s bankruptcy, especially for the associated fur 
firms. Biedermann’s bankruptcy was more unexpected as well. Since that the firm was woven 
around the person of David Biedermann, his unanticipated death in December 1930 hastened 
the collapse since none of his subordinates had been prepared for the task. Biedermann’s firm 
ranked as one of the most influential on the Brühl and he also personally managed the Fur & 
Wool Trading Company, a subsidiary in London. Biedermann enjoyed large amounts of credit 
from British and German banks for both subsidiaries: just as with the Eitingons, these debts 
were largely unprotected.
1162
 After the sudden death of the firm owner, the Dresdner Bank 
claimed 5 million RM of the Biedermann inheritance. However, there was not much to 
recuperate, as the credit was largely unsecured. Concessions and the value of the stock only 
marginally compensated the Dresdner Bank. Assets flowed to different creditors as well.
1163
 
The insolvent Biedermann company generally contaminated the Brühl. This was a result of 
Biedermann’s business practice of including smaller firms in large import contracts. In return, 
these firms had offered bills of exchange that acted as extra securities to convince creditors. 
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The latter now demanded the payment of these securities.
1164
 Richard Gloeck, a fur merchant 
on the Brühl, was one of the firms that went into liquidation because of its connection to the 
Biedermann business.
1165
  
 
The maelstrom of bankruptcies equally affected the industrial sector of the fur cluster. The 
bankruptcy of the largest fur factory in the district, Walter AG, exemplified the decline of the 
Leipzig fur dressing industry during the Great Depression. The crisis dragged Walter AG 
down at an impressive pace. As well as suffering from lower demand, Walter AG faced sharp 
competition from French and Belgian dyers even before the crisis, particularly in rabbit skin 
dyeing. The figures of Walter AG were deep in the red at the beginning of the international 
crisis, registering a loss of 355,769RM in 1929 and 422,967RM in 1930.
1166
 In the summer of 
1930, the Walter AG made a desperate attempt to reverse its demise by moving a whole 
section of the factory from the Leipzig district to Diegem, near Brussels, where labour costs in 
fur dressing were significantly lower, according to the board.
1167
 The Walter AG plant in 
Naunhof, a town south of Leipzig, was dismantled and the dyeing and dressing machinery 
moved to the new factory in Belgium. Despite the volte-face in operations, losses nonetheless 
doubled to the sum of 800,000RM in 1931. Due the economic crisis, a district firm took the 
radical decision of leaving Leipzig.  
 
The exposure of the banking sector in this firm was less pronounced than was the case with 
the traders. Total bank debts amounted to about 210,000RM, a low sum in comparison with 
deficits caused by the lending market for trading firms. In March 1932, Walter AG agreed to a 
short moratorium with its creditors, the most important of which was was the IG Farben 
cartel, a supplier of synthetic dyestuffs for the factory. By that time, the employment rate 
within the factory had plummeted dramatically from 1,400 in 1923 to a mere 250 fur workers 
in 1932. Given the precarious condition of Walter AG and the downward trend of fur 
consumption, there was little enthusiasm from the side of the banks to finance a restart of the 
company after the moratorium. It finally went into liquidation in 1934. 
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Despite the avalanche of bankruptcies that eliminated a number of leading concerns, several 
of the larger firms (Theodor Thorer, Friedrich Erler and J. Ariowitsch) managed to endure the 
crisis, even with decreasing trade volumes. Arndt Thorer reported that he was able to avoid 
considerable losses between 1929 and 1930 because the consumption of Persianer and 
Astrakhan furs remained relatively stable and deflation in these articles was less dramatic. 
The business in karakul skins took up 70% of Thorer’s business volumes. Moreover, at the 
end of 1929, Thorer had depreciated its stocks so as to ease the impact of price deflation on 
his firm. During the subsequent crisis years, Paul Hollender and Arndt Thorer managed to 
keep their business out of the red. Profits in 1929 amounted to 1,997,000RM on a business 
volume of 21,738,000RM.
1168
 Business volume dwindled the following year to 
16,537,000RM but profits reached 505,000RM. The managers of the Thorer concern 
continued to be active in the Russian business, which provided for their factories and branches 
inside Germany and abroad at levels that were significantly lower than prior to 1930.  
10.2.2 A new era of business-bank relations?  
 
Despite the fact that several firms survived the crisis relatively well, the bankruptcy 
maelstrom had ramifications for the bank – business relationship in the district. The local 
bank branches had largely ignored the risks concerning their participation in the international 
fur trade. Furthermore, credit was given unsecured as a rule. Given their exposure during the 
fur crisis, local banks now redefined their role in the local economy. The Deutsche Bank in 
Leipzig lowered its credit portfolio in the fur industry after 1930, which was particularly 
upsetting to the ‘surviving firms.’1169 Early in 1931, Hollender, in his role as president of the 
German Fur Merchants Association, discussed the impact of the crisis with the banks, in 
particular the bankruptcy of David Biedermann. Hollender warned that modifications to the 
lending conditions would injure business and he requested that “the banks should abstain from 
credit reduction because of the Biedermann affair.”1170 Nonetheless, the banks did make their 
lending conditions more stringent and this affected the firms that had survived the crisis.  
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Late 1932, the Ariowitsch firm requested credit for the purpose of importing Russian furs. In 
contrast to previous lending conditions, the Deutsche Bank in Leipzig now demanded to look 
into the book-keeping of the Ariowitsch firm to see whether such credit was justified. Very 
few businesses allowed banks to pry into their books prior to the crisis. Only after numerous 
requests did the Ariowitsch firm reluctantly give permission. On studying these documents, 
which gave finally insight into activities in London and Leipzig, the Deutsche Bank came to 
the conclusion that Ariowitsch was perfectly capable of operating independently without new 
bank credit: “the rumours about the Ariowitsch that say that they have $1,200,000 at their 
disposal are true. They can finance the deal through London.”1171 On this basis, the Deutsche 
Bank refused to offer finance.  
 
Individual firms lost the ability to profit from multiple bank connections and from the 
advantages derived from friendship and personal networks with bankers. Banks now made 
collective arrangements in order to reform the credit market. In 1931, for instance, the 
Dresdner Bank and the Deutsche Bank made a secret agreement to increase the interest rates 
on acceptance credit for the medium-sized firm Semi Goldstaub. Even though the increase 
was minimal (0.125%), Goldstaub considered it an insult from his ‘friend’ Naumann of the 
Deutsche Bank and a breach in business practice: “For a quarter of a century we have worked 
together. The personal impression I have of you was the best possible and I have sincerely 
appreciated you as a true friend of my company. For some time you are no longer the old man 
I used to know. (...) It seems that you want to break with the good old traditions.”1172 The 
request that Goldstaub should make his accounts transparent was met with similar hostility. 
Personal networks mattered less and less in bank-business relationships after the economic 
crisis.  
 
In case of the Thorer firm, the Leipzig branch of the Deutsche Bank first reduced acceptance 
credit in pound sterling for the auctions in London from £60,000 to £30,000.
1173
 Later, banks 
collectively revised their strategy towards Thorer. In November 1932, the German banks in 
Leipzig demanded extra securities in return for bank credit.
1174
 As we have seen with the 
downfall of other major fur firms in Leipzig, the banks had been faced with the problem that 
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securities on the loans were largely insufficient to claim assets from liquidations. Particularly 
galling to the Dresdner Bank was the structure of the Theodor Thorer firm, the so-called 
“Thorer KG.” In a nutshell, the Thorer KG was the overarching holding concern of the Thorer 
business. But only the trading section, with relatively few assets, belonged directly to the 
Thorer KG firm. The important factory in Leipzig-Lindenau as well as the branches in 
London and New York operated relatively autonomous of the Thorer KG. In other words, the 
Thorer branches belonged directly to the Thorer family and not to the Thorer KG. As such, 
individual firms and factories fell outside the securities, which related primarily to the Thorer 
KG. As the Dresdner Bank noted, “it is difficult for us to put claims on the valuable fur 
dyeing factory in Leipzig-Lindenau because our debtor does not possess shares in its 
individual companies. The control over these firms belongs to the private assets of the 
associates Paul Hollender and Arndt Thorer, and even parts of these firms may belong to 
other persons unknown to us. It is therefore doubtful how far the property of the associates 
can be liquidated to our benefit.”1175 Hollender immediately assuaged the worries of the banks 
and included two new assets as securities for loans. Firstly, the assets of Marie Thorer, his 
wife and a silent partner in the firm, were forward as security. The new collateral included 
real estate in Leipzig and its environs. Secondly, Hollender put up the assets of the London 
subsidiary Raw Furs Ltd as a collateral for the loans.
1176
  
 
Still, the new security arrangements failed to renew trust. In the summer of 1933, the largest 
credit providers of Thorer (the ADCA, DD Bank, Dresdner Bank, and the 
Reichskreditgesellschaft) organised a meeting in which they collectively agreed upon the fact 
that Thorer should provide extra guarantees in exchange for commercial credit. A few hours 
after the banks had agreed upon stricter restrictions, the bank directors jointly received 
delegates of the Thorer firm. Paul Hollender had brought along Graf, a new director of the 
firm, and his son, Gerhard, who was being trained in the business according to the family 
tradition. Hollender probably presumed that this was a regular meeting with the bank 
directors, one of the many in which the financing of future deals was discussed. In the 
meeting, Hollender informed the banks that he needed roughly 2,500,000RM for future 
affairs. The banks, however, declared that without any additional securities, Hollender could 
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only enjoy credit under 1,000,000RM. The banks demanded that extra securities should be 
yielded in the form of imported goods.  
 
A bitter discussion followed. Vernickel of the DD Bank noted the hostile reaction of the 
Hollender to the proposition of the banks: “Mr. Hollender looked surprised at the new security 
request, since he believed to have met the wishes of the banks to the fullest extent through the 
guarantee of his wife. The discussion now took some quite unpleasant forms. Mr. Hollender 
initially bluntly refused the request for coverage and stated that he would prefer to reduce or 
even close down his company.”1177 Alfred Weinkrantz of the Dresdner Bank registered the 
tension at the meeting in similar terms: “Hollender reacted to our demand (...) by declaring 
that he would liquidate his business in Leipzig.”1178 Hollender calmed down later but 
nevertheless argued that the extra securities damaged the reputation of his business: “all other 
creditors, particularly abroad, will be surprised by the extra collateral on my goods, especially 
after decades of having unsecured credits at my disposal. They will see it as a weakness of my 
firm and the perception on my business affairs will be pessimistic because of the demands of 
the German banks.”1179 However, the new bank directors were no longer susceptible to this 
kind of reasoning. During what should have been a typical business meeting, Hollender’s son 
witnessed a drastic change in the social structure of the local economy as his father was 
forced to accept the new demands of the banks.
1180 
The above discussion may seem theatrical 
but it reveals much of the changing nature of networks between banks and the fur business. 
The pendulum had clearly swung in favour of the banks, which had resolved their 
unfavourable position in relation to the fur firms. 
 
The dramatic meeting of 1932 is all the more interesting because it reveals much about the 
previous mechanisms of bank-business relations. From the reports of the collective meeting, it 
becomes clear that Hollender used to play the banks off against each other. In particular, 
Hollender often blamed the Deutsche Bank for being disloyal to the interests of the local fur 
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industry. This explains the passive role of Vernickel of the Deutsche Bank in the meeting, 
who carefully avoided accusations of spoiling the lending market: “for a very long time, Mr. 
Hollender has known the opinion of our bank and he also loves to blame us as a 
‘troublemaker’ (...) and to represent us as the driving force behind these negotiations. 
Therefore I kept a low profile during the meeting so as to give Mr. Hollender no cause to go 
to the head office in Berlin and ask for an intervention.”1181 The block between the banks was 
thus not as solid as it seemed at first glance. The careful attitude by Vernickel, who avoided 
being named as the mastermind behind the credit restrictions, was not left unnoticed by 
Weinkrantz of the Dresdner Bank: “I have noticed that Mr. Vernickel did not say a word 
during the meeting with Mr. Hollender (in contrast to the internal meeting beforehand) 
(...)Mr. Vernickel declared that the DD Bank already had separate meetings with the Mr. 
Hollender that made its position clear,”1182 The DD Bank clearly avoided being associated 
with the new credit restriction: thus the ‘bank coalition’ against the fur industry was not 
entirely watertight.  
 
Nonetheless, the meeting marked a landslide in a relationship that used to be characterised by 
powerful firms on the one hand and competing banks on the other hand. Now banks agreed 
upon lending conditions collectively. The continuity in personal relationships, a central 
foundation for the good relationships between banks and businesses, had disappeared as well. 
The highest echelons of the banks in Leipzig were replaced in the wake of the crisis. Paul 
Vernickel took over from Eugen Nauman as head of the DD bank in 1930. Although von 
Klemperer still headed the Dresdner Bank in Leipzig, Alfred Weinkrantz, who had moved 
from the Danzig branch, was clearly the coming man since he replaced von Klemperer in that 
particular meeting.
1183
 These men personified the new lending policy of the local banks 
towards the fur industry.  
 
Only after a few years did the situation on the lending market slightly improve. The Dresdner 
Bank especially was an advocate of making the lending conditions less strict, in particular 
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with regard to the Thorer firm.
1184
 The Dresdner Bank in Leipzig noted, in a vein reminiscent 
of earlier times, that “the banks should not further restrict the freedom of this firm – except 
perhaps for the Russian business – by imposing further claims on his business and goods (...) 
It should be added that the Thorer business is one of the few firms that is still able, because of 
its connections towards Russia and other countries, to attract raw furs to Leipzig and thus 
provide employment for the dyeing and dressing industry.”1185 In 1937, the banks reversed 
restrictions upon the Thorer firm by again granting unsecured loans for daily affairs: “the 
general situation has changed to such an extent that the German creditors are in the position of 
granting unsecured loans to the firm Theodor Thorer just as before the crisis.”1186 By then, 
however, the Thorer firm was the only remaining firm of international importance in Leipzig.  
 
10.3 The external threat posed by the first Soviet Five Year Plan.  
 
The economic and financial crisis was not the only cause behind the decline of the fur 
industry in Leipzig. The first Soviet Five Year plan in 1928 posed an additional exogenous 
challenge for the industrial district. From the perspective of the Soviet Union, a volte-face in 
economic policy was necessary. In 1928, the economic situation of the Soviet Union was less 
favourable than compared with 1913. Production per capita lagged far behind pre-war 
levels.
1187
 In addition, foreign trade was essentially flawed. With the exception of Germany, 
the Soviet Union ran a trade deficit with its main partners. Moreover, export-led economic 
growth was highly unpredictable. Significant problems occurred when exports fell below 
what was expected or when terms of trade turned against the Soviet Union.
1188
  
 
In order to understand the impact of the new Stalinist economic policy upon the fur district, 
we need to separate the general characteristics of the Five Year Plan, especially its foreign 
trade dimension, and the particular changes in the Soviet fur trade. In general, Stalin 
envisioned a self-sufficient industrial economy. The Politburo therefore initiated import 
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substitution in order to decrease dependency upon the import of industrial goods. The Soviet 
Five Year Plan was thus accompanied by a surge in industrial production.
1189
 At the same 
time, the USSR planned to attain larger trade surpluses by a surge in production and exports 
of agricultural and other commodities. The new foreign trade policy under the Five Year Plan 
was “aggressive” in contrast to the flexibility that characterised the NEP.1190 The sudden 
surge in exports further added to the process of price deflation on the world market, much to 
the despair of capitalist countries, which saw the practice as “dumping.”1191 Indeed, because 
of the tremendous efforts through collectivisation and forced labour, Soviet produced-
commodities growingly detached from world market prices. Although the targets of the Five 
Year Plans were never fully achieved, the change in economic policy had profound effects on 
Soviet society and international commerce.
1192
  
 
10.3.1 A double threat: dumping and Soviet auctions.  
 
The Soviet fur trade was part of the Five Year Plan but its outcome differed slightly from 
general picture. Import substitution in the fur industry was not crucial in the eyes of the 
planners. Like agricultural commodities, furs were central in the surge of exports. The Soviets 
therefore profoundly transformed fur exporting and its trade parameters. First of all, the 
Soviets tried to replace the export of raw furs with manufactured furs (dressed and dyed) in 
order to realise larger added value and incorporate labour-bound processes in the commodity 
chain into the USSR. In the first stage in 1930, manufactured furs were introduced onto the 
world market rather aggressively whilst waging a price war. Industrialisation, the more 
aggressive policy on the world market, and the rolling back of raw material exports obviously 
jeopardised the Leipzig cluster in its traditional role as a fur market and manufacturing hub. 
 
Catching up in fur dressing and dyeing was a lengthy process in Soviet Russia. Before World 
War I, fur manufacturing in Russia was an infant industry at best, consisting mainly of a 
putting-out system in the countryside, with concentrations in Vladimir, Perm, Viatka, Kazan, 
and Samara. At this time, there were 550 dressing companies employing about 3,690 workers: 
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there were another 22 workshops with 115 workers in Russian Poland.
1193
 Therefore the pre-
war Russian fur industry was incapable of serving the internal market for fur garments. 
However, fur manufacture for the purpose of exporting gradually expanded in the USSR 
throughout the 1920s.
1194
  
 
Initially, the Leipzig community felt only slightly threatened by the surge in industrial fur 
production in the USSR. German reports on the Soviet fur industry in 1928 described the 
products being churning out of the new dressing factories as substandard.
1195
 However, by 
1930, the attempts to industrialise fur manufacturing in the Soviet Union were taken more 
seriously. In addition to the export of specialised machinery from Germany, mention was 
made about the outflow of qualified German labourers attracted by the Soviet industry. 
Hollender, as president of the German Fur Merchants Association, noted in the summer of 
1930:  
 
“(...) large orders and deliveries of machines for the dressing industry to Russia have  
lately been made on the account of the Soviet fur syndicate [Soiuspushnina]. German 
fur dressers, dyers, and qualified employees are systematically passed over to Russia. 
These facts are consistent with occasional utterances from the men of the Russian fur 
syndicate about the Russian government’s intentions to manufacture raw furs 
themselves and to throw these finished goods at dumping prices on the European 
market. The official Russian authorities like to trivialise these operations. However, 
the opposite is the case.”1196 
 
The report on labour drain was largely exaggerated. A special report of the German 
ambassador in Moscow on the experts active in Soviets industrial niches stated that the Soviet 
dressing and dyeing industry employed only one German labourer: Arthur Brocks, an 
engineer specialised in machinery for the fur dyeing industry, worked for Mosmechprom, a 
Soviet fur industry agency.
1197
 Even so, the observation on increased exports of manufactured 
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furs did correspond with trends in the Soviet trade structure (see figure 1). Since 1925, Soviet 
trade agencies systematically increased exports of dressed furs to the world market, a 
development that reached its climax in 1929. After the launch of the Five Year Plan and the 
price deflation in the fur trade, the value of raw fur exports declined rapidly. Exports of 
manufactured furs and raw ones converged towards 1933. Nonetheless, in the second half of 
the 1930s, the export value of raw furs continued to rank above manufactured furs, albeit by a 
much thinner gap than in the 1920s. Figure 2 shows the ratio of processed – unprocessed furs 
in the trade between Germany and Russia. Imports of manufactured furs increased in size 
between 1926 and 1929 but were still dwarfed by the value of raw furs. The ratio between raw 
and manufactured furs changed drastically after 1931, when manufactured Soviet furs 
represented almost 50% of the total fur exports to Germany.  
 
 
Figure 10-1: Soviet total fur exports, dressed and raw furs.1198 
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Figure 10-2: Soviet imports (raw furs vs manufactured).1199 
 
Soviet manufacturing proved to be a powerful competitor for the Leipzig fur district since 
price-cutting was used as a tactic to introduce fur garments on the world market. Indeed, 
Soviet export commodities ceased to correspond with world market prices during the 
depression years.
1200
 The surge in Soviet exports coalesced with the general tendency of 
falling world market prices. Soviet exports therefore added to declining prices. The term 
‘dumping’ was used to describe the sale of agricultural goods on the world market by the 
Soviets.
1201
 The same was said of furs. In 1930, the Thorer firm predicted that the Soviets 
would compensate for the lack of quality by systematically undercutting world market prices: 
“Russian fur products can balance differences in terms of quality by their appropriately cheap 
pricing.”1202 In order to promote the domestic fur industry, Soviet manufactured furs were 
delivered more cheaply than raw furs, thereby threatening firms on the Brühl, especially those 
involved in manufacturing.
1203
 Reports described the arduous efforts of the Soviets to price 
the Leipzig fur industry out of the market: “Some of the prices for finished furs are so low 
that they do not even reach the regular prices for raw hides and can be justly called dumping 
prices: e.g., a squirrel coat made by the Russians is offered for 238RM while German 
                                                 
1199
 Ibidem, chast 2.  
1200
 James, The End of Globalization, 159. 
1201
 See in this regard: PA AA, , Sonderreferat Wirtschaft R 94389. Auszüge aus: Berliner Börsen Courier, 
25.09.1930. Vossische Zeitung. 24.09.1930. Die Russen wehren sich Gegen Dumping-Vorwürfe. Moskaus 
Dumping-Feldzug 25.09.1930;  
1202
 Sächs. HStA, Wirtschaftsministerium 11168, nr. 630, f. 26 Abschrift: Thorer an das 
Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Betrifft: Export-Förderung, Ausfall-Garantie des Reiches im Russlandgeschäft. 
19.08.1930. 
1203
 PA AA, Sonderreferat Wirtschaft R 94389. Reichsverband deutschen Rauchwarenfirmen, Sitz Leipzig. an 
das Reichswirtschafsministerium. 5.04.1930. 
0 
50 
100 
150 
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Soviet fur exports to Germany 
(1926-1935) 
raw fur imports manufactured furs 
Collective action in times of crisis 
369 
 
manufacturing cannot sell these for under 800RM. Peshaniki [the fur of a suslik] are to be 
offered for 95RM while the minimum cost price in Germany is 160RM.”1204 The arrival of 
large quantities of manufactured furs meant heavy competition for the crisis-ridden Leipzig 
fur industry. 
 
The final result of the new foreign trade policies resulted in changes on the level of 
international commerce. The Soviet’s long-standing wish to gain more systematic control 
over the trade in furs and reverse dependency on foreign sales markets has been mentioned 
before: now words were increasingly put into practice. Like in Leipzig, auctions were seen as 
the instrumental economic institution that would allow control over the organisation of the fur 
trade. An earthquake struck the international fur trade when the first international fur auction 
in Leningrad was held in March 1931. In 1932, a second auction took place and was visited 
by representatives of 8 German, 6 English, 4 American, and 3 French firms.
1205
 The auctions 
in Leningrad gradually replaced the large Soviet auctions that had been held in Leipzig, 
affecting the latter’s status as an international market. In 1933, the Soviets held two auctions 
in Leningrad instead of one. It was visited by 50 international firms, 12 of which were 
German. After 1934, the Leningrad auctions became a permanent institution.
1206
 
 
The creation of auctions in the USSR was remarkably similar to the process conducted in 
Leipzig earlier in the 1920s. The Soiuspushina attracted foreign experts to transform the first 
auctions into an efficient international market institution.
1207
 It was painfully clear that the 
intention was to replace the Leipzig auction: the first Leningrad auctions were even held in 
German.
1208
 Almost uncanny was the presence of the Leipzig RAVAG auctioneer Büttner, 
who was now lending his services to the Leningrad auction.
1209
 Firms in Leipzig that had 
invested in economic institutions, the system of trade privileges, favouritism, and concessions 
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from the state monopoly were directly exposed to this new form of competition. Aside from 
the international crisis, the modifications in international trade by the USSR constituted the 
main source for business failure and unemployment in the industrial district. How could 
businesses reverse this unpalatable trend? 
 
10.3.2 Self-help as crisis management. The limits of collective action (1930-1933).  
 
The competition posed by Soviet manufacturing and auctioneering motivated collective action 
in the Leipzig cluster. Impulses for collective action against this external threat originated 
from the German Fur Merchants Association and its president Paul Hollender. However, the 
task at hand was almost impossible. Firstly, the exports of Soviet manufactured furs had to be 
restricted without disturbing the Soviets. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the trade in 
furs was embedded in fixed bilateral trade relations. Furs were a highly strategic resource both 
for Berlin and Moscow. Modifications that might disturb the balance of trade could have 
ramifications for business interests far beyond those of the Brühl. Nevertheless, local key 
figures lobbied for changing trade arrangements with the Soviets to the advantage of the fur 
industry. Leipzig’s mayor Carl Goerdeler asked the Ministry of Economic Affairs to bargain 
for a better deal for the fur industry in its discussion of German deliveries to the USSR.
1210
 
Hollender also reported to the German government about the deplorable situation the Leipzig 
fur industry that had been caused by Soviet dumping.
1211
 Hollender asked that the government 
to impose restrictions on the import of manufactured furs.  
 
However, the Leipzigers were unable to bend government policy largely because of the 
strategic importance of furs. Furs were part of a carefully negotiated and interconnected trade 
structure, the modification of which could not be achieved without damaging intertwined 
business interests. In fact, the interest of the Leipzig fur industry ran directly counter to those 
of German heavy industry. In order to explain opposing interests, we need to examine the 
development of the bilateral German-Soviet trade. In contrast to the period between 1926 and 
1929, the deficit of Germany faded and the trade balance was more or less restored in 1930. In 
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1931, German exports (762.7 million RM) far exceeded Soviet imports (303.5 million 
RM).
1212
 Since German exports to the USSR had grown by such large proportions, tipping the 
balance of trade over in favour of Germany, it was not in the government’s direct interest to 
tolerate import restrictions on fur garments processed in the Soviet Union. Indeed, a drop in 
imports would curtail the financial abilities of the Soviets to pay for German exports, 
especially those produced by heavy industry. Here, the fur trade was paramount. Fur imports 
accounted for roughly 18% (one third of which were processed furs) of goods imported from 
the USSR in 1930.
1213
 The German government realised the importance of the fur trade for 
Soviet earnings. 
 
Restricting the flows of furs would automatically disrupt bilateral trade that was already 
shifting out of balance. A statement from a meeting of the German government in the summer 
of 1931 illustrates the fear of disturbing the trade balance with the USSR: “German imports 
will only amount to about 280 million RM. Von Raumer [a prominent member of the 
Zentralverband der Deutschen Elektrotechnischen Industrie (the German Electro-technical 
Industry Association)] is worried that this will lead to a standstill in the trade with Russia, 
since it will no longer be able to pay for its exports (…) One could say that the entire German 
industry, in particular the electro-mechanical industry, is now living from the trade with 
Russia.”1214 Thus, rather than cutting back, the government ideally wanted to expand imports 
from the USSR by additional 250 million RM. The strategic position of furs in the Soviet 
foreign trade now turned into a major disadvantage for the Leipzigers. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (Reichswirtschaftsministerium) stated that “sharp restrictions on fur imports 
will incline the Russians to revise their orders with the German machine industry.”1215 In 
other words, the particular interests of the fur district were at odds with the interests of the 
more influential heavy industry, particularly those of the powerful German electrotechnical 
industry.  
 
In the highest political echelons, the fur industry in Leipzig was sacrificed on the altar of 
industrial exports to the USSR. The Saxon ambassador in Berlin noted the failure of high 
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politics: “The negotiations between Germany and Russia have now been completed. With 
regard to the supply of the Leipziger Platz with Russian raw furs, an agreement was not 
reached. The matter therefore remains suspended for subsequent trade negotiations (...) What 
result these negotiations will have is uncertain.”1216 With a political solution off the table, the 
question of importing raw and manufactured furs was increasingly left to businesses and local 
actors. Hollender, for one, strongly encouraged fur firms in the cluster to follow a strategy of 
‘self-help.’ The policy of self-help was an appeal to individual firms to protect the local 
industry in their dealings with the Soviets by restricting the proportion of manufactured furs 
in business dealings. The strategy was of a pragmatic nature. Instead of refusing to import 
‘substandard’ Soviet garments altogether and thereby most likely lose his deals with the 
Soviets, Hollender tried to negotiate coupling the exports of a small percentage of 
manufactured furs to a larger percentage of raw furs. He called this practice ‘allocation’ and 
implemented it in his own business. He explained his strategy in an exposé:  
 
“The way of self-help [Selbsthilfe] will be enforced by commanding a large supply 
contract for raw furs with a corresponding advance on a defined quota of 
manufactured Soviet products for the European market. In this sense, I believe I will 
get a detailed insight into the extent of exports of manufactured goods and also will be 
able to contractually limit the efforts of these exports, at least for a time.”1217 
 
It is clear that Hollender believed that the strategy had some specific advantages. In particular, 
the Thorer concern kept control over the distribution of a quantity of Soviet fur garments on 
the European markets. However, the execution of the allocation policy was another matter. In 
1931, Thorer cooperated with the Chaim Eitingon AG in order to make a large deal for 
karakul skins, organised according to the principles of his allocation policy. The ratio between 
raw and manufactured skins was set at 3 to 1. The deal compromised of the import of 600,000 
raw Persianer coupled to 200,000 dyed karakul skins, divided between Thorer (60%) and the 
Eitingon concern (40%) for the sum of $3,600,000.
1218
 Unfortunately for Thorer, Eitingon 
dropped out and closed a separate deal with the Soviets. Furthermore, Hollender had 
overestimated the size of karakul production. He was therefore forced to accept a less 
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lucrative deal, 200,000 raw karakuls linked to a corresponding 100,000 dyed karakuls skins. 
This contract represented 60% of the total Soviet karakul export (500,000 skins).
1219
 
 
Importantly, Hollender tried to apply the principles of the allocation strategy to the collective 
deals of the district firms: “because the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
are, for political reasons, not able to implement quotas in trade negotiations on the quantity of 
processed fur products in Russia, Leipzig and the Leipzig industry must proceed to help 
themselves.”1220 Collective self-help was put into action once the first auctions in Leningrad 
were held in March 1931. The auctions in Leningrad were in fact the result of reluctance to 
accept a larger quantity of manufactured furs for the Leipzig auctions.
1221
 The Leipzig firms 
embarked on an independent ‘diplomatic’ mission to Moscow with representatives of the fur 
industry. The aim was to establish a limited quota of manufactured furs for sales at the 
Leipzig auctions. Hollender was joined by Max Ariowitsch, who had good connections in 
Moscow, consul Schlesinger of the German foreign office, and several bank officials who 
were closely involved in the auction business. The individual negotiations were a complete 
fiasco. Moscow easily kept the attempts to fix a quota on imports at bay. In fact, it was able to 
press its claims against the Leipzigers. The Soviets demanded that the German banks should 
expand their financing of the import of manufactured furs for the Leipzig auctions.
1222
  
 
The policy of self-help thus ran aground on the Soviets’ steadfastness. Hollender’s Fur 
Merchants Association made a last attempt to reconcile with Russians and pursued the 
Leipzig banks to restrict financing of manufactured furs at 25% against 75% raw furs at the 
auctions in Leipzig. In Moscow, the bank proposal was again denied. The same fate befell a 
counterproposal of the diplomatic mission suggesting a ratio of 66% against 33%. The Soviets 
played hardball: trade representatives refused any restrictions on the export of manufactured 
furs and threatened to withdraw the Soviet auctions from Leipzig altogether.
1223
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Clearly, Hollender had overestimated the power of the self-help strategy and his own abilities 
to influence his Moscow contacts in a matter of high strategic importance both for Germany 
and the USSR. In addition, his approach and his personal single-handed pursuit were 
increasingly being questioned on the home front. The foreign office (Auswartiges Amt) 
heavily criticised Hollender’s obstinate behaviour towards the Soviets: “the ministries of the 
Reich, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are of the opinion that it would have been 
better if the representatives of Leipzig’s fur industry, especially Mr. Hollender, had not 
embarked on their own in a fight with the Russians and left the whole matter to a question of 
power of the Russian trade policy.”1224 What is more, neighbouring firms also doubted the 
allocation strategy. In particular, the solidarity of firms specialised in commerce rapidly 
dwindled after the failed conference with the Soviet trade representatives. Max Ariowitsch, 
for instance, would no longer run the risk of losing the Russian business altogether. He wrote: 
“it is better to import processed furs than no furs at all.”1225  
 
The banks were also unable to execute a policy that protected local manufacturing. Banks and 
auction companies were forced to abandon the allocation policy in an early stage. As 
mentioned above, the Soviets continuously exerted pressures on the Leipzig banks to grant 
credit for the sale of dressed furs on the Leipzig auctions.
1226
 The Dresdner Bank was unable 
to withstand the pressure from the Soiuzpushnina and abandoned the 75 -25% quota in March 
1931.
1227
 In contrast, it was more successful in imposing the 75 – 25% restriction on the State 
Bank of the USSR, apparently a less ‘aggressive’ organisation than the Soiuzpushnina. The 
Dresdner Bank maintained the import quota in the contract with the State Bank until 1934, 
when it was lowered to 45% raw furs and 55% manufactured furs.
1228
 In contrast to earlier 
projects of collective action, external developments failed to provide a framework for 
collective action involving all economic actors.  
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In subsequent collective negotiations, the fur firms also accepted larger quotas of 
manufactured furs.
1229
 In 1932, the Soviets sold furs for 10 million RM to a consortium in 
Leipzig, which predominantly consisted of the Jewish trading firms Felsenstein, Ariowitsch, 
Ehrmann, L & W Fuchs, Mautner & Ahlswede, Gebrüder Neugass, Paul Poser, and Siegried 
Poser. They were joined by several gentile firms: Theodor Thorer, Robert Ehrmann, and 
Heinrich Koenigswerther.
1230
 Leading trade firms owned 80% of the contract: J. Ariowitsch 
(32%), Theodor Thorer (20%), Robert Ehrmann (16%), and Heinrich Koenigswerther 
(12%).
1231
 The contract represented 34% of the total fur exports from the Soviet Union to 
Germany (which amounted to 18,090,000RM raw furs and 15,700,000RM manufactured furs 
in total). This consortium accepted the same ratio as the auction company: 55% of dyed furs 
against 45% of unprocessed furs, a further indication that the policy of keeping the ratio of 
raw furs higher than processed furs had largely failed.  
 
An alternative strategy to remedy the impact of Soviet fur manufacturing lay in international 
policy coordination. Such attempts were based on the internationalism in the fur trade that had 
been institutionalised in the International Fur Trade Association in 1930. However, the 
rampant international crisis and the subsequent retreat from internationalism made this option 
seem unrealistic. Hollender travelled as president of the International Fur Trade Association 
to London but his attempts to coordinate international business against the ‘Soviet dumping’ 
largely failed. Internationalism in the fur industry existed at the level of labour associations as 
well. The actions of the international workers unions reached a more advanced stage but were, 
in the end, equally ineffective. In 1931, Rhys Davies (1877-1954), a British Labour Unionist 
for the garments union and a Member of Parliament, visited Leipzig in order to discuss the 
possibilities for international action against the Soviets. Davies’ visit stirred hope that an 
international solution could curb the ‘dumping.’1232 His sojourn led to an international 
garment union conference in Leipzig visited by Belgian, German, and British delegates. 
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During the conference, workers supported a policy of import restriction instead of tariffs.
1233
 
However, the international fur workers protocol was not able to exercise any influence on 
government policy. In fact, all hopes for an international solution were erased when countries 
resorted to protectionist measures. Great Britain constructed a high tariff wall of 30% on the 
import of manufactured furs in the early 1930s, which was even more damaging to the 
Leipzig industry.
1234
 In sum, both local and international coordination failed. The 
international economic system had taken a profound turn that paralysed economic action.  
10.4  Anti-Semitism and the erosion of the industrial district (1932-1936).  
 
Squeezed in a pincer movement between the economic crisis and the changing parameters of 
the Soviet fur trade, the emergence of the Third Reich, and its anti-Semitic program in 
particular, further destabilised the social underpinnings of industrial district. Over the course 
of the five years between 1933 and 1938, Jewish businessmen in Leipzig were systematically 
driven out of economic life. Jewish businesses were almost immediately attacked by the new 
regime and the situation continued to worsen as time went on.
1235
 On 1 April 1933, a national 
boycott against Jewish business was held across Germany, which heavily affected the fur 
business in Leipzig. In addition to pillaging businesses, SA men forced certain Jewish traders 
to walk on the Brühl holding signs saying “don’t buy from Jews, shop at German stores!”1236 
Other actions were more cynical. A specific measure in Leipzig was implemented against 
gathering on the streets. This malicious rule affected commerce because it was a habit of 
Jewish businessmen to conclude business deals standing in front of their firms.
1237
 The Nazis 
described the measure as a traffic and security issue. Hollender, as president of the Leipzig 
Fur Merchants Association, hesitantly defended the measure against trading on the streets in 
the interests of “law and order.” He did little to protect the traditions of his Jewish colleagues 
other than vaguely formulating an idea of creating indoor meeting rooms, emulating business 
practices in the London fur trade.
1238
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News about the hostilities against Jews crossed the German borders rapidly and stirred 
international sentiment. Jewish fur traders in Great Britain were outraged, denouncing the 
recent incidents as “medieval savagery.” By the end of March, the English Jewish fur traders 
decided that the Leipzig trade should be boycotted.
1239
 In July 1933, the overarching National 
Council of Fur Trade Organisations in the US boycotted German firms.
1240
 Since Jewish 
businessmen held key positions in the international fur industry, gentile businessmen on the 
Brühl experienced the disruptive impact of anti-Semitic outbursts on international trade. 
Moreover, the uncertain status of the Jews and their property in Germany discouraged more 
foreign merchants of Jewish origin from travelling to Leipzig.  
 
The damaging effects on foreign trade initiated a barrage of complaints from stakeholders in 
the industrial district. However, such official complaints against excesses were hesitant and 
careful. One of the first reactions came from the heavily affected Association of German Fur 
Dyers, an almost exclusively gentile association of industrialists. These industrialists 
depended upon the supply of raw furs from the Brühl, which was to a large extent organised 
by Jewish traders. The representatives of the association wrote to chancellor Adolf Hitler, 
demanding the protection of Jewish individuals and a guarantee of the rights of foreign 
traders.
1241
 It was not the only action to protect the Jewish community in Leipzig. Carl 
Goerdeler, the mayor of Leipzig, was known for his resistance against anti-Semitic policies. 
According to his own testimony, he crossed SA pickets during the April boycott and went 
inside Jewish fur businesses trying to avoid plunder and vandalism. Allegedly, Goerdeler also 
deployed the city police to liberate Jews who had been detained by the SA.
1242
  
 
With the Saxon government as mediator, representatives of the fur industry continued to 
petition to the Reichskanzlei to put an end to the excesses against the Jews: “the 
representatives of the fur trade, under the guidance of Hollender and the mayor Dr. Goerdeler, 
intend to visit the Reich Chancellery, the Ministry of Economy 
(Reichswirtschaftsministerium), and possibly the Secretary of State Dr. Pfundtner and ask for 
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uniform, clear, and unambiguous guidelines and instructions for lower-ranked party officials, 
because of the treatment of Jewish fur traders in Leipzig.”1243 The Saxon government, 
sensitive to the problem of regional industrial decline, instructed their ambassador in Berlin to 
support the delegation. However, the role of the ambassador was carefully limited as it was 
noted that: “Count Holtzendorff [the Saxon ambassador] should be induced to join only for 
the purpose to express how important the fur trade is for Saxony’s industry. Holtzendorff, 
however, should not touch upon the political side of things.”1244 In sum, gentile businessmen 
did defend their Jewish colleagues but their reactions were limited to letters of complaint and 
concealed criticism. An open confrontation with the new regime was clearly not an option. 
 
What is more, several reactions with the aim of helping Jewish colleagues were in fact highly 
ambiguous and deeply coloured by anti-Semitism. In defending Jewish fur businesses, the 
Chamber of Commerce in Leipzig divided the Jewish population of the city into a desireable 
and an undesireable part:  
 
“Why should it not be possible in trade and industry that similar guidelines should be 
valid for German Jews as they apply to lawyers and doctors. Everyone, even the Jews 
who lived in Germany since before the war and have become German, fully 
understand that deceivers, pests, and Jewish pirates who migrated here during and 
after the war must be eradicated, but [the integrated Jew] does not understand (and I 
must confess I do not either) that he who feels and thinks as a German and has often 
bled for Germany should be seen as unpatriotic at this time and thus be outlawed. 
Should it not be possible to mitigate this situation, Leipzig will lose its meaning as a 
fur city in the shortest possible time: Paris, Prague, and London are the beneficiaries of 
this German anti-Jewish attitude, without distinction of person” 1245 
 
This strong reaction of the Chamber of Commerce has to be set in the context of the evolving 
Nazi policy towards the Jewish population in Germany, which increasingly targeted Jews of 
Eastern European origin. This culminated in a regulation in the summer of 1933 that enabled 
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the de-naturalisation of recently arrived Jews from Eastern Europe.
1246
 The regulation 
particularly affected the Jewish community in Leipzig. One of its characteristics, when 
compared to other middle-sized Jewish communities in Germany, was the rather high level of 
foreign-born Jews.
1247
 In 1925, 68% of the Jews in Leipzig were born abroad. The request of 
the Chamber of Commerce was intended to protect the older generation of “German-born” 
Jews. The families that stood at the foundation the Saxon fur industry’s success were seen as 
more important.  
 
The Chamber of Commerce was not alone in employing such a discourse. Without the 
insulting language employed by the Chamber of Commerce, Hollender also focused on 
preserving the rights of the oldest generation at the Brühl. Families like the Eitingons, 
Felsensteins, and Ariowitschs, all of which were established in Leipzig at the end of the 
nineteenth century, were arguably the most successful: “The stance of the NSDAP authorities 
and party members is unchanged (...) however, distinction should be made between the ‘long 
established’ (alteingesessenen) Jewish firms and the Jewish merchants from the East who 
arrived here after 1919.”1248 In separating German Jews from Eastern European Jews, 
businessmen represented reigning anti-Semitic discourses. Although industrialists and traders 
appropriated a substantial part of discourse of the new rulers, they were not able to gain 
protection for even the most “valuable” businessmen. At no point did protests attain a 
subversive pitch or become systematic.  
 
In early 1934, the devastating impact of the political transition upon the local fur trade and 
industry had become clear to Hollender. The migration of Jewish entrepreneurs was especially 
damaging: “there is no question that not only many members of our industry have migrated 
abroad, but they also took along their customers. The migration of these Jews has 
strengthened the markets with which Leipzig is competing.”1249 London turned into a hotspot 
for the refugee entrepreneurs. By the summer of 1938, about 8,000 German refugees lived in 
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England, 187 of which persons were classified as refugee entrepreneurs.
1250
 The British Home 
Office made attempts to send refugee entrepreneurs to ‘declining’ areas in Britain, ‘special 
zones,’ that were in need of entrepreneurs. However, most of the fur refugees ignored the 
preferences of the government and settled in London, overwhelmingly so in the case of 
Leipzig’s fur merchants. 
 
A special report about refugees in Great Britain in 1939 singled out the importance of refugee 
entrepreneurs in the fur industry as one of the most important niches transplanted from Nazi 
Germany: “One specific example is shown by the fur trade in which there are about sixty 
refugee firms in Great Britain working as commission agents and brokers which were 
formerly established in Leipzig or Berlin. In addition, there are some three or four 
manufacturing furriers now in London employing fifty or sixty workers who previously ran 
business in Germany. At least one firm exists in London for the dressing and dyeing of furs, 
many of which were formerly prepared in Leipzig; this firm is managed by a German refugee 
but gives employment to some 160 British employees.”1251 Apart of the refugee 
entrepreneurs, merchants like J. Ariowitsch & Co moved their headquarters to London, where 
they had already a branch. What remained of Ariowitsch’s business in Leipzig was finally 
liquidated in 1938.  
 
The refugee movement from Leipzig harboured a social dimension as well, one that pertained 
to the generational division referred to above. The older generation of firm owners that fled 
Leipzig were clearly wealthier. Moreover, firms like Ariowitsch could draw on an existing 
network of branches outside Leipzig. The poorer and smaller Jewish entrepreneurs stayed in 
Leipzig but soon found themselves in a precarious situation. Reports in 1936 still mention the 
presence of Jewish owners of smaller firms but the opportunities to settle abroad rapidly 
dwindled. The emigration officer of Leipzig’s Jewish community reported on those who 
wanted to leave:  
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“The majority (...) are dealers and traders, commercial workers. Of the craftsmen, 
shoemakers, and tailors, many are older people who were previously self-employed 
but have lost their Aryan clientele and cannot find sufficient replacements in the 
Jewish community. Furriers and fur workers are out of work because of the decline of 
the fur business. Unfortunately, there is no prospect of bringing them to the new larger 
centres of the fur trade, such as London, New York, although they are often efficient 
professionals.”1252 
 
After damaging Jewish economic life and the community elite, the next stage involved 
liquidating Jewish enterprises (“Aryanisation”), which was executed in 1938.1253 However, 
Jewish business activities had already systematically decreased before this. In 1933, about 
100,000 Jewish enterprises were domiciled in Germany: in 1935, numbers plummeted to 75-
80,000 in 1935 and then 40,000 in April 1938.
1254
 Many cases demonstrate that German 
businesses profited from taking over Jewish competitors. However, it has been shown that the 
debilitating effects on commerce were much higher in Leipzig than the profits gained by such 
an operation. The Deutsche Bank in Leipzig reported in 1939 that it still had investments of 
500,000 to 600,000RM in the Jewish part of the Leipzig fur industry. It was stated that: 
“Discontinuance [of investing in Jewish business], together with the loss of the ancillary 
business associated with credit (turnover, bill discounting, guarantees, etc.), will also result in 
a certain diminution of returns.”1255 The Aryanisation was therefore unprofitable. More 
importantly, Jewish merchants had taken their most valuable asset with them: connections. At 
the end of 1936, 113 fur firms, specialised in foreign trade, had moved their business to 
London, New York Paris, Prague, or Milan.
1256
 Aside from the economic crisis and the Soviet 
industrial policy, the anti-Semitic policy in the Third Reich heavily disturbed the social 
structure of the district. All three developments eroded the effectiveness of collective action.  
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10.5 The decline Leipzig district in the 1930s: some concluding remarks.  
 
The abovementioned developments destroyed the equilibrium that existed between the 
industrial and commercial sectors as well as the harmony between the gentile and Jewish 
firms. Even worse was the exodus of Jewish business. After 1933, migration had a deleterious 
effect on the value of German fur commerce. Imports and exports shrunk to figures under 50 
million RM. After 1935, Germany was no longer the main importer of Russian furs. The 
export business in raw furs dwindled and imports of raw and processed furs converged: prior 
to this, the success of the Saxon fur industry was largely based on importing large quantities 
of raw furs and exporting processed furs abroad. Governmental economic policy equally 
disturbed the balance in the district. From February 1935, the government put the import of 
furs under strict control in order to monitor spending in foreign currencies. Firms had to pay 
on special accounts (Sondernkonto) and transfers to the Soviet trade representation only 
occurred with the permission of the Currency Bureau (Devisenstelle).
1257
 The German Fur 
Merchants Association in Leipzig noted that this discriminated against the smaller firms in the 
district: “the new arrangement, as it resulted from payment agreements with Russia, is not to 
the benefit for the entire sector as it will obstruct the import of furs from Russia for middle 
and small-sized firms rather to the few larger firms which import from Russia and which have 
already concluded large deals before 15.02.1935.”1258  
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Figure 10-3: Import and export of furs, Germany (1930-1938).  
 
Economic exigencies, the migration of the Jews, and the restrictions on the foreign trade 
eroded the trade in Leipzig to such an extent that it is questionable whether one can still 
characterise the local fur industry as an industrial district. Is it still valid to speak of the fur 
industry in terms of the defining aspects of the industrial district, like local collaboration, 
mutual learning, and a balanced size distribution between primarily small and medium sized 
firms? It is a question that cannot be unequivocally answered: firms continued to construct 
collaborative networks but developments in the early 1930s had undoubtedly disrupted size 
distribution in the district. In terms of the latter, there is little doubt about the fact that 
Theodor Thorer was now the largest firm and the only one remaining of international 
importance whereas the district was previously characterised by few lead firms and an arena 
of successful smaller businesses. This imbalance eventually led to a reaction from the smaller 
firms. In October 1939, several of the smaller firms in Leipzig merged into the RIAG 
(Rauchwaren Import Actiengesellschaft), which was based on a starting capital of 
1,000,000RM. These firms shared the motive of competing at the level of the Thorer firm: 
“Less pronounced, but therefore not a lesser motive, is a certain unease about the superior 
position of the company Theodor Thorer on the Brühl. With all due respect to the person of 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
va
lu
e
 in
 M
ill
io
n
 M
ar
k 
Import of raw furs 
Import ofprocessed furs 
Export of raw furs 
Export of processed furs 
Collective action in times of crisis 
384 
 
Mr. Hollender and his services to the fur industry, the superiority of his company is 
uncomfortably felt by all other fur dealers. The deliberation to occasionally form an 
approximately equal partner is likely to have caused the idea of the merger of several 
companies into a larger company in the first place.”1259 
 
On the other hand, collective action continued to structure business behaviour in the industrial 
district, whether carried out by new initiatives or old institutions. Firstly, the last, albeit 
modest, feat of the Leipzig Fur Merchants Association was the promotion of air transport for 
fur commerce. The rapid expansion of air transport through the Leipzig/Halle airport, which 
opened in 1928, offered the opportunity to improve the logistics of the Leipzig district. In 
1935, the Fur Merchants Association closed a deal with Lufthansa, which offered temporary 
lower rates for airfreight. The Fur Merchants Association hoped that its members would make 
use of the rapidly expanding airport. After 1935, Lufthansa organised night transports from 
Russia to Leipzig for use by the fur industry.
1260
  
 
Another evolution was that the dumping of furs in 1930s entailed sharing innovations and 
techniques in industrial fur dyeing so as to render the fur industry more competitive. Projects 
that were staged in this regard were however of marginal importance. Noteworthy was the 
creation of a highly specific codicil called Der Rauchwarenveredeler (the Fur Producer) 
inside the journal Der Rauchwarenmarkt that consistently discussed the latest advancements 
in the processing of raw furs. It was explicitly created in order to counter outsourcing from the 
regional fur dyeing industry.
1261
 In a similar vein, the research institution Reichszentrale für 
Pelztier und Rauchwarenforschung re-oriented its research focus onto production methods in 
the fur dyeing and dressing industry in contrast to its original research into fur breeding. For 
this purpose, the RZ established connections with IG Farben and the Institute for Organic 
Chemistry at the Leipzig University.
1262
 The Reichszentrale wanted to expand its research into 
industrial chemistry in order to compete with foreign fur dyeing manufacturing: “More and 
more, other nations outclass our fur dyeing industry (…) and often they have shorter delivery 
times than the Leipzig district. Many of our dyeing and dressing plants, which often are 
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operating with handwork, do not have laboratories at their disposal.”1263 However, the 
expansion of the RZ was troubled by a lack of financial support from local actors.  
 
One of the last collaborative efforts was the somewhat surprising involvement of several 
Leipzig firms in the creation of a shipping company, the Nordmeer Studien und Reederei 
GmbH. The company, with a jointly invested capital base of 160,000RM, was created in order 
to organise seal hunting in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The joint venture consisted 
of 35 firms in Leipzig, including Theodor Thorer.
1264
 The joint venture was not far-fetched 
since sealskins formed an important submarket in the fur trade. The Leipzig fur industry 
entered maritime seal hunting with the purchase of the ship Sachsen in 1938. In 1939, the 
shipping company purchased an additional ship Storis from the Norwegian fleet that was 
better equipped for seal hunting.
1265
 Even if it is important to note the existence of such 
cooperative initiatives in the 1930s, they were unable to reverse the damage done by 
economic exigencies and adversarial government policy. Still, district-like elements continued 
to characterise the declining Leipzig fur industry. 
 
It would be easy to conclude that the Second World War, the destruction of the Brühl in 1943, 
and the collectivisation of the private fur industry by the DDR was the end of the story of the 
Leipzig industrial district. This is true in a literal sense, although some ‘fur companies’ 
remained active in Leipzig after collectivisation in the DDR. I would like to finish by pointing 
out that the Leipzig industrial district continued to have influence as a model. The ‘Leipzig-
model,’ in which the fur commerce and industry had organically grown through the proximity 
of firms, inspired post-war reconstruction policy at the local level. A clone of the Brühl was 
created in Frankfurt-am-Main. The city attracted many of the German fur traders and 
industrialists who left the Soviet occupation zone. Frankfurt was also home to former 
influential members of the industrial district. In 1946, Walter Leiske, the former member of 
the Leipzig council and one of the masterminds behind the International Fur Exhibition, was 
appointed president of the Chamber of Commerce in Frankfurt.
1266
 Leiske, who had nurtured 
the idea to develop “regional economics” in central Germany, demonstrated a similarly 
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creative attitude towards the local economy when he subsequently became mayor of 
Frankfurt. He was successful in luring Leipzig entrepreneurs to his new home. The book 
printing and, to a lesser extent, the fur industry were successfully transplanted there. In 1946, 
Paul Hollender purchased an old leather manufactory in Offenbach, close to Frankfurt, and 
established a new firm called Thorer and Hollender KG. Other Leipzig firms were said to 
have established businesses in the Niddastrasse, close to the railway station. With the support 
of the town hall, the Leipzigers in Frankfurt revived their old trade institutions. One of them 
was an annual Frankfurt fur fair: as with the Leipzig fair, the new institution took place in the 
first week after Easter.
1267
 Moreover, attempts were also made to reconstruct international 
links. Thorer restored its branches in London, New York, and South Africa. In the summer of 
1950, Hollender died in an accident while on a business trip in South Africa and Namibia.  
 
The history of the remarkable transplantation of the Leipzig printing and fur industries, their 
impact upon the post-war economic recovery, and the extent to which Leipzig arrangements 
were reconstructed in Frankfurt remains to be written. The same goes for the historical 
trajectories of decentralised economic activities and the impact they had on future policy 
makers and a new generation of entrepreneurs in rebuilding the post-war German economy. 
More generally, the legacy of such historical and organically grown production systems in 
processes of industrial reconversion remains opens for future research projects that can link 
history writing with contemporary economics, geography, and politics.  
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Picture 6: The Thorer buildings after the bombing of the Brühl, December 1943 (BA 1977 1187 Brühl 70. 
Ritterstrasse 3/33 bis 35. Geschäftshaus der FA. Thorer.  
 
 
  
Collective action in times of crisis 
388 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
389 
 
11 Conclusion. 
 
In this thesis, I have addressed the apparent paradox of the historical persistence of 
decentralised economic organisation in Saxony, marked by the concentration of large 
numbers of small to medium-sized and highly specialised firms, when the region was 
simultaneously at the forefront of processes of globalisation. In other words, why did a 
decentralised production system in Saxony prevail despite being the ‘storm centre of trade 
cycles’? This problem was the foundation for the study of the history of the fur industry in 
Leipzig between 1880 and 1939. The fur industry in Leipzig emerged during the long 
nineteenth century as an industrial district and it was one of the most open sectors in Saxony. 
The Leipzig fur industry depended on the organisation of transborder activities for the supply 
of resources whilst also being open to export markets. I conducted the research in order to 
remedy the lack of understanding of how regional business systems interact with the outside 
world. It was argued that historical research has not yet fully taken into account the position 
of industrial districts within the global economy since usually industrial districts have been 
discussed within the debate about the history of industrialisation. The research lacuna relates 
to the internationalisation of the firms in the district on the one hand and the impact of macro-
economic developments on the industrial district on the other. 
 
11.1 The international roots of the industrial district.  
 
One conclusion to surface in this research is that the assumed mismatch between regional 
systems and world market openness does not adequately capture the interaction between the 
industrial district and the outside world. The industrial district in Leipzig did not grow in spite 
of its transnational connections and world market dependency but because of it. The life cycle 
of the district was inextricably connected to the expansion and contraction of the international 
fur business. The growth and consolidation of the industrial district in Leipzig was to a large 
extent due to the expansion of international trade in the long nineteenth century whereas its 
demise was caused by the economic turmoil of the 1930s. The initial growth of the industrial 
district required little protection from external forces since global manufacturing was in its 
initial stages. The industrial district managed to emerge in Leipzig because of the city’s 
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historical role as a trade centre in furs and its successful entry into a phase where capitalist 
business came to dominate the global trade. The growth of the district coincided with the 
boom in world market prices and global competition after 1900. Even after World War I, the 
firms of the district managed to reintegrate themselves into the flows of world trade. Only in 
the 1930s did the impact of macroeconomic and geopolitical changes prove too disruptive for 
the district to reproduce itself.  
 
In other words, the importance of transborder activities and transnational connections lay at 
the very roots of the industrial district. Saxony as a region stood at the forefront of global 
economic interdependencies that were created by the forceful impact of revolutionary 
transportation methods, new patterns of human mobility, and the economic boom that typified 
the long nineteenth century. International railroad networks replaced river shipping and the 
wandering merchants that had previously joined Saxony to Russia. Human mobility in 
particular stimulated the formation of the district. Artisans came to Leipzig in the wake of 
freedom of commerce in 1861, epitomising internal mobility in Germany. The currents of 
modern mass migration brought entrepreneurs of Jewish origin who connected Leipzig more 
firmly with the trade in the east. These migration movements helped transform the local fur 
industry into an industrial cluster.  
 
Mobility continued to impact on the growth of the district. The phenomenon of national and 
transnational entrepreneurship was at the root of the industrial district. Whereas first 
generation merchants drew on international networks in order to organise the procurement of 
raw furs, the tremendous possibilities proffered by the conquest of foreign markets lay within 
the reach of expanding Leipzig fur manufacturing. Transnational entrepreneurship led to the 
capture of the Brussels and (possibly) the Paris market for processed German furs. In 
particular, transborder business activities between Leipzig and Brussels were successfully 
managed through personal connections with members of the immigrant community in 
Brussels. The organisation of transborder activities through transnational entrepreneurs had a 
twofold advantage for the firms in Leipzig. Firstly, foreign business adventures were costly 
affairs and so it made economic sense to consider the option of partnerships with furriers or 
entrepreneurs on the move. This practice enabled smaller firms to participate in transborder 
activities. Secondly, this alternative form of transborder business activities kept decentralised 
activities in the district intact. Entrepreneurs profited from links with foreign markets without 
having to expand the organisational basis of the firm. By utilising transnational 
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entrepreneurship, the social structure of the district was maintained and patterns of 
concentration that usually go hand in hand with increases in scale were avoided.  
 
Whereas transnational entrepreneurship signified a viable alternative to firm branching, 
especially in proximate markets, several district firms did however assume a multinational 
organisation, in particular the ‘lead firms’ of Leipzig. However, multinational organisations of 
Leipzig fur firms were structured through family connections. Branches emerged in important 
fur centres like New York, London, and Moscow and were usually run by sons and brothers 
of the firm owner in Leipzig. Through kinship rather than managerial pressure, the link of the 
firm with Leipzig remained central in the affairs of the business. Even in the 1920s, family 
multinationals remained organised in such a way that the Leipzig division retained the status 
as the head office in the family firm network. Only particular circumstances, like the personal 
and unforeseen ambitions of family members, disturbed the balance in the multinational 
organisation of the Leipzig businesses. In general, the pursuit of internationalisation through 
multinational business organisation left local attachment and district participation largely 
unaffected. In sum, the translocal activities of the industrial district should be conceptualised 
along lines of scale, even in multinational organisations. Key drivers of transborder 
connections were individuals, family members, former labourers, or acquaintances.  
 
By emphasising personal connections, the thesis has therefore added to a growing body of 
literature that stresses the important yet understudied layers of economic globalisation at the 
‘micro-level,’ concealed in a web of transnational ties between a multitude of smaller 
businesses, brokers, migrants, representatives, and travelling merchants. The organisation of 
such transnational ties is hard to reconstruct. In unravelling the many links that connected the 
firms in Leipzig to the outside world, the almost momentary and fragile character of translocal 
activities should be stressed. Small offices abroad were easily abandoned, partnerships with 
brokers as easily set up as cancelled. Agents resided in a particular area for as long as it was 
interesting. The presence of Leipzig firms abroad did not leave an indelible print on the cities 
in which they settled, in contrast to the presence of multinationals in the early twentieth 
century. Rather, it was shadowy and ephemeral.  
 
Even though ephemeral, global links and transnational connections were remarkably robust. 
After World War I, most of the largest Leipzig fur firms were able to restore their presence in 
foreign fur centres. Unlike larger firms that suffered from sequestration, the physical removal 
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of representation and low-asset branches abroad did not constitute an insurmountable loss. 
Furthermore, despite the state monopolisation of foreign trade in the USSR, the Siberian trade 
was characterised by a continuity of personal connections. Some of the Jewish merchants of 
foreign descent in Leipzig profited from having a nationality other than the German. This is 
an argument that has been stressed particularly within the context of the Russian trade, where 
officials of the state agencies were often the same men that ran the tsarist business. Therefore, 
the scale of translocal connectivity remained situated, to a large extent, on the level of 
personal connections. In any case, the particular issue of former ‘capitalists’ in the garb of 
state officials and their links to foreign business during the early years of the Soviet Union 
certainly deserves further research. 
 
11.2 The power of collective action: adaptation or modification?  
 
Aside from the robustness of personal connections in fabricating transnational ties, this 
research has also put forward the hypothesis that the industrial district built up capacities to 
deal with exogenous pressures in the district as a social structure. Economic actors of the 
industrial district used the same resources that coordinated its internal system of decentralised 
production, like collective action and collaboration, to adapt to external challenges and to 
participate in processes of internationalisation. The same local collaborative mechanisms that 
characterised the success of districts in the industrialising world, the argument ran, shaped the 
interaction between the district and the outside world.  
 
The capacity to adapt to global competition or macro-economic challenges indeed was a 
major source for dynamism in the industrial district. The industrial district did not simply 
follow the tides of expansion of the international fur business. On the contrary, it managed to 
adapt at several crucial moments of intensified competition and contraction in international 
trade. Firstly, the flexibility of the local financial market in Leipzig and the networks between 
bankers and businessmen in the district allowed the firms to pursue an expansive policy at the 
turn of the century. At that time, businesses and banks in Leipzig adapted to world market 
prices that were virtually exploding both in the Siberian and in the North American market 
segments. After World War I, the nexus between local banks and the fur industry continued 
on largely the same lines. With a generous credit policy, local bankers allowed the Leipzig fur 
industry to pursue an expansive international strategy. The banks have therefore been 
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portrayed as economic actors that were closely related to the fur district. Secondly, the 
Leipzig fur industry adapted to a major modification in the international fur business, namely 
the establishment of state capitalism in the Soviet Union, most particularly in the case of the 
foreign trade monopoly. Firms in the district jointly created auction companies, a new sales 
mechanism that were especially designed to lubricate deals with the Soviets trade agencies.  
 
What can we learn from the historical trajectories of the industrial district that resulted from 
external challenges? Firstly, the importance of the ‘lead firms’ has been stressed. Literature on 
the industrial district has focused on the individual strategies of lead firms in their creation of 
links between the industrial district and the outside world. This dimension is certainly true for 
our case as well. Nevertheless, lead firms were also involved in, and initiated processes of, 
collaboration and collective action. Secondly, there is an important distinction to be made in 
the nature of collective action between that which adapts to changes and that which seeks to 
create alternatives to global problems and the modification of the international system. 
Certainly, external challenges led to increased collaboration and both categories share the aim 
to remedy the effects of macro-economic changes. However, collective action can be adaptive 
to external challenges in the sense that local institutions are re-modified. The examples given 
above belong to the latter category. The bank – business nexus adjusted to the financial 
requirements for foreign trade and the auction company replaced the Leipzig trade fairs, one 
of the most important regional institutions. The system of trading on the fairs had become 
increasingly redundant and therefore firms jointly created new market institutions capable of 
accommodating changes on the world market. 
 
Collective action can also be the stage for alternatives and the modification of the supply 
chain in order to alleviate external pressures. The creation of a new international order in the 
International Exhibition and Congress in Leipzig was probably the most ambitious form of 
collective action in the district. The exhibition was not a response to a specific event but 
rather was designed by Leipzig businessmen to create new mechanisms for international 
business coordination and to jointly promote the Leipzig business world to a national and 
international public. New production paradigms featured prominently as alternative projects, 
entailing the creation of new supply lines that lightened the dependency of the industrial 
district on the ‘capriciousness’ of the world market. However, this happened only in extreme 
circumstances. Processes of resource substitution were introduced during World War I, when 
the industrial district was separated from the world market. Immediately after the war, when 
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the revival of international trade was still in the distant future, businessmen set their hearts on 
the creation of fur farming in Germany. Such alternative production paradigms were hard to 
realise and lost support when firms in the district re-oriented themselves towards the more 
accessible world market. Moreover, strategies of modification and adaptation could even go 
hand in hand. Several firms participated in both adaptive and alternative projects. 
 
I would like to formulate some additional remarks with regard to the capacity of the industrial 
district to deal with external challenges. Firstly, the progressive expansion of collective action 
had ramifications for the spatial extent of collaborative networks. Evidence has been provided 
that firms in the district cast a much wider net in terms of collaborative networks. Processes of 
collaboration were not limited to proximate actors. This was certainly the case in the creation 
of new production paradigms. Firms in Leipzig created links with the imperial state for the 
introduction of fur farming in the colonies. In the 1920s, the firms created a research 
institution in Leipzig that was set up primarily to extract advantages from the creation of fur 
farming in Germany. Businessmen were able to assemble a strong network that not only 
profited from the opening of the veterinary faculty of the Leipzig University but also 
assembled some of the leading agricultural experts across Germany’s academic landscape. 
The epicentre of the network was undoubtedly regional, yet it also included the support of 
leading national scientists.  
 
Secondly, processes of adaptation had ramifications on the local organisation of business. 
Although solidarity was an important motive, local collaboration forged imbalances or 
asymmetries within the industrial district. In particular, the growing prominence of the 
financial sector in the industrial district generated such asymmetries. Banks have an important 
function in local business entities as the credit market sets the framework for local business 
growth and strategies. However, the clustering of local banking and fur businesses in Leipzig 
took on peculiar proportions. Due to the growing financial requirements on the international 
fur market, the local bank system gradually extended its role as financer of these international 
operations. The lenient lending market allowed the firms to expand their activities on the 
international stage before and after the war. The heavy losses incurred by the local banking 
sector in the wake of the economic meltdown in 1929 demonstrated how unhealthy local 
clustering of finance and business was. Instead of purifying the district with moderate credit 
rules and restricting dependency on foreign trade, the leniency of the credit market created a 
fur industry bubble. Once the international expansion halted, banks corrected lending 
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conditions abruptly, which then disrupted the size distribution of firms in the industrial 
district. Local bank policy was therefore neither moderate nor consistent, reinforcing upward 
but also exacerbating downward trends. Due of their involvement in the auction companies, 
several of the local banks stepped out of their traditional field of financial activities. A few 
banks became actively involved in fur trading, thereby further expanding bank activities that 
were dependent upon the international fur market. Furthermore, the growing importance of 
bankers in the process of wholesale auctioning meant a decline of entrepreneurial power in fur 
commerce.  
 
Finally, creative collective action is not a guarantee of effectiveness. Certainly, district firms 
were diligent in creating new projects, but since every single participant could profit from the 
result of collective actions, participation often failed to reach higher levels. The fact that firms 
relied on maximising effects born from new combinations and actions explains the reluctance 
to force investments up. This reluctance to assume additional risks has been described in 
various sections throughout the thesis. In the creation of karakul farming in South West 
Africa, costs were largely externalised and placed upon the colonial administration and 
agricultural science, although this did not specifically lead to a loss of effectiveness. This 
stood in sharp contrast to the project of fur farming inside Germany, where the industry 
missed the opportunity to extend funding into agricultural expertise or professional fur 
farming. The research network in Leipzig never received the means to achieve its goals of 
controlling the fur farming business, which increasingly revealed itself as the future of the 
modern fur business. Similarly, the disproportionately small investments made by firms in the 
IPA and the externalisation of costs upon the already heavily burdened city treasury painfully 
revealed reluctance to invest in the common good. As such, although new collective actions 
were easily constructed and existing ones reconstructed, promising collective actions often 
failed to develop much further. This “tragedy of the commons” dilemma and the 
externalisation of risks demonstrated the limits of the collective action of the district.  
 
An important conclusion seems to be the presence of a common goal as the precondition of 
collective action. Whereas individual business needs are translated into strategies by the 
business leader and management, the identification of external threats and its translation into a 
common goal is largely an invisible matter. It is based upon a sense of local belonging, of 
being part of a business group in which individual businesses are faced with similar problems. 
The translation of such a sense of belonging into collective action is to be ascribed to a broad 
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range of institutions, in particular the trade press and collective bodies like trade associations. 
A number of individuals such as local politicians, prominent businesses, and lead firms also 
exerted such a function. These actors created a mindset suited for initiating processes of local 
collaboration. One of the most meaningful mindsets that enabled collective action was the so-
called ‘comeback’ notion, which described the collective desire to re-claim the leading 
position of the Leipzig industry as an international fur trade and manufacturing centre after 
World War I. The ‘readmission strategy,’ or rather strategies, that stemmed from the 
comeback notion reveals that the industrial district existed in the mindset of contemporaries. 
The ‘readmission strategy’ gained momentum in Leipzig from the end of the war as a concept 
that was collectively discussed by city officials, businessmen, and other economic actors. The 
‘restoration discourse,’ as vague and incoherent as it often sounded, structured collective 
action and solidarity mechanisms. The goal of readmission allowed for businessmen to 
conceptualise the local as a business strategy within the context of their international 
activities. This intangible point of departure very much illustrates that the joint ventures, trade 
consortia, auction companies, and exhibitions are social constructions.  
 
Furthermore, the pursuit of world market readmission as a common goal highlights the 
problem of periodisation of economic globalisation from an actor-oriented perspective. Much 
of the academic debate nowadays centres on the question of whether World War I formed a 
rupture in terms of world economic integration. Even if there were major differences in 
economic organisation before and after World War I, I would like to open the debate here on 
whether pre-war idealisations, or “pressures of continuity,” in the post-war period played a 
much larger role in international business strategies than hitherto assumed. Collective action 
in the district was strongly inspired by the aim to restore old pre-war connections, especially 
in regards to the Russian trade. What did such visions mean for other economic actors in 
between the wars? Did this orient business behaviour throughout Europe or were ‘pre-war 
idealisations’ something specifically German? The predisposition of economic actors towards 
restoring ‘the old’ may be an aspect in the robustness of global networks, collective action, 
and post-war business patterns that is perhaps too easily overlooked.  
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11.3 The construction of the world market: the local and the global.  
 
A final question that needs to be addressed here concerns the parts and the whole. In what 
ways was the small cosmos of entrepreneurs in the industrial district constitutive of the 
structures of world trade? The way in which the macro and micro-level interact remains a 
thorny issue. To begin with, this thesis adheres to the view that markets are, just like industrial 
districts, social constructions. Generally, the transnational dimension of local business 
practices and collective action on the macro level has been stressed in this thesis. Such a 
transnational view has been put forward by using the concept of the commodity chain. Due to 
processes of entanglement, the organisation and practices embedded in local structures 
interacted with the way in which market transactions were organised and strongly influenced 
the spatial and economic organisation of the international fur trade.  
 
Firstly, on the level of individual businesses, lead firms in the district with their highly mobile 
personnel were usually lead firms in the governance of the commodity chain as well, 
especially prior to World War I. To a large extent, the fur merchants in Leipzig set the 
parameters of trade in the Siberian commodity chain. Individuals, merchants, and 
businessmen lent trust and shaped market transactions. These merchants had adjusted 
themselves to Russian credit preferences, possessed great knowledge of the market, and had 
contacts inside Russia: they were therefore in a position to dominate the internal market. 
Moreover, the organisation of the international fur trade by individuals was robust and created 
long lasting dependencies and ties. The German-Soviet fur trade was initially based on 
personal contacts between German traders and former tsarist traders. In addition, the Leipzig 
fur industry was able to coordinate with the early phase of Soviet state capitalism by adjusting 
its underlying institutions. The importance of fur trading in the economic recovery of the 
Soviet Union was made possible by the connections, persons, firms, and institutions that had 
shaped its foreign fur trade. Especially in the second half of the 1920s, the ties between the 
strategically important Soviet fur trade and the local industry in Leipzig were inextricably 
close.  
 
Not only did the actions of individuals determine the trade flows but collective action in the 
district also shaped the geography of the global commodity chain. This was especially the 
case for fur farming by Leipzig firms. Certainly, the fur industry became less global because 
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of resource substitution through fur farming. Nevertheless, although fur farming was meant to 
replace global supply chains, it incorporated new geographies and social contexts into the 
world market of furs. Fur farming as initiated by the Leipzig fur industry brought the arid 
pastures of South West Africa, colonised by German farmers and Boers, within the structures 
of world trade. Furthermore, fur farming was responsible for the regionalisation of the fur 
trade and incorporated farming in old producing areas like North America and ‘new’ ones like 
Scandinavia. The construction of new market institutions in Leipzig as joint ventures, such as 
the auction companies, cemented these spatial developments.  
 
In itself, the concentration of the fur business in the industrial district also contributed to the 
spatial distribution of the international fur business. The fur trade not only occupied immense 
frontier spaces but was also at the same time densely concentrated in a limited number of 
markets in city regions like Leipzig, London, and New York. Subarctic resource frontiers 
supplied several international centres where trading was connected to manufacturing and from 
whence distribution links spread across a hinterland. The emergence, regeneration, and 
decline of trade within city markets determined the structure of the international fur trade and 
manufacturing. The transformation of cities or city regions into fur capitals was determined to 
a large extent by their market institutions. Salient were the organisation and modification of 
large-scale sales event, like fairs and auctions. These institutions enabled the temporary 
concentration of the international trading community, or at least a substantial part of it, and 
organised the supply of raw material to manufacturers. Tremendous benefits were derived 
from the fact that a large portion of the international community was brought together in these 
instances. It made the international fur trade predictable, had an influence on price-setting 
mechanisms, and generated learning effects in local firms. Thus, Leipzig’s market institutions, 
which were formed by collective action, gave shape to the geography of world trade. It helped 
maintain the strucutres of the international fur business, divided into frontiers, hinterlands, 
and dominant city markets.  
 
An important conclusion follows with regard to regional particularism and translocal 
connectivity from the significance of local market institutions. Corporate umbrella institutions 
in Saxony like the trade fairs and exhibitions have usually been framed as elements that 
pertained to Saxony’s economic uniqueness within Germany. The fairs and particularly the 
exhibitions were seen as elements pertaining to economic particularism, employed to 
exemplify regional economic power within the national context. However, exhibitions and 
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fairs not only rendered regional production and consumption visible within the national 
context, but also were of seminal importance in constructing international connections. 
Regional economic institutions constructed the boundaries of the region within the national 
context, established links to the wider world, and were in part created by the external 
developments. Regional umbrella institutions often intertwined regional, national, and 
international interests. 
 
Regarding the above remark on regional particularism, the narrative of this thesis has 
generally called for a better historical understanding of the federalisation of economic policy 
as a historical process (or the historical process of the discovery of regional economics as a 
policy tool). The discovery of regional and district economies generated remarkable patterns 
of continuity and has inspired subsequent generations of policy makers and entrepreneurs in 
processes of industrial reconstruction. Firstly, district economies were an important aspect of 
post-war economic thought, formed the object of a deliberate economic reconstruction policy, 
and determined migration flows of economic elites from East to West Germany. As such, 
Frankfurt-am-Main welcomed the arrival of many Leipzig district activities, like book 
printing and the fur industry. The creation of Frankfurt as a new fur centre went side by side 
with the re-creation of its old institutions. Such transplanted operations certainly deserve 
further attention. Secondly, the belief in systems like clusters and districts or, more generally, 
in the benefits of proximity has recently strongly re-surfaced in Leipzig, especially after 
German reunification. A new media cluster emerged in the wake of the establishment of the 
Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk in 1992. The fact that the Saxon state provides a framework for 
generating cluster effects shows that preceding historical trajectories continue to guide 
patterns of urban economic planning and contemporary processes of federalisation.  
 
Since the political economy of the international fur trade was initially a matter of competition 
between fur centres, regional politics and local action had a strong influence upon the course 
of the world market. Global competition existed in the sense that local actors in fur markets 
actively remodelled institutions. This political economy was pronounced during the interwar 
period when firms and local administrations more consciously constructed market institutions 
that reinforced the position of their centres. At this time, awareness about the malleability of 
market institutions was ‘discovered’ by local stakeholders throughout the world and also in 
Leipzig. The intervention of regional and local administration also became more frequent. 
The city administration in particular favoured the creation of new economic institutions as 
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part of a wider regional economic policy. However, this locally managed political economy in 
furs was increasingly overrun by state capitalism and modifications to the international 
political economy, especially in the period between the wars. When Stalin’s new economic 
order replaced the NEP and state-led protectionism gained the upper hand, the regional and 
local institutions through which the Leipzig firms governed the chain proved ineffective. 
National and international political considerations came to rule over transnational business 
practices and exogenous effects could no longer be remedied effectively by local and regional 
action. 
 
The intrusion of state capitalism that heralded the marginalisation of regional economic policy 
and the disruptive impact of economic protectionism on the industrial district may be valid 
lessons as well. In particular, it seems to throw new light on the nature of contemporary 
exogenous challenges on the industrial district. For instance, contemporary political strategies 
in the EU, as can be seen in texts like the Regions2020 or the Small Business Act of 2008, 
seem to focus on protecting regional business structures from global challenges and 
stimulating international expansion of small and medium-sized business. However, is this 
focus correct? To a large extent, historical actors and businesses in industrial districts were 
able to construct their own mechanisms for internationalisation and capacities to resist 
exogenous pressures. However, the industrial district seemed unable to cope with the rise of 
state capitalism, especially after 1930. Whereas the first phase of state capitalism in the 
USSR, in the garb of the NEP, already brought radical modifications to the industrial district, 
the political economic developments of the 1930s could not be remedied by local and regional 
collective action. By no means do I want to draw a literal parallel between the 1930s and the 
current situation. Nevertheless, many have argued that state capitalism in the contemporary 
world economy is on the rise again, especially after the economic crisis of 2008 and seems to 
be given analytical priority over earlier conceptions like the flattening world and economic 
globalisation.
1268
 At this very moment, for instance, Europe and Russia are on the verge of an 
escalating trade war, which submerges business interests to political considerations. The main 
challenge to contemporary industrial districts or regional small businesses in Europe seems to 
come from the renaissance of state capitalism and the discordance in scale when regional 
economies deal with international political considerations. The real task for supranational 
administrations like the European Union is perhaps not so much located in what it defines as 
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‘global competition’ but in protecting regional small business from calculated political 
considerations produced by state capitalism.  
 
Having discussed the interaction between the industrial district and the outside world, I would 
like to write a few final words on processes of incorporation and the spatial expansions and 
contractions of the world economy. Incorporation processes are (correctly) often seen through 
the lens of frontier perspectives and have dealt with the question of how remote entities or 
non-capitalist structures were integrated into the world economy. However, not only frontier 
regions are incorporated into global capitalism. It seems important to note that the core was 
far from a monolithic entity and that ‘core structures’ like industrial districts or industrial 
regions in the world economy underwent processes of incorporation and disconnection too. 
The core of the world economy is marked by heterogeneity, harbouring very dynamic entities 
that follow a life cycle connected to the expansion and contraction of global commerce. 
Regions and business communities can be disconnected even though spatially they are located 
at the ‘heart of global capitalism,’ and thus become frontiers of capitalism once again. 
Furthermore, entities in the core of the world economy share with their frontier counterparts 
aspects of communal agency within processes of incorporation. Small communities in both 
contexts were constituent of world market integration as well and were able to ‘negotiate’ 
their integration in the world market to a certain extent. In addition, incorporation processes 
are not always to be seen within the dichotomy of frontiers or communities against the 
system. A commodity chain perspective makes clear that incorporation was not always a 
process that connected ‘a system’ and a community but is rather the connection of multiple 
geographically disparate communities and social systems in frontiers as well as ‘core’ regions 
of the world economy. Core entities were relying on new connections too and processes of 
industrial decline were caused in part by disconnection. Fortunately, the complicated fabric of 
global capitalism can be unearthed by scrutinizing the creativity of local economic actors .  
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